Borhi deemphasizes western actions in Stalin's decision to give the Hungarian and Czechoslovak communists the go ahead to take power in 1947 and 1948, but Churchill's warning about an "Iron Curtain" descending on eastern Europe, Harry Truman's adoption of a containment policy, and the Marshall Plan (including aid to the western zones of Germany) accelerated the Kremlin's timetable.

Borhi is on solid ground in his critique of US policy in the mid-1950s. Although in 1952 Dwight Eisenhower had run on a commitment to liberate the Soviet satellites, Borhi reveals that the Kremlin knew that the United States would take no military action to support the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcasts promising support—which was not to come—were not coordinated with the State or Defense Departments.

The lack of coordination and ineffectiveness of US policy in 1956 continued for the next several decades. Washington had a few weak cards to play: most-favored-nation status and increased trade, the return of the Crown of St. Stephen, and loans. Borhi argues persuasively that trade and cultural exchanges were more effective in undermining communist rule than diplomatic isolation and an economic embargo, which only hurt the Hungarian people.

In the 1970s, Romania, Poland, and Hungary became Washington's favored Warsaw Pact countries, Romania for its deviation from the Kremlin's foreign policy line, Poland and Hungary for their economic reforms and relative cultural openness. In the 1980s, the brutality of the Nicolae Ceausescu regime and the suppression of Polish Solidarity were met with sanctions from Washington, while Hungarian leader János Kádár was rewarded with MFN status and the return of the Crown of St. Stephen. Hungary allowed the opening of an American library in Budapest, and Radio Free Europe eschewed propaganda in favor of playing popular rock and roll and other western programming that kept Hungarians longing for the amenities on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

Borhi contends that US engagement policy had an important impact on exposing the sclerosis of the Soviet bloc dictatorships. Relations between Washington and Budapest normalized, something Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and even Ronald Reagan promoted. However, Borhi is critical of realist US policymakers who accepted a Europe of two blocs as the lesser of two evils, for fear of nationalist conflicts.

What brought down communist rule in 1989? Borhi acknowledges that Mikhail Gorbachev's renunciation to use force to prop up the communist regimes was decisive, although Gorbachev wanted to maintain the Soviet sphere of influence. Borhi emphasizes the efforts of the Hungarians themselves to create a multi-party system. George H.W. Bush has been largely praised for his cautious policies toward the revolutions of 1989, not wanting to provoke the Soviets toward armed intervention. Borhi is less enthusiastic about Bush's lack of a bold policy to back the Hungarian reformers.

While one can quibble about some of Borhi's interpretations, and the lack of Soviet documents that would provide evidence of the Kremlin's policies, this invaluable reference work belongs on the library shelf of any Cold War scholar.

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In the Name of the Great Work. Ed. Doubravka Olšaková. New York: Berghahn Books, 2016. x, 311 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. Tables. $120.00, hard bound.
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The harsh policies that the Bolsheviks imposed on the Soviet Union for *raison d'état* were, as a rule, much less defensible when applied to the other countries of eastern

Europe. Agricultural collectivization, industrial centralism, and political terror, however costly or ultimately self-defeating for the Soviets themselves, could be justified as the results of a revolutionary process in which ordinary Russians might have participated, and which worked toward internal strength. However, those same policies, when forced on nations under Soviet control only as a result of postwar occupation, amounted to folly at best and rank oppression at worst. This insight is explored in *In the Name of the Great Work*, a collected volume that examines the impact of the Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The authors of the essays collectively contend that the plan had largely disastrous consequences, characterizing it as a product of Soviet totalitarian hegemony and dictatorial irrationality, but also distorting many of its key features.

The introductory essay by Paul Josephson aims to provide a historical background for the Great Stalin Plan, although his treatment elides the Great Stalin Plan with Stalin's program of rapid industrialization and therefore omits much of the Plan's distinct character. Absent in the text is a discussion of the long history of Russian afforestation on the dry southern steppes, the plan's origins in Soviet forest protection agencies, the successful effort by the plan's designers to wrest control away from Trofim Lysenko, or the plan's modest accomplishments. Instead, Josephson redefines the Stalin Plan as "a series of government resolutions for dam, reservoir, canal, forestry, roadway, and other construction projects, some of which dated to the 1930s," although the plan was not announced until 1948 (2). As a result, many essential aspects of the Great Stalin Plan are ignored, including its cultural, nationalist, ecological, and political dimensions—all of which played a role when the plan was exported to eastern Europe.

The next essay in the volume, by Doubravka Olšaková and Arnošt Štanzel, explores the Great Stalin Plan in Czechoslovakia, arguing that the plan as implemented there was more moderate and conservationist than its Soviet counterpart, although it should be said that this contention is based on a simplified understanding of the original proposal. The authors characterize the Great Stalin Plan as "monstrous," and in contrast point to Czechoslovak rhetoric that emphasized "useful subjugation" rather than Soviet transformation, reflecting intentions that the authors contend were less violent or rough. They trace this ameliorating tendency to the continuity of progressive Czechoslovak ideas about nature conservation from the interwar period. However, this conclusion ignores an almost identical conflict between conservationists and scientific radicals in the Soviet Union at the same time. With national approaches to nature as their primary explanatory mechanism, the authors allow intriguing questions to go unanswered: why did the Czechoslovak government begin their efforts in September 1948, before the Soviets announced the plan, and why did they accelerate the pace of their efforts after Stalin's death in 1953 rather than discontinue them, as the Soviets did? The dynamic at work was likely more complicated than mere resistance to external domination.

The second essay and third essays, about Hungary and Poland respectively, draw more ambiguous conclusions about the fate of the Great Stalin Plan in eastern Europe. Zsuzsanna Borvendég and Mária Palasik, writing about Hungary, cast their net beyond the Great Stalin Plan to discuss crop acclimatization and hydroelectric dam construction, but as for the elements of the Great Stalin itself, they conclude that "despite its mostly irrational ideas, nature transformation did have some positive results for Hungary," because "afforestation and the establishment of protection forests in the 1950s [proved] to be valuable endeavors" (187, 197). Beata Wysokińska writes that the plan "actually had little influence on farming and forestry practices," but because Poland had been significantly deforested by the war as well as by pre-war

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Polish forestry practices, the planting of 5.4 million trees coincided with a Polish interest in reforestation (226).

In general, two common problems recur throughout the volume: the authors use the term "Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature" to refer to Stalinist economic development as a whole, and they work from the assumption that the Great Stalin Plan was the work of Trofim Lysenko. In truth, the Great Stalin Plan was the result of a scientific struggle inside the Soviet government, initiated by those who worried about the dangers of Stalin's industrial policies, and who resented Lysenko's interference in their work. The plan was accompanied by a considerable amount of bombastic propaganda, but at its core was an intention to protect and improve Russian hydrology. The authors effectively point out that the plan, designed with specifically Russian conditions in mind, failed to transform nature in eastern Europe when exported there, but their true item of concern is Soviet economic and scientific imperialism. The Great Stalin Plan, with its emphasis on afforestation, was among the least harmful aspects of Soviet domination.

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Phantomgrenzen und Regionale Autonomie im Postsozialistischen Sudosteuropa: Die Vojvodina und das Banat im Vergleich. By Đorđe Tomić. Phantomgrenzen im ostlichen Europa. Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016. 357 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Tables. €32.90, paper.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2017.296

Despite its subtitle, which promises to offer a comparison between Vojvodina and the Banat, Đorđe Tomić's monograph on "phantom borders" and regional autonomy in southeastern Europe is primarily a study of the recent history of Vojvodina and its autonomist movement. According to the author himself, the comparison between the two regions is "asymmetrical," and the example of the Banat serves as a foil for the story of Vojvodina (53).

This, however, in no way diminishes the quality and import of this thorough work. Building on the German research project, "Phantom Borders in East Central Europe," which has already produced several interdisciplinary theorizations of the concept of "phantom borders," and positioning himself within the spatial turn in the social sciences, Tomić focuses on the political history of Vojvodina since the "yogurt revolution." An outpouring of popular discontent in the provincial capital of Novi Sad in the fall of 1988, instrumentalized by the then-leader of the Serbian communists, Slobodan Milošević, was the watershed event (which Tomić identifies as the first act of the Yugoslav break-up) that resulted in ousting the Vojvodinian leadership and initiating the process of stripping the province of its autonomy. Understanding "phantom borders" as "earlier, mostly political borders or territorial divisions that, even after politically abolished, continue to structure space" (51), Tomić asks "how, by whom, and to what purposes were the respective conceptions of space constructed in Vojvodina and the Banat" (45).

The central part of the book is a lengthy, 160-page chapter on Vojvodina that follows the theoretical introduction of the concept of "phantom borders," the review of current literature, and Tomić's assessment of the field of study. The long chapter first traces the history of the idea of autonomy in Vojvodina and suggests that, contrary to the claims of its political advocates from the Milošević era who prefer to base it in the province's Habsburg legacy or borderland status, it emerged politically during