

Partisan Affiliation and the Evaluation of Non-Prototypical Candidates

Alexander W. Severson*

Abstract

Ideologically impure candidates—RINOs and DINOs—risk losing the endorsement of their fellow copartisans. However, which copartisans? In this article, I assess how party affiliation and the strength of partisan affiliation condition the evaluation of ideologically impure, non-prototypical candidates. Using a nationally representative survey experiment, I present evidence that while partisans negatively evaluate non-prototypical copartisans, there is not a consistent relationship between strength of identification and the degree of punitiveness. Moreover, candidate non-prototypicality causes convergence in candidate support between Republicans and Democrats. My results provide evidence that nominal partisan affiliation is by itself insufficient to save an ideologically non-prototypical candidate from the rebuke of fellow copartisans and thus that the “in-name-only” charge holds some weight.

Keywords: Partisanship, prototypicality, candidate evaluation, survey experiment

How does partisan affiliation influence evaluations of “in-name-only” candidates? Political scientists have long engaged with the question of how partisan affiliation structures candidate evaluations (Campbell et al., 1960; Greene, 1999; Green et al., 2002). The consensus from this literature is that if a voter is a member of the same political party as a candidate, she is more likely to vote for that candidate. In this view, partisan identity straightforwardly predicts candidate evaluation. However, what happens when a candidate’s policy positions conflict with their partisan identification?

Support for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation (Award no. 1430505). The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available at the *Journal of Experimental Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at doi:[10.7910/DVN/HO2KIC](https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HO2KIC). I thank Robert Jackson, Eric Coleman, William Berry, Heather Maranges, three anonymous reviewers, and the editors of the *Journal of Experimental Political Science* for helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper.

*Department of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA, e-mail: aws12@my.fsu.edu, awseverson@gmail.com, Twitter: [@awseverson](https://twitter.com/awseverson)

The relationship between shared partisanship and candidate evaluations may be less straightforward than previously thought in the case of “in-name-only” candidates. Social psychological research on prototypicality perceptions (e.g., how representative an individual is of group norms and values) suggests that group members punish less representative, non-prototypical members (Kleef et al., 2007; Steinel et al., 2010). Relatedly, political science research suggests that under some conditions, when candidates defy party platform, they are punished (Arceneaux, 2008).

In this article, I integrate research on the psychology of group prototypes (Hais et al., 1997; Hogg, 2001) with research on party identification (Fiorina, 1976; Huddy et al., 2015; Rahn, 1993) to explain how citizens evaluate ideologically “impure” candidates. Because candidates frequently level the RINO and DINO charge at ideologically more moderate opponents particularly in primary season,¹ it is important to evaluate whether and to what extent the “otherness” criticism implicit in the “RINO–DINO” charge hurts candidates electorally.

I anticipate that individuals will be less likely to vote for and feel warm toward a prototype-defying copartisan candidate. However, it is unclear how identity strength conditions severity of punishment. To the extent that party membership reflects instrumental concerns over policy outcomes (Fiorina, 1976), it might be that strong partisans evaluate prototype-violating copartisans negatively. Alternatively, it might be that the psychological pull of group attachment overrides concerns over ideological purity (Huddy et al., 2015).

To test these competing predictions, I examined data from an experimental module on the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Specifically, I presented respondents with a series of issue stances of a hypothetical candidate. I manipulated the candidate’s party affiliation and prototypicality, reversing the candidate’s position on four of seven policy issues to mirror those of the outparty. I subsequently assessed respondents’ prototype perceptions, candidate affect, and vote intentions. I present evidence that (a) partisans negatively evaluate non-prototypical copartisans, (b) strength of partisan affiliation is not consistently related to degree of punishment, and (c) non-prototypicality creates convergence in candidate support among Republicans and Democrats.

In what follows, I first survey the psychological literature on prototypicality and the political science scholarship on party identification. I proceed to discuss survey design, methodology, and my empirical results. I conclude by considering the implications of my findings for future research.

¹RINO and DINO are commonly used acronyms which denote “Republicans-In-Name-Only” and “Democrats-In-Name-Only,” respectively.

PARTY PROTOTYPES AND GROUP IDENTIFICATION

Former Senator Jim Webb (D – Virginia), a candidate in the 2016 Democratic Party presidential primary, withdrew from the race in October 2015. In the press conference in which he announced his exit, Senator Webb noted, “I fully accept that my views on many issues are not compatible with the power structure and base of the Democratic Party. For this reason I am withdrawing from any consideration of being the Democratic Party’s nominee for the presidency” (Gass and Strauss, 2015). In national public opinion polls, Webb failed to attract appreciable support among registered Democrats and likely-Democratic voters (Kiley, 2015). Conversely, Donald Trump (R) was a candidate for the 2016 Republican Party presidential primary who secured the party’s nomination and eventually the presidency, despite occasionally deviating from conservative orthodoxy. Noting his own departure from mainstream conservative ideology, then-candidate Trump remarked in an interview, “This is the Republican Party, it’s not called the Conservative Party” (Shapiro, 2016).

These distinct narratives of electoral failure and success raise questions about the electoral cost of ideological purity and the weight voters give ideological considerations in an increasingly ideologically sorted political landscape. How are perceptions of ideological purity formed, who cares about ideological purity, and does ideological impurity influence candidate support?

Social-categorization theory posits that when an individual becomes a member of a group, she develops prototype perceptions of the ingroup (Smith and Zarate, 1990; Schmitt and Branscombe, 2001). As Hogg states, “The process of social categorization perceptually segments the social world into ingroups and outgroups that are cognitively represented as prototypes. These prototypes are context specific, multidimensional fuzzy sets of attributes that define and prescribe attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that characterize one group and distinguish it from other groups” (187: 2001). A group member who is a pure prototype perfectly embodies the values and norms central to the social construction of the group (Smith and Zarate, 1990).

When individuals join groups, they become more likely to detect prototype violations (Hogg and Terry, 2000). Ingroup prototype violators are often punished, whereas ingroup prototype exemplars are often rewarded with leadership positions, influence, and obedience (Hogg, 2001; Hogg and Reid, 2006). Group members thus have strong incentives to conform to group prototypes.

While multiple factors contribute to partisans’ perceptions of prototypicality such as performance evaluations and group alliances (Conover and Feldman, 1989; Rahn, 1993), perhaps the most important factor is ideology. As Republicans and Democrats have become increasingly ideologically sorted (Levendusky, 2009), ideological consistency has emerged as an important litmus test partisans use to assess the “Republican-ness” and “Democratic-ness” of inparty candidates. A

2017 Morning Consult/Politico poll found that 51% of Trump voters indicated they wanted their party's next presidential candidate to be more conservative, and that 48% of Clinton voters indicated they wanted their party's next presidential candidate to be more liberal (Yokley, 2017).

Partisans only conditionally value ideological purity, however. Rahn (1993), for instance, demonstrated that when presented with party cues alongside policy information about a candidate, individuals ignored the policy information (even when the information violated party stereotypes), preferring to use party heuristics to guide their evaluations (though see also Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014). More recently, Arceneaux (2008) demonstrated that politically aware citizens punish prototype-violators, suggesting that for the vast majority of the politically unaware electorate (Carpini and Keeter, 1996), ideological impurity is of little evaluative consequence. Additionally, a candidate's ideological inconsistency may not matter when the inconsistency exists over issues of low salience (Arceneaux, 2008; Ciuk and Yost, 2016).

However, the importance of ideology to partisans also depends on the meaning of partisanship. The instrumental model of partisanship suggests that party affiliation and ideology are mutually-reinforcing. Individuals join political parties because they believe the party values their policy preferences (Fiorina, 1976). In this view, non-prototypicality among copartisans should be punished more severely as inparty identification increases. Conversely, the expressive model of partisanship holds that party membership is motivated less by reasoned ideological considerations and more by motivational and affective needs for group affiliation (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Green et al., 2002; Huddy et al., 2015; Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017). In this view, affect toward party often precedes the construction of issue positions, and the simple act of belonging to a group generates enduring ingroup biases (Turner, 1978).

These competing models of partisanship generate competing predictions about the degree to which strong copartisans punish prototype violations. The instrumental model suggests that ideological impurity should be most severely punished by strong partisans given increasing alignment between partisan and ideological identities (Mason, 2015). Alternatively, the expressive model suggests that affective attachment to the party and the desire for the ingroup to win blunts the influence of ideological considerations on candidate evaluation, and thus that non-prototypicality is not perceived as particularly damaging among stronger copartisans (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). In this article, I aim to contribute to this debate by analyzing whether strength of inparty identification predicts increased punishment of non-prototypical copartisans.

METHODS

To assess how party affiliation strength conditions support for non-prototypical candidates, I conducted an online survey experiment as part of the 2014 Cooper-

ative Congressional Election Study (CCES) administered by YouGov/Polimetrix. In addition to Common Content questions administered to 30,000 respondents, 1,000 respondents participated in Florida State University's team module. The CCES uses YouGov/Polimetrix's matched random sample methodology to select representative samples from non-randomly selected respondent pools (Ansolabehere, 2009).

To examine whether party affiliation structures evaluations of non-prototypical candidates, I manipulated the partisanship and policy positions of a hypothetical candidate. I randomly assigned respondents to one of four conditions: Republican Prototypical Candidate (*Condition 1*), Republican Non-Prototypical Candidate (*Condition 2*), Democratic Prototypical Candidate (*Condition 3*), and Democratic Non-Prototypical Candidate (*Condition 4*). Randomization into conditions worked as intended.² In the two non-prototypical candidate conditions, I reversed the candidate's issue stances on four out of seven issues. The four issues selected for reversal were support for government run healthcare, support for abortion rights, support for school vouchers, and support for gay marriage (for full text of the manipulation, see Appendix G). Reversing the candidate's position on four of the seven issues produced a candidate who nominally was a Republican or Democrat yet who overall expressed issue positions more consistent with the outparty's platform. I selected these four issues because they were relatively salient issues on the public agenda in 2014. Additionally, I did not reverse all seven candidate issue positions, because I wanted the candidate to mirror the more realistic degree of ideological divergence observed in real-world examples of RINOs and DINOs.

To measure prototype perceptions, I asked respondents, "How similar do you think [Republican/Democrat] Louis Harrison's views are to those of most [Republicans/Democrats]?" Answers to this question were coded on a scale of 1–7 (1 = very dissimilar; 7 = very similar). Respondents, on average, were able to detect prototype violations. In the prototypical-candidate conditions, respondents reported significantly higher prototype perceptions ($M_{C1} = 5.19$ and $M_{C3} = 5.16$) than respondents in the non-prototypical-candidate conditions ($M_{C2} = 3.50$ and $M_{C4} = 3.71$) ($t = 12.29, p < 0.01$; $t = 9.98, p < 0.01$). To measure vote propensity, I asked respondents, "How likely are you to vote for [Republican/Democrat] Louis Harrison?" (1 = "Very Unlikely"; 7 = "Very Likely"). To measure affective evaluations, I used a feeling thermometer scale (0 = cold feelings/negative affect; 100 = warm feelings/positive affect).

FINDINGS

First, it is important to assess whether perceptions of prototypicality vary by identity strength and political knowledge. Theoretically, strong copartisans and the

²I assessed covariate balance by regressing a treatment indicator on a set of covariates in a multinomial logit model. No covariates achieved statistical significance at conventional levels ($\alpha = 0.05$). Results of the covariate balance check are available in Appendix F.

politically knowledgeable should be well-equipped to detect prototype violations because they have greater familiarity with ingroup norms and greater knowledge of the policy positions of the major parties. However, the extremity of the policy reversal and the salience of the issues reversed in the treatment may reduce the likelihood that identity strength or political knowledge predicts violation detection. To assess whether identity strength predicts the detection of prototype-violations, I regress prototype perceptions on party identification, condition, and the interaction of party identification and condition.³ Marginal effect plots for the Republican and Democrat candidate conditions are presented in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.⁴

Similarly, to assess whether political knowledge predicts the ability to detect prototype violations, I regress prototype perceptions on the 4-item political knowledge scale, condition, and the interaction of political knowledge and condition. Marginal effect plots for the Republican and Democrat candidate conditions are presented below in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.

If respondents detect prototype violations, then the marginal effect of non-prototypicality should be negative. Figures 1 and 2 show this is generally the case—partisans of both parties are able to detect prototype violations. Weak identifiers from both parties, however, do not perceive significant differences in prototypicality in the Republican candidate conditions. From Figure 3, I find evidence that high-knowledge respondents ($M_{C2} = 2.53$, *s.e.* = 0.37) were better able to detect prototype violations than low-knowledge respondents ($M_{C2} = 4.10$, *s.e.* = 0.56) ($F = 1.15$, $p < 0.02$). Interestingly, in the Democratic candidate conditions, a non-monotonicity exists in the relationship between political knowledge and prototype perceptions. High-knowledge respondents in Condition 3 perceived the prototypical Democratic candidate to be decidedly non-representative ($M_{C3} = 3.87$, *s.e.* = 0.46).⁵ High-knowledge respondents were able to correctly detect the non-representativeness of the candidate in Condition 4, however ($M_{C4} = 3.87$, *s.e.* = 0.32).

In order to estimate the effect of prototypicality on evaluation across party identification, Figures 5 and 6 plot the average treatment effect (ATE) of non-prototypicality on the likelihood of voting for the Republican and Democratic candidates respectively.

Figure 5 reveals that Strong Republicans (ATE = -4.10 , *s.e.* = 0.45) punish prototype-violating Republican candidates significantly more than Weak Republicans (ATE = -1.55 , *s.e.* = 0.66), but not significantly more than Leaning Republicans (ATE = -1.69 , *s.e.* = 0.84). Moreover, Independents and most

³For this and all subsequent regression results reported in the paper, I include appropriate survey weights.

⁴Mean prototype perceptions across levels of partisanship and political knowledge are available in Appendices D and E, respectively.

⁵Beyond statistical artifact, it is theoretically unclear why this particular result would obtain.




Figure 1

Average Marginal Effect of Condition on Prototype Perception. Marginal effect of party identification and condition on prototypicality perception with 95% confidence intervals for Republican candidate. Marginal effects were estimated by regressing prototypicality perceptions on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID \times condition. Condition 1 = Prototypical Republican. Condition 2 = Non-Prototypical Republican. (Color online)

Democrats—with the exception of Weak Democrats—rewarded Republican non-prototypicality. Figure 6 reveals that Strong Democrats significantly punish prototype violations ($ATE = -1.98$, $s.e. = 0.52$). However, the magnitude of their punishment is statistically comparable to levels of punishment among Weak and Leaning Democrats.

The discussion so far has largely centered on the effect of prototype violation on punishment *between* conditions, and not on differences among partisans *within*




Figure 2

Average Marginal Effect of Condition on Prototype Perception. Marginal effect of party identification and condition on prototypicality perception with 95% confidence intervals for Democrat candidate. Marginal effects were estimated by regressing prototypicality perceptions on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID \times condition. Condition 3 = Prototypical Democrat. Condition 4 = Non-Prototypical Democrat. (Color online)

conditions. To visualize these differences, Figures 7 and 8 plot the adjusted predictions of party identification on vote propensity in the Republican and Democrat candidate conditions, respectively.

Figures 7 and 8 reveal that prototype violations produce convergence in vote propensity across all levels of partisan affiliation. There are not significant differences in vote propensities by party affiliation when evaluating either non-typical Republican or Democratic candidates.




Figure 3

Average Marginal Effect of Political Knowledge on Prototype Perception. Marginal effect of political knowledge and condition on prototypicality perception with 95% confidence intervals. The political knowledge index is a summative scale of four questions, coded 0 if the incorrect answer was given and coded 1 if the correct answer was given. Scale values range from 0 (low political knowledge) to 4 (high political knowledge). Marginal effects were estimated by regressing the political knowledge scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of political knowledge \times condition on prototypicality perceptions. Condition 1 = Prototypical Republican. Condition 2 = Non-Prototypical Republican. (Color online)

Turning now to affective evaluations, [Figure 9](#) reveals that non-prototypicality significantly depresses the positive affect Strong Republicans feel toward the Republican candidate ($ATE = -51.99$, $s.e. = 6.34$). Further, while Strong Republicans punish deviation significantly more than Weak Republicans ($ATE = -17.68$, $s.e. = 10.01$), they are statistically as punitive as Leaning Republicans ($ATE = -38.03$, $s.e. = 9.39$). This tendency—for leaners to be as




Figure 4

Average Marginal Effect of Political Knowledge on Prototype Perception. Marginal effect of political knowledge and condition on prototypicality perception with 95% confidence intervals. The political knowledge index is a summative scale of four questions, coded 0 if the incorrect answer was given and coded 1 if the correct answer was given. Scale values range from 0 (low political knowledge) to 4 (high political knowledge). Marginal effects were estimated by regressing the political knowledge scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of political knowledge \times condition on prototypicality perceptions. Condition 3 = Prototypical Democrat. Condition 4 = Non-Prototypical Democrat. (Color online)

punitive as strong partisans—is consistent with previous research that shows that leaners have become more ideological and are often simply closeted partisans (Petrocik, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2014). In contrast, the ATE plot in Figure 10 reveals that non-prototypicality has little effect on affect among Strong Democrats (ATE = -11.32 , s.e. = 8.81). Indeed, there are not significant differences in the ATE




Figure 5

ATE of Prototype and PID on Vote for Republican Candidate. Average treatment effect of party identification and prototypicality condition on vote propensity with 95% confidence intervals for the Republican candidate. ATEs were estimated by regressing the vote propensity score on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID \times condition. Condition 1 = Prototypical Republican. Condition 2 = Non-Prototypical Republican. (Color online)

of non-prototypicality on affect between Strong, Weak, and Leaning Democrats. One potential explanation is that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to perceive loyalty to the ingroup as an important moral trait (Graham et al., 2009). *Ceteris paribus*, Republicans may be more likely to punish copartisans for perceived ideological disloyalty.

Finally, Figures 11 and 12 reveal that prototype violations produce convergence in affective evaluations of the candidates. There are not significant differences in affect across party affiliation when evaluating non-prototypical candidates. It




Figure 6

ATE of Prototype and PID on Vote for Democrat Candidate. Average treatment effect of party identification and prototypicality condition on vote propensity with 95% confidence intervals for the Democratic candidate. ATEs were estimated by regressing the vote propensity score on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID \times condition. Condition 3 = Prototypical Democrat. Condition 4 = Non-Prototypical Democrat. (Color online)

thus appears that copartisans use information about a candidate's issue stances to construct their evaluations of RINO and DINO candidates and care relatively little about the party cue.

DISCUSSION

The results of this experiment shed new light on the identity dynamics that structure candidate evaluation. I present evidence that “in-name-only”




Figure 7

Adjusted Predictions of PID on Vote Propensity for Republican Candidate. Mean of vote propensity by party identification and condition with 95% confidence intervals for the Republican candidate. Adjusted predictions were estimated by regressing the feeling thermometer score on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID × condition. Condition 1 = Prototypical Republican. Condition 2 = Non-Prototypical Republican. (Color online)

candidates are rebuked by copartisans for ideological impurity. Importantly, while party affiliation predicts punishment of ideologically impure candidates, as inparty identification increases, punishment for impurity does not monotonically increase. Additionally, prototype violations generate convergence in candidate evaluations—Republicans and Democrats evaluate prototype-defying candidates similarly.




Figure 8

Adjusted Predictions of PID on Vote Propensity for Democrat Candidate. Mean of vote propensity by party identification and condition with 95% confidence intervals for the Democratic candidate. Adjusted predictions were estimated by regressing the feeling thermometer score on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID \times condition. Condition 3 = Prototypical Democrat. Condition 4 = Non-Prototypical Democrat. (Color online)

Some limitations of the present design suggest fruitful avenues for future research. In this study, I present subjects with an artificially simple decision-environment. It seems reasonable to suggest that candidate evaluations are reference-dependent, sensitive to the degree of prototypicality, the total number of candidates fielded, the level of prototypicality of these candidates, and electability considerations. Future research should explore how variations in candidate attributes and electorate composition shape candidate evaluation as instrumental and expressive considerations may become more salient in different contexts.




Figure 9

ATE of Prototype and PID on Affect Toward Republican Candidate. Average treatment effect of party identification and prototypicality condition on candidate affect with 95% confidence intervals for the Republican candidate. ATEs were estimated by regressing the feeling thermometer score on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID \times condition. Condition 1 = Prototypical Republican. Condition 2 = Non-Prototypical Republican. (Color online)

Moreover, while I argued that policy preferences are an important component of prototype perceptions, other factors also influence these perceptions. Future work should explore the relative importance of ideology over other factors in generating partisan prototypes.

With these caveats in mind, the results of this study provide preliminary evidence that nominal partisan affiliation is insufficient to save “in-name-only” candidates from the rebuke of fellow copartisans. Though increasingly rare in an increasingly




Figure 10

ATE of Prototype and PID on Affect Toward Democrat Candidate. Average treatment effect of party identification and prototypicality condition on candidate affect with 95% confidence intervals for the Democratic candidate. ATEs were estimated by regressing the feeling thermometer scores on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID \times condition. Condition 3 = Prototypical Democrat. Condition 4 = Non-Prototypical Democrat. (Color online)

sorted ideological universe, candidates who profess nominal allegiance to a party but who endorse issue positions inconsistent with its platform, risk punishment by their base.




Figure 11

Adjusted Predictions of PID on Affect for Republican Candidate. Mean of candidate affect by party identification and condition with 95% confidence intervals for the Republican candidate. ATEs were estimated by regressing the feeling thermometer score on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID × condition. Condition 1 = Prototypical Republican. Condition 2 = Non-Prototypical Republican. (Color online)




Figure 12

Adjusted Predictions of PID on Affect for Democrat Candidate. Mean of candidate affect by party identification and condition with 95% confidence intervals for the Democratic candidate. ATEs were estimated by regressing the feeling thermometer score on the PID scale, condition, and the pairwise interaction of PID \times condition. Condition 3 = Prototypical Democrat. Condition 4 = Non-Prototypical Democrat. (Color online)

APPENDIX A: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACROSS EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS

Table A1
Participant Frequencies by Condition

Experimental condition	<i>N</i>	Frequency	Cumulative frequency
Condition 1: Republican prototype	227	24.73%	24.73%
Condition 2: Republican non-prototype	236	25.71%	50.44%
Condition 3: Democrat prototype	221	24.07%	74.51%
Condition 4: Democrat non-prototype	234	25.49%	100.00%
Total	918	100.00	

APPENDIX B: COVARIATE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table B1
Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Condition	2.503	1.121	1	4
Prototype Perceptions	4.37	1.711	1	7
Vote Propensity	3.417	2.018	1	7
Thermometer Score	37.001	30.263	1	100
Political Knowledge Index	2.419	0.905	0	4
Party ID	3.737	2.16	1	7
Ideology	4.275	1.733	1	7
Political Interest	3.281	1.136	1	5
Education	3.688	1.47	1	6
Gender: Female	0.516	0.5	0	1
Race: White	0.76	0.427	0	1
Religion: Protestant	0.399	0.49	0	1

APPENDIX C: COVARIATE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY CONDITION

Table C1
Means and Standard Deviations

	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3	Condition 4
Political knowledge	2.419 (0.920)	2.428 (0.884)	2.376 (0.899)	2.453 (0.922)
Party identification	3.590 (2.146)	3.805 (2.217)	3.606 (2.114)	3.936 (2.153)
Ideology	4.097 (1.750)	4.360 (1.709)	4.104 (1.842)	4.521 (1.605)
Political interest	3.260 (1.124)	3.284 (1.141)	3.276 (1.148)	3.303 (1.137)
Education	3.586 (1.462)	3.754 (1.510)	3.615 (1.437)	3.791 (1.466)
Religion: protestant	0.383 (0.487)	0.407 (0.492)	0.362 (0.482)	0.440 (0.497)
Sex: female	0.546 (0.499)	0.521 (0.501)	0.516 (0.501)	0.483 (0.501)
Race: white	0.762 (0.427)	0.788 (0.409)	0.747 (0.436)	0.744 (0.438)
<i>N</i>	227	236	221	234

APPENDIX D: PROTOTYPICALITY PERCEPTIONS BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND CONDITION

Table D1
Prototypicality Perceptions by Party ID and Condition

	Condition 1 mean/s.e.	Condition 2 mean/s.e.	Condition 3 mean/s.e.	Condition 4 mean/s.e.
Strong Democrat	5.55* (0.26)	2.99 (0.29)	5.12 (0.30)	3.16 (0.19)
Weak Democrat	4.42 (0.34)	3.94 (0.35)	4.63 (0.27)	3.80 (0.34)
Leaning Democrat	5.84** (0.17)	3.47 (0.41)	5.17 (0.32)	3.52 (0.35)
Independent	4.61	3.46	5.00	3.35
Leaning Republican	4.68 (0.31)	2.96 (0.25)	6.13** (0.30)	4.77** (0.31)
Weak Republican	4.52 (0.19)	3.91 (0.41)	4.68 (0.26)	3.70 (0.32)
Strong Republican	5.57** (0.15)	3.21 (0.18)	5.76+ (0.32)	4.31+ (0.44)

+ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Independents are used as the baseline for statistical-significance testing.

I assessed prototypicality perceptions through the following question: "How similar do you think [Republican/Democrat] Louis Harrison's views are to those of most [Republicans/Democrats]?"

Answer choices were coded on a standard 7-point scale, where 1 = Very Dissimilar; 4 = Neither Similar nor Dissimilar; 7 = Very Similar.

Higher values on the scale accordingly indicate respondent perceptions that the candidate is more representative of the party.

Condition 1 = Prototypical Republican.

Condition 2 = Non-Prototypical Republican.

Condition 3 = Prototypical Democrat.

Condition 4 = Non-Prototypical Democrat.

APPENDIX E: PROTOTYPE PERCEPTIONS BY POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND CONDITION

Table E1
Prototypicality Perceptions by Political Knowledge and Condition

	Condition 1 mean/s.e.	Condition 2 mean/s.e.	Condition 3 mean/s.e.	Condition 4 mean/s.e.
0 Correct	3.65 (0.27)	4.10 (0.56)	4.66 (0.56)	4.94 (0.48)
1 Correct	4.97** (0.36)	3.89 (0.36)	5.00 (0.35)	4.13 (0.16)
2 Correct	5.01** (0.22)	3.24 (0.23)	5.32 (0.18)	3.67* (0.27)
3 Correct	5.28** (0.16)	3.46 (0.18)	5.53 (0.18)	3.48** (0.22)
4 Correct	5.29** (0.27)	2.53* (0.37)	3.87 (0.46)	3.87+ (0.32)

+ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Those who scored 0 on the political knowledge scale are used as the baseline for statistical-significance testing. I assessed prototypicality perceptions through the following question: "How similar do you think [Republican/Democrat] Louis Harrison's views are to those of most [Republicans/Democrats]?"

Answer choices were coded on a standard 7-point scale where 1 = Very Dissimilar; 4 = Neither Similar nor Dissimilar; 7 = Very Similar. Higher values on the scale accordingly indicate respondent perceptions that the candidate is more representative of the party.

Condition 1 = Prototypical Republican.

Condition 2 = Non-Prototypical Republican.

Condition 3 = Prototypical Democrat.

Condition 4 = Non-Prototypical Democrat.

APPENDIX F: ASSESSING COVARIATE BALANCE

I assess covariate balance through use of a multinomial logit model in which treatment assignment is the dependent variable. I use Condition 2 as the base condition. I present the results of this model in [Figure 5](#). No variables achieve statistical significance at conventional levels, suggesting that randomization worked as intended.

Table F1
Estimation Results : Covariate Balance

Variable	Coefficient	(std. error)
Condition 1		
Political knowledge	0.018	(0.106)
Party identification	0.013	(0.060)
Ideology	-0.107	(0.074)
Political interest	0.033	(0.090)
Education	-0.103	(0.067)
Gender: female	0.055	(0.198)
Race: white	-0.156	(0.234)
Religion: protestant	-0.051	(0.196)
Intercept	0.702	(0.521)
Condition 3		
Political knowledge	-0.033	(0.106)
Party identification	0.020	(0.060)
Ideology	-0.105	(0.075)
Political interest	0.036	(0.091)
Education	-0.091	(0.068)
Gender: female	-0.056	(0.199)
Race: white	-0.239	(0.233)
Religion: protestant	-0.136	(0.199)
Intercept	0.866	(0.520)
Condition 4		
Political knowledge	0.038	(0.107)
Party identification	0.011	(0.059)
Ideology	0.042	(0.074)
Political interest	-0.009	(0.089)
Education	0.020	(0.066)
Gender: female	-0.147	(0.196)
Race: white	-0.292	(0.230)
Religion: protestant	0.109	(0.192)
Intercept	-0.124	(0.522)

+ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

APPENDIX G: VIGNETTE TEXT

G1: Condition 1

Imagine that **Republican** Louis Harrison is running for office in your district. The following are his views on a variety of policy issues:

- Economy: “I believe that free markets and individual achievement are the primary factors behind economic prosperity.”
- Health Care: “I oppose a government-run single-payer health care system.”
- Abortion: “I am pro-life and oppose elective abortion on religious and moral grounds.”
- Gun Control: “I support gun ownership rights. I oppose laws regulating guns.”
- Affirmative Action: “I oppose affirmative action for women and minority groups.”
- Vouchers: “I support school choice through charter schools and school vouchers for private schools.”
- Same-Sex Marriage: “I oppose same-sex marriage.”

G2: Condition 2

Imagine that **Republican** Louis Harrison is running for office in your district. The following are his views on a variety of policy issues:

- Economy: “I believe that free markets and individual achievement are the primary factors behind economic prosperity.”
- Health Care: “I support a government-run single-payer health care system.”
- Abortion: “I am pro-choice and do not oppose elective abortion for moral reasons.”
- Gun Control: “I support gun ownership rights. I oppose laws regulating guns.”
- Affirmative Action: “I oppose affirmative action for women and minority groups.”
- Vouchers: “I do not support school choice through charter schools and school vouchers for private schools.”
- Same-Sex Marriage: “I support same-sex marriage.”

G3: Condition 3

Imagine that **Democrat** Louis Harrison is running for office in your district. The following are his views on a variety of policy issues:

- Economy: “I believe government intervention is necessary to reduce economic inequality.”
- Health Care: “I support a government-run single-payer health care system.”
- Abortion: “I am pro-choice and support elective abortion for moral reasons.”
- Gun Control: “I do not support gun ownership rights. I support stricter gun control laws.”
- Affirmative Action: “I support affirmative action for women and minority groups.”

- Vouchers: “I do not support school choice through charter schools and school vouchers for private schools.”
- Same-Sex Marriage: “I support same-sex marriage.”

G4: Condition 4

Imagine that **Democrat** Louis Harrison is running for office in your district. The following are his views on a variety of policy issues:

- Economy: “I believe government intervention is necessary to reduce economic inequality.”
- Health Care: “I oppose a government-run single-payer health care system.”
- Abortion: “I am pro-life and do not support elective abortion for moral reasons.”
- Gun Control: “I do not support gun ownership rights. I support stricter gun control laws.”
- Affirmative Action: “I support affirmative action for women and minorities.”
- Vouchers: “I support school choice through charter schools and school vouchers for private schools.”
- Same-Sex Marriage: “I oppose same-sex marriage.”

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