

Chapter 4 explores how, given its role in the fight against colonial rule, Salafism became part and parcel of the nationalist narrative, which is a key feature of Algerian politics. Salafis have increased their influence by supporting the state since the civil war of the 1990s and throughout the 2011 Arab Spring protests, thereby providing an alternative to Islamist and Salafi-jihadi currents alike. Algerian Salafism is split between an apolitical majority and an aggressive reformist minority, which is causing increasing discontent within an Algerian society already divided along linguistic, socioeconomic, and cultural lines. The failure of both mainstream political Islam (or rather its systematic co-optation by the regime) and Salafi-jihadism in Algeria allowed a grassroots quietist Salafi movement to take control of mosques and preaching circuits, filling the religious and political void left by both state institutions and moderate Islamist parties.

Chapter 5 describes how the Bourguiba regime hijacked the Salafi project and, later on, how Ben Ali's repression of Salafi currents empowered Salafi-jihadi recruitment networks throughout the early 2000s. Ben Ali's fall in 2011 enabled more Salafis to quickly emerge as a social and religious force in the first days of Tunisia's democratic transition. The 2011 formation of Ansar al Sharia reflected the oversized influence of jihadi groups. The group paid lip service to democracy but pursued violence, leaving the government no choice but to dismantle it. Today, while jihadis have gone underground after several deadly attacks, the Salafi Reform Front Party and other smaller comparable parties seem to have embraced pluralistic democracy while still espousing the Salafist goal of an Islamic state.

Chapter 6 details how the "Madkhalis Salafi," a quietist current following a famous Saudi cleric, has emerged as a powerful force in Libya. Salafis in general benefited greatly from their sustained relationship with the previous regime, especially in the last months of Qaddafi's long tenure. After the revolution, the same "quietists," who had long eschewed political activity and advocated support of the sitting ruler, formed police forces and militias, playing a useful counterterrorism role. These armed groups later became ubiquitous, infiltrating both the "legitimate" government in Tripoli and a number of competing rebel groups, including General Haftar's ambitious "army." Libyan Madkhalis today inspire fear, particularly for their antidemocratic agenda and record of violence. While continuing to threaten liberal activists, and mainstream Islamists, Madkhalis have become even stronger in the context of the civil war.

The book concludes that Salafis have become autonomous political forces in the majority of concerned countries. As they were thrown into the political melee, the doctrinal lines between Salafis and other competing groups became blurred in the post-Arab Spring era.

Despite their obvious passion for detailed accounts and analysis, Wehrey and Boukhars left a few stones unturned.

First, they rightly show how after moderate Islamists went mainstream, Salafis of all hues stepped in to champion the popular demands for more Islamic politics and fill the void of religious and social conservatism. Yet, the authors do not probe further whether the politicization of quietists and of their interest in party politics could potentially have a moderating effect. Second, for a book seeking to document the politicization of Salafism, its focus on elite politics and major figures is only fitting. It comes, however, at the cost of a more complete picture of the spread of Salafism in Maghrebi societies. Grassroots diffusion of Salafism is mentioned but not systematically documented. Third, some readers might take issue with the causal connection between "social dislocation, poverty" and "conversion" to Salafism that the authors take for granted without addressing head-on. The explanation of Salafism as an expression of frustration and marginalization does not account for other key factors such as history and religion. Finally, although its core argument is neither entirely original nor counterintuitive, *Salafism in the Maghreb* succeeds nevertheless in conveying a considerable amount of information and insight in concise fashion. The book is indeed a welcome addition to the ever-growing scholarship on Muslim politics.

**Business & Politics in India.** Edited by Christophe Jaffrelot, Atul Kohli, and Kanta Murali. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 334p. \$99.00 cloth, \$34.95 paper.  
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Ever since Atul Kohli's (2004) *State-Directed Development* first argued that Indian politics has taken a pro-business turn, the literature on business and politics in India has grown. Nevertheless, there remains considerable room for improving our understanding of the scope of Indian business's increasing power and impact on public policy and of how this research should be integrated with the broader literature on comparative political economy. By collecting essays from leading experts in the field and synthesizing them into a provocative analytical framework, *Business & Politics in India* provides a major contribution that advances our analysis in these areas.

After an introductory overview, the volume begins with two chapters that provide a theoretical framework illuminating the mechanisms through which business has achieved its growing power. Next, it investigates the impact of business's growing power on important issues: labor relations, land acquisition, urban development, and the changing role of the media. Then, it examines variation in business power across three states with diverse socioeconomic contexts: Gujarat, which has a relatively advanced economy and a history of probusiness policies;

Tamil Nadu, a southern Indian state that like Gujarat has achieved high rates of growth but is ruled by regional parties whose Tamil nationalism and competitive populism have provided a degree of autonomy from business; and Odisha, an economically backward state whose development strategy has centered on resource-extractive industries and that is characterized by neopatrimonial state-business relations. The volume's concluding chapter draws on the preceding analysis to consolidate theoretical insights and suggest areas for future research.

*Business & Politics* makes three important contributions. It draws on the comparative political economy literature to conceptualize the growing power of Indian business in terms of structural and instrumental power. Kanta Murali's chapter shows how business's structural power has increased after reforms in 1991, enabling greater capital mobility and replacing public investment with private investment as the primary engine of economic growth. Aseema Sinha analyzes how the instrumental power of Indian business has grown: as mounting electoral expenses have led to India's political parties' greater dependence on business for campaign finances, business leaders have entered parliament in increasing numbers, the rise of India's regulatory state has created spaces for business policy influence, and resort to public-private partnerships has made the state more dependent on private business. Perhaps most importantly, the volume shows how structural and instrumental power interact in ways that affect business's ability to veto policy, set the agenda, influence policy decisions, and subtly shape popular worldviews.

Though its theoretical analysis is focused on elaborating the mechanisms of business power, the second contribution of *Business & Politics in India* is to help us to better understand how business power is conditioned by political institutions. Narendra Modi failed to pass legislation to facilitate land acquisition for business shortly after his 2014 landslide parliamentary victory, less because of the protests of India's powerful farm lobby and more because India's electoral laws left opposition parties in control of the upper house. At the same time, India's federalism provides business with multiple points of entry, and business exercises greater leverage at the state level where governments compete for investment. After land acquisition reform was stifled at the national level, business was more successful in securing favorable policies in various states.

Greater business power at the state level, however, does not mean that business is even more powerful at the municipal level. Even when business communities mobilize to promote urban development, Heller, Mukhopadhyay, and Walton show that their initiative is usually thwarted, because most authority over municipal development policies and revenues resides at the state level where dominant politicians have other priorities.

Restricted access to development funding enables cabals of rent-extracting politicians and businesses to dominate urban politics. These cabals impede the formation of business coalitions while using patronage to secure political support and attenuate societal accountability. For all of business's structural power, the institutional and political context of India's municipal governance encourages businesses to use their instrumental power to pursue particularistic interests in a manner that impedes attaining their collective interests.

The third contribution of *Business & Politics in India* is to suggest issues for further research that advance our understanding of business politics in India and beyond. Murali speculates that the "internal heterogeneity of capital and varied preferences is an important factor that is likely to limit business's structural power" (p. 46). We need to know more about how the structure of Indian business and the dynamics of its collective action affect the exercise of its power. To what degree do business associations serve as encompassing organizations that build coherence among diverse firms? A study cited by *The Economist*, "Elephants in the Room" (May 20, 2020), finds that in 2019 just 20 companies received nearly 70% of corporate India's profits, up from 14% three decades ago. Does this concentration of wealth enhance business's structural power, or is it a consequence of patronage and cronyism that divide business and impede collective action?

Finally, Jaffrelot, Kohli, and Murali observe, "The study of power is best framed as a dynamic process between the forces of domination and opposition" (p. 296). If power is a dynamic process, then we need to pay close attention to the strategic interaction between business and other key actors that shape it. In the elitist realms of Indian policy making, we need rigorous analysis of politicians' strategies, as well as those of business, if we are to fully understand the consequences of rising business power. Politicians shape the nature of business power even in an era when its potency is growing. For instance, after being condemned by national business leaders when a 2002 pogrom killed more than a thousand religious minorities under his watch as Gujarat's chief minister, Narendra Modi encouraged the formation of the "Resurgent Group of Gujarat" to build an alternative base of support within the business community. In the years before Modi became chief minister in 2001, Gujarat's industrial policy prioritized support for small and micro businesses. During his 13-year tenure as chief minister, however, Modi reoriented the state's industrial policy to favor megaprojects benefiting loyal big businesses. To what extent did this change represent the increasing power of big business? To what extent did it reflect Modi's preference for crony capitalism and centralized control over illicit political finance? After becoming prime minister, Modi initiated programs to promote small and micro enterprises. Does this reversal

reflect differences in the structure of business power at the national level, or does it reflect a new strategy to reward a core political constituency of his Bharatiya Janata Party? At a time when the Modi government continues to provide economic benefits to select businesses, such as the Reliance and Adani groups, is Modi's promotion of Hindu nationalism a way to maintain popular support for an exclusive developmental model, or is Modi cultivating support from these businesses to advance the cause of Hindu nationalism?

The issues of how the composition and organization of capital affect business power and how business power is shaped by the strategies of political leaders are vital for political economy in India and beyond. *Business & Politics in India* provides a valuable service by advancing our understanding of business power and underscoring the importance of these issues.

**Everyday Economic Survival in Myanmar.** By Ardeth Maung Thawngmung. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2019. 320p. \$79.95 cloth.  
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In *Everyday Economic Survival in Myanmar*, Ardeth Maung Thawngmung makes an important contribution to studies of poor people's politics in Southeast Asia. Everyday life for Myanmar's citizens is shown to be marked by extreme economic hardship that significantly constrains their ability to engage politically. The coping strategies that the poor use are shaped by the imperative of economic survival, which often leads to a shoring up of prevailing social and political structures, rather than providing an impetus for political change. The study is firmly situated in the literature on everyday politics in Southeast Asia (specifically, the work of James Scott [1987] and Benedict Kerkvliet [2005]), but through its focus on everyday coping strategies and tactics, it illustrates a key limitation of this literature: the tendency to focus on the everyday as a site of resistance and change without acknowledging what writers like Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1993) call "the violence of everyday life"—the sheer exhaustion, physical and mental depletion, and injustice associated with eking out a living in situations of economic adversity.

The book has several strengths. First, its analysis is rooted in an impressive in-depth body of empirical research undertaken over several years and encompassing numerous interviews and engagements with people experiencing impoverishment. The richness of the case study material at times blends with the author's own experiences of growing up in Myanmar; the preface to the book reaches into the autoethnographic as Thawngmung

recounts her own everyday encounters with poverty and economic survival in Myanmar: "accommodating and adsorbing the bruising impact of a repressive regime while trying to survive on a daily basis" (p. xii). The coping strategies examined in each of the chapters are illustrated with stories, interviews, and reflections that consistently center the voices and experiences of the poor and marginalized. In recounting a key economic survival strategy—"living frugally" (chapter 2)—we are introduced to Maung Soe, a landless laborer and resident of a remote rural village, and Wah Paw, a former shopkeeper who struggled to make ends meet following the birth of her daughter and her husband's death. High levels of indebtedness and the constant efforts involved in securing any kind of income marked their lives, as they battled to provide for themselves and their households. These are just two of the many stories that fill the pages of this book, and it is this huge body of research and interview data that leads Thawngmung to challenge the somewhat romantic assumptions about agency and resistance that can often be found in work on everyday politics.

The book's second strength lies in how it extends understandings of everyday politics to encompass economic "coping strategies." These include the kinds of activities that might be familiar to scholars of international development, such as community-level responses that mobilize bonds of mutuality (sharing, pooling resources), and accessing state or donor assistance. But she also includes in her understanding of coping strategies psychological strategies such as turning to gambling, astrology, or religion, alongside political coping strategies that range from bribery, efforts to avoid the predatory state (for example, through tax avoidance), and more direct challenges to state rule, including forms of violent insurgency or activities such as strikes. These responses to economic adversity are captured within her LPVE framework: loyalty, passive resistance, voice, and exit. "Loyalty" comprises a variety of different "accommodating" behaviors (p. 11), "Exit" is "literal flight from oppressive acts and policies" (p. 11). "Voice" captures conscious political struggle—speaking out, joining collective resistances—activities that by their very nature challenge the system challenging. By contrast, "passive resistance" is "the more subtle, indirect, frequent, and often uncoordinated acts of resistance" (p. 11).

Indeed, a third strength of this book concerns the specific challenge that it raises for studies of everyday politics that center (passive) resistance. Thawngmung asks that we reframe everyday politics away from dominant approaches found in the work of Scott and Kerkvliet that position the everyday as a resistive site, where the often unintentional actions of the powerless coalesce in ways that ultimately challenge authority. The LPVE approach reflects that Thawngmung does *not* see the everyday as a