constraint" and permits economic policy actors to exercise agency. Shambaugh also invokes the aspect of the contingency of outcomes. He argues that the impact of individuals and institutions on policy making is contingent on the degree to which their authority is accepted or contested by other actors. Just as constructivists argue that actors' interests and motivations are dependent on the structure of actors' identities and interests (in both socially and historically contingent contexts), Shambaugh argues that policy flexibility and the efficacy of policy decisions are shaped by (and contingent on the outcomes of) competition for authority among would-be policy makers or veto players. This contingency arises from the context-specific relationship between market risk and policy flexibility, which helps shape the expectations of financial market actors.

Certainly, all of these cognitive variables—context dependence, contingency, actor expectations, and social agency—tick most of the boxes for generating a constructivist argument, although I cannot speak to Shambaugh's intent. The term does not appear in his book or index. Yet he moves on to a discussion of the constitutive power dynamics of "particular central bankers and economic policy makers" to move the expectations of private market actors in and out of the "comfort zone" of his RIC curve. He argues that this capability is "a function of their constitutive power dynamics" (p. 28), which in turn are predicated on the policy makers' ability and willingness to exploit or expand their authority, build and maintain deference from national executive authorities, and generate the political capacity to implement their expectation-transforming policies (pp. 28–33). The sources of these "constitutive power dynamics" are authority, deference, and political capacity and whether these attributes are either accepted or contested by other powerful actors within the government and the market active segment of the public. This discussion sets Shambaugh up for six likely outcomes, or risk management or mitigation scenarios. These he summarizes in tabular form in Figure 2.5 (p. 34) and uses them to good effect in his three empirical case studies. Admittedly, Shambaugh's analytical discussions in his first two chapters, where he lays out his RIC model and his larger argument, are not an entirely easy read, but Shambaugh writes with a careful rigor that renders his meanings consistently coherent and often insightful.

Since Shambaugh's primary audience for his highly insightful book is clearly the policy community and not the IR theory community, I shall not criticize him with the frequent and tedious complaint that "you should have done it my way, according to my theoretical school." Yet I will briefly raise the issue of his consistent claim of having uncovered "second-order powers" of policies and institutions, particularly when he discusses "constitutive power dynamics." He generously cites Peter Bachrach, Morton Baratz, Michael Barnett, Raymond Duvall, and me as earlier developers of the concepts of "power to control an agenda, define and enforce the rules of the game, and delineate the roles that actors play" (p. 214). Shambaugh has employed so many other constructivist concepts in his work that he might have updated his "second order powers" with variations of Barnett and Duvall's (2005) "structural," "institutional," and "productive" forms of power, some of which I have since argued are themselves variants of "deontic" power.

Finally, I worry that the publisher has done Professor Shambaugh a disservice with the size of his many useful figures and tables. I found some so small as to be readable only by accessing the online version of the book and enhancing the scale. I detected another small error only because it involves the use of my name. I have not enjoyed the privilege of meeting Professor Shambaugh: he can easily be forgiven for being unaware that my surname is simply "Hall" and not "double barreled." Yet I worry that spare copyediting might also have given other scholars entirely new published identities. These matters aside, the book is a significant accomplishment bound to be highly useful to the policy community and students of international political economy, and I highly recommend it to both.

Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation after War. By Pamina Firchow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 158p. $99.99 cloth, $34.99 paper.
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— Naazneen H. Barma, *The Naval Postgraduate School*
nhbarma@nps.edu

The question of what exactly constitutes peace or, more concretely, how to conceptualize and measure its attainment is central to the pursuit and success of peace-building interventions in conflict-affected countries. It has thus been one of the central lines of inquiry animating the wide-ranging and expansive peace studies and peace-building scholarship, from Johan Galtung's path-breaking distinction between negative peace (the absence of violence) and positive peace (societal resilience to conflict) down to today (see Galtung,"Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research,* 6 [3], 1969). With *Reclaiming Everyday Peace*, Pamina Firchow makes an original contribution to the study of peace measurement, both advancing the conceptual frontier and delivering granular empirical findings in a concise text.

Firchow's approach to measuring and evaluating peace is rooted firmly in the now extensive "local turn" of the peace-building literature (e.g., Roger Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance*, 2011; Oliver P. Richmond, *Failed Statebuilding*, 2014). Turning a critical eye on the very concept and on the practices of

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international peace building, scholars working within this school of thought have bemoaned a myopia about local, indigenous views toward and experiences of peace. They have argued that interventions must absorb these local perspectives to address the needs of societies emerging from conflict and to build tangible peace in local communities. Along these lines, Firchow's framework for understanding and measuring peace rests explicitly on the insight that the would-be beneficiaries of peace interventions define success in peace consolidation in very different ways from external interveners. To emphasize this point, she draws the distinction between *big-P* peace building, involving macro, top-down, and all-encompassing interventions, and *small-p* peace building, focused more on community-level, bottom-up, and relational transformation.

The book is thus first and foremost a clarion call, advanced in part I, for a concerted effort to develop community-defined indicators of peace that "actively include communities not only in the evaluation, and monitoring of external interventions, but also in programming design" (p. 3). In chapters 1 and 2, Firchow offers an extensive critique of the universal, one-size-fits-all evaluation systems that are typically used by external peace-building organizations in a top-down fashion in the communities in which they work; she makes the case instead for using locally contextualized measures of peace that capture "indigenous technical knowledge" (pp. 62–66). She then develops, in chapter 3, an approach to collecting precisely such bottom-up, participatory, community-defined measures in the form of the Everyday Peace Indicators (EPI) methodology.

Reclaiming Everyday Peace also delivers, in part II, a fascinating demonstration of how Firchow applies the EPI methodology to her own specific empirical study. Her research is built on a carefully selected matched case design of four communities, two each in Colombia and Uganda, along with a labor- and time-intensive process of working with individuals in the chosen communities to generate their own specific, tangible definitions of peace. Through a series of focus groups facilitated by local research teams, these communities isolated a range of factors by which they evaluate peace themselves, such as whether they felt safe walking home at night, local business success, infrastructure development, and so on. Firchow and her team then grouped these community-specific measures of peace into macro categories, such as daily security, conflict resolution, food and agriculture, and economic development; then they further aggregated them into four dimensions—security, human rights, development, and social—to enable the identification of trends over time and comparisons across the four cases.

Firchow asserts that the more granular, locally specific indicators can be valuable for targeted evaluation and hence enable better programming in the communities themselves. The different levels of external intervention between within-country community pairs, combined with longitudinal community surveys of the community-generated indicators, enable Firchow to conclude that the localities that received a higher degree of external intervention do not have substantively higher levels of peacefulness than those with lower levels of intervention. As expected, the different communities defined peacefulness in varied ways, using a range of tangible measures. Firchow's major empirical cross-case finding is that the communities in which violent conflict was more distant in time tended to identify more positive peace indicators, related to conflict resolution and societal resilience, than negative peace indicators, related to violence and physical security. Moreover, assessing locally defined peace priorities against external assistance programs reveals that the nature and distribution of the supposed benefits of these interventions are at odds with the needs of the communities in question.

Given the rigor of the framework and the effort devoted to data collection, it is disappointing that these comparative empirical conclusions are not more substantial. Such findings have already been established by large-N and case-oriented studies of peace building in the positivist vein (epitomized, respectively, by Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 2006, and Roland Paris, *At War's End*, 2004), as well as in the more thickly described sociological and interpretivist scholarship (e.g., Severine Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 2014). Firchow believes that too much emphasis in the peace-building scholarship is placed on national-level elite politics, resulting in the elision of the truly lived local experience of peace at the community level: thus the "state" or "government," even at the local level, is (deliberately) almost entirely absent in both the conceptual and empirical sections of the book. Yet, by entirely setting aside the interaction between national and local state officials and international organizations, which forms a central aspect of the peace-building scholarship (e.g., Naazneen H. Barma, *The Peace-building Puzzle*, 2017), Firchow loses the opportunity to drill down more on how local communities interact with local elites in the actual politics of building local peace and to explain why the mismatch between community needs and forms of assistance is so persistent.

The central conceptual claim of *Reclaiming Everyday Peace* is that, through the process of aggregation from community-defined indicators to categories and then macro-dimensions, "experience-near indicators can help us count and populate experience-distant categories and dimensions more effectively" (p. 111). What is by turns innovative and, ultimately, also stymieing about Firchow's work is that she has developed a hybrid conceptual framework that offers real advances in thinking about peace, yet she leaves the reader to grapple with some central unresolved theoretical and practical tensions. On the one hand, she adopts a positivist or problem-solving approach, with

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the explicit goal of improving peace operations through evidence-based policy making. On the other hand, she shares the ontological position of critical theorists of peace building in emphasizing the need to understand peace from the perspective of the "peacekept," the recipients of interventions, rather than the purveyors of peacekeeping. This hybrid approach delivers an innovative process for generating community-defined peace indicators that measure in high fidelity how local communities experience peace or the lack thereof.

Yet the book falls short in making the case that this approach is truly replicable and scalable in terms of linking up experience-near community indicators to experience-distant universal measuring efforts, in systematic and cumulative ways. Without that concrete connection between bottom-up and top-down, Firchow cannot really make the case for the ultimate value of the EPI approach to the stated goal of improving measurement that, in turn, will improve policy making—or to returning some measure of agency and power to the peacekept from the peacekeepers. The reader is left with the tantalizing possibility, but not the directions, for how *big-P* and *small-p*—or exogenous and indigenous approaches to—peace building can really be harmonized in the way that Firchow desires. Fortunately, she has crystallized beautifully what it could actually mean to develop bottom-up, community-defined measures of peace. This makes her book an important contribution to peace studies and charts an expanded research agenda for those interested in further conceptualizing how indigenous and exogenous indicators could be reconciled to improve project design and to better measure peace-building effectiveness at different scales.

Rebel Politics: A Political Sociology of Armed Struggle in Myanmar's Borderlands. By David Brenner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019. 162p. $115.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
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— Jenny Hedström , *Örebro University*
jenny.hedstrom@oru.se

David Brenner's first book, *Rebel Politics: A Political Sociology of Armed Struggle in Myanmar's Borderlands*, makes a timely and distinctive contribution to scholarly debates on rebel governance and armed conflict, as well as to the growing field of Myanmar studies. His argument—that rebellion is more than anything else a *social process*—posits that the internal politics of rebel movements is key for understanding conflict in Myanmar's borderlands and beyond. Honing in on the experiences of "two of the oldest and most important rebel movements" in Myanmar (p. 3), the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Brenner challenges traditional analysis that centers elites and disregards the everyday, sometimes mundane, social environment in which rebellion takes shape. Brenner's focus on the social practices of rebellion provides a fresh and much-needed analysis of why conflict has persisted in Myanmar, despite the rise to power of the former democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi and the commencement of political reforms, including a national-level ceasefire process.

Brenner's book emerged from several months spent within Myanmar's "rebel borderworlds" (p. 37), the liberated areas of Kawthoole and Kachinland. This rich ethnographic background enables Brenner to craft detailed insights into the inner workings of rebellions and, in particular, the relationship between elites and the communities through which these rebellions gain legitimacy. His "ethnographic bent" (p. 24) provides a much-needed antidote to the many past studies on conflict in Myanmar lacking in primary and firsthand content; as a result, Brenner is able to provide a novel perspective on rebel politics in the country. Rather than treating rebel groups as homogeneous, fixed entities, Brenner's work instead draws attention to how struggles over authority within these groups both shape and are shaped by relationships with the grassroots. These relationships are embedded in a social contract through which the leaders vie for legitimacy and, thus, authority. This in turn affects the willingness and ability of rebel groups to wage war. Building on sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias, and connecting this work with the study of rebellions and resistance politics as advanced by theorists including James Scott, Charles Tilly, and Zacharia Mampilly, among others, Brenner proposes a relational approach for studying rebellions. Connecting these schools of thought allows Brenner to situate the KNU and the KIO as "ontologically embedded within a social environment" (p. 16).

Both of these rebel movements are exemplars of parastates controlling areas of territory in which they provide public goods, including limited social welfare and security, for the communities living under their control. Brenner maintains that these critical relations of care and power, enmeshed within everyday kinship relations and community practices, are the means through which rebel leaders attempt to create legitimacy and consolidate power. In other words, rebel leaders must build cohesion and support through the reciprocal provisioning of services and power relations with the grassroots. These relations are key, indeed foundational, to a movement's success or otherwise: they can lead to a stronger rebel force able to resist the incumbent state or the reverse, a fractured rebellion incapable of waging a successful war. His primary argument, then, is that rebel leaders, unable to foster compliance through sheer force alone, attempt to build relations of legitimacy among and with the grassroots in order to "develop momentum of their own in driving collective conduct" (p. 27). Engagement with Alicia De La Cour-Venning's study on Kachin rebel interaction with international humanitarian norms as a means to affect

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