what early American notions of friendship might entail. Godbeer offers, however, a thorough and perceptive account of one very important strain especially resonant among middle-class and elite men. His greatest contribution may be to elucidate the range of vivid and loving expression available to early American men in their relationships with one another and to show that, just as it recast familial connections, the American Revolution invested the ties of friendship with increased significance.

McCurdy makes a compelling argument for attending to a long-neglected group in American history, both for what we learn about the men themselves, and for what they in turn reveal about mainstream society. His approach, however, reduces the richly textured identities of men who were rich and poor, farmers and merchants, and, yes, often eventually husbands, down to one distilled identity, "the bachelor," to the obfuscation of other aspects of their lives. The strength of that single element of men's identities takes on perhaps too much importance in McCurdy's analysis. For example, he posits that in at least one social club, the famous Tuesday Club of Annapolis, latent hostility manifested between single and married men, creating "two mutually exclusive groups" separated by "a degree of animosity or at least distrust" (150). This argument ascribes a fixed and antagonistic group identity for men now shorn of all other characteristics but marital status. The same limits manifest in McCurdy's political analysis. For example, he points to the radical Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 which extended suffrage to 90 percent of that state's white male population. Most historians focus on the class implications of this move; McCurdy ignores them, emphasizing instead that most of the Pennsylvanians affected were single men. Contemporaries debated hotly the social and political ramifications of the enfranchisement of propertyless men, but McCurdy himself admits that not one comment survives about the enfranchisement of so many bachelors. He uses this negative evidence to conclude that a revolutionary shift had occurred, prioritizing masculinity rather than marital status in giving full political rights. McCurdy's work is suggestive, but as he does not convincingly demonstrate that bachelorhood was nearly as significant a barrier to full political participation as economic or social status, his conclusion comes across as somewhat one-dimensional.

Both works' subtitles are revealing. They each announce their intention to demonstrate the link between their subject and the "creation" of the new American republic. Together, they insist on a serious interrogation of men's lives and masculinity in that creation.

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Lawrence A. Peskin, *Captives and Countrymen: Barbary Slavery and the American Public, 1785–1816* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009, $55.00). Pp. vii + 256. ISBN 978 0 8018 91839 7.

After 11 September 2001, many books have explored the clash between the United States and the Barbary States in the years bridging the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, seeking the traces of early national engagement in the

Muslim world. The interest in this clash of cultures has given rise by now to a considerable bibliography, recognizing that as early as the Jefferson presidency there was a real conflict. Usually these books lack originality, basing their arguments especially on *Naval Documents Related to the United States War with the Barbary Powers*, published in 1939 with the strong support of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in which long-term interest in the American navy was buttressed by the contingent interest in showing that the United States had from his earliest decades engaged in foreign wars, succeeding where European powers had shown themselves inadequate.

In *Captives and Countrymen: Barbary Slavery and the American Public*, Lawrence A. Peskin, associate professor of history at Morgan State University at Baltimore, finally moves beyond these publications, bringing both new sources and new ideas into play. Enlarging the sphere of attention to include the American public, Peskin rethinks actors and events, showing how the ambivalent conception of slavery was at the core of the policies of the new nation. Abandoning his usual field of economic history for the history of ideas, the author shows in the three chapters of the book – "Captivity and the Public Sphere," "The Impact of Captivity at Home," and "Captivity and the American Empire" – how Washington, Adams, Jefferson and Madison faced the Barbary Wars, trying to avoid the cycle of great wars and destructions that had characterized the European balance of power, but at the same time reacting with force to the enslavement of American sailors, as American public opinion required, defining a new vision of a republican empire based on white freedom, the slavery of African Americans and the barbarity of Native Americans.

As Peskin points out, the ethnic and religious dynamic of Barbary and Indian captivity appeared the opposite of African captivity in the United States. Alongside the portrait of "the captors as devilish heathen" (71), we have the portrait of "the supposedly civilized Americans" (76) defending in arms the principles of a system that will collapse only after the Civil War. Even if many of the poems and plays of the period simply stressed the contrast between liberty and slavery, showing sympathy toward the fate of the African slaves in the United States and effecting the American abolitionist movement, it was clear that the Republican elites, and the common people as well, differentiated the threats to liberty from arbitrary tyrants – the Barbary bashaws – from the legal mastery of southern slaveholders and their practice of buying and selling African American slaves.

The final reflections on the War of 1812 show another original aspect of this book. For Peskin, "the war itself prompted a final Barbary captivity crisis and a second Barbary war" (187), offering a first chance to assert United States strength abroad and to demonstrate the ability of the Americans to tame "barbarians" in both the Old World (the Barbary pirates) and the New (the savage Indians supposedly incited by the British).

In this larger view, the war President James Madison asked Congress to declare against Great Britain was not a single war but "The Wars of 1812," including along with the British not only the Barbary pirates but the new surge of Indian hostility in the American West, culminating in 1811 with the Battle of Tippecanoe as well. In fact many Americans – like former Whiskey Rebel William Findley of Pennsylvania, at that time in the House of Representatives – believed British agents responsible for "intriguing with the savage tribes."

Finally, declaring that after these wars "Americans could proclaim themselves fully independent of Britain and Barbary" (187), the book reveals that, though these clashes soon disappeared from classic historiography, which chose to focus on the creation of the myth of a peaceful republic, the debate over the Barbary Wars was pivotal in American contemporary politics and public opinion.

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J. C. A. Stagg, *Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish–American Frontier, 1776–1821* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009, £45.00). Pp. x + 307. ISBN 978 0 300 13905 1.

Professor Stagg, the editor-in-chief of the Papers of James Madison at the University of Virginia, here provides us with a tightly written history of the policies of Madison, secretary of state under Thomas Jefferson (1801–9) and then Jefferson's successor as president (1809–17), toward Spain's provinces on the United States' southern border. Five chapters totaling just over two hundred pages are followed by over eighty pages of notes. The first chapter surveys US relations with Spain from the 1780s to 1809. Then come one each on Madison's activities in his first presidential term (1809–13) in West Florida, in East Florida, and in Texas. The concluding chapter, "Toward the Transcontinental Treaty" (1819), discusses the final conveying of the Floridas to the United States and creation of an American claim overland to the Pacific coast for the first time.

Impressively and hardly surprisingly, the footnotes reveal thorough immersion in the Madison papers and much else. Virtually all published scholarship on US–Spanish relations in the period is cited appropriately. Spanish historians, however, are seldom mentioned and are never really engaged, nor are others who assess Spain's positions seriously. This is unfortunate because without them, the book avoids a detailed, frontal evaluation of whether the Jefferson–Madison contentions that the Louisiana Purchase was entirely legitimate and that West Florida and Texas were part of Louisiana and thus of the purchase were sound. (Spain vehemently disagreed.) Although Stagg states that the United States "wrongly insisted" on these points, he continues that Spain "was obliged by treaty to cede these territories to France" (7). (Why?) Thus the Jefferson–Madison contentions are taken as givens, as is the idea that "at no time after 1809 did Madison ever assume that the nation's territorial disputes with Spain could be solved by means that were other than legal" (4).

The author notes "the indisputable fact that in the summer of 1810 Madison sent executive agents into all three of the Spanish provinces … with instructions that envisioned their incorporation … into the Union after the displacement of their [Spanish] colonial regimes" (8), referring to William Wykoff in West Florida, George Mathews and John McKee in East Florida, and William Shaler in Cuba and Texas. But he stoutly denies that Madison was "implicated … in illegal revolutions" in the Floridas and an "equally illegal … filibuster" in Texas. True, Madison was very careful not to involve US regular troops (which would have been a *casus belli*). But his