

BOOK SYMPOSIUM

The roots of ethnic cleansing in Europe, by H. Zeynep Bulutgil, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 234 pp., 8 b/w illus. 12 tables, \$99.99 (cloth), ISBN 9781107135864

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As the title of her book suggests, Zeynep Bulutgil seeks to answer one of the big social scientific questions of modern times: “The roots of ethnic cleansing,” but equally importantly, “in Europe.” The empirical focus on Europe is also theoretically relevant, as it influences the main argument she develops regarding the roots of ethnic cleansing, as I will discuss further below. Also significant from a theoretical perspective is the temporal scope of the book, which is the entire twentieth century. With these specifications, Bulutgil proposes a theoretically crisp, empirically sound, and thus overall fairly convincing argument about when and where ethnic cleansing happened in Europe in the twentieth century. I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book, and learned a great deal even about cases that I thought I already knew well.

The book’s geographical and temporal scope, “limited” to Europe in the twentieth century, is not at all an exceptional limitation if one considers that most of the social scientific literature on ethnic cleansing is about “Europe in the twentieth century.” Therefore, most of the theories about ethnic cleansing and genocide that we currently have are based on the European experience in the twentieth century. Bulutgil’s contribution covers all instances of ethnic cleansing in Europe in the twentieth century, which include 41 cases listed in Appendix 2.1 (67–68). Thirty-six of these took place in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1912–1950 period, which Bulutgil also compares with 28 cases of ethnic cleansing that took place in Africa in the 1955–2010 period (177). In sum, 69 cases of ethnic cleansing in Europe and postcolonial Africa in the twentieth century are included.

The strengths of this book are very many. First, and most importantly, the book explains why ethnic cleansing happens particularly during and after episodes of war. Bulutgil argues that territorial revisions during and after interstate wars are likely to alter the ethnic policy preferences of political actors due to “the non-repetitive nature of ethnicity across space” (20). Second, her main argument brings in cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic political coalitions to the very center of the study of ethnic cleansing, which is a major achievement. She convincingly argues that “countries with deeper nonethnic cleavages and more internal competition within the dominant ethnic groups should be less likely to use ethnic cleansing” (17). The most common nonethnic cleavage in the cases that she discusses at length is “class” and the political competition between the left versus the right. Her primary focus is on the political competition *within* the dominant ethnic groups, and secondarily, on

the political competition *within* the minority ethnic groups, as explanatory variables of ethnic cleansing. In short, she argues that ethnic cleansing occurs only when there is no powerful political faction or party within the dominant ethnic group that advocates a different policy toward the ethnic minority. Nonethnic cleavages appear as the most formidable obstacles against ethnic cleansing. As a result of territorial changes in the course of interstate wars, political parties or factions of the dominant ethnic group that previously advocated different policies toward ethnic minorities change their positions and converge on ethnic cleansing as the most feasible solution.

Why and how does interstate war over territory change the ethnic policy preferences within the dominant ethnic group? Arguing that “the main barrier against ethnic cleansing in State A would have been those members of a, who care about other dimensions of politics such as class or religion,” Bulutgil convincingly demonstrates how “collaboration between a non-dominant group and an enemy state during a territorial conflict might change this situation for a number of reasons” (36). Ethnic groups that are “promoted” after the occupation by an enemy state are much more likely to be targeted with ethnic cleansing if and once those territories are recovered.

Prominent examples for cases of ethnic cleansing that fit the description of “promoted group” include the Germans in central Europe after World War Two, Ukrainians in Poland in the same period, as well as Greeks in Turkey after the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–1922. (61)

Ethnic groups that are classified as a “defending group,” defined as “the group that forms the backbone of the army of the defending state as well as any other groups that form auxiliary military units that explicitly fight against the annexing state” (50) also face a higher likelihood of ethnic cleansing after annexation.

Theoretically, the book is one of the most complete and exhaustive accounts of its kind that I have read. For every hypothetical scenario, Bulutgil seeks to identify all the mathematical possibilities, the entire “property space” of potential causal configurations, and the hypothetical outcomes that would follow. Empirically, the book employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, such as the cross-national tests using inferential statistics that include all cases of ethnic cleansing in chapter 2, and rich historical case studies of Germans in Czechoslovakia, Germans and Ukrainians in Poland, and Greeks in Turkey in chapter 3. Overall, the book provides a causal account of ethnic cleansing that is theoretically sound and empirically persuasive for most of the cases it discusses.

The book articulates a very common, and perhaps even the most common, causal path to ethnic cleansing, based on the concatenation of domestic and geopolitical, ideological and military strategic considerations. While Harris Mylonas (2012) explained ethnic policy choices with reference to alliance patterns between host states and kin states of ethnic minorities, Bulutgil advances a similar agenda by focusing on acts of war and micro-dynamics of war such as collaboration as they influence domestic political alignments. Nonetheless, there are a number of debatable theoretical assumptions and empirical mispredictions that motivate me to suggest that the causal account presented in this book is only applicable to “monoethnic” regimes, and thus provides only one of the multiple causal paths to ethnic cleansing and genocide.

First, the book implicitly assumes all nation-states to have a “monoethnic regime,” which I define as a state that seeks to equate the nation with one ethnicity only (Aktürk 2012). This is a regime type that is most common in Eastern Europe, but not as much in Western Europe. Monoethnic regimes are even less common in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. I must emphasize that this problematic assumption is not at all limited to Bulutgil’s book. Among others, the late Walker Connor, an influential pioneer in the study of

nationalism, preferred to use the term “ethnonationalism” instead of nationalism because he explicitly argued that all nationalisms are ethnic in nature (Conversi 2017). Many scholars still adhere to this usage or share the underlying assumption. As a more recent example, in the very first sentence of *Waves of War*, Andreas Wimmer (2012, 1) categorically states that “Nationalism demands that rulers and ruled hail from the same ethnic background.” This is an assumption that much of the social science scholarship on ethnicity and nationalism implicitly shares, including Bulutgil’s book under review. However, it is a claim that is only accurate for a subset of nationalisms and nation-states around the world, and a very large number (according to my unpublished research, the majority) of nation-states do *not* have monoethnic policies that favor only one ethnicity. Many nation-states are based on nonethnic identity groups’ claims to popular sovereignty, and these nonethnic nationalisms include religious (e.g. “the Muslim State” and “the Jewish State”), sectarian (e.g. Twelver Shiism, Catholicism), and territorial (e.g. most African and American nation-states) identities.

Which ethnic group constitutes the “ethnonational core” of Pakistan: Baluchis, Pashuns, Punjabis, Sindhis, or the muhajirs who immigrated from India and arguably founded the state of Pakistan? None, presumably, because Pakistan was founded and continues to be a Muslim nation-state that is challenged by a myriad of ethnic claims (Akturk 2015). What about India, the largest democracy in the world, or Indonesia, the largest Muslim state, or Nigeria, the largest African state? Arguably, none of these states have a single ethnic group as their ethnonational core. Thus, the intrastate wars that such nonethnic states wage are unlikely to result in ethnic cleansing, which would challenge Bulutgil’s account.

Bulutgil recognizes one important empirical consequence of this challenge in that she devotes a separate chapter addressing the “relative absence of ethnic cleansing in Africa” (chapter 6). However, these “anomalies” are not limited to Africa. One could also find such anomalies in Asia, the Americas, and even in Europe. For example, German-speakers of Alsace Lorraine were “drafted or volunteered to the German army and the SS forces ... did not even trigger limited post-war deportations, let alone ethnic cleansing,” a seeming anomaly that Bulutgil explains with reference to “the extent of competition within the dominant ethnic groups” (61–62). However, one can also argue that they were not targeted by ethnic cleansing precisely because France does not have a monoethnic definition of nationhood, and is instead based on forging a common nationhood through the assimilation of multiple ethnic groups. Nonetheless, I suggest Bulutgil’s arguments can be salvaged by specifying that they primarily apply to states with a monoethnic regime, which is the case for most of Eastern Europe.

The second major challenge to Bulutgil’s argument is posed by the cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide that targeted groups without any interstate war over territory. Some ethnic groups were eliminated without ever being a “promoted group” or a “defending group” or even a “fifth column” (a control variable for Bulutgil) in the context of interstate competition. Jews and Roma in Nazi Germany are obviously challenging cases in this vein, which Bulutgil concedes not being able to explain. To her credit, she acknowledges that her theory is “probabilistic,” and that there can be different causes for the removal of barriers to ethnic cleansings. “Succinctly put, while territorial conflict does not account for Germany’s policies against the Jewish and Roma populations, the existence of these atypical cases is compatible with the inherently probabilistic nature of the argument” (165). However, a large number of such unexplained or mispredicted cases, especially in Africa and in the Americas, suggests to me that there might be an entirely different path to ethnic cleansing that is beyond the scope of Bulutgil’s framework. King Leopold of

Belgium murdered millions of people in the Belgian Congo in what may be considered a genocide, and yet the victims were not a promoted ethnic group supported by a geopolitical rival in a competition over a disputed territory. Imperial Germany committed a genocide against the Hereros in Namibia, and the British American settlers ethnically cleansed various Native American tribes. I think what these examples demonstrate is that there is another causal path to ethnic cleansing and genocide, which is not primarily driven by interstate conflict over territory that Bulutgil is emphasizing.

There might be two causal pathways, one ideological and the other geopolitical, both leading to ethnic cleansing. Then the question arises as to whether the outcome that results from these alternative causal paths is also different. Could one label the geopolitically motivated outcome “ethnic cleansing,” which Bulutgil explains so well, and the other, ideologically motivated act, as a “genocide,” as in the case of the Holocaust? This tension also exists in the coincidence of domestic and international causes in Bulutgil’s framework. Could there be an ethnic cleansing or genocide that is purely or primarily motivated by domestic causes, unrelated to any international or geopolitical considerations? Again, Nazism with its “applied biology” and “racial hygiene” leading to genocide could be a good example.

Third, and related to the second point above, the explanation for the genocide in Bosnia (chapter 4) is significantly different from all the other cases discussed in this book. In Bosnia, nationalists came to power prior to the onset of the territorial conflict, which is contrary to the causal mechanism elucidated in the book. Bulutgil explains this anomaly with reference to the successful elimination of nonethnic cleavages such as class under Communism, which left nothing else but ethnicity for political parties to rely on for mobilizing voters once competitive elections were introduced. Moreover, “the destruction of all nonethnic cleavages by a revolutionary regime” is also her explanation for the ethnic cleansing of Finns, Germans, and Iranians in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union’s reification of ethnic identities through its “nationalities policy,” which paradoxically elevated ethnic identity as the only seemingly “primordial” identity above all others, is widely accepted in Soviet studies (Slezkine 1994). However, even if the destruction of nonethnic cleavages by a revolutionary regime may have facilitated the politicization of ethnicity above all other social identities, which is a plausible claim that I agree with, this does not explain why specifically Muslims were targeted in Yugoslavia. Thus, although the lack of nonethnic cleavages may plausibly explain the rise of nationalist parties, it cannot explain the occurrence of civil war, let alone the ethnic cleansing of Muslims specifically. The targeting of Muslims rather than Croats is particularly inexplicable based on the logic of interstate conflict since the militarized conflict that initiated the disintegration of Yugoslavia was between Croats and Serbs, and not between Muslims and Serbs. Moreover, even the memory of the most recent historical military conflict pitted Croats against Serbs during World War II. In predicting the specific targeting of Muslims, the availability of an ideology such as Christoslavism with its demonization of Muslims as Christ-killers, an “innovative” spin on the age-old anti-Semitic trope, may have been critical, as Michael Sells (1996) argued.

Fourth, another specific empirical challenge is posed by a case that is listed in the appendix but never discussed: the expulsion of Greek Muslims in 1923–1924. Among the cases discussed in detail, the “atypical” case of Germans in Hungary may be the closest to Muslims in Greece. However, Greek Muslims potentially pose a bigger challenge than Germans in Hungary for Bulutgil’s theory for two reasons: First, Greek Muslims did not collaborate with an external enemy in the immediate years preceding their expulsion. Greece was the aggressor, not the defender, in the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–1922, and mainland Greece that Muslims lived in did not face Turkish occupation since 1912–

1913. Second, based on their voting patterns in 1912–1923, Greek Muslims appeared to be staunch allies of the anti-Venizelist political bloc in Greece, and their removal would tip the political balance in favor of Venizelos and against the (royalist) opposition. Thus, one would expect significant resistance to their deportation by the royalist opposition to Venizelos, and yet the deportation of Greek Muslims, to the best of my knowledge, occurred without major obstruction or resistance. Why? This is also an intriguing case because it is usually taken for granted as the reciprocal “mirror image” of the expulsion of Greeks from Turkey, one of the cases examined in detail in this book, and yet the critical causes (wartime collaboration, promotion, etc.) of ethnic cleansing for Bulutgil’s theory are absent in the case of Greek Muslims.

Fifth, I have an empirical comment with theoretical ramifications concerning the history of violence in Europe. Although mass violence in the form of ethnic cleansing was heavily concentrated in Eastern and Southeastern Europe in the twentieth century, it was disproportionately concentrated in Western and Central Europe in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. The early modern mass violence in Western Europe was based on the religious sectarian (i.e. Catholic-Protestant) faultline, and it had many episodes of what we could retrospectively call ethnic cleansing and genocide. Anthony Marx (2003) demonstrated how the ethnic cleansing of Jews and Muslims in Spain, persecution of Protestant Huguenots in France, and Catholics in England were central to the origins of nationalism and nation-building in these three major Western European polities. As late as the early twentieth century, the Catholic-Protestant faultline was decisive in many European contexts. Even in the 1900s, as Bulutgil notes, Austrian landowning nobility opposed pan-German nationalists because they “found the demands of incorporating Austria into the politically dominant and majority Protestant Germany unacceptable” (161). Any theory of identity-based mass violence, including ethnic cleansing and genocide, that does not take into account early modern European history as well as the subsequent violence that accompanied colonialism, especially settler colonialism (see my second point above), is destined to be incomplete. This would be a challenge if Bulutgil wanted to extend her framework to account for the pre-twentieth century history of mass violence. To be fair, Bulutgil does not claim to explain all ethnic cleansings in the world since the dawn of modernity, but her theory has such a universalizable potential.

In conclusion, Bulutgil formulated a truly original theory about the roots of ethnic cleansing, which convincingly explains dozens of cases of ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe better than any rival theory can. Unlike many other arguments about causes of ethnic cleansing based on a single case or a small number of cases, Bulutgil draws on insights from, and tests her theory against, the empirical details of 41 cases of ethnic cleansing in Europe, which is a major strength. Moreover, unlike many statistically oriented large-N studies that dismiss the cases they mispredict as “outliers” or “the exceptions that prove the rule,” Bulutgil instead tries to account for each case of ethnic cleansing that does not conform to her expectations (perhaps with the exception of Greek Muslims) as “negative” and “atypical” cases (chapter 5). The theoretical sophistication, empirical richness, and the methodological rigor of this book are very impressive. This book is a must-read for students and scholars working on ethnic cleansing and the dynamics of mass violence more broadly. The arguments put forth in this book regarding the central role of cross-cutting cleavages, ethnopolitical coalitions, and interstate wars over territory in the causal processes leading to ethnic cleansing and genocide deserve to be discussed widely across the social sciences.

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
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Zeynep Bulutgil has written an important book on the roots of ethnic cleansing in Europe. Bulutgil invites us to read twentieth-century European history not just from the perspective of ethnicity but also from the perspective of class, rural–urban, and religious–secular cleavages. She is trying to understand the roots of ethnic cleansing. Building on classics such as Seymour Lipset’s *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (1959) and Robert Dahl’s *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956), Bulutgil employs the insights from the cross-cutting cleavages literature to construct her argument. She suggests cross-cutting cleavages in a society operate as an obstacle to the emergence and political success of actors who want to perpetrate ethnic cleansing against ethnic minorities. Then she draws from the international security literature and argues that territorial conflict increases the salience of ethnic cleavages. Putting the two propositions together, the salience of other cleavages fragments the dominant group and makes ethnic cleansing less likely to prevail as a viable policy, while territorial conflict increases the salience of ethnicity and the likelihood of