

right line (text: § 9, 10, 13, 47, 77, 129, 132; translation: § 3, 10, 13, 29, 53, 66, 99, 125, 129, 132, 139, 142).

All in all, the book leaves mixed feelings: V. assembles valuable material (especially in the commentary), and his tendency to defend the transmitted text against interventions by earlier critics is in itself not unreasonable, but too often pursued too far; his general view of the speech is questionable, and his translation could have been more accurate in a number of places. The definitive commentary on Dio's *Trojan Speech* still remains to be written.

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STOIC LIVING

SELLARS (J.) *The Art of Living. The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy*. Pp. x + 228. Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003. Cased, £42.50. ISBN: 0-7546-3667-4.

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We live in an era when many English-speaking people who can afford the time and the money enrol in therapy sessions or purchase self-help manuals. They do not attend university classes in philosophy because Anglo-American philosophers are not in the business of counselling their students. The divorce of British and American philosophy from the explicit guidance of life is probably the most striking respect in which it differs from the philosophy of classical antiquity, especially the schools that were most active and influential from about 300 B.C. to A.D. 200. Scholars such as Pierre and Ilsetraut Hadot, Foucault, Nussbaum and Sorabji have done much to explore the therapeutic goals of philosophy in this period. John Sellars' book (published in the *Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy* series) is a further contribution to this distinctive and, until recently, neglected dimension of intellectual history.

S. sets the scene with a useful survey of the ancient interplay between philosophy and biography, noting, with reference to Nietzsche and Foucault, that a conception of philosophy as the art of life is still alive in a minority of modern thinkers. Nietzsche and Foucault advertised their indebtedness to Greek philosophy. By following in their tracks, S. proposes not only to elucidate this conception but also to present its attractions as an alternative to what he takes to be the dominant model of philosophy as a purely theoretical enterprise. Rather than pursue the second aim directly (which would be an immensely ambitious undertaking), he largely lets it emerge from a sympathetic presentation of Stoicism, but the fact that he finds the art of living a viable project for contemporary philosophy may enhance the interest of his book even among those (the majority, I suspect) who will remain quite sceptical.

It was Socrates, he argues, especially the Socrates of Plato's *Apology*, *Gorgias*, and *Alcibiades I*, who stimulated the Stoics to elaborate an ethical *technê* that combined theoretical principles (*logos*) with *askêsis*. Socrates was certainly the paradigm the Stoics were most eager to acknowledge, but it was not necessary for 'art of living' proponents to think of themselves as Socratics. The Epicureans, who confined their hagiography to Epicurus, were equally committed to the transformative power of the doctrines they recommended, and even the Pyrrhonian Sceptics, though officially resistant to the notion of an art of living, shared an analogously practical goal.

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S. acknowledges these points, but instead of a comprehensive survey of his main theme (which could have included much more than he reports from Epicurus as well as telling excerpts from Seneca and Plutarch) he focusses on Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, to each of whom he devotes a whole chapter. Readers who encounter this material for the first time will find him a generally reliable guide to the doctrinal content underpinning the plethora of imperatives which Arrian's *Manual* of Epictetus issues to its readers and which Marcus issues to himself. What they may not be encouraged to follow up, and what literary scholars will certainly miss, is any close attention to the rhetorical virtuosity and urgent tone of these Stoic authors, especially Epictetus, whom S. in his chapter on that figure represents through Arrian's somewhat grim summary rather than by close study of passages from the *Discourses*.

Why does that omission matter? If philosophy is to have a transformative effect on people's lives, it had better engage the emotions and aesthetics as well as the reason and practice of its hearers. Or, to put the point more forcefully, it had better be the sort of challenge to the whole person that Plato's Alcibiades evinces when he tells the sympotic company that Socrates is the only man who has ever made him feel shame (*Symp.* 216b). Epictetus took this point splendidly (see, for instance, *Diss.* 4.9). S. is anxious that the case he is making for a philosophical art of life should not appear to conflate its 'spiritual exercises' with a devaluation of 'rational argument' or conflate it with a 'religious way of life'. Unfortunately, his treatment of these categories is too imprecise and historically loose to do full justice to his general theme.

A more basic worry that I have concerns his ways of distinguishing between a 'philosophy conceived as rigorous argument and intellectual analysis' on the one hand and a philosophy of life. Aristotle's *Ethics* cuts right through this supposed dichotomy, but S. leaves his readers with the impression that for Aristotle *theoria* always trumps *praxis*. The book also suffers from advancing straw men when it comes to the moderns. Bernard Williams is one of S.'s principal instances of a philosopher who is supposed to doubt that rigorous philosophy 'could impact upon how someone leads their life' (p. 2). S.'s citations of Williams' work are confined to a review in the *Times Literary Supplement* and a three-page response to a paper by Sorabji. Yet in Williams' major works (e.g. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, included in S.'s bibliography), we encounter a thinker who was acutely engaged with issues such as truthfulness and a meaningful life, and whose last words in that book run: 'philosophy can help to make a society possible in which most people would live such lives, even if it still needs help to learn how best to do so. Some people might even get help from philosophy in living such a life – but not, as Socrates supposed, each reflective person, and not from the ground up'.

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ACHILLES TATIUS

MORALES (H.) *Vision and Narrative in Achilles Tatius' Leucippe and Clitophon*. Pp. xiv + 270, ill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Cased, £45, US\$75. ISBN: 0-521-64264-7.

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This book is a gem. M. very skilfully gathers the disparate threads of studies on Achilles Tatius and, tying them to her own perceptive insights, weaves a tight new

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