compliance and non-compliance which can only be understood in the context of detailed understanding of Serbia's contemporary history, its protracted transition and, in particular, the ambivalence with which the ICTY was regarded (12). This is where Ostojić's book is most interesting, in demonstrating that opposition to the ICTY was shared among Serbia's political elite, not just among nationalist politicians, but also among those who were not opposed to pursuing some form of transitional justice or accountability, but were nevertheless opposed to the ICTY because of its perceived threat to Serbia's fragile stability. This trend is made clear in his account of the immediate post-Milosevic era, including the arrest and transfer of Milošević in June 2001 and the murder of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić two years later (57–85).

In his discussion of "truth-telling," Ostojić exposes the difficulty with the purported didactic potential of the ICTY, where the "record" created by the Tribunal's judgements was supposed to provide an authoritative account. Ostojić shows how this was undermined by the perceived conflation of individual and collective responsibility in the conduct and coverage of the Milosevic trial and in the Genocide case at the International Court of Justice (126–146). Even the eventual, and hard-won, recognition of the fact that genocide had indeed occurred in Srebrenica by the Serbian parliament in 2010 "hardly reflected or facilitated reckoning with war crimes in Serbia" (160). The failure of the Tribunal to generate public engagement with issues of accountability for war crimes resulted from the attitudes and policies of Serbian elites, which ranged from outright denial, to cynical cooperation and finally, grudging partial acknowledgement (219). This leads to the somewhat depressing conclusion that the disconnect, or dissonance, between the ICTY and the way in which it was perceived in Serbia has engendered what Ostojić rightly terms an "ambivalent legacy" (217).

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Postsowjetischer Separatismus. Die pro-russländischen Bewegungen im moldauischen Dnjestr-Tal und auf der Krim 1989—1995. By Jan Zofka. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2015. 437 pp. Notes. Bibliography. EUR 39.90, hard bound.

This carefully written book (I noticed only one minor error, the misspelling of the English word "sovereignty" on page 63) can be recommended for its thorough treatment of the overall context of pro-Russian movements in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s and their specific local driving forces. The question of the relation between these movements and the present-day policies of President Vladimir Putin will inevitably be in the reader's mind. The author responds, however, that the Russian seizure of the Crimea in 2014 was "not the work of the pro-Russian movement of the 1990s," because twenty years later this movement "was in practice no longer in existence" (396). This is in fact slightly contradictory to his earlier assertion that "the activities of the pro-Russian nationalists in the Crimea since 1991 were a necessary prerequisite for its military appropriation" (10). One would have liked to see some attempt to reconcile those two statements.

Dr. Zofka adopts Carsten Wieland's position that "ethnic conflicts do not exist" (12) as the starting-point of his study, and he repeats the phrase at the end (408). The appearance of ethnicity, he says, emerges because narratives of conflict "serve the interests of political and economic elites" (13). The claim that "villagers spontaneously attack their neighbors out of hatred" is, he says, part of the "West's mythology about the Balkans, the Caucasus and Africa" (28). His study, in contrast, is located very

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clearly within the context of the recent effort by political scientists and sociologists to analyze ethnic conflicts in non-ethnic terms. Post-communist conflicts were "not the struggle of nations but of institutionally constituted national elites" (29). This assertion is backed up by a reference to the way new supposedly ethnically-based states arose in post-Soviet space on the basis of the administrative units set up in the Soviet Union by Vladimir Lenin and Iosif Stalin. Existing studies, according to the author, tell us nothing about the protagonists in these conflicts because they concentrate on the group or the international context. A wide range of literature both on post-Soviet conflict in general and Crimean and Moldovan conflicts in particular is then examined in order to show that no one has yet managed to produce "a sociology of post-Soviet territorial conflicts" (38). There has, he says, been too much concentration on a search for causes of conflict. What is important is to examine the *process* (my italics), preferably at the micro-level (410).

The author proceeds to do this by examining the two cases of the Crimea and Transnistria (or, in full, the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic). A long chapter is devoted to each case study, culminating in a collective biography of the participants, which underlines the differences between the two cases. In Transnistria leaders were strongly linked with the old administrative elite, whereas in the Crimea they were largely academics, doctors, and journalists, who emerged in the era of perestroika. In Transnistria there were existing power structures on which to build, whereas the pro-Russian movement in the Crimea, despite mass local support, lacked the power to confront the Ukrainian state. What the two cases had in common, though, was the absence of clear-cut ethnic lines of conflict. National affiliation was not the key factor. What was at stake here was "a continuation of local power struggles between different elite groups and different institutions" (406). The author argues convincingly for this conclusion. The Transnistrian separatists, for instance, were at first not fighting against the Moldovan government or the Moldovan People's Front but against "the local communist party apparatus" (406). Whether the author is right to use these case studies to back up a general thesis (or perhaps, more precisely, a methodological assumption) that ethnic conflicts never exist is more doubtful.

Dr. Zofka's book, which is based on a very thorough study of local newspapers and publications, interviews, archival sources and internet websites, makes few concessions to the casual reader. This perhaps reflects its origin as a doctoral thesis. There are no photographs and no maps of the two areas in question. This absence is all the more surprising given that the author stresses his concern to establish "the geography of the movements" (55), distinguishing, for instance, between the north and the south of the Crimea. The bibliography is long and exhaustive, but there is no index. An index, at least of personal names, would have been desirable particularly in view of the prosopographical character of these case studies.

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Augenzeugenschaft, Visualität, Politik. Polnische Erinnerungen an die deutsche Judenvernichtung. By Hannah Maischein. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016. 636 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. €89.99, hard bound.

Alongside Germany, no other European country has received greater international attention than Poland regarding its complex memory of the Nazi genocide of the Jews. Indeed, a very large literature now exists in English, German, Polish, French, and Hebrew on the topic of how non-Jewish Poles have both remembered and forgotten

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