

MYTH-MAKING: POLITICS, PROPAGANDA AND THE CAPTURE OF CADIZ IN 1596

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ABSTRACT. *The capture of Cadiz in 1596 was a spectacular but short-lived success in England's war against Spain. More enduring were the many partisan accounts of the victory, which were prepared and disseminated by various officers from the expedition. This article traces these rival narratives and explores their circulation in manuscript form, including the earl of Essex's notorious 'True relation'. Such documents illustrate the increasingly bitter divisions of late Elizabethan politics. The stories of Cadiz gained a fresh currency when England and Spain went to war again in the 1620s, placing a heavy burden of expectation on the government of Charles I.*

The Anglo-Dutch victory over a Spanish fleet at Cadiz,¹ and the subsequent seizure of the city itself, on 21 June 1596, was one of the very few decisive military successes of the long war between England and Spain in the late sixteenth century.² The victory at Cadiz was such a spectacular triumph that news of it resounded across Europe and helped to plunge the Spanish monarchy into a new round of bankruptcy proceedings.³ Within the English context, however, the victory at Cadiz immediately became the subject of fierce controversy. At the strategic level, the warm glow of triumph proved to be extremely fleeting. Lulled by the comprehensive nature of their victory, the English were taken by surprise when the Spanish managed to send a new armada against them only four months later. Although the Spanish fleet was destroyed in an autumn gale, any lingering euphoria was at once supplanted by

¹ An early version of this paper was given at the combined Australasian Historians of Medieval and Early Modern Europe/Australia and New Zealand Medieval and Renaissance Society conference, held in Hobart in February 1994. I am grateful for the encouragement that I received on that occasion.

² The standard account of this campaign remains J. S. Corbett, *The successors of Drake* (London, 1900), chs. 3–5. There is also much detail in S. and E. Usherwood, *The Counter-Armada, 1596: the journal of the 'Mary Rose'* (London, 1983). Briefer and more simplistic accounts are offered by A. Hayne, 'The Cadiz expedition, 1596', *History Today*, xxiii (1973), 161–9; H. Vetter, 'Faint smile in defeat', *Military History*, vii (1991), 22–8. For the Spanish view, see P. Pierson, *Commander of the Armada: the seventh duke of Medina Sidonia* (New Haven and London, 1989), ch. 11. Note that all dates in this article are Old Style, although the year is taken as beginning on 1 January.

³ For contemporary reports of this process, see, for example, L[ambeth] P[alace] L[ibrary], MS 655, fo. 89r–v; *ibid.* MS 659, fo. 156r; *ibid.* MS 660, fos. 258r–v, 260r–v. Much, but not all, of the material from L.P.L. MSS 647–662 (the papers of Anthony Bacon) is printed in the second volume of T. Birch, *Memoirs of the reign of Queen Elizabeth from the year 1581 till her death* (2 vols., London, 1754).

acute feelings of renewed vulnerability.⁴ Controversy also stalked the memory of Cadiz in more divisive ways. Almost as soon as the battle was won, English commanders rushed to send home letters and accounts describing their part in the victory. Over the ensuing months and years, this welter of competing claims and counter-claims transformed the events at Cadiz into a highly charged issue within late Elizabethan politics. This partisan battle of words and images produced a body of documentation for the Cadiz expedition that is unequalled by the sources surviving for any other Elizabethan naval venture. However, the politically-charged nature of these documents often makes them dangerous evidence.

Despite its success, the Cadiz expedition was not a happy one. From the start, the leadership of the venture was riven by conflict and personal jealousies. There were two commanders, the earl of Essex and the lord admiral, Lord Howard of Effingham, each with overlapping responsibilities and each accompanied by large numbers of their relatives, friends and followers.⁵ During April 1596, when they were diverted in a vain effort to relieve Calais, Essex and Howard came into open conflict. Howard complained that ‘I am yoused but as the druge’ and threatened to resign his command.⁶ Although the lord admiral’s ruffled feathers were quickly smoothed and amicable relations restored, tensions remained among their subordinates. Matters were further complicated by the fact that there were two separate chains of command for the Cadiz expedition, one for the fleet and one for the army, which were only linked through a joint council of war. The consequence was a series of personal rivalries among the senior officers which Essex, in particular, went to great lengths to reduce: ‘I am overwhelmed with the task I have here which, rather than I will not performe, I will not onlie loose my recreation of entertaining my friends but my very meate and sleepe.’⁷ Even so, sharp words between Sir Francis Vere, marshal of the army, and Arthur Throckmorton, brother-in-law of the rear-admiral, Sir Walter Raleigh, prompted Throckmorton’s arrest.⁸

⁴ R. B. Wernham, *The return of the Armadas: the last years of the Elizabethan war against Spain 1595–1603* (Oxford, 1994), ch. 9. The deliberations of the emergency committee convened to deal with this impending Spanish attack were drawn together and printed for official use by a later generation of English government officials in 1803: P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], SP 9/52, no. 23.

⁵ For general discussion of the life and career of Essex, see G. B. Harrison, *The life and death of Robert Devereux, earl of Essex* (London, 1937); R. Lacey, *Robert, earl of Essex: an Elizabethan Icarus* (London, 1970). For Howard, see R. W. Kenny, *Elizabeth’s admiral: the political career of Charles Howard, earl of Nottingham, 1536–1624* (Baltimore and London, 1970).

⁶ Hatfield House, Cecil MS 40/6. I am grateful for kind permission of the marquess of Salisbury to cite from his manuscripts. This document is printed in H[istorical] M[anuscripts] C[ommission], *A calendar of the manuscripts of the Most Hon. the marquis of Salisbury, KG, &c., preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire* (24 vols., London, 1883–1976), vi, 144 (hereafter cited as *HMCs*). For the frantic, but abortive, efforts to save Calais from the Spanish, see especially P.R.O., SP 12/257, *passim*.

⁷ Essex continued: ‘I am busied in bringing all this Chaos into order, in setting downe every man’s rank and degree that those under me may not fall together by the eares for presedensy and place, as in other armies hath bene sene’ (L.P.L., MS 657, fo. 139r). For these orders by Essex, see B[ritish] L[ibrary], Cotton MS Galba DXII, fos. 51r–54r.

⁸ As usual in quarrels between Elizabethan officers, events came to a head ‘att table in drincke’: L.P.L., MS 657, fos. 3v, 5v, 6r. See also A. L. Rowse, *Raleigh and the Throckmortons* (London, 1962), pp. 199–200. Vere later claimed that Raleigh and Conyers Clifford, an officer in the land force, were jealous of his position. Vere asserted that Essex only drew up the statement of rank on his

Such tensions persisted even in the heat of the battle itself. During the attack on the Spanish fleet, for example, Vere was determined not to be headed by Raleigh and tried to pull his own ship past Raleigh's by attaching a hawser to Raleigh's vessel. Raleigh cut the rope but, while these two officers were bickering, Essex took his own ship past both of them – all the while under intense cannon fire.⁹

Many commentators have used this and other incidents during the battle to exemplify the quintessentially Elizabethan obsession with personal honour and pride. Undeniably, these were proud men, even arrogant, and such concerns therefore featured prominently in the quest for publicity after Cadiz. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the impression that the conduct of the leading participants during the battle itself was just as scripted and self-conscious – and competitive – as the accounts which they later wrote for public consumption. Time and again, one senses a strong feeling of theatricality and deliberate performance. Raleigh, for instance, cheered the start of the attack with a well-chosen turn of Spanish, while Essex conspicuously threw his hat into the sea.¹⁰ A significant insight into this behaviour can perhaps be detected in a comment from a letter by Raleigh: 'What I have wrote is to yourself. What others shall deliver of me, I know not. The best wilbe that ther was 16,000 eye witnesses.'¹¹ The spotlight which leading participants later tried to cast upon themselves by their writing was therefore in keeping with their efforts to seize the limelight during the theatre of battle itself.

As well as personal point-scoring over honour – who fought longest in the most dangerous position, who performed the boldest deed – many of the claims and counter-claims that were circulated after Cadiz concerned the division of spoils. This was primarily due to the cleavage between army and navy officers and the differing opportunities for enrichment presented to these groups. Put simply, the army was able to pillage the city of Cadiz, while the navy missed out on their expected pot of gold. Rather than allow the English to seize the rich merchant fleet which was trapped in the bay, the Spanish burnt it before their eyes.¹² If evidence from a Dutch source is accurate, it was Raleigh who

urging. Both comments carry a strong odour of self-justification after the event (W. Dillingham, ed., 'The commentaries of Sir Francis Vere, being divers pieces of service wherein he had command; written by himself, in way of commentary', in E. Arber, ed., *An English garner: ingatherings from our history and literature* (8 vols., Westminster, 1895–6), vii, 81–2). Of the multitude of works on Raleigh, probably the most useful here are J. H. Adamson and H. F. Folland, *The shepherd of the ocean: an account of Sir Walter Raleigh and his times* (Boston, 1969); W. M. Wallace, *Sir Walter Raleigh* (Princeton, 1959); S. W. May, *Sir Walter Raleigh* (Boston, 1989), esp. ch. 1.

⁹ Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, pp. 79–95.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 75.

¹¹ F[olger] S[hakespeare] L[ibrary, Washington DC], MS V.b.214, fo. 109r. Another copy of this document, held in the Huntington Library, California, is printed by P. Lefranc, 'Raleigh in 1596 and 1603: three unpublished letters in the Huntington Library', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, xxix (1965–6), 344.

¹² The Spanish were perhaps more willing to take this action because the merchants who actually bore the loss were fellow countrymen of the Dutch force who were assisting the English: F. Braudel, *Civilization and capitalism 15th–18th century*. iii. *The perspective of the world*, trans. S. Reynolds (London, 1984), p. 209.

prevented soldier followers of Essex from attacking the merchant ships out of fear that the army would leave the seamen empty-handed.¹³ Whether this is true or not, the alleged maldistribution of spoils became a cause of anger among officers of the fleet. An anonymous letter addressed to John Stanhope,¹⁴ and circulated at court, gives a flavour of the resultant criticism: news of the fall of Cadiz was followed by the comment that, ‘within 2 dayes, all was sacked and spoiled, but the landmen had all’ – allegedly thereby denying both the sailors and the queen their fair share of the riches.¹⁵ As a consequence, Edward Reynoldes, Essex’s agent at home, feared that ‘the sea faction’ would ‘seeke to disgrace my lorde’s noble actions’.¹⁶ Essex was the commander of the army and the patron of many of its leading officers. In Reynoldes’ eyes, this made him the obvious and undeserving target for calumnies by naval officers who were jealous of his military success, and of the profits of his followers. With Essex absent and unable to defend himself, such accusations gained a momentum of their own. Looking back on events several weeks later, Anthony Bacon wrote that ‘my lord returned in the nick, for if his lordshipp had stayde never so little longer he had falne into such a quagmire of accusations as he would never have bene able to have clered himselfe’.¹⁷

Although the precise details remain obscure, there can be little doubt that criticism by the ‘sea faction’ helped to encourage a financial witch-hunt upon Essex’s return. This investigation was launched to recover booty illegally hidden by returning soldiers and sailors (and hence denied to the queen’s coffers).¹⁸ However, the inquisition also extended to searching questions about Essex’s own conduct.¹⁹ Bacon described the earl as ‘continualle baited like a

¹³ William Shute (trans), *The triumphs of Nassau: or, a description and representation of all the victories both by land and by sea, granted to the noble, high and mightie lords, the Estates Generall of the United Netherland Provinces, under the conduct and command of His Excellencie, Prince Maurice of Nassau* (London, 1613, S.T.C. no. 17676), p. 190. Shute’s work is a translation of J. J. Orlers and H. de Haestens, *Description et représentation de toutes les victoires... [de] Maurice de Nassau* (Leyden, 1612).

¹⁴ A fixture at court, Stanhope was master of the posts and a friend and relative of Sir Robert Cecil. He was knighted, created treasurer of the chamber and appointed to the privy council no later than 18 July 1596 (P.R.O., SO 3/1, fo. 599v; J. R. Dasent, ed., *A[cts of the] p[ri]vy c[ouncil of England]* (46 vols., London, 1890–1964), xxvi, 22).

¹⁵ L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 116r. Another copy of this letter is *ibid.* fo. 117r–v.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* fo. 9r. Edward Reynoldes was Essex’s personal secretary: P. E. J. Hammer, ‘The uses of scholarship: the secretariat of Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex, c.1585–1601’, *English Historical Review*, cix (1994), 26–51, *passim*.

¹⁷ L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 277r.

¹⁸ On 2 August, special commissioners were despatched to ensure that every ship returning from Cadiz was thoroughly searched (P.R.O., SO 3/1, fo. 604r; P.R.O., SP 12/259, fos. 185r–89r; B.L., Cotton MS Otho EIX, fos. 356r–62v). Elizabeth’s determination to pursue this issue was manifested in her own furious letter to the returning generals (*ibid.* fos. 363r–4r) and another from the privy council at her direction (*ibid.* Cotton MS Galba DXII, fos. 48r–49v; this letter is printed in *A.P.C.*, xxvi, 84–9). When inadequate amounts of booty were recovered, individual officers were called in to explain their conduct (eg. L.P.L., MS 659, fo. 15r). The result was claim and counter-claim between various officers (eg. P.R.O., SP 12/260, fo. 38r–v).

¹⁹ Essex and the lord admiral were required to appear before the queen and their fellow privy councillors to defend their actions on 18 August (L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 153r). This meeting failed to resolve the matter and another secret sitting of the council was held in the privy chamber on the following day (*ibid.* fo. 228r). The council register records only the text of letters despatched by the council on these days and give no indication of the heated discussions which took place

bear of Paris garden'.²⁰ As the scope of the inquest widened, so too did the outrage of those under attack. Essex himself privately complained about mushroom men who knew all the quaestorial arts.²¹ His friend Lord Willoughby, although not involved in the expedition, compared auditors to harpies, 'and contrary to sound judgment and weale publiques'.²²

Although the financial investigation which followed the return of the expedition assumed a distinctly partisan character, its genesis cannot be ascribed entirely to politics. The enquiry was launched at least in part because of what seems to have been a misjudgement by the commanders themselves. Flushed with their success, Essex and Howard sent back two freshly created knights, Sir Anthony Ashley and Sir Robert Cross, to report to the queen and privy council.²³ A copy of the report made by Ashley and Cross makes it clear that they placed great emphasis – undoubtedly at the direction of the generals – upon the financial rewards which Elizabeth could expect from the victory.²⁴ Indeed, Ashley and Cross added a dash of hyperbole to their account: 'the spoiles worth in the towne half that is London[sic]. The common souldiers, disdayning bagges of peper, sugar, wine and such grosse commodities, by the space of five or sixe dayes, with their armes full of silk and cloth of gold, in as ample a manner as if they had been in Cheapside... inasmuch as in their fullnesse they forbare St Lucas and two or thre prety villages.'²⁵ When the queen received little money from the returning force, the heightened expectations that this hyperbole had aroused turned to royal indignation.

Although news of the victory had already been spread by returning

(*A.P.C.*, xxvi, 120–2). For the direct criticism of Essex in particular, see L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 106r–v, MS 659, fos. 160r–v, 161r–v. ²⁰ *Ibid.* fo. 161r.

²¹ W[arwick County] R[ecord] O[ffice], TD 69/6(ii), item 75, Essex to Antonio Perez, 16 Sept. 1596. I am grateful to the earl of Aylesford for his kind permission to cite from this document. The letter is printed in G. Ungerer, *A Spaniard in Elizabethan England: the correspondence of Antonio Perez's exile* (2 vols., London, 1974–76), I, 264.

²² B.L., Egerton MS 1943, fo. 78v. Willoughby also wrote a paper clearly backing Essex for the vacant post of master of the ordnance, which shares the same aggressive tone towards bureaucrats: 'Consider that none but a Hercules cann cutt of Hydra's heades of ignoraunce or Alexander unloose Gorgus' knott of ill customes and abuses crept yn' (*ibid.* fo. 86r).

²³ Ashley was a clerk of the privy council who served as secretary to the expedition's council of war. He had served in a similar capacity on the Portugal expedition of 1589, in which Essex was also a leading figure (R. B. Wernham, ed., *The expedition of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake to Spain and Portugal, 1589* (Navy Records Society, vol. cxxvii, 1988), pp. xxx–xxxii, 202–3). Cross was a former associate of Sir Francis Drake and acted as the subordinate commander of Raleigh's squadron (Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, pp. 58–9). They left the fleet on 9 July, with Ashley sailing on the 'Lion's Whelp', and Cross, in company with the sick earl of Sussex and Essex's steward, Gelly Meyrick, on the 'Swiftsure' (Usherwood, *Counter-Armada*, p. 152). Henry Cuffe (see below) also returned to England at this time, presumably on Ashley's ship. Ashley arrived ahead of the others, leaving Plymouth on horseback by 28 July (Hatfield, Cecil MS 42/103).

²⁴ Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 297, fo. 23r–24v. This document is a seventeenth century copy and is headed 'A true report brought to Her Majestie of the Earle of Essex's voyage 1596 by Sir Antonie Ashley and Sir Robert Crosse, two new made knights'. It is quite different from the statement given by Ashley which survives as a 'vera copia' by George Buck: B.L., Cotton MS Otho EIX, fo. 349r–v. ²⁵ Corpus Christi College, MS 297, fo. 24r–v.

merchants,²⁶ Ashley and Cross were the first messengers sent back from the fleet itself. As a result, both of them also brought home a range of accounts of the action written by other men. Ashley was particularly important in this respect because he was known to be headed for court immediately after his return to England. Among the papers that Ashley carried back was a studiously balanced letter from the lord admiral to his father-in-law, Lord Hunsdon, the lord chamberlain, who died before the letter could be delivered.²⁷ Ashley also probably carried at least two accounts of the victory by Raleigh, one addressed to his friend the earl of Northumberland and another to his cousin Arthur Gorges.²⁸ There were also letters from Sir Christopher Blount, the husband of Essex's mother, and Anthony Standen, the former spy.²⁹ There was also a report to Burghley about the victory from a Captain Price.³⁰ No doubt, Sir Robert Cross and those who sailed with him also carried home various packets from others. Taken together, this welter of information about the victory at Cadiz opened the way for partisan debate in England about the true architects of the triumph. More immediately, the claims of corruption and deceit among the army which began to circulate from the 'sea faction' reinforced Elizabeth's determination to proceed with the financial investigation.

As the weeks passed, the cleavage between the land and sea officers increasingly came down to a rivalry between the earl of Essex and Sir Walter Raleigh. Despite his previous brushes with Essex, or perhaps because of them, the lord admiral remained publicly aloof from the battle for acclaim after

²⁶ An unknown correspondent informed Sir Thomas Kitson on 23 July that statements had been taken from merchants landing in the West Country, 'wherof many copies are everywhere published' (Bodl[eian Library, Oxford], Tanner MS 77, fo. 93r. It is possible that this was how the letter to Stanhope arrived in England: Reynoldes complained that this document was a 'forerunner', beating Ashley to court by a day (L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 259r).

²⁷ For copies of this letter, see F.S.L., MS V.b.214, fos. 247v–250v; L.P.L., MS 658, fos. 55r–56r. Hunsdon died on 23 July 1596. Howard's letter also served as the basis for a separate short account of the expedition: B.L., Stowe MS 164, fos. 90r–91r. As Corbett suggests (p. 414), this was probably drafted by the lord admiral's secretary. Other copies of this document include F.S.L., V.b.142, fos. 13r–14r and Woburn Abbey, H.M.C. Bedford 13 (Journal of Sir William Russell), fos. 89r–91r. The latter source states that the document was received by Russell, lord deputy of Ireland in a packet from England on 28 August 1596, although the identity of the sender is not recorded (ibid. fo. 89r). A list of the knights made at Cadiz accompanies the Stowe and Russell manuscripts. (I am grateful to the marquess of Tavistock and the Trustees of the Bedford Estate for permission to cite the document at Woburn Abbey.)

²⁸ Raleigh's letter to Northumberland is printed in [W.] Oldys and [T.] Birch, *The works of Sir Walter Raleigh* (8 vols., Oxford, 1829, repr. New York, [1965]), viii, 667–74). For Raleigh's letter to Gorges, see Lefranc, 'Raleigh in 1596 and 1603,' pp. 340–4. Lefranc suggests that the latter report was not carried by Ashley (p. 338, n. 5) but his arguments are not very convincing. Raleigh certainly did make use of Ashley's services because he mentions this explicitly in a letter to Cecil dated 7 July: E. Edwards, *The life of Sir Walter Raleigh* (2 vols., London, 1868), ii, 134–5. For brief comments on Raleigh's Cadiz letters, see May, *Raleigh*, pp. 59–60.

²⁹ Blount's letter, dated 5 July, was directed to Lady Penelope Rich, Essex's sister (L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 198r). Standen wrote to Anthony Bacon (ibid. MS 658, fo. 145r–v) and also to Lord Burghley, the latter an obvious attempt to curry favour in the hope of resuscitating his ruined career (B.L., Harleian MS 6845, fos. 101r–102r). For Standen, see P. E. J. Hammer, 'An Elizabethan spy who came in from the cold: the return of Anthony Standen to England in 1593', *Historical Research*, LXV (1992), 277–95.

³⁰ B.L., Lansdowne MS 82, fos. 156r–158r.

Cadiz. Lord Thomas Howard, the vice admiral, was more concerned to ensure that Essex would guarantee him a healthy profit from the voyage.³¹ This left Raleigh as the only clear rival to Essex from among the naval officers. Raleigh's candidacy to be the hero of Cadiz was strengthened by a number of factors. Perhaps above all, Raleigh was an expert self-publicist and had already established a public reputation as a professed naval expert. His defence of the reputation of his relative Sir Richard Grenville for the loss of the *Revenge* in 1591 was an enormously successful piece of propaganda.³² In the months immediately prior to the Cadiz expedition, Raleigh gave another example of his literary abilities by publishing an account of his recent expedition to the Orinoco.³³ The joint dedication to this book was also interesting because it made clear that Raleigh was both a relative of the lord admiral and a friend of Essex's arch political rival, Sir Robert Cecil.³⁴ This latter bond proved highly significant for events in 1596.

After years of striving for the post, and years of opposition from Essex, Sir Robert Cecil finally succeeded in obtaining the post of principal secretary of state on 5 July.³⁵ Essex's reaction to the news suggests how profoundly this altered the political balance at court:

This vexed him to the soule, as I knowe certaine of myne owne knowledge, for I was the first that gave him notice thereof, meeting him att sea, which discontent hee could not conceale, being thereupon exceedingly dejected in countenance and bitterly passionate in speech, vehemently affirming unto mee that hee had to the uttermost of his power withstood it above a yeare and att his going from the Court the queene had given him a faithfull promise not to doe it, and had confirmed her promise by her letter sent to him to Plymmouth before his setting saile.³⁶

Cecil's promotion and his subsequent actions as secretary were interpreted by followers of Essex as the start of a push by Cecil and his friends – including Raleigh – against the interests of the earl and themselves. In this highly polarized atmosphere, the investigation of financial aspects of the Cadiz voyage increasingly seemed like a partisan process. Essex's friends were therefore mightily pleased when news arrived about the Spanish treasure fleet at the start of September which vindicated the earl's attempts to delay the return of the expedition and 'greatly and justly incensed Her Majesty' against leading seamen, and Sir Walter Raleigh in particular.³⁷ Yet, even so, the rumblings

³¹ L.P.L., MS 658, fos. 240r, 245r–v (pr. Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 114–16).

³² *A report of the truth of the fight about the Iles of the Acores, this last sommer...* (London, 1591, S.T.C. no. 20651). Raleigh's narrative effectively dominated our understanding of this event until the publication of P. Earle, *The last fight of the Revenge* (London, 1992).

³³ *The discoverie of the large, rich and bewtiful empyre of Guiana, with the relation of the great and golden citie of Manoa...* (London, 1596, S.T.C., no. 20636). This work is discussed at length in S. Greenblatt, *Sir Walter Raleigh: the Renaissance man and his roles* (New Haven and London, 1973), pp. 99ff.

³⁴ Raleigh, *Discoverie of Guiana*, sig. A2r.

³⁵ *A.P.C.*, xxvi, 7. For a brief overview of this rivalry and its place in the politics of the 1590s, see P. E. J. Hammer, 'Faction, patronage at court and the earl of Essex', in J. Guy, ed., *The reign of Elizabeth I: Court and culture in the last decade* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 65–86.

³⁶ B.L., Egerton MS 2026, fo. 32r. The author of this document is not identified, although 'Sr N S' is written above the first line of the passage quoted. ³⁷ L.P.L., MS 659, fo. 160r–v.

about booty did not die away immediately. On 7 September, Cecil and his father, Lord Burghley, the lord treasurer, openly criticised Essex in the presence of the queen about the loss of booty. As Essex wrote to Anthony Bacon, ‘this day I was more braved by your little cosin then ever I was by any man in my lyfe’.³⁸

The significance of the link between Raleigh and Cecil did not depend entirely upon the new, and seemingly aggressive, stance of Cecil. It also seemed important because of previous tensions between Raleigh and Essex. These made Cecil’s association with Raleigh seem ominous to supporters of Essex. As is well known, Raleigh had been a royal favourite earlier in his career, when he and Essex had been bitter rivals for the queen’s countenance. On several occasions in the late 1580s, Raleigh and Essex almost came to blows. However, Raleigh was sequestered from his post as captain of the queen’s guard and denied access to court after the revelation of his secret marriage to Elizabeth Throckmorton in July 1592. After years in the political wilderness, public association with the victory at Cadiz now seemed to offer Raleigh a likely prospect of recovering royal favour. This hope was most clearly expressed in the anonymous letter addressed to John Stanhope, a close friend of Cecil: ‘he [Raleigh] diserved very much in this that he fought so bravely with the Spanish fleete while they were overthrowne. If our soveraigne mistris had seen it, it would, I thinke, have been a sufficient expiation of all his faults whatsoever. I have allwayes held him to be wise, and now I am testipo de vista that he is a very valiant seaman.’³⁹ When Edward Reynoldes sent his master a copy of this letter on 9 August, he noted tartly that ‘a blinde man may see whereat he aimeth. His [Raleigh’s] friends in Court do all imodestly broch and publish his praise, aswell by lettres as by speach.’⁴⁰ Behind Reynoldes’ words lay the fear that Raleigh’s recovery of royal favour would make him a powerful ally for those courtiers who were now clearly seeking to oppose Essex.

The suspicions of Reynoldes and others about the way in which Cadiz might be used to support the rehabilitation of Raleigh were certainly justified. When the queen and privy council banned all publications about Cadiz,⁴¹ it was decided that a single official account of the victory should be produced. This was drafted by Sir Anthony Ashley under the direction of Cecil and Burghley.⁴² In the event, this account was apparently never published but at least two copies survive, one of them the original draft which bears amendments in the hand of Sir Robert Cecil.⁴³ Cecil’s changes are highly instructive because they

³⁸ Ibid. fo. 142r.

³⁹ Ibid. MS 658, fo. 116r.

⁴⁰ Ibid. fo. 260r.

⁴¹ Longleat House, Wiltshire, Devereux MS 2, fo. 90r. I am grateful to the marquess of Bath for permission to cite from these papers.

⁴² B.L., Lansdowne MS 82, fo. 178r. Corbett incorrectly suggested that this official account was based upon the letter which the lord admiral wrote to the late Lord Hunsdon (Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, pp. 439–40).

⁴³ P.R.O., SP 12/259, fos. 226r–227r. A copy of the amended text is among the papers of Anthony Bacon: L.P.L., MS 657, fos. 218r–219r. It is endorsed in French as the relation which ought to have been printed (‘La relation qui doit estre imprimée ...’), suggesting that it was never published. No such work is listed in the *S.T.C.*

generally down-play the role of Essex in the victory and emphasise the part played by Raleigh and other naval officers. After one reference to Raleigh, Cecil inserted: 'who was hurt out of the Philip'. In place of 'our general', Cecil preferred the more neutral 'therl of Essex'. In a list of officers prominent in the sea battle, Cecil deleted 'Mr Dudley, Captayne Crosse and other [gentlemen]' and wrote 'Sir Robert Sowthwell and one or two more [gentlemen]'. Dudley was Essex's step-brother, while Southwell was the son-in-law of the lord admiral. In the section describing the attack on the city, Cecil even added a whole new sentence: 'The lord admiral seconded the erl with a sea regiment of 1200 at the wyning of the towne.'

While the so-called 'sea faction' were busy pushing the cause of Raleigh, the earl of Essex was far from inactive in advancing his own interests. Traditionally, historians have wanted to ascribe Essex's attempts at publicity after Cadiz to sheer vainglory. However, since 1953, when L. W. Henry published an article on Essex's military planning, these endeavours have appeared in a rather different light – as a deliberate attempt to influence a continuing debate within the Elizabethan regime about the direction of England's war effort.⁴⁴ In this broader context, the whole Cadiz expedition was a political football of the first order. What became the Cadiz expedition initially evolved as a reluctant response to the news that a new armada was being prepared in Spanish ports. For Elizabeth, the aim of the venture was to neutralise the Spanish fleet before it could leave port, and hopefully also to capture some rich treasure ships in the process, as a way of paying for the operation. Among her advisers and military men, however, there were a range of other opinions.⁴⁵ Above all, the earl of Essex wanted to use this venture not simply to make a raid on Spain but to seize a permanent base there. Instead of 'idle wanderings upon the sea',⁴⁶ he would plant a thorn deep in the king of Spain's side. By this means, he hoped to be able to isolate metropolitan Spain from its transmarine empire and destroy Spanish power in its entirety.⁴⁷ In the light of the dubious practicality of this plan, not to mention the eye-watering quantity of resources which it would require, Elizabeth and Burghley, her oldest and most trusted adviser, rejected it outright.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, when the fleet sailed, Essex left a long letter advising the privy council that he would attempt to implement his plan, regardless of the queen's instructions.⁴⁹ Delivery of this letter to the privy council was carefully

⁴⁴ L. W. Henry, 'The earl of Essex as strategist and military organizer (1596–7)', *English Historical Review*, LXXIII (1953), 363–93.

⁴⁵ Wernham, *Return of the Armadas*, pp. 55–9, 82–90; W. T. MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth I: war and politics 1588–1603* (Princeton, 1992), pp. 107–29. ⁴⁶ Henry, 'Essex as strategist', p. 366.

⁴⁷ Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex, *To Maister Anthonie Bacon. An apologie of the earle of Essex, against those which falsly and maliciously taxe him to be the onely hinderer of the peace and quiet of his country* (London, [1600], S.T.C. no. 6788), sig. A4r–v.

⁴⁸ This was reflected in the instructions which were given to Essex and Howard (B.L., Cotton MS Otho EIX, fos. 343r–48v). The generals' commission was also carefully drafted by Elizabeth, Burghley and Cecil (Cambridge University Library, MS Ee.iii.56, no. 87).

⁴⁹ The original is P.R.O., Sp 12/259, fos. 30r–31v, which is followed by two copies (fos. 33r–37r, 38r–43v). The original bears some marginal annotations in the hand of Burghley.

delayed until after the fleet was beyond recall.⁵⁰ After the capture of Cadiz, debate on whether to hold the city raged for several days among the senior officers of the expedition, and Essex's intention was only barely foiled.⁵¹ Such behaviour may well have encouraged Elizabeth to break her promise to Essex and appoint Cecil as secretary of state. It certainly reaffirmed the determination of a growing number of leading courtiers to oppose Essex and cut him down to size.⁵²

Once it became apparent that Cadiz would be abandoned, Essex took urgent measures to try and keep the victorious army in being for other offensive action. He required Ashley to ensure that officials in disembarkation ports would not dismiss any of the returning veteran troops.⁵³ Next he ordered Reynoldes to make discreet approaches to the Dutch ambassador and French *chargé d'affaires* to have them urge the queen to employ the army on the continent, preferably to recapture Calais. Further secret initiatives were directed at the City of London, through the offices of the remembrancer, Dr Giles Fletcher.⁵⁴ In contrast to his Europeanist overtures to the foreign diplomats, the scheme to encourage London to volunteer resources for new military action was deliberately nationalistic: 'for the makinge of Callais Englishe.'⁵⁵ This tailoring of approaches to suit his intended audience depended upon a careful appreciation of the desires of each party and strict secrecy. As Reynoldes reported back, 'this we have donne severallie and secretlie, none of these knowinge what hath bene imparted to the other'.⁵⁶ Whether any of these

⁵⁰ 'Which yow shall deliver butt nott till the wind hath so served us att least a weeke as yow may judg us to be in Spayne' (W.R.O., TD 69/6(ii), item 80, Essex to Reynoldes, 31 May [1596]). Copies of the letter were also privately circulated among some of the friends whom Essex left behind, although the number of copies was meant to be strictly limited (Bodl., Tanner MS 77, fo. 93v). In addition to those manuscripts mentioned in the previous note, copies of Essex's letter to the privy council include: F.S.L., V.b.214, fos. 103r–105r; *ibid.* V.b.142, fo. 45r–v; Society of Antiquaries, London, MS 200/201, no. 56; Bodl., Tanner MS 89r–92v. A cut-down version of the letter is F.S.L., V.b.142, fo. 15r–v.

⁵¹ In addition to the material cited by Corbett (*Successors of Drake*, pp. 109–13), see Shute, *Triumphs of Nassau*, pp. 192–3.

⁵² Although the marginal notations on Essex's letter are not very enlightening, it seems significant that the comment 'I [have] forgotten those reverend formes which I shoulde have used' is heavily underlined (P.R.O., SP 12/259, fo. 30v).

⁵³ B.L., Cotton MS Otho EIX, fo. 349r–v.

⁵⁴ Specifically, Essex wanted Caron, the Dutch ambassador, to lobby to ensure that experienced soldiers withdrawn from the English forces in the Low Countries were returned there if they were not used for some other service helpful to the Dutch cause. Mons. de la Fontaine, the minister of the French Church in London and resident agent for Henri IV, was encouraged to agitate for a strike on Calais or at least a bolstering of the forces around Boulogne. It was planned that this lobbying would be reinforced by the duke of Bouillon, who was expected in England shortly to ratify a treaty on behalf of the French king. Fletcher professed himself 'intirelye devoted to my lord' and won over the London authorities. As a result, they approached the lord treasurer to declare 'a great readines in the City to contribute very largely to the uttermost of their ability.' For all of this, see L.P.L., MS 657, fo. 106r–v; *ibid.* MS 658, fos. 136r, 202r, 272r.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* MS 658, fo. 136r.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* MS 657, fo. 106r. Following Essex's directions, Reynoldes allowed only Anthony Bacon to be complicit in this scheme. Essex's original letter of instruction to Reynoldes was apparently destroyed but Bacon made a copy, complete with the instruction: 'this is onlie for your owne eyes and after for the fire' (*ibid.* MS 658, fo. 136r).

activities became known to the queen or his rivals is unclear. However, there can be little doubt that the Cecils and others at court were highly suspicious of Essex and encouraged Elizabeth to give priority to Irish matters over any costly new operation on the continent.⁵⁷ In turn, Essex's awareness of this hostility and his profound frustration at the way his plans were constantly thwarted gave a special urgency to his propaganda after Cadiz.

The best-known example of Essex's proselytising is the notorious affair of the so-called 'True relacion'. This partisan account of the battle at Cadiz was hastily composed 'according to his lordship's large enstructions' by Henry Cuffe, one of the earl's secretaries, and brought back to England by Cuffe and Ashley.⁵⁸ In accordance with orders from Essex, Cuffe sent Edward Reynoldes the following instructions about the document:

I would wish you to penne a better [preface] of the same argument and prefixe it that the whole may seeme a letter sent from Calez, and the title in the tytle page may be *A true relacion of the action at Calez the 21 of June, under the earl of Essex and lord admiral, sent to a gentleman in Court from one that served there in good place*. And, withall, conferre with Mr Grivill whether he can be contented to suffer the 2 first lettres of his name to be used in the inscription, which, if he graunt, he must be entreated not to take notice of the author but to give out that indeede he receved it amongst other papers by the first messenger... the subscription may [be] DT or some other designed name as you shall thinke good... If he be unwillinge, you may put RB, which some noe doubt will interpret to be Mr Beale, but it skills not...⁵⁹

Devious as they were, these efforts at dissimulation ultimately counted for nought. News of the 'True relacion' was leaked to the privy council by Ashley and its publication was suppressed by the queen, allegedly on pain of death.⁶⁰ Almost certainly, Ashley betrayed the document in a vain attempt to protect himself after being caught with undeclared spoils from Cadiz.⁶¹

⁵⁷ In the event, the 2000 or so men drawn from the forces in the Low Countries were sent back but only 1000 of the other troops were not dismissed to save money. The thousand men were sent to serve under Sir John Norris in Ireland (B.L., Cotton MS Galba DXII, fo. 49r-v). Norris was a bitter rival of Essex and a client of the Cecils. He had originally requested 3000 of Essex's soldiers but had to make do with the lesser number (P.R.O., SP 63/191, fos. 239r, 274r).

⁵⁸ Cuffe describes the composition of the 'True relacion' as almost a joint effort with Essex: 'besides my owne knowledge, he enformed me of sundry particulers of moment in the processe therof. And after I had penned it as plainely as I might, alteringe little or nothing of his owne drawght, I caused his lordship to peruse it on[c]e againe and to adde extremam manum, which he hath done, as yow may perceve by the enterlyninge' (L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 88r). For Cuffe, see Hammer, 'Uses of scholarship', passim.

⁵⁹ L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 88r-v. 'Calez' or 'Cales' was the normal English rendering of Cadiz at the time. 'Mr Grivill' was Fulke Greville, an intimate friend of Essex who was working to protect the earl's interests at court during his absence. 'Mr Beale' was Robert Beale, a clerk of the privy council and inveterate collector of interesting documents. Many of his papers now constitute that massive part of the Additional MSS series at the B.L. previously known as the Yelverton MSS. Essex and Beale had had a falling out in 1595, so Cuffe's suggestion is probably intended to be an unfriendly gesture.

⁶⁰ The whole story is recounted by Reynoldes for Essex in L.P.L., MS 658, fos. 259r-60v.

⁶¹ Ashley's plight is reported by Cecil in a letter to George Carey of Cockington, one of the commissioners responsible for seizing booty for the queen. Cecil urged Carey to make a special

The failed attempt to circumvent the ban on publications about Cadiz with the ‘True relacion’ ensured rigorous enforcement of the order thereafter – despite much ‘gaping’ amongst the printers for copy about the victory.⁶² This presumably explains why a journal compiled by Sir George Carew was retained by the archbishop of Canterbury, who acted as the government’s chief censor.⁶³ A composite account compiled by the commercial publisher Richard Robinson in October also seems to have been kept from the presses.⁶⁴ This censorship was still very much in force at the end of 1598, when Richard Hakluyt published a new edition of his *Principal navigations*. Hakluyt was forced to recall the book in order to delete a lengthy narrative of the Cadiz expedition and remove all reference to it from his title page.⁶⁵

Bans on publication did not deter Essex: they merely made his propagandising more difficult. As he wrote to Edward Reynoldes, ‘I must, like a watermen, rowe one waie and looke another.’⁶⁶ Copies of the ‘True relacion’ were therefore translated and despatched into France, The Netherlands, and northern Italy.⁶⁷ Dr Henry Hawkyns, Essex’s agent at Venice, also tried to have this account included in Cesare Campana’s new *History of the world*, then

effort to track down all of Ashley’s spoils in order to protect himself from the queen’s anger (B.L., Cotton MS Otho EIX, fos. 372v–373r). Ashley was pleading for Burghley’s favour over the matter by 8 August (ibid. Lansdowne MS 82, fo. 178r). According to Standen, Ashley had ‘well flesht hymselfe in this place’ (L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 145r). He was still in prison and apparently offering to inform against Essex in mid-October. However, Cecil did not trust ‘the knave’ (ibid. MS 659, fo. 233r).

⁶² B.L., Cotton MS Julius CIII, fo. 280r. The expression comes from a letter of Thomas Nashe, who opined that printers who failed to publish Cadiz material would not get ‘a scute or a dandiprat’ (pr. R. B. McKerrow, *The works of Thomas Nashe* (5 vols., 1904–1910, Oxford, 1966 edn), v, 194).

⁶³ L.P.L., MS 250, fos. 344r–362v. This document forms the basis of Usherwood, *Counter-Armada*, and is printed as Appendix 1 (pp. 124–58). The suggestion that the journal was censored is made in Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, p. 444.

⁶⁴ Bodl., Rawlinson MS B 259, fos. 47r–61v. The work is entitled ‘An English quid for a Spanish quo’. The narrative section (fos. 54r–57v) is allegedly based upon a journal compiled by one Swansley, a servant to the lord admiral. It also includes a copy of the lord admiral’s letter to Hunsdon (fos. 58r–60r). It is conceivable that Robinson may have been assisted by the lord admiral in preparing this volume.

⁶⁵ C. E. Armstrong, ‘The “Voyage to Cadiz” in the second edition of Hakluyt’s “Voyages”’, *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, LIX (1955), 254–62; D. B. Quinn, ed., *The Hakluyt handbook* (2 vols., Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser., vols. 144–5, London, 1974), II, 49off. Hakluyt’s account of the expedition was based upon the journal kept by Dr Roger Marbeck, who travelled as physician to the lord admiral. Judging by the survival of at least two fair copies, Marbeck’s narrative may have been privately circulated in manuscript form (B.L., Stow MS 159, fos. 353r–69v; ibid. Sloane MS 226, whole vol.). For Hakluyt’s edited version of this account, see R. Hakluyt, *The principal navigations voyages and discoveries of the English nation* (12 vols., Glasgow, 1903–5), IV, 236–68.

⁶⁶ L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 136r.

⁶⁷ Distribution of the document in France was entrusted to Mons. de la Fontaine, the French agent in London, while Thomas Bodley, the queen’s former ambassador at The Hague, was given charge of the copies in Dutch (ibid. fo. 259v). Anthony Bacon sent a copy of the tract to Dr Henry Hawkyns for translation into Italian on 7 August 1596 (ibid. fo. 162r), while Reynoldes sent a copy to James Guicciardini, Essex’s agent at Florence (*H.M.C.S.*, VII, 95).

about to go to press.⁶⁸ Despite ‘the cordiall wurking of gould’, this bold attempt at European-wide publicity seems to have failed because of the author’s fear of Spanish retribution.⁶⁹ Manuscript copies of the ‘True relacion’ were also sent to Scotland,⁷⁰ as well as being circulated within England itself. Although kept from a mass audience by the ban on printing, Essex’s account of the victory at Cadiz was far from being suppressed entirely. Like some other narratives, such as that written by Dr Marbeck, the ‘True relacion’ enjoyed a steady existence through the circulation of manuscript copies among members of the elite.⁷¹ Judging by the greater number of copies of Essex’s document which survive, it seems that the earl devoted considerable scribal effort to winning the propaganda battle over Cadiz. However, far more telling evidence about Essex’s aims is provided by the inter-relationship between these copies. For the links between these documents show precisely how Essex’s propaganda was created and developed.

There has been much uncertainty over the years about the precise identity of Essex’s ‘True relacion’. In his detailed appendix on the extant sources for the Cadiz expedition, J. S. Corbett suggested that the most likely candidate is Sloane MS 1303, folios 3r-6r.⁷² Corbett is essentially correct, although the reality is somewhat more complicated. In Queen’s College, Oxford, there is a document titled ‘Secretarie Cuffs letter to a ffreind describinge the takinge of Cales’.⁷³ Detailed scrutiny of this letter proves that this title is credible. The contents and wording of this document are very close to those of the Sloane manuscript but careful comparison reveals some highly significant differences. A few examples will suffice: ‘after the fight with the gallies beinge ended, Sir Walter Raleigh and the foremost shipps wayed anker and soe they all bare in with the shipps’ becomes ‘anone after, the lord generall [ie Essex], cuminge up to Sir Walter Rawleye and the lord martiall [i.e. Sir Francis Vere], caused them to weighe anchor and so they all bare in with the shippes’; ‘this greate victory being bestowed by God’s greate and speciall favour, the generalls determined to pursue it with all possible expedition...’ becomes ‘this greate victorye bestowed upon us by God’s espetiall favour, the lord generall determined to pursue it with all expedition’; ‘prisoners doe with sighes and teares protest that 19 of the shipps which we have destroyed with the St Mathew and the St Andrew, which we have taken, were able to beate the greatest parte of the shipps that the kinge hath left’ becomes ‘doe with sighes and teares proteste

⁶⁸ Ibid. MS 660, fo. 254r; *ibid.* MS 656, fo. 244v. The work in question was a new, enlarged edition of Campana’s *Delle historie del mondo*, divided into thirteen parts (Venice, 1596). The previous edition (Venice, 1591) had been divided into four parts.

⁶⁹ L.P.L., MS 660, fo. 254r.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* MS 658, fo. 259v.

⁷¹ On this phenomenon in general, see H. R. Woudhuysen, *Sir Philip Sidney and the circulation of manuscripts, 1558–1640* (Oxford, 1996), chs. 1–6, and H. Love, *Scribal publication in seventeenth century England* (Oxford, 1993), chs. 1–2.

⁷² Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, pp. 440–1.

⁷³ Queen’s College, MS 121, pp. 532–40. This document is a copy, not the original. As a well-connected Oxford man, it is not surprising that Cuffe’s letter was preserved within the university. The friend in question may well have been Henry Savile, warden of Merton College and Cuffe’s friend and mentor. However, in the absence of any evidence, this must be regarded as no more than speculation.

that one quarter of the shippes that we have distroyed with the St Mathew and the St Andrewe, which we have taken, were able to beate the best parte of the shippes that the kinge of Spayne hath in the world'.⁷⁴ Time and again, it seems, the wording of the Oxford document has been modified in the Sloane manuscript to produce a tighter and altogether more partisan account. Ironically, the only passage in the Sloane manuscript which has no antecedent in the Cuffe letter is an entirely disingenuous claim to honesty at the end.⁷⁵ In light of Cuffe's own comments about the composition of the 'True relacion', the manuscript at Queen's College must be the version which included changes to Cuffe's original draft suggested by Essex himself. The Sloane manuscript must therefore represent the next stage in the process, embodying changes which stem from Essex's own final editing of the 'True relacion'.

If Cuffe's 'letter to a ffreind' formed the basis of the Sloane manuscript, a range of other related manuscripts reveal further signs of elaboration. At least four copies of the Sloane manuscript⁷⁶ add a new ending to the document, suggesting that another discourse would soon be available which would explain what happened after the capture of Cadiz.⁷⁷ Two of these documents also add a new preamble which borrows from the cynical conclusion to the Sloane manuscript in order to express the same claim about accuracy and lack of bias.⁷⁸ The preface may be the work of Edward Reynoldes. In a hasty letter

⁷⁴ In light of subsequent events, it is ironic that the Sloane manuscript adds a laudatory comment about Anthony Ashley: 'who was ever with the lord generall in all the fightes'. There is no mention of Ashley in the Queen's College manuscript. This suggests that the addition was made either to explain Ashley's knighting on 27 June or to appease him before his return to England.

⁷⁵ 'Yow shall find [this account] neyther coulored with arte nor in anye part amplyfyed beyond the truth, bothe of these [faults] havinge beene most clearly avoyded, and a playne and direct narration of particulars religiouslye observed. Vivat regina' (B.L., Sloane MS 1303, fo. 6v).

⁷⁶ N[ational] M[aritime] M[useum], MS PHB/P/1; FSL, MS V.b.214, fos. 254v–259v; B.L., Add[itional] MS 48152, fos. 249r–253v; Inner Temple Library, Petyt MS 538, vol. 46, fos. 194r–197r. All four copies also correct the error made at the start of the Sloane MS by changing the day of the fleet's departure from Plymouth Sound from a Wednesday to a Thursday. It is interesting that the copy from the Inner Temple Library ends with the initials D. T., just as Cuffe suggested to Reynoldes.

⁷⁷ 'Thus have you, accordinge to my promise, the some of all that passed the xxi daye of June, towchinge as well the defeate of the kinge's navye as the takinge of his towne of Cales. Sithence which tyme untill this presente nothinge memorable on either syde hath ben attempted, only of late there hath ben a consultation holden whether the towne should be maynteyned with a garrison or within a few dayes abandoned, and many reasons of either partie hath ben alleadged, which because I understand a gentleman of great sufficiencie is resolved not onely to lay together but also to examin, I must crave your patience untill his discourse be perfited, and so I rest' (F.S.L., MS V.b.214, fo. 259v).

⁷⁸ 'Sir though you had not at my departure bound mee by solemne promise to advertise you from time to tyme of our cheifest actions during this employment, yet knowing of old your great desire to have more then vulgar notice of all occurrences of importaunce, it had bin a sufficient motive for mee not to overpasse soe good an opportunitie both of satisfyinge your request and shewinge myselfe not altogether unmindfull of your continewd favour. I send you therefore by this gentleman a summarie relation of that which passed here at Cadiz the 21th of this present, wherein I have plainely and faithfully, without eyther exactnes of forme, colour of wordes or amplifyinge any one point beyond the truth, set downe the particulars as they happened, my purpose beinge onely to shew you and others our good freindes to whome it shall please yow to imparte them, that

written soon after his return to England, Cuffe specifically asked Reynoldes to write a new preamble if he thought unsuitable 'this preface which I have in this my greatest wearynes and distemper scribed in hast'. At some point in the copying process, or at least for some copies, it would seem that Reynoldes did replace Cuffe's preface. The new ending is less easily explained but may perhaps be connected to other papers circulated by Essex about Cadiz.

As well as the 'True relacion', Essex and his friends also circulated other documents in manuscript. One is known as 'The omissions of the Cadiz voyage' and survives in at least six copies.⁷⁹ This was Essex's response to those critics who complained that the expedition could, and should, have achieved more. It is actually part of a much longer and more interesting *apologia* penned by Essex on his return to England. This longer paper, first discovered in 1953, was never finished and remained entirely private.⁸⁰ One further document which received some currency in late 1596 was entitled 'The advantage Her Majesty hath gotten by that which passed at Cadiz'.⁸¹ As the title suggests, it is another defensive paper aimed at defeating criticism that the victory at Cadiz did not strike a sufficiently telling blow against Spain. The provenance of this document is uncertain but it exudes a distinctly Essexian odour.

Thus far, it has been shown how the victory at Cadiz sparked an elaborate kind of paper war in England, as rival interests jostled to apportion blame and glory. However, the earl of Essex, in particular, had far too much political capital invested in this campaign to be content merely with pumping out partisan documents for reading at court or in the country houses of the elite. Essex wanted not only to claim the credit for the victory but also to whip up a groundswell of support for his idea of an aggressive war on the Continent. This required the Elizabethan equivalent of a multi-media propaganda campaign. Accordingly, he prevailed upon the archbishop of Canterbury to hold a day of

as the successe itselfe (which noe doubt ere this tyme is generally noysed throughout the greatest parte of Christendome) forceth all men of judgment to acknowledge the infinite goodnes of God toward our gracious soveraigne, not onely in protecting her forces, being soe fewe against soe many, but also in giving her soe happie and glorious victorie at the very doores of her prowdest and most potent enemie: so the menaginge and execution of the whole service doth no lesse prove her royall and incomparable wisdome in making choyse of so noble, complete and excellent commaunders. In soe good an argument, their needs no other eloquence then truth, which, I assure yow, you shall find throughout the narration followinge, to which I referr you without further discourse' (F.S.L., MS V.b.214, fos. 254v–255r). The same preamble can be found in B.L., Add. MS 48152, fo. 249r–v.

⁷⁹ Copies include B.L., Add. MS 37232, fos. 97v–98v; *ibid.* Cotton MS Otho EIX, fos. 336r–338r; F.S.L., MS V.b.214, fos. 198r–199r. Three further copies are noted in Henry, 'Essex as strategist', p. 363, n. 5. This document was also translated into Italian, a contemporary copy of which is P.R.O., P.R.O. 30/125/1. Further comments about 'The omissions' are given in Henry, p. 393.

⁸⁰ The original, incomplete manuscript survives in Essex's own hand in the so-called Hulton MS. Formerly B.L., Loan 23, this document is now for sale and not available for consultation or citation. Essex's paper is analysed in Henry, 'Essex as strategist'.

⁸¹ Copies include B.L., Egerton MS 2877, fo. 77r; *ibid.* Harleian MS 6845, fo. 103r–v; L.P.L., MS 657, fos. 216r–v, 220r–v; N.M.M., MS HSR/A/1; *ibid.* PHB/P/1.

public thanksgiving in London on 8 August.⁸² A laudatory sermon was delivered at Paul's Cross by William Barlow, one of the archbishop's chaplains,⁸³ while bonfires were lit in the streets during the afternoon and 'drinking, banquetting and other waies rejoicing' went on until ten or eleven at night.⁸⁴ After his return, Essex was accompanied about London by swarms of military officers and Essex House on the Strand became the site of a constant veterans' reunion.⁸⁵ Essex himself also sported a spade-shaped beard, grown on the voyage, which he kept to the end of his life. In contrast to his previous dedicated following of fashion – the latest hair-styles, different shapes of moustache⁸⁶ – Essex now adopted a fixed facial image, which served as a constant reminder of Cadiz. The new style was immortalized by a huge new painting of Essex by Marcus Gheeraerts, which subsequently served as the basis for a large number of copies and variations.⁸⁷ Many of these paintings were probably given by Essex himself, who had a highly developed sense of the value of visual propaganda.

Essex also got around the prohibition on publishing accounts of the action at Cadiz by sponsoring the production of a map.⁸⁸ Drawn by Baptista Boazio,⁸⁹

⁸² Essex had initially hoped to make this a national day of thanksgiving and Archbishop Whitgift was agreeable but the celebrations were subsequently restricted to London at the queen's command (L.P.L., MS 658, fo. 260r). Despite this ban, there were some spontaneous celebrations outside elsewhere, such as the ringing of bells at St Andrew's, Canterbury (C. Cotton, 'Churchwarden's accounts of the parish of St Andrew, Canterbury, from A.D. 1485 to A.D. 1625: Part IV. 1553/4–1596', *Archaeologia Cantiana*, xxxv [1921], 107).

⁸³ According to Reynoldes, Barlow 'very truly and with great applause sounded your lordship's worthy fame, your justice, wisdom, valour and noble carriage in this action, making many comparisons with the chiefest generalls and much inveighing at such as extenuated this happy victory. But, saith he, honour and valour will flourish maugré malice and envy itselfe and so I doubt not it will...' (ibid. fo. 260r–v). Barlow's sermon made such an impact that he was pointedly called upon to give the sermon which condemned Essex after his abortive rising in 1601 (M. Maclure, *The Paul's Cross sermons 1534–1642* (Toronto, 1958), pp. 80–6, 219, 221).

⁸⁴ John Stow, *A summarie of the chronicles of England* (London, 1598, S.T.C. no. 23328), p. 450.

⁸⁵ Reynoldes complained that 'his lordship is so continually hanted and barricaded with cavaliers as we can hardly have access to hym' (L.P.L., MS 659, fo. 90r).

⁸⁶ R. Strong, *The cult of Elizabeth: Elizabethan portraiture and pageantry* (London, 1977), ch. 2; idem, *Tudor and Jacobean portraits* (2 vols., London, 1969), I, 115–17; ibid. II, pls. 225–33; D. Piper, 'The 1590 Lumley inventory: Hilliard, Segar and the earl of Essex. II', *Burlington Magazine*, LXXXIX (1957), 299–303.

⁸⁷ The original portrait is probably that now at Woburn Abbey, which measures no less than 213.4 cm by 127 cm. It is much reproduced. See, for example, Strong, *Cult*, pl. 38; idem, *Tudor and Jacobean portraits*, II, pl. 233; idem, *The English icon: Elizabethan and Jacobean portraiture* (London and New York, 1969), p. 300; For discussion of the painting and its variants, see Strong, *Cult*, p. 61; idem, *Tudor and Jacobean portraits*, I, 115–17; idem, *English icon*, pp. 269, 297; R. Strong and V. Murrell, *Artists of the Tudor Court: the portrait miniature revisited, 1520–1620* (London, 1983), pp. 105–7.

⁸⁸ S.T.C. no. 3171.5. It is printed, for example, in A. M. Hind, *Engraving in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (3 vols., Cambridge, 1952–64), I, pl. 133 and in E. M. Tenison, *Elizabethan England: being the history of this country 'in relation to all foreign princes'* (12 vols. in 13, pr. for subscribers, Leamington Spa, 1933–61), x, opposite p. 66. The precise date of the map is unclear but it must have been published before Dr Marbeck completed his account of the victory: near the end of his narrative he refers the reader 'to the mappe that is set fourth of this journey, where it is in some part conveniently touched and specified' (B.L., Sloane MS 226, fo. 20v).

⁸⁹ Precious little is known about Boazio beyond the evidence provided by his surviving maps. After accompanying Drake to the West Indies in 1585–6 (five of his maps chart this voyage), his

a former servant of Sir Francis Drake, and engraved by Thomas Cockson,⁹⁰ the map was signed into the register of the Stationer's Company by the two wardens and Essex himself.⁹¹ Entitled 'An exact map of the town of Cales, made by the commandment of the lords generals', this is literally a graphic depiction of the victory, combining an imaginary bird's-eye view of the Cadiz area with a sequence of illustrations which show successive stages in the battle. Like other Tudor art, this is not an image which displays a unity of time and space but a composite image, cumulatively depicting a series of events which occurred within a limited geographical area. The strongly narrative nature of the map is underlined by the elaborate key to events which accompanies it. Taken together, the images and key constitute an account of the victory which seems to owe more to Boazio's own observations than to any of the descriptions circulated within England. Boazio's map also seems to be scrupulously bipartisan. For every mention of Essex, there is a matching reference to the lord admiral. Boazio's map therefore gave the earl no propaganda advantage but it did at least allow readers of the 'True relacion' to visualize the scene at Cadiz more clearly.

The last element in Essex's propaganda campaign over Cadiz played upon the reputation which he cultivated as a paragon of noble liberality. This involved the conspicuous bestowing of spoils from Cadiz as gifts. It is well known that the first big donation to Thomas Bodley's new library at Oxford came from Essex in 1600 and consisted of some two hundred books, many of which had been seized from the episcopal library at Faro during the return home from Cadiz. Some of the books which Essex donated also came from Cadiz itself.⁹² However, Essex made an even more pointed gesture at Cambridge, his own alma mater. A great psalter from Cadiz was deposited in the library at King's College, where it became the pride and joy of the college

next known activity was mapping defences on the Isle of Wight in 1591. By 1596, when Drake was on his last, fatal voyage, Boazio had seemingly moved into the service of Essex. In addition to the Cadiz map, he also produced a map of Calais in 1596 – the target of the abortive relief mission in which Essex played the leading rôle. Thereafter, Boazio drew maps for Essex's Azores expedition of 1597 and his Ireland campaign of 1599. See R. V. Tooley, 'A dictionary of mapmakers ... Part I. A–Callan', *The Map Collector's Circle*, II (1965), 41; idem, *Tooley's dictionary of mapmakers* (New York and Amsterdam, 1979), p. 65; E. Lynam, 'Boazio's map of Ireland, circa 1600', *British Museum Quarterly*, 11 (1937), 92–5; M. F. Keeler, ed., *Sir Francis Drake's West Indian voyage, 1585–6* (Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser., London, 1981), pp. 17, 31, 61, 290, 311, 317–19.

⁹⁰ For Cockson, see Hind, *Engraving in England*, I, 239–57.

⁹¹ E. Arber, ed., *A transcript of the registers of the Stationers' Company of London 1554–1640 AD* (5 vols., priv. pr., London, 1875–94), III, 77.

⁹² K. M. Pogson, 'A grand inquisitor and his library', *Bodleian Library Record*, III (1922), 239–44; P. S. Allen, 'Books brought from Spain in 1596', *English Historical Review*, XXXI (1916), 609–10. Books seem to have been a popular form of plunder on this expedition: *ibid.* 606–9; E. P. Cheyney, *A history of England from the defeat of the Armada to the death of Elizabeth* (2 vols., London, 1914–26, repr. New York, 1948), II, 77–8; Rowse, *Raleigh and the Throckmortons*, pp. 202–3, 339. A very large book of music, Thomas Ludovicus de Victoria's *Molecta festorum totius anni cum communi sanctorum* (Rome, 1585), now held at Christ Church, Oxford, as Mus. 1, bears the name of yet another plunderer of books inscribed on its title-page: 'Liber Rob. Westhawe ex domo Faraonensi 1596.'

library. Special Latin verses were appended to the opening page to boast about the victory at Cadiz and praise Essex:

... what man never heard tell of that fearful grappling with Spain,
That famed Peninsular raid, which, under the command of a hero
– Greater than Hercules he – came right to Hercules' Pillars!
He (and in proverbs now, his name personifies valour)
Who is the friend and beloved of the common people of England,
Head and shoulders above the rest in height and honours,
Who held all menacing Spain in check, at the sack of Cadiz...⁹³

Chained in the library, this massive volume proved to be a popular attraction for visitors to the university, garnering Essex much renown.⁹⁴

According to the verse, this psalter was placed at King's on Accession Day 1597, a whole year and more after Cadiz. This is important because it points to the way that the memory of Cadiz remained as a running sore in Elizabethan politics. At the time, Essex had just returned from his disastrous voyage to the Azores (the so-called 'Islands voyage'), which sparked new enmity with Raleigh and made the earl's disappointment about not holding Cadiz all the more acute.⁹⁵ Even worse, Essex returned to find that the lord admiral had been made earl of Nottingham and that the victory at Cadiz took a prominent place in the new earl's patent of creation.⁹⁶ To Essex, this seemed as if his rivals were trying to steal 'his' victory and he boycotted court until Elizabeth finally appointed him earl marshal as a sop.⁹⁷ Even then, he complained that he was ascribed 'too innocent virtues' in the initial draft of his patent, rather than the 'active virtues' which he considered appropriate.⁹⁸ Essex viewed this ap-

⁹³ This is the translation offered in G. W. Groos, ed., *The diary of Baron Waldstein: a traveller in Elizabethan England* (London, 1981), p. 106. The volume is now in King's College, Cambridge, MS 41. Waldstein's diary is the only record of this celebratory verse which survives. It was subsequently ripped out of the front of the book, almost certainly as a result of his conviction for treason in early 1601.

⁹⁴ Waldstein was clearly impressed enough by the book during his visit in mid-1600 to copy down the verses attached to it. Two years later, another visiting German nobleman, the duke of Stettin-Pomerania, also felt that the psalter was worthy of specific mention. Although noting the size and nature of the book, and its connection with Essex and Cadiz, the duke makes no reference to the verse panegyric (G. von Bulow, ed., 'Diary of the journey of Philip Julius, duke of Stettin-Pomerania, through England in the year 1602', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, new ser., vi (1892), 35). See also M. R. James, *A descriptive catalogue of the manuscripts other than oriental in the library of King's College, Cambridge* (Cambridge, 1895), p. 68.

⁹⁵ For the Azores expedition, see Corbett, *The successors of Drake*, ch. 8; Wernham, *Return of the Armadas*, chs. 10–12; MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth I: war and politics*, pp. 124–32; A. Haynes, 'The Islands voyage', *History Today*, xxv (1975), 689–96.

⁹⁶ P.R.O., SP 13, case G, no. 8.

⁹⁷ [André Hurault, seigneur] de Maisse, *A journal of all that was accomplished by Monsieur de Maisse, ambassador in England from King Henri IV to Queen Elizabeth* (trans. G. B. Harrison and R. A. Jones, London, 1931), pp. 5, 6, 15, 28, 48–9, 67–8, 75, 273; *H.M.C.S.*, vii, 479, 527–8; P.R.O., SP 12/265, fos. 10r, 16r–v; *H.M.C.*, *Report on the manuscripts of Lord De L'Isle and Dudley preserved at Penshurst Place* (6 vols., London, 1925–66), ii, 302, 305 (hereafter *H.M.C.D.*).

⁹⁸ *H.M.C.S.*, vii, 520. Essex also rejected the conclusion to the initial draft as 'merely impertinent'. He therefore sent Cecil his own notes on the subject, assuring him that 'I reach at nothing to which I lay not a true claim' (*ibid.* p. 527). A draft fragment of the patent, much amended in Cecil's hand, is Hatfield, Cecil MS 168/74. A draft of the preamble to the commission also survives. Again, this is much amended in Cecil's hand: *ibid.* Cecil MS 176/10 (noted but not summarized in *H.M.C.S.*, vii, 526). The full patent does not seem to have survived.

pointment not only as a recognition of his military exploits but also as an office which had an inherently martial character.

Essex's appointment as earl marshal appeased him in the short term and soothed his wounded pride over the victory at Cadiz. However, this new office also gave him a perfect vehicle for exercising his concerns about martial honour and reward from the crown in potentially dangerous ways.⁹⁹ More to the point, Essex's antipathy towards Raleigh, Cecil and the lord admiral still remained. Both of these themes – martial honour and continuing political rivalry – can be seen in other echoes of the bitter divisions which followed Cadiz. In an engraving by William Rogers in 1599, a portrait of Essex features small maps of Cadiz and Ireland (where he was then on campaign) flanking his coat of arms and personal motto: *Virtutis comes invidia*. Above Essex's head, a figure of Constancy holds a laurel wreath which is inscribed *Basis virtutum constantia*. Significantly, a figure of Envy is shown snatching away a twig from this wreath, perhaps alluding to the contested legacy of Cadiz.¹⁰⁰ More dangerous was a series of equestrian images engraved by Thomas Cockson, who had engraved Boazio's map of Cadiz three years earlier. In Cockson's image of Essex, which gained some currency in 1599, the earl is shown in martial splendour on horseback. Soldiers can be seen fighting in the immediate background but behind them are views of Cadiz and the Azores which are taken from the maps of Boazio. Ireland lies on the distant horizon. To assist the reader, each item is labelled in English and a couplet appears at the bottom of the picture praising Essex:

Vertues honor, wisdomes vature, graces servaunt, mercies love,
Gods elected, Truths beloved, heavens affected doe approve.¹⁰¹

By depicting Essex in a quasi-regal stance and linking the image with the decidedly royal phrase 'Gods elected', this engraving went far beyond the bounds of what was acceptable.¹⁰² When copies of the engraving began to flood on to the London market in early 1600, it was immediately banned.¹⁰³ Rumours even circulated that Essex himself would be sent to the Tower.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ M. James, 'English politics and the concept of honour, 1485–1642', in idem, *Society, politics and culture: studies in early modern England* (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 321ff; idem, 'At a crossroads of the political culture: the Essex revolt, 1601', in *ibid.* pp. 416–65; R. McCoy, "'A dangerous image": the earl of Essex and Elizabethan chivalry', *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, xviii (1993), 313–29; idem, *The rites of knighthood: the literature and politics of Elizabethan chivalry* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1989), ch. 4.

¹⁰⁰ Hind, *Engraving in England*, I, 267–8, pl. 150.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* I, 245–6 and pl. 126. The image is also reproduced, for example, in McCoy, *Rites of knighthood*, p. 97, and idem, 'Dangerous image' p. 325. There is also another equestrian engraving of Essex dating from this period (late 1599/very early 1600), executed by Robert Boissard. Interestingly, it is one of a series of six images of English *naval* commanders. As in the Cockson image, the background contains military scenes but they seem to be generic rather than specific. There is no obvious reference to Cadiz (Hind, *Engraving in England*, I, 192, pl. 109).

¹⁰² For the semi-regal connotations of this equestrian pose, see W. Liedtke, *The royal horse and rider: painting, sculpture and horsemanship 1500–1800* (New York, 1989).

¹⁰³ L.P.L., MS 3470, fo. 222r; *H.M.C.D.*, II, 435. The privy council gave Archbishop Whitgift a specific directive to suppress all such equestrian engravings on 30 January 1600 (A.P.C. xxx, 619–20).

¹⁰⁴ *H.M.C.D.*, II, 436. Essex was then already in confinement at the lord keeper's house as a result of his questionable behaviour in Ireland in the previous year.

Cockson also produced similar engravings of the earl of Cumberland and the lord admiral, which were suppressed by the same order.¹⁰⁵ The engraving of the lord admiral is particularly interesting because its composition is strikingly similar to that of the Essex image. Although Howard's horse rears more dramatically, a view of Cadiz derived from Boazio's map again appears in the right-hand background. Unlike the Essex picture, however, this view is marked only with a tiny date ('1596') and the sparse lines of verse at the base of the image are in Latin and altogether more modest than those for Essex. Nevertheless, there is a passing reference to Cadiz in this verse: 'Gadiumque ruinam'. Clearly, the rivalry over the victory at Cadiz still remained a burning issue even at the end of the decade.

The controversy about Cadiz did not finally begin to lose its special bitterness until the fall of Essex in February 1601. When John Stow published his new edition of *The annales of England* later in that year, he seems to have faced no problems including an account of the Cadiz expedition – even though he was using precisely the same source and printing very similar material to Hakluyt three years earlier.¹⁰⁶ Echoes of the victory continued to reverberate in more personal ways. Captain Morgan, for example, was still proudly known as 'Cales Morgan'.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, after Elizabeth's death, the old partisan qualities of the accounts about Cadiz gradually became irrelevant. Under the new dynasty, many of Essex's former enemies were brought low and new political patterns emerged. Far more important was the fact that the narratives all trumpeted war against Spain, and victory. The stories of Cadiz mingled with those about Drake, Hawkins and Grenville to produce that myth of bold Elizabethan 'sea dogs' which contrasted so sharply with the eirenic policies of James I and, later, the military disasters of Charles I.

Memories and accounts of Elizabethan military exploits assumed a greater prominence after 1618, thanks to the controversy over Raleigh's execution and the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in Germany. The past seemed to offer inspiration and guidance for a new generation of soldiers and sailors, and useful propaganda for those who agitated for war. A welter of publications testified to the interest in Elizabethan exploits. In 1625, Samuel Purchas printed a massive work on English sea-faring as a continuation of the work of Hakluyt.¹⁰⁸ An

¹⁰⁵ Hind, *Engraving in England*, 1, 243–4, 249–50, pls. 125, 127. Cockson also produced a very similar image of Lord Mountjoy (earl of Devonshire). However, this can be clearly dated to the opening of the next reign.

¹⁰⁶ *S.T.C.* no. 23336. The title page declares that the book is printed 'cum privilegio' and it is dedicated to Archbishop Whitgift, the government's chief censor. Stow's account of Cadiz is printed in pp. 1283–93. It begins with a marginal note that it is 'an abstract...drawne out of the commentaries written at large by a gentleman who was in the voyage'. A cursory examination shows that Stow based his narrative on Dr Marbeck's account, just as Hakluyt did.

¹⁰⁷ P.R.O., SP 12/283, fo. 140r.

¹⁰⁸ *Hakluytus posthumus or Purchas his pilgrimes* (4 vols., London, 1625, *S.T.C.* no. 20509). The standard modern edition is 20 vols., Glasgow, 1905–7. Given the size of the work, it is little wonder that it took four years to emerge from the press (hence the original dedication was to Charles as prince of Wales, rather than as king).

account of the Cadiz expedition was included in the new publication which was taken directly from the suppressed narrative of Hakluyt.¹⁰⁹ Cadiz was also celebrated in a poem, 'The winning of Cales', which was included in Thomas Deloney's *The garland of good will*.¹¹⁰ Other new works celebrated the exploits of Drake.¹¹¹ There were also publications which consciously stirred up nostalgia for Essex.¹¹² Gervase Markham, a former follower of Essex, openly urged his son, the third earl, to 'be the imitator' of his father's actions as the very 'heart of this warlike preparation'.¹¹³ Advice and comment on naval matters were also circulated in a manuscript volume by Sir William Monson, the captain of Essex's flag-ship at Cadiz. Monson's book included a detailed account of the action at Cadiz, where he himself had been knighted.¹¹⁴ In more private manner, Dr Lionel Sharpe, a former chaplain of Essex, urged the duke of Buckingham to make use of his master's old notes about war with Spain.¹¹⁵ Stories of Elizabethan exploits, and especially of Essex and Cadiz, were thus a powerful presence when England returned to war in 1625.

This point was never made more clearly than when an English fleet again attacked Cadiz in October of that year. When the fleet sailed into the Bay of Cadiz, the ghosts of 1596 lay heavily upon them. Led by a Cecil, the senior officers included Essex's son. The latter had been specifically chosen for the venture by the king because of his name and was desperate to live up to the memory of his father.¹¹⁶ Among the lesser officers, there were also many other names which had a decidedly familiar ring: Wingfield, Rich, St Leger, Burgh,

¹⁰⁹ Purchas acknowledged his debt explicitly: 'out of which I have taken that which served our purpose.' The account of Cadiz is printed in *ibid.* xx, 1–23 of the modern Glasgow edition.

¹¹⁰ London, 1628, *S.T.C.* no. 6553.5. This is the earliest extant edition of Deloney's work, although there are earlier entries in the Stationers' Register for March 1593, August 1596 and March 1602. It is tempting to suggest that the Cadiz poem was added in the 1596 printing (assuming that these entries resulted in new editions) but there is no evidence for this speculation (F. O. Mann, ed., *The works of Thomas Deloney* (Oxford, 1912), pp. 562–3). Deloney himself did not write the Cadiz poem. It is printed in *ibid.* pp. 367–70.

¹¹¹ Philip Nichols, *Sir Francis Drake revived: calling upon this dull age, by this memorable relation, of a third voyage, when Nombre de Dios was surprised* (London, 1626; another edition 1628, *S.T.C.* nos. 18544, 18545); *The world encompassed by Sir F. Drake, being his next voyage to Nombre de Dios formerly imprinted* (London, 1628; another edition also 1628, *S.T.C.* nos. 7161, 7161.3).

¹¹² New editions of *A lamentable dittie composed upon the death of Robert lord Devereux late earle of Essex* (first published in 1603) were printed in 1620 and 1625 (*S.T.C.* nos. 6791.5, 6791.7). These editions were published in company with *A lamentable new ballad upon the earle of Essex death* (*S.T.C.* nos. 6792.3, 6792.7). There were also two editions of Thomas Scott's *Robert earle of Essex his ghost* published in 1624 (*S.T.C.* nos. 22084, 22084a).

¹¹³ Gervase Markham, *Honour in his perfection: or, a treatise in commendations of the vertue of Henry earle of Oxenforde*... (London, 1624, *S.T.C.* no. 17361), p. 33.

¹¹⁴ Monson's first book seems to have been circulating about 1624, when Monson attached himself to the duke of Buckingham, who succeeded Howard as lord admiral in 1619 (M. Oppenheim ed., *The naval tracts of Sir William Monson in six books*, 1 (Navy Records Society, vol. 32, London, 1902), xl–xli, xliv, xlvi, lxi).

¹¹⁵ *Cabala, sive serinia sacra: mysteries of state and government, in letters of illustrious persons, and great ministers of state* (2nd edn, London, 1691), pp. 342–4.

¹¹⁶ V. F. Snow, *Essex the rebel: the life of Robert Devereux, the third earl of Essex, 1591–1646* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1970), ch. 6.

Conway. One of the captains was even named Raleigh Gilbert.¹¹⁷ However, the expedition proved to be a complete fiasco. The assault on the city failed miserably.¹¹⁸ By the time Essex's ship returned to port, there were not even enough fit sailors to man the sails – less than forty out of a complement of 250.¹¹⁹ In Morocco, news of the disaster prompted comment that 'there were now no more Drakes in England, all were hens'.¹²⁰ The claims and counter-claims which followed the fleet's return were not about illicit spoils or deeds performed, but accusations of blame.¹²¹ The weight of the legend of 1596, which had been so carefully and competitively crafted by Essex, Raleigh and others, proved too great a burden to bear.

¹¹⁷ A. B. Grosart, ed., *The voyage to Cadiz in 1625, being a journal written by John Glanville* (Camden Society, vol. 32, London, 1883), pp. 2–3. Gilbert was the captain of the 'Reformation' (ibid. pp. 28, 43).

¹¹⁸ Snow, *Essex*, pp. 134ff; R. Lockyer, *Buckingham: the life and political career of George Villiers, first duke of Buckingham, 1592–1628* (Harlow, 1981), pp. 281–5.

¹¹⁹ Grosart, *Voyage to Cadiz*, p. 109.

¹²⁰ Cited in K. R. Andrews, *Ships, money and politics: seafaring and naval enterprise in the reign of Charles I* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 1. This report from Morocco was a serious setback for Charles because it had been hoped that a successful attack at Cadiz would lead to a coordination of efforts against Spain (ibid. p. 167).

¹²¹ See, for example, B.L., Egerton MS 3378, fos. 61r–67v, 68r–73r; ibid. Add. MS 4183, fos. 58r–77r.