

less mobile and more specific to national economies (pp. 294, 302).

Stuart Soroka, Keith Banting, and Richard Johnston analyze international migration, which seems to be negatively correlated with the growth of the size of the welfare state. The evidence suggests, they contend, that societies made more diverse through immigration may be unable to support the strong sense of common identity, solidarity, and trust necessary to support social welfare and other egalitarian policies. Other chapters in this volume, however, are somewhat more optimistic about the prospects for egalitarian policy in a globalizing world. Carles Boix, for example, suggests that countries that open themselves to trade will be more likely to adopt policies that redistribute income toward sectors that are hurt by changes in world markets. Those supporting free trade will only be politically successful in implementing their preferred policies, Boix claims, if they “commit, in a credible manner, to a compensation package” (p. 213).

Bowles, in a second piece, argues that while globalization may indeed make it more difficult for national governments in the short run to adopt egalitarian policies that negatively affect the relative prices of mobile goods and factors of production, in the longer term it should open up more redistributive possibilities. Social democratic reforms that enhance the influence of trade unions in collective bargaining or eliminate sharp wage disparities, for example, may increase productivity or improve the labor discipline environment such that monitoring costs are reduced (p. 136).

Such social democratic reforms are often dismissed as infeasible for less developed countries. Yet Karl Ove Moene’s and Michael Wallerstein’s fascinating chapter on the emergence of social democracy in the Nordic countries suggests that egalitarian policies such as wage compression through highly centralized wage-setting institutions could hold considerable promise for countries such as Brazil, India, or South Africa. Ove Moene and Wallerstein point out that the Nordic social democratic governments in the 1930s inherited countries burdened with high inequality, intense industrial conflict between employers and unions, and high unemployment—conditions not unlike Brazil, India, and South Africa—and that basic agreements between national associations of unions and employers sharply reduced industrial conflict, significantly increased efficiency (most likely through higher productivity), and sharply reduced inequality (pp. 155, 162). The authors conclude that the free flow of capital and goods should make such egalitarian policies more rather than less economically feasible. They concede, however, that the political feasibility of such reforms in large developing countries is more difficult to gauge.

Pranab Bardhan’s thoughtful chapter suggests that the overarching question of globalization’s effect on the likelihood of egalitarian outcomes or policies may be ill-

conceived, because speaking of the effects of globalization on the poor *as such* is misleading. Whether or not poor unskilled workers lose from trade liberalization, for example, will depend a great deal on whether appropriate policies of compensating displaced workers are adopted at the national level (p. 19) and even whether macroeconomic stabilization policies prescribed by the International Monetary Fund harm the poor may depend on whether national governments cut public expenditures for the poor or, instead, address inefficiencies in the provision of public services or cut expenditures that largely benefit the rich or small but influential interest groups (pp. 20–21).

The collection might have done more to underscore that economic globalization itself can take many forms, some of which may be more friendly to the interests of the less advantaged than others. That is, the question is not simply whether and how much globalization will help or hinder egalitarian reforms at the national level, but what kinds of institutional frameworks for globalization may do so. Consider, for example, the fear (voiced in many chapters) that egalitarian policies may raise the costs of production, leading countries that implement them to become less attractive locations for export-oriented production. It is certainly true that under present international trade rules, companies can profit by choosing to operate in a country in which labor standards are lax. However, if global trading rules offered such countries additional access to export markets in rich countries or financial assistance, then the cost-raising effects of worker-friendly reforms would be neutralized. Economic globalization pursuant to such international trade rules would reduce the competition between poorer countries to attract trade and investment by lowering wages or disregarding social protections for workers and thus arguably raise the living standards of the less advantaged. Promoting the living standards of less advantaged persons throughout the world will thus depend, it seems, on developing complementary institutional arrangements at the global and national levels.

Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians. By R. Charli Carpenter. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006. 230p. \$89.95 cloth.
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— Erin K. Baines, *University of British Columbia*

On the occasion of Remembrance Day in grade six and as my classmates and I cut small poppies out of red construction paper, we learned about the brave young Canadian men who died fighting for our freedom and were laid to rest in Flanders Field. A striking memory of this history lesson was that I secretly congratulated myself for being a girl. If I ever found myself in the midst of a war, it was the boys who would have to fight. A narrow escape from a dreadful fate!

R. Charli Carpenter’s *Innocent Women and Children* is a poignant investigation into how local and global norms on civilian protection are gendered. While this in itself is

not a new contribution to the study of international relations, Carpenter uniquely extends her analysis to focus on a particular group of civilians made vulnerable because of gender essentialisms, civilian men, a group little studied by gender experts.

According to Carpenter, gender essentialisms reproduced in the “civilian protection regime” strongly associate all women, children, and the elderly as innocent, vulnerable bystanders. All men, on the other hand, are associated as combatants. In practice, such global gender norms “legitimize belligerent’s sex-selective targeting of men and boys” (p. 89) during wartime, and justify non-humanitarian intervention when sex-selective massacres occur. In effect, men of combat age are the first to be targeted in times of war, and yet humanitarian action to protect civilians is more likely to be taken only when women and children are involved.

To illustrate her argument, Carpenter critically examines the discourses of UN bodies and transnational advocates for enforcement of the civilian protection regime, finding few to no references to “innocent men” but a plethora of appeals for urgent actions based on the terminology “innocent women and children.” Through her careful analysis of international legal documents and statements, we see how the slaughter of women and children—real or fictionalized—is often used by international actors to justify humanitarian intervention. For instance, the targeting of women and children by Serb forces in Kosovo was frequently evoked by humanitarian bodies, the media, and activists to justify the NATO-led humanitarian intervention in 1999. In contrast, gender essentialisms also function as an excuse for nonaction, such as in Rwanda in 1994 when the United States and other major powers avoided using any reference to women and children, let alone to the term “genocide.”

To explore the role of gender norms at the level of the practical, Carpenter turns to an in-depth case study of Srebrenica, where seven thousand men were executed by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) after the fall of the enclave in 1993. Despite the fact that civilian men were suspected of being combatants by the BSA and therefore would most likely to be targeted for execution, humanitarian actors evacuated only women, children, and the elderly. Carpenter suggests that belligerents forbid humanitarians from evacuating men of combat age, and the humanitarian actors—although aware of what may happen to the men—are unwilling and unable to extend them protection. She interviewed humanitarian workers who had worked in Srebrenica during the evacuation and found they were aware of these biases and what may happen to men. However, most reported being totally restricted by the demands of belligerents. The BSA threatened to stop convoys of women and children if men were found on board. Despite this, the author still feels that gender essentialisms guided some aspect of their decision making.

While Carpenter convincingly presents the case that men are more likely to be targeted first for killing (as are women for other gender-related harms), her argument that men are not the majority of total combatants is less so. Of course not all men are combatants, and some women are. But I was not convinced that men and women are equally engaged in combat the majority of the time. Her intention is to trouble gender essentialisms, but the fact that sex is one of the greatest indicators of one’s role in conflict remains unchallenged by the book. Whether norms create this reality, or the reality fuels the norm, is not resolved.

Other doubts crept in. If it is the case that intervention is more likely to occur when women and children are considered to be the greatest targets of killing, what happened in northern Uganda where the majority of combatants in that region’s 20-year-old conflict were children abducted from their homes and killed en masse by the Ugandan forces and rebel groups? Despite an enormous effort by transnational advocates and attention inside the UN, intervention was not forthcoming. To what degree does gender essentialism affect decisions to intervene over (or more likely in relation to) other determining factors, such as economics, politics, race? Missing from Carpenter is an examination of the overlapping and intersecting roles of multiple social constructions. Not only is violence against women in war time somehow constructed as “more atrocious” than that committed against men, but even more complex hierarchies count in far greater ways that determine intervention and nonintervention.

Still, as Carpenter fairly claims, *Innocent Women and Children* is meant to “scratch the surface” (p. 167) of investigation into how gender essentialisms have affected the actual protection of civilians, particularly a group that to date has been considered gender neutral, men. Her book is a significant contribution in this regard, and is certain to stimulate critical reflection on scholarship.

The book is also a useful contribution for humanitarian practitioners, though perhaps shy of recommendations on what, exactly, a humanitarian should do when facing belligerents who are not exactly fond of international principles. Some 30 years after cutting out poppies and being thrilled I was a girl who would not have to go to war, I was housed for seven days at a military outpost near the border of the Congo, surrounded by members of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army. While officially part of an observer team to the peace talks ongoing in the region, I side-barred to help a humanitarian agency negotiate the release of women and children being held “in captivity.” The LRA presented us with 105 women and children so that we could see they were in good health, but refused their release. We appealed to them on humanitarian grounds. One local woman came along and appealed to them as a mother. The LRA did not budge: They were a “family” and their “wives” and children would remain with

them. In the meantime, our “guards” were young, male youths carrying AK rifles and empty stares. We did not bring up the subject with their senior commanders that they had been abducted at a young age. We knew they would never release them. But we also did not raise the fact that their “wives” were also abducted, and being raped, technically, by them. Instead, we used the term “innocent.”

Would a more impartial and principled approach suggested by Carpenter have made a difference?

Mediating Globalization: Domestic Institutions and Industrial Policies in the United States and Britain. By Andrew P. Cortell. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006. 243p. \$70.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics. By Mark J. C. Crescenzi. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005. 173p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071320

— J. P. Singh, *Georgetown University*

Given the context of globalization, these two books generate and answer substantive puzzles in security, trade, and industrial policy. Building on the Kantian hypothesis, Mark Crescenzi asks: “Does economic interdependence lead to peace or conflict?” Taking off from the neoliberal convergence hypothesis, Andrew Cortell asks if globalization entails the end of state-led industrial policies or economic intervention. The “it depends” answers that may be expected come down to “it depends on the domestic bargains and opportunity costs for states,” therefore providing us with a common conceptual anchor for adjudicating together the quality of these works. For Crescenzi, interdependence poses exit costs in terms of the relative scope, ranking, and importance of the trading relationship for the two countries. Depending on the exit costs for breaking off economic ties, states may indulge in political conflict varying from low-level conflict, such as issuing threats, to high-level conflict, such as war. Yes, says Crescenzi, economic interdependence curtails political conflict, but we need to understand the causal mechanisms, here embedded in exit costs. For Cortell, the answer to the persistence of industrial policy, even as neoliberal market-based convergence takes place globally, depends on the capacity and autonomy of state institutions and the pressures that states face from firms seeking economic intervention. It is based on a simple intuition: Just because globalization is taking place does not mean that firms will not ask states for intervention ranging from budgetary support to trade protectionism.

Backed with conceptual frameworks, detailed evidence, and pluralistic methods, both Cortell and Crescenzi narrow their focus of enquiry but speak to broader debates in global politics about state-society relations, the role of the state, and the nature of global interactions. If this is the new wave of globalization scholarship, I hope it continues for a

while so we can deepen our understanding of these themes and issues. In doing so, as I detail below, if globalization is mediated by bargains that states can or cannot effect, then let us also use some formal techniques for analyzing bargaining and negotiations. These two books raise questions for each other and for future scholars. I do not detail this below, but if we are to get our message across, let us spend some time revising our tomes to get the message out clearly. Globalization need not be so ponderous.

Cortell’s approach is situated in historical intuitionism, which allows him to integrate insights from strategic and neoclassical trade theory, comparative politics, and industrial policy. He builds a taxonomy of six institutional contexts to explain the intervention outcomes. These contexts combine the degree of autonomy and capacity of state institutions with the presence or absence of networks connecting states with societal actors, in this case mostly firms. Three of the six institutional contexts are merely analytical possibilities, and he concentrates on explaining the other three. In one case (Type V), institutional networks exist between states and society, and state actors have “lateral autonomy” (in terms of capacity) to shape industrial policies. He traces the success of the \$500 million Sematech initiative for boosting semiconductor research and production in the United States under Reagan to a Type V context. In a Type II context, the networks are absent but the executive has autonomy, which under Margaret Thatcher led to liberal strategies, albeit ones that sought to attract foreign direct investment through policy instruments. The Type III context features the presence of institutional networks and decentralized decision making resulting in outcomes such as multifaceted industrial policies or a liberal strategy. Cortell analyzes 13 episodes of intervention drawn from the semiconductor industry (“the quintessential globalized industry,” p. 15) in two states where neoliberal convergence may be most expected, namely the United States and Britain. That both states choose intervention, especially under conservative governments, such as those of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and John Major, supports the “hard test” that Cortell sets up for his theory. Of the 13 cases, 8 feature Type V scenarios.

Crescenzi’s Kantian debt is to scholars who have tried to test the irenic or bellicose effects of trade on political conflicts. His own argument eventually rests on Albert Hirschman, who supplied “the quintessential argument . . . that economic interdependence is a source of political power for nations” (p. 19) in that countries indulging in political conflicts must calculate their exit costs dependent on their alternatives to breaking off a trading relationship. The first half of this book develops, slowly and somewhat torturously, the exit costs model in terms of 1) “constraint,” where the exit costs are high for one nation to challenge another; 2) “bargaining power,” where one state challenges another, which capitulates because it faces