

by contrasting the deleterious impact of the bargaining position or the general attitude of the other side with their own side's reasonableness and flexibility.

Moreover, although the results of this conference have been published in both American and Chinese editions, the two volumes are not identical. No specifics are offered in an introductory note in the American version reviewed here that informs the reader that due to "differences in viewpoint and interpretation on a small number of issues," and despite the fact that the "two sides hold very similar views" regarding "most issues," a separate Chinese version with "some changes in structure and content that were agreed upon by both sides" would be published. In addition, there is a disclaimer that the co-editor and CFISS "do not necessarily endorse all of the views conveyed by Michael D. Swaine in the introduction and conclusion of this volume."

In the Chinese edition, *Duikang, boyi, hezuo: ZhongMei anquan weiji guanli anli fensi* (Beijing, Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), we find similar statements. One footnote informs the reader that although the volume reflects "several shared or similar viewpoints" that came out of the study, there were also "certain differences (*chayi*) even comparatively large disputes (*fenqi*)" which resulted in both sides accepting the principle of "seeking common ground while reserving differences" (*qiutong cunyi*) (p 2). And, as the American edition anticipates, Michael Swaine's introduction and his conclusion are not included in the volume although a note informs the reader that parts of both are included in an introductory article. Swaine, we are told, agreed with its "principal contents, but did not agree with the entire viewpoint of the article."

Those who have taken part in Sino-American projects over the past few decades realize that behind such often predictable differences over publication or among perspectives of the participants, lie hours of extremely candid and valuable dialogue that cannot be reflected in the published papers. Moreover, it is not possible to assess the extent of the impact which these discussions may have had on the viewpoints of the very influential individuals who took part in the project and, thus, perhaps, also on future Sino-American encounters – both academic and diplomatic.

Some insights into the high quality of the intellectual discourse that likely characterized these meetings are found in Michael Swaine's introduction and conclusion. In both essays, Swaine not only ties together insights from a relatively large number of diverse chapters. He also does a superb job of teasing out some of the major themes from the project with the aim of assessing the nature of past encounters and of suggesting their applicability to a possible future crisis over Taiwan – an eventuality that was clearly weighing heavily on the minds of the participants in this project. Given the great dangers inherent in such a crisis, Swaine's essays, and the case studies that they bracket, deserve a wide audience and careful consideration within China and without.

STEVEN M. GOLDSTEIN

*Redefining Nationalism in Modern China: Sino-American Relations and the Emergence of Chinese Public Opinion in the 21st Century*

SIMON SHEN

Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007

xiv + 293 pp. £55.00

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This is an extremely ambitious research project. Simon Shen sets up his goal: to deconstruct Chinese nationalism, and then re-construct it. This is why Shen uses the term "redefining" in the book title.

The basic argument of the book is very simple, that is, “nationalist discourse is merely a channel for different players in China to advance their personal and group interests. As long as participation in the discourse of nationalism can gain advantages for the party-state, intellectuals or ordinary citizens and consolidate their position in ‘public opinion,’ these players do not necessarily have to act upon their nationalistic rhetoric. Much nationalist rhetoric is basically a coded way of directing dissent at the Chinese state itself, and thus acts as a safety valve” (p. 2).

To support this argument, Shen places it in the context of the interaction between Sino-American relations, various players in Chinese foreign affairs and contemporary nationalism during four events. All four cases took place in the last decade: the Belgrade Embassy Bombing (May 1999), the Spy Plane Collision Incident (April 2001), the 9/11 Incident and the War in Afghanistan (September–December 2001), and the War in Iraq (January 2002–May 2003). Although no comprehensive surveys were conducted, Shen attempted to collect all possible first- and second-hand materials on Chinese public opinions on these events. Overall, the book shows how different social groups in China perceived these events, and how the interactions between these groups affect the expression of different nationalist voices.

It is misleading to say that in previous studies Chinese nationalism was regarded as monolithic, since scholars including this reviewer have tried to disaggregate Chinese nationalism as expressed by different social groups. Despite this simplistic statement, Shen has made a valuable contribution by introducing the concept of “interest” to the study of nationalism. This concept enables him to identify key interest-based social groups and how their “interests” drive them to become “nationalistic” when a given event takes place.

Shen treats Chinese nationalism as a non-unitary and segmented movement practiced by different people for different purposes. It is a valuable step in advancing the study of Chinese nationalism. However, there are unsolved puzzles.

Shen reduces the motivation of nationalism to different “interests.” This is highly debatable. If nationalism can be reduced to different “interests,” then is there something called nationalism? This can hardly explain why nationalism has involved emotions ever since it came into being centuries ago. It can be fairly argued that nationalism is associated with different “interests”; “interests” facilitate and promote nationalism, but do not create it. In explaining any form of nationalism, one needs to address the “interest” factors as well as “passion” factors.

At the next level, Chinese nationalism can certainly be regarded as a social movement. Here there is another big question. Any social movement involves different actors, such as organizers, leaders, followers and observers. Needless to say, “interests” mean different things to different actors. So, when the concept of “interest” is employed to explain nationalism, “interest” must first be defined as to different social groups. Unfortunately, Shen fails to do so. While “interests” are important, one must not deny the role that “passions” play in transforming “observers” into participants.

This research would have been more productive had Shen narrowed his focus. Ambitiously, he attempts to categorize Chinese nationalism, for example as civil, primordial and statist at the ideological level, and diplomatic, territorial, economic, cultural and populist in forms of expressions. While all these forms of nationalism can be found in Sino-American relations, this wide coverage makes some explanations superficial.

This research is on how Chinese nationalism is reflected in Sino-American relations. One legitimate question can be raised: does Chinese nationalism show similar characteristics within Sino-Japanese relations or in the case of China’s relations with other countries? Since Chinese nationalism was introduced from

outside (as Shen recognizes), it has been reactive, meaning that each nationalistic movement has its own particular characteristics. If this is so, a case study of Chinese nationalism in the context of Sino-American relations does not lead to general conclusions on Chinese nationalism. Nevertheless, thanks to Shen's painstaking effort, the questions that his study raises will lead us to think further about Chinese nationalism.

YONGNIAN ZHENG

*Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan's Security*

Edited by MICHAEL D. SWAINE, ANDREW N. D. YANG and EVAN S. MEDEIROS

Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007

xvi + 416 pp. \$22.95

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This is a rich book on a subject that may easily be compared to a moving target. Aware of the fast-changing reality surrounding Taiwan's security, the editors of this volume have aimed to give "a more comprehensive and complex picture of the potential Chinese military threat to Taiwan – and the larger challenge to Asia – than usually appears in studies of the subject" (p. 3). Including papers selected from three successive conferences held from 2004 to 2006 in Taipei, *Assessing the Threat* has on the whole reached its objective. However, like all studies of a possible but unprecedented war in the Taiwan Strait, it raises many unanswerable questions, as well as a few which could have been better addressed.

Each chapter brings value. Organized in four sections, the main body of the book is divided into two parts: the first titled "The People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s doctrine and capabilities" (section 2); and the other, "Threats, deterrence, and escalation control in a Taiwan contingency" (section 3). The first section, apart from the introduction, also includes a very promising contribution from Alex Liebman on China's Asia policy and its need to maintain a balance between reassuring its neighbours and deterring Taiwan from moving toward formal independence. In the last section, Alan Romberg looks at the future East Asian security architecture and concludes that even the most optimistic scenario would not convince China to "forego a deterrent capability against Taiwan" (p. 331). Michael Swaine and Oriana Skylar Mastro then assess the threat not only for the island-state but also for the US, and they make a couple of useful recommendations.

Although discussing well-researched issues, the two main sections give absolutely no impression of *déjà vu*. Dean Cheng shows how the PLA has been slowly moving from a theoretical to a practical approach to joint operations, a crucial factor in any Taiwan military contingency. Basing his analysis on the growing quantity of works published by the main PLA academies, Lonnie Henley underscores how the concepts of "war control" and "escalation management" have made their way into the PLA, arguably (in my view) increasing the risks of a limited use of force. Roy Kamphauser and Justin Liang present in a very unconventional way the various facets of PLA power projection, understood as a variable of China's comprehensive national power and including its growing participation in Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) and joint exercises with other militaries.

The third section, consisting of six chapters, is the heart of this study: air force deterrence and escalation (Kenneth Allen), naval options in an escalatory scenario (Bernard Cole), the nuclear dimension (Brad Robert) and PRC information operations (James Mulvenon) are among the best-covered subjects. Well-known