

was rebuilt. The ghetto, of course, was not.³

³A short piece of fiction takes up this subject in an interesting way; see "My Warsaw" by Joyce Carol Oates in her collection, *Last Days: Stories* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1984).

Editor's note: In a cooperative effort with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a version of the following article was written for CASS's Political Science Abroad and then made available to PS. We anticipate other joint publishing ventures with Political Science Abroad.

Politics and Political Science in the Netherlands

M. P. C. M. van Schendelen
Erasmus University Rotterdam

The Netherlands is a small country of about 15 million people, located in north-western Europe, almost directly sur-



M. P. C. M. van Schendelen

rounded by the three major countries of Western Europe, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom, and for around 50% of its national income dependent on international trade (general data source: CBS, yearly). In economic terms it belongs to the rich countries of the world. Private consumption is, in world-perspective, at an extremely high level. Since 1950 the number of people has grown by almost 50%. As of 1982 there live 347 people per square kilometer, more than anywhere else.

In this article both Dutch politics and Dutch political science are briefly introduced. References are only to English-language sources. Our two questions are: how do these 15 million people live together politically?; and what is the role Dutch political science plays in the society?

Dutch Politics

Increased Politicization. In the last three decades Dutch society has increasingly become affected by politics, i.e., by official political institutions, such as the government and the Parliament. In the early fifties about 30% of the national income was spent via the political system, mainly on public consumption and investment. By the early eighties about 70% of the national income was spent by the political system. This increase is mainly due to the rapid growth of public transfers and subsidies, principally in the fields of social welfare (income maintenance, education, social housing, and public health) and to the advantage of the lower-income groups; one-third of the national income is now being spent on this social welfare. Thirty years ago about nine percent of the total labor force was employed by the political system (civil servants and related groups such as

Marinus P. C. M. Van Schendelen (1944) is professor in political science at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. He published many books and numerous articles on Dutch politics, European politics, comparative parliaments, mass-elite linkages, and politics-business relationships.

railway men, teachers, nurses and so on); now it is almost three times more (26%). In the early fifties the yearly number of formal bills was almost the lowest in Western Europe; now Dutch politics is reported to be, after Italy, the largest producer of such legislation (Rose, 1984, p. 69), and here a public law tends to be taken much more seriously than in Italy. In short, within three decades Dutch society has increasingly become affected by the political system in its roles of spender of national income, organizer of social welfare, employer, and legislator.

The main factors behind this process of politicization of the Dutch society are: (1) the post-war need for reconstruction, (2) the "depillarization" of society, (3) the need and demand for social welfare programs, and (4) the growth of the European Communities.

After the Second World War a large part of the society had to be reconstructed (Griffiths, 1980). Much public capital (railways, harbors, buildings) and private capital (industries, land, houses) was in poor condition, obsolete or even devastated (e.g., the harbor of Rotterdam). At the same time a major source of national income, the trade with the Netherlands-Indies colonies (now Indonesia), was lost since these colonies gained independence. To meet this accumulation of problems and serious challenges, the central government took the lead and with American financial help developed programs of economic reconstruction.

Traditional Dutch society was characterized by "pillarization": The four socio-cultural minority groupings of Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and upper-class non-religious people ("Liberals") were, like four pillars each standing on its own, linked together only at the top, where the leaders of the groupings accommodated each other and created political unity out of the social diversity (Daalder, 1966; Lijphart, 1968; Van Schendelen, 1984). Each social grouping had its own inside world of schools, social welfare, labor unions, voluntary associations, mass media and one or more political parties. Interaction and sympathy were high within, but low among the groupings.

The major rule of political decision making at the top was to give each pillar a maximum of autonomy. By implication, in many fields the government's intervention in the society was restrained, often more procedural than substantial, and careful not to destabilize the weak structure of the society.

In the early fifties about 30% of the national income was spent via the political system. By the early eighties about 70% of the national income was spent by the political system.

At the end of the fifties the pillars, however, started to crumble. Increasingly, the rank-and-file of the four groupings refused to give deference and obedience to their leaders. By the end of the sixties, mass resistance against the pillarized society had become so wide that in all groupings the leadership was turned over, the over-arching rules of decision making changed into almost their opposite, and the main level of substantial decision making shifted from the pillars to the central government.

During the same years there came rising demands for better and more social welfare (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981). In the past each pillar had organized some social welfare for its own members, but both the quality and the quantity of it were limited. As in other Western European countries, the post-war population asked for better education, housing, health services and (in case of sickness, unemployment, etc.) income maintenance. The rapid growth of population, in addition, made it impossible for the pillars to meet these demands by themselves. Their leaders readily decided to institutionalize more and better social welfare programs at the national level. Public finance, collected through taxes and premiums, and public regulation provided the means for it. Since the citizens could get the welfare benefits directly from the state, they became less depend-

ent on their pillars. And, in its turn, the depillarization accelerated the government's intervention in social welfare, now up to 30% of the national income.

The final and formal decision making is institutional, but the real process of decision making, with all its discussions and negotiations, can be found in group life.

Again during the same years the European Communities were built up. In 1957 the European Coal and Steel Community, erected in 1951 in order to facilitate the production of the most crucial raw materials, became broadened into the European Communities. After coal and steel, agriculture became the major policy field of the EC. Step-by-step the EC not only expanded its number of member-states (from the original six to now twelve), but also its variety of policy fields. Because the EC basically functions as an intergovernmental organization, it also strengthened the position of the central government inside each nation-state.

Pluralist Linkage Groups. In the pillarized society each social grouping had its own network of organizations, ranging from mass media to political parties and from housing corporations to voluntary associations (Windmuller, 1969; Kramer, 1981). These organizations had also important political functions: inside the pillar they served as channels of political communication and control and outside they strongly competed with the organizations of the other pillars in the same policy field. Each wanted to get most out of the political system, to the benefit of its own social grouping.

A large variety of political parties and pressure groups has always been a major characteristic of the Dutch society. During, for example, the national elections (at least every four years), usually about 25 political parties compete for a seat in the Parliament; but also usually half of them fail to win one.

Freedom of speech and organization are crucial for such an open and diverse political system. They are not only essential under the Constitution but also real in practice. Anybody may form an organization and make political use of it. Anybody can start a political party and try to win one or more seats in Parliament. The electoral system is the most proportional in the whole of Europe, and the only threshold for entrance into Parliament is the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats (that is, nowadays, with an electorate of about 9 million people and 150 seats of the Second Chamber, a threshold of about 60,000 votes) (Lijphart, 1981).

The recent depillarization has brought some reduction of organizational variety. In particular some Catholic and Socialist party organizations failed to survive, lost membership and importance, or had to fuse into a joint organization (Gladdish, 1985; Houska, 1985). For example, the leading Catholic and Socialist national newspapers disappeared, their broadcasting organizations became middle-sized and their labor unions fused together. The leading Catholic and Protestant political parties formed, at the end of the seventies, one new Christian political party. But at the same time, facilitated by the open entrance into the political system, many new organizations and political parties were formed, thus increasing again the organizational variety and pluralism. They range from consumers' organizations to so-called peace movements; and from a left-wing Liberal party (1966) to right-wing religious parties. In the last national election (1986) there were 26 different and competing parties, of which nine gained one or more seats.

The turnover of members of Parliament is much higher in the Netherlands than in any other Western country.

The pressure groups and political parties behave, to an important degree, as representative organizations. The underlying

mechanism is that the more members these organizations have, the more resources they get at their disposal and the more influence they can exert. For example, time on radio and TV is distributed according to the size of the membership of each broadcasting organization. Labor unions are taken seriously politically insofar as they can mobilize their adherents. Political parties derive their major power (seats) directly from the number of votes they collect. Because of this mechanism the pressure groups and political parties tend to strive for wider and better representativeness for and on behalf of their target groups and to behave (or at least to present themselves) as a linkage between masses and core elites.

Yet, they have their problems of linkage. Although usually around 90% of the electorate takes part in national elections (but much less in other elections), only 5% are members of a political party and much less than 1% are active party members. Most Dutch labor unions have less than 50% of the workers in their sector as members and only a very small percentage are active members. Many potential members prefer 'free ridership' or passivity, leaving the costs of political participation to others, but sharing the rewards from it. Membership and support also fluctuate, thus creating uncertainties to the linkage groups (Andeweg, 1982; Van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1983). It is estimated that roughly 50% of the electors do not have an enduring party identification: either they change their preference or their participation. As

The multiplicity of groups, inside or outside political institutions, poses more demands on the political system than can be handled, let alone be financed.

a net result of the many changes to and from specific parties, 17 of the 150 seats of Parliament moved in the 1986 elections from one party to another party. Where membership and support fluctuate so strongly, it becomes difficult for link-

age groups to represent the opinions and interests of their adherents, because the adherents themselves are fluctuating.

In this political market of organizations, it is difficult for unorganized citizens to participate individually and effectively.

From their side the leaders and cadres of pressure groups and political parties try to attract members and supporters by following trends in public opinion, promising what people seem to want and formulating what people ought to want. All these efforts originate, by their nature, in the organizations' offices, from behind the professionals' desks. Then the problem of linkage often is that "the market of support" has been misjudged. For example, such a misestimate occurs when labor union leaders experience wildcat strikes or opposition from their members and as a result their political parties then lose votes.

While each pressure group or political party may fail in its linkage function, each citizen always has a choice of a rich variety of linkage groups. Easy group formation and strong competition among the groups constantly keep the linkages between masses and elites dynamic and varied.

Arenas of Political Elites. Only a very few, usually small-sized groups are satisfied with nothing more than expressing their political demands or testifying their political beliefs. Most groups want to become more substantially satisfied: to get what they desire. The main target of their pressures are the governmental institutions, simply because these (and only these) have the formal authority to make binding decisions and to implement them with (if necessary) the use of police and courts. The major governmental institutions are the Parliament, the Cabinet and the public administrative bureaucracies. From these institutions the pressure groups and parties try to get the desired laws and regulations, budget and subsidies, rights and freedoms, or

whatever decision would be favorable to them. What they ask for may range from intervention by the state to state inaction. They not only try to get their demands met, but also try to prevent competing groups from achieving success. Thus one group is usually being countervailed by another group, with the end result that lasting winners or losers hardly exist.

The dominant intellectual orientation in The Netherlands is American and British political science.

The major vehicle to influence governmental institutions is via the building of coalitions and of developing strongholds in the government. Regarding the relationships between political parties on the one side and the Parliament and the Cabinet on the other side, this activity is the crux of Dutch democratic practice. According to their share of votes, the parties get their numbers of seats in Parliament. The party with a majority of seats (50% + x) fills the Cabinet positions. Never in Dutch history, however, has a party got a majority on its own; the open, multi-party system always prevents such singular dominance. So far, all Cabinets have been run by coalitions of two or more parties, which together have a majority in Parliament. Officially a party cannot nominate people for administrative positions and neither can members of the Parliament or the Cabinet hold such positions. But the recruitment and promotion of administrative leaders are under the final control of the minister-in-charge, and he is usually led in part by party considerations. The nomination of heads of provincial and local governments is openly party-based. In ministries it is an open secret which officials have been pushed by which party.

Pressure groups do not have such direct ways to insinuate themselves into formal governmental structures. They have to operate indirectly, either through the party system or from an administrative stronghold they already have. All major pressure groups are affiliated with one or

more major parties: the labor unions with the Socialist Party, the employers' organizations with the Liberal Party, the farmers' organizations with the Christian Party, and so on. Through these affiliations they get their people, under the label of the party, into the Parliament, the Cabinet or the Administration. On the basis of enduring relationships they can build up a stronghold to expand their influence. For example, the ministry of Economic Affairs has become a stronghold of the employers' organizations, that of Social Affairs of labor unions, the ministry of Agriculture is usually run by former farmers' leaders, etc.

The political arenas are, in short, a mixture of political institutions and political groups. The final and formal decision making is institutional ("the Parliament, the Cabinet, the Minister, the official decides. . ."), but the real process of decision making, with all its discussions and negotiations, can be found in group life.

Institutional boundaries are easily crossed and new group boundaries are easily created. Although, for example, the Cabinet and the Parliament formally have their own responsibilities, the Cabinet usually sends its proposals to the Parliament only after it has reached substantial agreement over their contents with the leading members of the coalition parties in the Parliament (the party leaders and the party specialists). Such an agreement can already have been made during the formation of the majority parliamentary coalition. The result of this closed-door politics usually is that the real decisions have been made before the Parliament as an institution formally decides. The governmental parties are dominant, while the other parties have only marginal impact on the proposals or insofar as the governmental parties take them into account. In the ministries too, institutional boundaries are often crossed, as the officials in charge discuss their issues with the relevant, major pressure groups and make a formal decision only after some agreement has been reached.

This political practice also indicates new group boundaries. An osmosis exists

between the Cabinet and the coalition parties in Parliament such that it resembles an informal inner circle that also consists of much smaller circles for each policy field composed of the responsible minister and the few subject-matter specialists of the coalition parties and usually being a small group of less than ten people. Also in the administration there exist many informal group boundaries: officials with similar occupational or other backgrounds, the one administrative faction against the other, or whatever the result of bureau politics is.

In several respects the key decision makers behave as a more or less closed group. Their discussions and negotiations usually take place in inner circles, meeting in the national capital of The Hague. They consult small affiliated circles of party members, trustees in the Administration, and representatives of pressure groups. In this small country most of them personally know each other.

But in two other respects the arenas are extremely open. The mass media produce much information about what is going on in the many inner circles. Not only do they gather this information professionally, but they also get it free from those who fear to lose or have lost some game in a political arena. Strong political competition leads to leaks of information. And, secondly, there is a high turnover of key persons. The turnover of members of Parliament is much higher in the Netherlands than in any other Western country (at an average almost 20% a year) and results in the entrance of new members who have their own backgrounds and networks. Usually half the number of ministers leave politics after their term. Turnover in pressure groups and the Administration is hardly less dynamic. The factors behind these turnovers are manifold, ranging from turmoils inside parties and pressure groups to upward career mobility, but two factors need special attention. One is the low threshold of entry to the political arenas. Those who want can fairly easily form a new political party or pressure group and take part in the political competition. The other is the dynamics of the ballot box. The votes of the citizens have a direct impact on the composition of the Parlia-

ment and an indirect one on that of the Cabinet. Tables 1 and 2 show how dynamic these impacts are.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Dutch Politics. Dutch politics can best be characterized by political competition. There are hardly any lasting winners or losers. No party or pressure group, let alone a person, has enough power to dominate on their own, either for a long time or in more than a few decision-making arenas. Power is distributed over many groups, institutions and persons. Political agreements are almost always under discussion and negotiation. Institutions like the Parliament, the Cabinet and the Administration are in political practice neither unified nor cohesive. Their boundaries, which might protect their autonomy, are open and crossed by many groups. The institutions operate as fragmented, complex systems, full of internal competition and external affiliations. Persons in positions of power, usually have a short political life expectancy, as they are always challenged by new power seekers.

The department at the University of Amsterdam is socialist oriented, the one at the Free University Protestant oriented, and the Nijmegen department is Catholic oriented.

The phenomena of closed door politics, inner circles and government agreements may seem paradoxical for this system of competitive politics, but these ideas are not in contradiction to it. Just as traders on a commercial, highly competitive market strive for cartel formation, fixed prices and long-term contracts, in order to minimize the risks and uncertainties of market competition, so do competitive politicians on the political market. For example, labor unions and employers' organizations periodically make so-called social agreements in which labor conditions are agreed upon, and sometimes these organizations are forced by the government to agree; before the elections some parties make an election

TABLE 1
Electoral Support for Political Parties, 1946-1986 (%)

Year	Catholic Party ^a	Protestant Parties ^b	Socialist Party ^c	Liberal Party ^d	Other Parties ^e	N Parties in Parl. ^f
1946	31%	21%	28%	6%	14%	7
1948	31	22	26	8	13	8
1952	29	20	29	9	13	8
1956	32	18	33	9	8	7
1959	32	17	30	12	8	8
1963	32	17	28	10	12	10
1967	26	18	23	11	21	11
1971	22	15	25	10	28	14
1972	18	14	27	14	27	14
1977	↘ 32 ←		34	18	16	11
1981		31	28	17	24	10
1982		29	30	23	17	12
1986		35	33	17	15	9

^aCatholic Party KVP; since 1977 part of Christian Party CDA

^bProtestant Parties ARP and CHU; since 1977 part of CDA

^cSocialist Party PvdA

^dLiberal Party VVD

^eRanging from Communist Party to extreme right-wing

^fAbsolute number of parties with at least one seat at the start of the new Parliament

TABLE 2
Party Composition of Coalition Cabinets, 1946-1986

Year	Catholic Party	Protestant Parties	Socialist Party	Liberal Party	Other Parties
1946	X		X		
1948	X	only CHU	X	X	
1951	X	only CHU	X	X	
1952	X	X	X		
1956	X	X	X		
1958	X	X			
1959	X	X		X	
1963	X	X		X	
1965	X	only ARP	X		
1966	X	only ARP			
1967	X	X		X	
1971	X	X		X	right-socialist DS'70
1972	X	X		X	
1973	X	only ARP	X		left-liberal D'66 left-catholic PPR
1977	↘ X ←			X	
1981		X	X		left-liberal D'66
1982		X			left-liberal D'66
1982		X		X	
1986		X		X	

agreement with other parties by which they hope to increase their chances of a majority; and after the elections, every new Cabinet must be based on a political agreement between two or more parties. All such coalition building indicates the presence of competition. The same applies to its durability, as most agreements do not hold for long and are also limited in policy-domain and scope. Table 2 shows how weak in fact the major political coalitions at Cabinet-level have been. Since the Second World War only five Cabinets have been able to fulfill their constitutional four-year term and only two of these without an interim crisis; the other 13 Cabinets have had an average duration of 18 months.

In assessing Dutch politics, all depends on the normative criteria one uses. Wide consensus seems to exist for hardly more than two criteria: that is, political decisions should be made and they should be made in an acceptably democratic way. In applying these criteria, however, one does not arrive at a clear and unidirectional assessment of the Dutch political system.

For political decision making the omnipresent group pluralism creates problems associated with an overload of demands and the difficulties of forming a consensus. The multiplicity of groups, inside or outside political institutions, poses more demands on the political system than can be handled, let alone be financed. Compromising is always difficult. But the advantages are that almost any social want has some organized political voice, that any voice has some chance to be taken into account, and that the final compromise can receive wide support. The compromises themselves have two sides too: they hinder quick and radical political decision making, but they also make the decision making more gradual and better supported.

Regarding the democratic nature of political decision making, the assessment is mixed as well. The strong competition prevents hegemonic dominance by one party, pressure group or power segment, which absence of tyranny suggests a high democratic performance. The political system is full of spontaneous checks

and balances, which exist in addition to the constitutional controls. The political competitions keep the arenas open in terms of information and new entrants, but they also stimulate cartel-like tendencies, which, however, usually do not hold for long. In this political market of organizations, it is difficult for unorganized citizens to participate individually and effectively, except for the act of voting which, as Table 1 showed, is extremely effective in keeping the system highly competitive. A final test of democracy is that, so far, all the changes and transfers of positions of power have taken place without any political violence. Disaffection towards politicians exists among about 40% of the citizens, but not with the rules of competitive politics (Van Schendelen, 1981a).

Dutch political science plays a living and institutionalized role in the society.

In retrospect, the conclusion is that the Dutch political system is still in development. After a long tradition of "low politics," the society has undergone a rapid process of increasing politicization. The political institutions have become more developed and important but are also fully fused with competitive group politics. Present-day Dutch politics has much of the character of a young political system.

Dutch Political Science

Dutch political science officially has existed since WWII. Full programs in political science became established at the University of Amsterdam (1948), the Free University of Amsterdam (1955), the University of Nijmegen (1969), the Erasmus University of Rotterdam (1978) and the University of Leiden (1983). But the academic study of politics is really much older (UNESCO, 1950, pp. 280-293). Especially in the 16th and 17th century many Dutch political thinkers and analysts brought fame to the country

International Political Science

(Erasmus, Grotius, Lipsius, Spinoza and others).

Today there are about 2,000 graduated political scientists in the country. They form the smallest group of social scientists. About 40% are employed in government, another 40% are in teaching and the other 20% are quite varied by profession, ranging from diplomacy to private enterprise and from politics to mass media. In particular this last-mentioned group tends to have successful careers, resulting in top positions in diplomacy, corporations, politics and journalism.

The dominant intellectual orientation in the Netherlands is that of American and British political science. Its main characteristic is the focus on factual, empirical research, clearly distinguished from normative thinking. Methods and techniques of research are considered to be important tools of political science. Normative thinking is, however, not neglected or given only lip service. In all departments the history of political ideas and ideologies ("from Plato to Mao") is part of the program.

Most research is on Dutch politics, usually placed in some diachronic or Western European perspective. Major topics of research are mass behavior (elections, participation, attitudes), political parties, the Parliament, the Cabinet, public administration, interest groups, provincial and local politics, European Community politics, and international politics (from peace movements to the United Nations) (Hoogerwerf, 1982). The two major periodical and inter-university research projects are the National Electors Study and the National Members of Parliament Study (recent data sources van der Eijk a.o., 1983, and Van Schendelen, 1981b).

Dutch political science itself is highly fragmented in the sense that among the political scientists competition is usually much stronger than cooperation. The National Political Science Association is only weakly organized. Most scholars are more active in the European association, the ECPR, located in Britain and convening all around Western Europe. The National Association's official journal,

Acta Politica, does not function as the platform for the competing (groups of) scholars. There are several other journals. This strong competition is not only related to the incentive systems, which are highly individualistic, and to the small size of the country, which easily generates animosities with the neighbor scholars, but also to specific political factors.

As in every society there exist also in the Netherlands general tensions between politics and political science. The reasons are evident. Politics focuses on power, on winning political games, while political science focuses on truth, on understanding political games. Politicians have to manipulate information and to veil some facts, while political scientists strive for unbiased information and want to unveil all facts. Tensions between the two professions are, because of these differences, normal.

But these tensions can become regulated in a specific way. In the Dutch situation the three older departments of political science have always been strongly interwoven with one of the major social groupings (pillars) of society and even have been founded by them. The department at the University of Amsterdam is socialist oriented, the one at the Free University Protestant oriented, and the Nijmegen department is Catholic oriented. The two younger departments, at Rotterdam and Leiden, have not such an ideological orientation; without being liberal, they are neither confessional nor socialist. Although the ideological orientation of the three older departments is not so outspoken anymore as it was some years ago, it is still reflected in their programs of study, the selection of research problems, and the political behavior of staff and students. For example, in the oldest department (Amsterdam) teaching is, more than elsewhere, focused on marxism and related theories, research is in particular on problems like discrimination and emancipation of social minorities, and the political behavior of staff and students is mainly and visibly left-wing. The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Protestant department in Amsterdam and the Catholic one in Nijmegen. In this respect the new depart-

ments of Rotterdam and Leiden are different. They do not expose some identifiable ideological orientation. For example in their courses on normative political thinking the major ideologies are treated as equally important and the focus is in particular on conceptual analysis. Ideological orientations can result in some protection by the related political parties, especially when they are in government. In this way the general tensions between politics and political science can get specific solutions. Although government interference with science is traditionally limited and marginal, such interference is — with the development of depillarization — rapidly increasing. By law the government has only listed the main courses to be given. In the field of political science: political science, methods and techniques of research, and three other courses of choice. But the faculty and the related department are fully autonomous in defining and implementing the content of the courses. By budgetary means, however, the government is increasingly interfering. In the field of research, for example, officially accepted programs get preferential financial treatment. In the field of teaching the government has recently declared its intention to compel, by budgetary pressure, the departments of Rotterdam and Leiden to fuse into only one department. By their lack of protection from an associated political party, these two departments can easily be compelled to merge.

The tensions between politics and political science can also be aggravated. Results of research often receive wide public and subsequent political attention. This is not only because in the Dutch society science has a high status, but also because political facts tend to be sensitive and responsive to (party) politics. At the same time, it is not uncommon for politicians and officials to react to political science publications publicly and critically. This indicates that Dutch political science plays a living and institutionalized role in the society, and also that it is still sufficiently free from political guardianship to speak with its own voice, even when some political scientists and some politicians have one common voice. □

References

- Andeweg, R. 1982. *Dutch Voters Adrift*. University of Leiden.
- CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics). *Statistical Yearbook of The Netherlands*. The Hague, yearly.
- Daalder, H. 1966. The Netherlands. In R. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 188-236.
- Flora, P. and A. Heidenheimer (eds.). 1981. *Development of Welfare States in Europe and America*. New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Gladdish, K. 1985. The Netherlands. In V. Bogdanor (ed.), *Representatives of the People*. London: Gower, pp. 135-148.
- Griffiths, R. (ed.). 1980. *The Economy and Politics of the Netherlands since 1945*. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Hoogerwerf, A. 1982. The Netherlands. In W. G. Andrews (ed.), *International Handbook of Political Science*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 227-245.
- Houska, J. 1985. *Influencing Mass Political Behavior*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kramer R. 1981. *Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State*. Berkeley: California Press.
- Lijphart, A. 1968. *The Politics of Accommodation*. Berkeley: California Press.
- Lijphart, A. 1981. *Democracies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rose, R. 1984. *Understanding Big Government*. London: Sage.
- UNESCO. 1950. *Contemporary Political Science*. Paris.
- Van der Eijk et al. 1983. *Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 1982*. Amsterdam: CT-Press.
- Van der Eijk, C. and B. Niemoller. 1983. *Electoral Change in the Netherlands*. Amsterdam: CT-Press.
- Van Schendelen, M. 1981a. Disaffected Representation in The Netherlands. *Political Behavior*, pp. 137-162.
- Van Schendelen, M. 1981b. *Codebook The Dutch Member of Parliament*. Rotterdam: Erasmus University.
- Van Schendelen, M. (ed.). 1984. *Consociationalism, Pillarization and Conflict-management in the Low Countries*. Amsterdam: Boom.
- Windmuller, J. 1969 and later editions. *Labor Relations in the Netherlands*. Ithaca: Cornell.

Asian-Pacific Association

The Asian-Pacific Political Science Association has published its first newsletter

International Political Science

under the auspices of its newly elected committee. The newsletter contains brief reports on meetings of member countries, e.g., Australia, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. For further information, con-

tact the APPSA Secretariat at: Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 0511. □