Feminism as if All People Mattered: Working to Remove the Causes of War, 1919–1929

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Feminist pacifism between the two world wars emerged directly from prewar suffragism. Most leading feminist pacifist women had received their political training in the suffrage cause in their own countries, and had developed its international dimension and a wide personal acquaintance through the International Women's Suffrage Association (IWSA), which by 1913 had auxiliaries in twenty-six countries, mostly in Europe, the British Empire, or north America.[1] In Britain and elsewhere, those bodies most involved in the IWSA had been the non-militant suffrage societies; the methods used were far from the confrontation and civil disobedience of the Pankhurst faction, to which historical mythology has ascribed the success of the suffrage movement. The legacy is false in that credit has been given almost entirely to methods which were not in fact those which produced the victory. In Britain, while the dramatic interventions of the militants had initially been useful in attracting publicity and arousing women's awareness, their increasing violence had become counter-productive, and after 1910 had served mainly to provide reluctant parliamentarians with an excuse to continue to withhold the franchise. Meanwhile, the so-called non-militant National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) had prepared the ground for parliamentary enactment of women's

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[1] Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: the Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 22 (reviewed by Denise Davidson below).

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suffrage by a steady campaign to convert a sufficient number of politicians, party leaders and members of the public. The sophisticated political knowledge and skill in lobbying developed during this process would become the heritage of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). [2]

Still more important is the carry-over of philosophy. Reflection on the violence sometimes shown by anti-suffragists, and on the problems caused in their own work by the violence of the militants against property and, although rarely, against people, had led some non-militants consciously to work out their beliefs, and to contend that the basis of any civilised political system was not force, but the consent of the governed, that might was not right, and that the whole rationale of parliamentary institutions was to enable government to proceed by the will of the people rather than by any test of physical strength. The argument carried over easily to the international arena, and informed WILPF's work.

Wartime background

Although, at the outbreak of the First World War, the several groups of suffragists were generally united in their condemnation of what was seen as a male way of dealing with problems for which males could easily be blamed (since voteless women had no political power), the unity had been short-lived. Most militant leaders in Britain, for example, soon supported the war effort. This article is only concerned with the non-militant suffrage societies, and primarily – except for the purpose of comparison – with the significant number of non-militants who turned their minds towards work for peace. The first notable outcome had been the Hague Congress of Women, held in April 1915. The small planning group had included women from Britain, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands; the congress itself was attended by women from twelve European and north American countries, including neutral countries and some on both sides of the conflict. The International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP), formalised at that conference, would change its name to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in 1919. The British section had taken the name of the Women's International League (WIL) in October 1915. Significantly, WILPF was exceptional among peace groups in that the international organisation predated the national sections. By 1921 there were twenty-two sections; in the 1920s further outreach took it beyond Europe and the English-speaking world.

[2] The NUWSS had gained an unrivalled understanding of the British political system, and, using this, had worked to convince MPs and cabinet ministers one by one of the merits of their cause, had campaigned among voters to secure support from the grassroots, had joined their cause with that of the many working men still without the vote, had wooed the Labour party so effectively that the women's franchise became part of its platform, had brought the once recalcitrant trade unions into support, and had used these successes to convince some leading Conservative and Liberal members of the inevitability of enfranchisement. See Jo Vellacott, *From Liberal to Labour with Women's Suffrage: the Story of Catherine Marshall* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), ch. 11 and *passim*; see also Martin Pugh, *The March of the Women: a Revisionist Analysis of the Campaign for Women's Suffrage, 1866–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 10.

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After some hesitation and on the basis of a rather haphazard canvass of views, the IWSA executive refused to give official support to the Hague conference. In the British NUWSS a majority of the prewar national leadership failed in their bid for the organisation to support the conference, and in their hope of committing it fully to education for a more peaceful world; many of them resigned their positions and moved over to give their energies to the newly formed WIL. How many NUWSS members throughout the country followed them cannot easily be assessed. WIL also drew a considerable number of women from the Society of Friends, many of whom had also been prewar suffragists.[3]

Making peace: two feminist approaches

With the Allied victory in November 1918, the ICWPP eagerly moved into consideration of the postwar settlement and international organisation towards which much of its wartime activity had been directed. At the 1915 Hague conference, the ICWPP had resolved to meet again when and wherever the Peace Conference should be held. The International Women's Suffrage Alliance, despite refusing to endorse the Hague congress, had also seen the importance of having women's interests represented at the peace discussions.[4]

What all had envisaged in 1915 had been that the postwar settlement would be negotiated between representatives from both sides of the conflict. But when the Peace Conference convened in Paris on 18 January 1919, only statesmen from the victorious Allied countries were present. The two feminist groups had to deal with restrictions which prevented women from the defeated countries from travelling to any meeting in Paris. The IWSA and the ICWPP responded in significantly different ways.

Working for a minimum feminist programme

Members of the IWSA, and in particular the French section, working with the International Council of Women (ICW) called on those who could to go to Paris to lobby for women's interests.[5] This lobby group, known as the Inter-Allied

[3] The NUWSS story is complicated by the fact that some of the peace women who resigned office early in 1915 made a rather halfhearted, and unsuccessful, attempt to regain control at the AGM in the summer. There is extensive material in the Marshall papers. For the Quaker women who wanted to go to the Hague conference, see Sybil Oldfield, 'England's Cassandras in World War One', in Oldfield, ed., *This Working-Day World: Women's Lives and Culture(s) in Britain 1914–1945* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1994).

[4] See Fawcett to Jane Addams, 11 May 1915, Addams Papers, Swarthmore College; Fawcett to Conway, 24 June 1915, Manchester Public Library; Fawcett to Carrie Chapman Catt, 21 July 1915, ms. (probably a draft for typing), Fawcett Collection. Fawcett's interest in having the feminist cause spoken for in the postwar settlement was genuine, but in 1915 she was clearly motivated in large part by a wish to make sure that she retained her influence in the IWSA, and that that body was not upstaged by the emerging ICWPP. For more detail, see Vellacott, forthcoming (second part of life of Catherine Marshall).

[5] Millicent Fawcett, *What I Remember* (London: Fisher Unwin; repr. Westport: Hyperion, 1976),

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Suffragists, held an informal gathering in Paris from 10 to 16 February 1919, and continued to maintain an even more informal presence throughout the following weeks. Their progress was watched supportively and with attention by the leaders of WIL (the British section of ICWPP), which indeed played a vital role in identifying issues to be addressed, by convening a conference in London at the end of February 1919 'to draw up a Minimum Feminist Programme'. This gathering became in effect a briefing session for the lobbyists in Paris, and passed a number of resolutions embodying wide-ranging hopes for improvement in the political status and condition of women.[6]

In Paris, the Inter-Allied Suffragists first struggled to get some representation for women in the peace-making process itself. The bulk of the work of the peace conference was done by commissions, meeting separately to make proposals on specific issues (such as minorities, mandates, reparations and borders), and the suffragists' hope was to see a special women's commission appointed, 'composed of women representing organised bodies of women in their respective countries, to whom questions bearing on the life and employment of women should be referred'[7] (the ICWPP would have preferred to have women represented on all commissions). Despite what seemed initially to be some encouragement from Woodrow Wilson, the women's effort to get an official forum of any kind was pushed aside or ignored. Within their own body they passed a number of resolutions on women's issues, on the basis of which they then lobbied individual delegates. They achieved only two official hearings. One was before the Commission on International Labour Legislation, which was indeed sympathetic, and made a strong recommendation in favour of equal pay for work of equal value.[8] The other was before the commission on the League of Nations, and resulted in a major achievement. Hailed as 'A Great Victory' by feminists, but passing almost unnoticed elsewhere, the draft Covenant of the League of Nations was amended to include a clause declaring that 'All positions . . . shall be open equally to men and women', a demand also included in the minimum feminist programme. The concession was important even if – once more – its effect was to prove only a small step.[9]

253–6; Margery Corbett Ashby, preface to D. M. Northcroft's *Women at Work in the League of Nations* (Keighley: Rydal Press, 1927).

[6] 'Conference to draw up a Minimum Feminist Programme', Preamble to preliminary agenda and to final agenda; see also 'Proceedings' and HMS's 'Chairman's Remarks', all in Col/WILPF.

[7] Proceedings, Col/WILPF; *Common Cause*, 21 February 1919, report by Ray Strachey.

[8] *Common Cause*, 4 April 1919. The phrasing of the recommendation goes beyond what had been claimed in the 'minimum feminist programme', where the resolution had asked only 'that women should receive the same pay as the men for the same job'; even this is still far from implementation. The commission, chaired by Samuel Gompers and under pressure from a large International Labour and Socialist Conference which met in Berne in February 1919, was already the most progressive of the commissions. Paul Kellogg and Arthur Gleason, *British Labor and the War: Reconstructors for a New World* (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1919, repr. with introduction by Jo Vellacott Newberry, New York and London: Garland, 1972), 285.

[9] *Common Cause*, 4 April 1919; Ferdinand Czernin, *Versailles 1919* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1964) contains a useful chart placing three successive versions of the Covenant side by side [140–163, unpaginated]. The version available to WIL is Czernin's second, his first being the Anglo-American draft, little more than a working draft; the clause regarding women's eligibility is Covenant, article 7,

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Beyond the minimum: feminist pacifism: the Women's Congress in Zurich, May 1919

In addition to organising the conference to draw up the minimum feminist programme (the work of the British section, WIL), the ICWPP had two major concerns in early 1919: one was to organise their own promised congress, including women from both sides of the recent conflict, and the other was to make their own commentary on the nascent peace settlement as it emerged.

ICWPP's refusal to go to Paris had been a matter of principle and of policy; it would not go where only women from the Allied countries could travel. The decision had not been an easy one, though it was somewhat sweetened by the role WIL had assumed in helping to draw up the feminist programme taken to Paris by the Inter-Allied Suffragists.

With the aid of the transatlantic telegraph and a willingness to be flexible, agreement was reached to meet in Zurich from 12 to 17 May 1919, and women from all over Europe and the United States made their way there.[10] In Mary Sheepshanks's words:

> Women from the warring as well as the neutral nations joined hands in grief and horror at the misery and devastation, the loss of millions of lives, the mutilation and ruined health of millions more and the wretched plight of the hundreds of thousands of refugees now scattered over the face of the earth, homeless and deprived of everything that makes life worth living.[11]

The sharing of grief described here was profoundly important as the basis of a shared vision, and the sense of the reality of war was greatly enhanced, especially for the women from the less devastated countries, by their travel through Europe. But the women would not spend time dwelling on the unalterable past rather than try their utmost to make the future to a different pattern. The timing of the conference in Zurich was fortuitous, in that the draft Covenant of the League of Nations had been published in February and the terms of the proposed peace treaty itself became available the very day that they gathered.

Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points are remarkably close in substance to the resolutions passed at the Hague Congress of Women in 1915 (and and highly praised by him at the time), and Germany had understood that the Fourteen Points would be substantially the basis for the coming peace settlement. Accordingly, the emerging peace terms were measured at Zurich against Wilson's Fourteen Points and the women's own Hague resolutions, and were found wanting. By the end of its one-week meeting the congress was able to send off to the Allied statesmen in Paris remarkable commentaries on the covenant and on the peace terms, perhaps the first and possibly the most thorough produced by any group for some time; even among the statesmen and officials in Paris it is probable that no one had read the

final version, Czernin, *Versailles*, p. [145]; Northcroft, preface. *Proceedings* of the Minimum Feminist Conference, resolution 7. See also Rupp, *Worlds*, 211–12.

[10] Various material, Col/WILPF.

[11] Mary Sheepshanks, unpublished autobiography, seen by courtesy of Sybil Oldfield, 61.

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huge document from beginning to end.[12] At the Zurich congress, the ICWPP also took on the name by which it is still known, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

The theme of the WILPF critique of the peace terms can be summed up as urging that the way forward to a lasting peace lay through rehabilitation rather than through vengeance, which they saw as condemning many millions in central Europe to 'poverty, disease and despair, which must result in the spread of hatred and anarchy'. As for the covenant, they were bitterly disappointed in the form it laid out for the League of Nations, condemning it as 'a league of conquerors against the conquered [which] would not save the world from future wars . . . useless as an instrument of peace'. So bad did they find it that it was only with difficulty that the decision was made to continue their support of the principle, while working to change the worst features, which they identified item by item.[13]

Two feminisms compared

The current analysis then is concerned with three approaches to the postwar settlement: that of the Inter-Allied Suffragists; that of WILPF; and that of the Allied statesmen who actually wrote the documents. The article looks at the main differences between WILPF and each of the others.

Why had the WILPF women labelled as 'minimum' the concerns taken to Paris by the Inter-Allied Suffragists? The feminist programme had embodied hopes that the Congress of Powers would endorse equal suffrage, equal status in national and international bodies, equality of opportunity in training and employment, equal pay for equal work, a woman's right to her own nationality independent of that of her husband, an equal share for both sexes in the rights and responsibilities of the guardianship of children, and the 'Endowment of Motherhood' (mothers' allowances). Other resolutions addressed safeguards for consumers' rights, a minimum wage, the 'traffic in women', the 'abolition of State Regulation of Vice', international marriage laws, and the 'universal abandonment of conscription'.[14] Even now, this may sound like a remarkably comprehensive feminist catalogue, and the term 'minimum' used by WIL was not pejorative; WIL completely supported suffrage feminism, but believed that, for themselves, feminism had to go farther.

Before the war some suffragists had spoken of the franchise in terms of women's rights. Others had emphasised needs, the necessity to enable women by political representation to protect themselves against unfair hardship, unequal wages,

[12] Sally Marks, *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 10–11; Czernin, *Versailles*, 5–43.

[13] *Towards Peace and Freedom* (Zurich: WILPF, 1919), 6–7; for more detail of the WILPF critique, see Vellacott, 'A Place for Pacifism and Transnationalism in Feminist Theory', *Women's History Review*, Vol. 2, no. 1 (1993), 23–56; Sabine Hering and Cornelia Wenzel, *Women Called Out But No One Was Listening*, draft of translation by Rosemarie Schade, 14, seen by the generosity of Rosemarie Schade and the late Barbara Roberts.

[14] *Proceedings* of Minimum Feminist Conference, Col/WILPF.

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discrimination before the law. Both of these aspects – rights and needs – are fully addressed in the advocacy of the minimum programme. Yet other prewar feminists had spoken of rights, needs and duties.[15] 'Duties' is not a word with much currency nowadays, but what was meant by it in the suffrage context was the opportunity for women to do, in the cause of good, all that they were capable of; there is a social feminist connotation, an understanding that women have a dimension to bring to polity that is missing in a male-dominated world. The extra dimension of obligation, of having a contribution they could and should make, helped to inform what was different about the approach of the women in WILPF, and resulted in a concern to bring about radical change, not merely to gain a foothold for women in the existing system.[16] The non-militant suffragists who embraced pacifist feminism were also overwhelmingly those who had come from left-wing roots or had moved to the left in the prewar years.

The British suffragist, Catherine Marshall, speaking in 1917, had described her vision of peace work:

> I am convinced that the great constructive task for us of the W.I.L. faith is not simply to oppose war in a negative way . . . but to help to find an *alternative* to war that shall be as creative of free and fruitful life as war is destructive of them, that shall make as urgent a call on men's and women's courage and devotion and self sacrifice, and that shall abolish not only armaments, offensive and defensive, but the spirit of *domination* on the one hand and of *defensiveness* on the other. And to achieve this fruition of the pacifist faith we have got to have a 'revolution' of our whole social, industrial and political systems . . . a revolution that will bring about . . . change without resort to the methods or the spirit of war.
>
> Long before the war came upon us I had begun to feel that the great contribution which the women's movement could make to the world lay in this direction. It was with this idea in my mind that I was so keen about developing understanding and co-operation between the women's movement and organised Labour, and the same thing which made me so anxious to develop the Int[ernational] aspect of the women's movement.[17]

Two things followed from this vision. The first was that the causes addressed by WILPF were not limited to obtaining rights and relief for women, although these remained important; and the second was that WILPF was not prepared to wait until those in power recognised their claims to a voice before speaking out on international affairs – if they could not do it from inside the existing power structure, they would do it from outside. A characteristic of WILPF work from the outset had

[15] Vellacott, *From Liberal to Labour with Women's Suffrage*, 55.

[16] For social feminism, see *inter alia* Naomi Black, *Social Feminism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989). The suffragists did not spend time debating whether the special contribution women would make came from nature or nurture, and nor shall I. For consideration of the effect of gender socialisation together with the segregation of roles, where men dominate international affairs, see, *inter alia*, Betty A. Reardon, *Sexism and the War System* (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia, 1985); Birgit Brock-Utne, *Educating for Peace* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985); Jo Vellacott, 'Hear the Women: Feminism and the Peace Movement', in Wytze Brouwer and Terrance Carson, eds., *Implementing Peace Education: proceedings of a conference at the University of Alberta, July 1985* (Edmonton: International Institute for Peace Education and University of Alberta, 1985).

[17] Marshall, 'The Pacifist contribution to Revolution', ms. notes for speech to Cambridge WIL, 1 Nov. 1917, CEMP.

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been a curious ability to get around disability by acting as if it did not exist, or as if it could be transformed into advantage. For example, after the women's conference at The Hague in 1915, delegations of WILPF women, lacking official sponsorship or diplomatic accreditation, had gone where perhaps no group of men could have gone, to visit heads of state or foreign ministers of neutral and warring nations, and had been received and heard in almost every country.[18] Similarly in 1919, they did not wait for an invitation, or pause to plead their worthiness, they simply went ahead with a critique of what was going on in Paris.

The WILPF, the International Women's Suffrage Alliance and the International Council of Women (ICW) have been exhaustively researched and ably analysed and compared by Leila Rupp in terms of their part in the development of feminist culture and the role of international sisterhood and gender solidarity. I have learned a great deal from her exposition, but depart from it in some points more significant to the focus of my analysis than to that of hers, which fits the ICW and the IWSA admirably but the WILPF less well.[19] The ICW's objective was quite general and can properly be defined as promoting sisterhood; it disallowed any controversy that might disrupt the sense of fellowship and mutual support. The IWSA had a more focused objective, initially relating strictly to women's right to the franchise, although they later saw peace also as a women's concern. For WILPF, sisterhood was not so much an objective as in part a *sine qua non*, something which had come about before the war, and in part a by-product, growing in depth as the work developed. The cause of women's political rights was a given – to be worked for but not to be waited for – and beyond it was the hope that it would help bring about a more peaceful world for all people, which was their central goal.[20] For this

[18] Mercedes Randall's account of the mission of the envoys from the Hague Congress includes a well-documented discussion of the role of President Wilson, *Improper Bostonian: Emily Greene Balch* (New York: Twayne,1964), 166–212; Anne Wiltsher, *Most Dangerous Women: Feminist Peace Campaigners of the Great War* (London: Pandora,1985), ch. 6; Women's Peace Party, *Report* (1915);*Towards Permanent Peace* (London: British Committee of ICWPP, 1915); Gertrude Bussey, Margaret Tims, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965), 21–24; Jane Addams, Emily Balch and Alice Hamilton, *Women at The Hague: the International Congress of Women and Its Results* (New York and London: Garland, repr. with new introduction by Mercedes Randall, 1972 [New York: Macmillan, 1915]), *passim*; Jane Addams, *Peace and Bread in Time of War* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1945), 15–20.

[19] Rupp, *Worlds of Women*; Rupp, 'Constructing Internationalism: the Case of Transnational Women's Organisations, 1888–1945', *American Historical Review*, Vol. 99, no. 5 (Dec. 1994). Rupp (1587–8) cites WILPF'S bar to 'debate on national responsibility for or conduct of the war' at the 1915 and 1919 congresses as an example of precedence of nationalism over internationalism. I believe it to have been the opposite; the women were determined to keep national political standpoints off the table so that they could get on with developing a shared agenda for the future. The organising group for the first major international women's studies conference held by the Simone de Beauvoir Institute at Concordia University in Montréal in 1982 similarly barred discussion of smouldering national issues (for example in the Middle East), seeing them as part of a man-made political system which was in itself extremely damaging to women on both sides, who might be better employed in jointly addressing the flaws in the system and studying to increase their own influence rather than in defending the position of their respective compatriot male leaders.

[20] The Zurich conference produced a twelve-point 'Women's Charter', but put most of its energy into international concerns.

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objective they saw women's influence as of paramount importance, and conversely, they held that women would never attain full equality in a world ruled by force.

The attention paid by WIL to the wider aspects of postwar international organisation shows up in some contrast to the interests of the Inter-Allied Suffragists, who had confined their representation at Paris to issues directly concerning women, although in the novel context of women at least attempting to be heard in international councils. The claim of WIL and the ICWPP was of a different quality; they insisted on expressing opinions on all subjects and in all spheres, even the most traditionally male-dominated, among which questions of international polity ranked (and still rank) high. Further, while the Inter-Allied Suffragists besought the statesmen in vain to admit them to their consultations, the ICWPP created its own forum, where at least they could speak freely and publicly, although, in common with the Inter-Allied suffragists, they lacked the political power to give their desires the force of law.

Comparing men in Paris and women in Zurich

If the difference between the approach of the two groups of feminists was significant, the difference between the method and conclusions of WILPF and of the statesmen gathered in Paris was more obvious.

The statesmen in Paris and the women in Zurich must both surely be credited with hoping to find the means to avoid the recurrence of a terrible war such as all had just come through. Tempting as it may be, it is comparing apples and oranges to say that if the women had been the treaty makers, the outcome would have been different. Manifestly, there are important aspects of the Peace Congress and of the one-week Zurich Congress of Women in which any attempt to compare is absurd. The Allied leaders had the power, the resources and the responsibility to produce a treaty which would have the force of law in setting the parameters of postwar Europe. They also all had political constituencies in their respective countries to whom they were answerable, or which they needed to convince of the appropriateness of their decisions. They faced a situation of enormous complexity.[21] The women had no matching power, very limited resources and only the self-imposed responsibility, which they took seriously, of trying to influence the men's deliberations, and of educating the public – those same constituencies to which the statesmen had reference – towards the hope of a real and lasting peace.

Nevertheless, there are some dimensions which can be compared and contrasted. Because of the difference in roles, comparison as individuals between the Big Four statesmen at Paris and the leading women at Zurich has only limited validity, but it may be worth remarking that while the statesmen had been – with the partial exception of Woodrow Wilson – fully dedicated for the past several years to the

[21] There is an extensive literature on the making of the peace settlements, and the challenges facing the leading statesmen. A good short summary of the crippling complexities, and to a lesser extent of the missed opportunities, can be found in Raymond Sontag, *A Broken World, 1919–1939* (New York and London: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), ch. 1.

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waging of war, and immersed in a climate where the word 'peace' had become almost a swear-word, many of the WILPF women, highly able and well educated, had spent considerable time during the previous four years studying international institutions and the requirements of a just peace. In some ways, too, the women had more freedom and flexibility in their deliberations, but it would be a mistake to see the statesmen as without the power to make choices, to take advice, to listen to a wider opinion, to try to lead their constituencies in new directions.

We have touched on one major difference already; the women were bitterly disappointed as it became clear that the peace would be written by the victors only, and their decision to ensure that their gathering comprised women from both sides of the conflict and from neutral nations was in itself a statement. It was not that the women brought different demands from various countries but that they brought a shared experience and saw the problems to be solved as the problems of all. Meeting only with their fellow victors, the statesmen thought in terms of laying blame, of retribution, of enforcement, of maintaining the upper hand, of gains to be secured from the defeated and in competition with each other, of how to place themselves in the best light with constituents at home. Starting from the basis of their shared and continuing suffering, the women thought in terms of what will really work? what can be done to provide a forum for resolution of conflict? how can the grievances which lead to war be obviated? how can justice and freedom for all be ensured? War was considered by the women not merely as something which has to be dealt with when it arises, nor as something for which 'the enemy' is always to blame, but as a consequence of attitudes and actions which precede it, on all sides.

I have elsewhere defined the basis of WILPF as 'transnational' rather than 'international', meaning that the women of WILPF struggled to base their relationship with one another on something beyond nationality. International negotiation usually implies a meeting between representatives of the interests of two or more countries, each trying to gain as much for his or her country as possible, and to yield the fewest possible concessions to the other side; the peace negotiations in Paris, even though they were only between the leaders of the victorious countries, clearly followed this pattern. I use the concept of 'transnationalism' (although the term is far from ideal) to reflect WILPF's attempt to lay aside national interests, to hear from all sides, to look at the good of the whole, and to consider long-term effects as well as present gain. In discussion, no one was expected to 'represent' her country.[22]

The two feminist critiques of the peace settlement might also be compared with that of mixed and male-dominated peace groups. In Britain, for instance, the Union for Democratic Control was at least as quick off the mark with its commentaries on

[22] For the use of the term 'transnationalism', see Anne Marie Pois, 'The U.S. WILPF and American Neutrality, 1935–1939', *Peace & Change*, Vol. 14, no. 3 (July 1989), 281, n. 1; Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941* (Boston: Beacon, 1973), 36–7; Vellacott, '"Transnationalism" in the early WILPF', in Harvey Dyck, ed., *The Pacifist Impulse in Historical Perspective* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). One of the difficulties with the use of the term is its fairly recent adoption as descriptive of large international corporations, although in fact they too operate 'above' national interests, though not necessarily for the public good.

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the Covenant and on the peace terms as the ICWPP, and made the same major points, facts which owed much to the active presence in both organisations of Helena Swanwick. But the comparison will not be pursued here, because the UDC was not international nor inter-allied in its composition although it was of course international in its sympathies, and encouraged the formation of similar bodies wherever it could.[23]

The blockade

While the peace treaty was being written and when the women's congress gathered in Zurich, much of Europe was experiencing deprivation resulting from the economic dislocation resulting from the war and its aftermath, exacerbated by the blockade imposed by the Allied powers.[24] The response of WILPF to the crisis provides an example of their approach.

Significantly, while the statesmen at Paris knew of the suffering, it was a direct part of the shared experience of the women. Some of those who came to Zurich were themselves visibly affected by malnutrition, and had lost family members to starvation and disease; at the end of the congress they would, as one delegate put it, 'go back into the night'.[25] Congress delegates also went to meet a trainload of 800 starved and weakened children from the hard-hit city of Vienna, who were brought to Switzerland for emergency care – leaving behind, it was said, a far larger number who were abandoned as too weak to travel. Delegates who were able to travel to some of the affected regions before and after the congress confirmed the terrible conditions, and particularly the effect upon the children.[26]

Here was a gendered cause – a motherhood cause – if ever there was one. In 1920, learning that although milk was being sent to Germany for babies whose starving mothers could not provide breast milk, there were no rubber teats with which to bottle-feed the infants, the British WIL would set to work to raise the million teats needed and to organise their distribution. But Helena Swanwick's later comment on the effort is illuminating: 'The W.I.L.', she wrote, 'had made it a rule not to branch off from its educative work into relief – a sore temptation in those days – and, though we never regretted this exception, we never repeated it. . . . There was only our one women's organisation trying to do educative pacifist work, and I thought that, if we abandoned that, we should indeed be surrendering to the

[23] H. M. Swanwick, *Builders of Peace* (London: Swarthmore Press, 1924; repr. Garland, with introduction by Blanche Wiesen Cook, 1973); Marvin Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). The UDC had an effective voice in British politics in the early 1920s, when a number of its members were elected to Parliament and some served in the Labour government.

[24] Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962–3) I, 88–9; Marks, *The Illusion of Peace*, 7; C. Paul Vincent, *The Politics of Hunger: the Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915–1919* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985).

[25] Gertrud Baer, recalled by Helena Swanwick, *I Have Been Young* (London: Gollancz, 1935), 319; see also *Towards Peace and Freedom*, 10–11; Gertrude Bussey and Margaret Tims, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965), 19.

[26] *Towards Peace and Freedom*, 12; see also Addams, *Peace and Bread*, 169–70.

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age-old notion that women had no concern in public life except to wipe up the mess made by men. I wanted women not only to "sweep the water out of the cellar"; I wanted them to "turn off the tap"'.[27]

The 'pacifist educative work' referred to by Swanwick was in fact well-informed political advocacy. Although the content came largely from the female experience, the form was female only in that women were outside the power structure and had to create their own forum and their own opportunities to exert influence. WILPF not only did its best to expose the human effects of the economic dislocation, but spelled out emergency measures to relieve the worst of those effects. The resolution sent from Zurich to the Paris Peace Conference referred briefly to the situation as 'a disgrace to civilisation' before moving on to urge

> the Governments of all the Powers assembled at the Peace Conference immediately to develop the inter-allied organisations formed for the purposes of war into an international organisation for purposes of peace, so that the resources of the world – food, raw materials, finance, transport – shall be made available for the relief of the people of all countries from famine and pestilence.

In concrete terms, the resolution urged that the blockade be lifted, that international transport be regulated to ensure delivery of necessities, and that rationing be introduced in every country 'so that the starving may be fed', and concluded, 'The Congress believes that only immediate international action on these lines can save humanity, and bring about the permanent reconciliation and union of the peoples'.[28]

The WILPF women were looking at the long-term political consequences as well as at the immediate humanitarian effects. They feared that famine and disease would continue under the harsh conditions imposed by the treaty, and they foresaw the political effects in the legacy of bitterness and hatred. They saw at the same time an opportunity for the Allied rulers to put in place international measures, perhaps making use of the new League of Nations, that might have an immense positive effect and enable the people of the world to view that body with more hope and more respect. Jane Addams later wrote, 'Could it [the League of Nations] have considered this multitude of starving children as its concrete problem, feeding them might have been the quickest way to restore the divided European nation to human and kindly relationship.'[29]

1919–1929

The history of WILPF between the wars divides quite sharply into two parts, with a turning point around 1929–31. The same can, of course, be said of the history of the League of Nations, and of the peace of the world. We shall be dealing here with only the first of these two decades.

[27] Swanwick, *I Have Been Young*, 315–6; Helen Ward, *A Venture in Goodwill, being the Story of the WILPF, 1915–1929* (London: WIL, 1929) 21–22.

[28] *Towards Peace and Freedom*, 18.

[29] Addams, *Peace and Bread*, 172.

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In devising a constitution for WILPF, the leaders strove to establish a format to transcend nationalism and to provide a forum where members could address issues, express opinions, and take action as women, not as citizens of Britain, France, Germany or any other country. Accordingly, members of the international executive were elected by the biennial congresses, and represented this international gathering, not the various national sections. Secondly, an international section was created, whose members were responsible to the executive but not directly to their own national sections.[30] Thirdly, in an act of faith and hope, once it was learned that the League of Nations was to be based in Geneva, WILPF opened an office there and shortly took a long lease on a tall old house, named it the Maison Internationale, and maintained a presence there, charged with doing what could be done to further the resolutions passed at the international congresses of the organisation. But the nature of WILPF's work at the Maison Internationale in itself resulted from a noted lack of success in achieving one of the main objectives of the women who had gathered at The Hague in 1915. Despite the continuing efforts of women's organisations, barely a handful of women was ever appointed by their governments or the League of Nations secretariat to positions of power or influence in that organisation, and what official service they were invited to give was largely in the areas of the welfare of women and children.[31] The case of the Mandates Commission is instructive. The League Assembly, recognising the need for oversight of what befell women in mandated territories, unanimously passed a resolution decreeing that there should always be 'a woman [sic]' on that commission. WILPF swallowed its objection both to the tokenism and to the implication that the woman would be expected to focus only on the care of women; however, since no government could appoint more than one member, none ever did in fact appoint a woman. So WILPF, believing the work to be important, did what it could to support and influence those of the male representatives who, they thought, would carry forward the concerns that interested them.[32]

The interwar work of WILPF was therefore carried out from the fringes of power; the international office in Geneva worked as a low-key lobby group, providing information to the male statesmen there (and what women there were) and trying to influence their decisions on causes chosen with care to serve the overall objective of working towards an enduring peace.

The process of WILPF's interaction with the statesmen at the League of Nations is of great interest. The term 'NGO' was not in use until much later, but WILPF was in fact a prototype for the modern development of a certain type of non-governmental organisation. Indeed, a central role of NGOs is to do exactly what the WILPF international section tried to do at Geneva; that is, marshall evidence and

[30] Two consultative members were appointed to the international executive by each national section, but these did not have a vote in its decisions.

[31] Bussey and Tims, 74–75.

[32] WIL (British) *Monthly News Sheet*, vol. 6, no. 5, March 1921, 3, Col/WILPF. For the mandates issue, see [Balch] to Swanwick, 24 Jan. 1921, carbon, Col/WILPF, and extensive material from 1926, Col/WILPF.

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research findings in a cause (often on behalf of a minority or a group without official representation), expose representatives to a desired point of view and attempt to influence the decision makers to implement public policy in that direction. The approach was usually made to a potential sympathiser (often a profile had been obtained from the WILPF section of his country); confrontation with confirmed opponents was avoided.

When the League of Nations was brand new, so was this type of lobbying, although it quickly grew into a regular practice; both the International Council of Women and the International Alliance of Women (formerly the IWSA) also maintained a presence at Geneva, and the three women's groups sometimes co-operated on an issue; increasingly, during the interwar years, peace became a concern of all three bodies, although WILPF's approach remained the most challenging.

If WILPF had a head start in its development over other groups, it was because of the experience in parliamentary lobbying and political process brought by some of its leading women, and perhaps in particular Catherine Marshall of the British section.[33] The WILPF women at the Maison Internationale quickly set to work to make themselves knowledgeable regarding the new structures of the League and to develop what would work in the new organisation. Marshall, arriving in Geneva a few days before the First Assembly opened, was the first person to ask to see the League's rules of procedure – and to suggest, with some effect, that they be modified.[34] At the same time the Maison Internationale worked closely with the very few women working in the League of Nations, and provided a supportive place for them in what could be a very chilly climate for women. Meanwhile, they took every opportunity to join with other women's groups pressing for the inclusion of more women at every level in the work of the League of Nations.

Work with diplomats at Geneva, like much of Marshall's work for suffrage, was not limited to formal methods. The Maison Internationale sometimes provided an informal safe meeting place where off-the-record encounters could take place between players whose public exchanges had to conform strictly to diplomatic protocol. People whose normal meetings were hedged about with formalities could come to know each other a little better. WILPF could provide some information about the state of public opinion in certain countries, as well as a solid and growing body of documented research on the issues of concern. WILPF staff could 'carry messages'[35] between the two sides in a delicate issue, informally letting each know the point where there might after all be some flexibility.

[33] Some of the methods and skills which Marshall had honed by 1914 were applicable in Geneva, and a few of the players were even the same, notably Lord Robert Cecil, an independent Conservative suffragist with whom Marshall had had friendly dealings before the war. Cecil had passionately espoused the concept of a League of Nations, had been instrumental in its formation, and was a delegate (though not for Britain) at the first three Assemblies and influential throughout its existence. Later, when Baldwin became prime minister in Britain, Cecil was put in charge of League of Nations affairs for Britain.

[34] Bussey and Tims, *Women's International League*, 35.

[35] For the message-carrying role of the mediator (in this case in armed conflict) see Adam Curle, *Tools for Transformation* (London: Hawthorn, 1992), ch. 10.

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Despite disappointment with the peace settlement, WILPF entered the period soberly hopeful, and throughout the decade initiated many proactive moves. The organisation's 'transnational' constitution worked adequately as long as there was substantial unity among the sections, with the work of the international executive and of the office at Geneva flowing fairly smoothly from decisions of the congresses; achievement was limited more by lack of resources than by controversy about direction, although controversy was not absent.

In particular, latent tension existed from the start between the international section and the national sections over the way in which the work was seen. Emily Balch, based at the Maison Internationale as the first international secretary in 1919, saw it as important for WILPF to preserve a non-aligned, non-partisan stance. Helena Swanwick, loyal as she had been to the officially non-party (or more accurately, all-party) stance of the NUWSS in the suffrage struggle before the war, saw that it might be impossible or at best debilitating to try to avoid 'taking sides' within each country. 'When it comes to practical political work', she wrote in 1919, 'National Sections will find themselves opposing a Government (as we must do in Great Britain) and working to put in place another [party] (as we are doing!) . . . this is a matter for National Sections not for the headquarters. Most of us here feel that there is not the least chance for a real League of Nations until our Imperialists and Profiteers are got rid of – Is that partisanship? It would ''exclude'' members of the Imperialist and profiteering parties!'[36] But major disagreement over roles or issues did not surface until the thirties.

Treaty revision, increased openness of League of Nations procedure, changes to the League's Covenant to permit all countries which so wished to join it (and the more remote hope that the Assembly might be elected by a directly democratic procedure) disarmament, the threat of increased 'scientific warfare' (that is, chemical weapons), protection of minorities, the principle of self-determination, the just working of the mandate system, economic reform were all addressed. The relief of distress and the situation of refugees were not disregarded, but WILPF's Geneva staff chose to address the causes of such suffering – and in particular, war – rather than getting drawn into palliative efforts. It made an exception where involvement was perceived as directly serving the more political aim.[37] Service on the Red Cross International Relief Commission formed to address the Russian famine of 1921, for example, enabled Marshall to promote the appointment of two individuals from Russia itself, previously unrepresented, and she also worked to have the commission circulate factual information about the rumour-bedevilled USSR.[38]

[36] Swanwick to Balch, 25 August 1919, Col/WILPF.

[37] For Balch's determination not to have WILPF sidetracked into humanitarian causes rather than concentrating on addressing the causes of war, see Bussey and Tims, *Women's International League*, 34–5; Helen Ward, *A Venture in Goodwill, being the Story of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (London: WIL, 1929), 21–2.

[38] Marshall to Jane Addams, 12 August 1921, Col/WILPF.

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Numerically, WILPF was never a large organisation.[39] While this contributed to its always being short of funds – perhaps in particular in the work at Geneva, which often had to beg for the crumbs from the tables of the national sections, themselves fully committed to work in their own countries – there were other resources in which it was rich out of all proportion to its numbers. Those who led it from the beginning were not only noted feminists with a great deal of political experience but in many instances were women of distinction in one field or another, who brought scholarship, experience and solid research to bear, as well as conviction. Helena Swanwick, as we have seen, had come to the 1919 Zurich congress already prepared with a detailed analysis of the League of Nations covenant, and Catherine Marshall to Geneva in 1920 with a sophisticated interest in process. On this and many other matters, WILPF women had done their homework more thoroughly than some of the appointed representatives and officials, and were able tactfully to provide a useful source of information and documentation.

Further, during the interwar years, many of the most brilliant women in the western world, and some men, were eager to put their knowledge and skills to the service of some particular project or issue endorsed by WILPF. To give just one example, WILPF's concern over chemical warfare was in large part sparked by Gertrud Woker, Professor of Chemistry at the University of Berne, whose interest in the topic had taken on a new urgency when she visited the American Gas Armament Center in Maryland. Woker served on the WILPF Committee on Chemical Warfare, and her respected position as a scientist, with contacts in the scientific community, enabled WILPF to interest a number of prominent persons. The convincing memorandum sent by the WILPF committee to all the delegates at the League of Nations Conference on Control of Traffic in Arms in 1925 may well have played an important role in leading the US delegate to initiate the discussion that led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons which emerged from that conference, even though the topic had not originally even been on the agenda.[40] The cause seems to be out of line with WILPF's general policy to eschew the promotion of 'rules of warfare' in favour of a simple condemnation of all warfare as unacceptable, but Emily Balch, who moved a resolution condemning chemical warfare at the WILPF congress in Washington in 1924, made it clear that she saw the emphasis on this extreme horror as a means to education on the real nature of war.[41]

In other fields as well, individual WILPF women acquired the knowledge and expertise they needed to speak with confidence on the issues that concerned them, examining, for instance, the means, and implications, of general disarmament, the working of the mandates system and a recovery from the effects of colonialism, the questions raised by minorities and self-determination, the changes needed in education to bring about a more peaceful and internationalist society, the develop-

[39] In 1926 membership was estimated at 50,000 women in forty countries. Bussey and Tims, *Women's International League*, 77.

[40] *Ibid.*, 66.

[41] Randall, *Improper*, 300.

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ment of international law and more effective means of arbitration between nations, and the overall question of economic reform, going far beyond the situation created by reparations. In addition to their own research, WILPF was able to call on support from other experts in the various fields, and would submit a brief to the appropriate authority, either a national government or a League of Nations body, such as the International Labour Office. For instance, in 1926, when the British government resisted the efforts of the Mandates Commission to exercise its authority to look more closely at the operation of mandates, the British section called together experts and was able to draw up, publicise and distribute to all members of parliament a very effective memorandum, resulting in a debate in the Commons, and in the government's backing down.[42]

On-site action and research were also features of WILPF's work. In some cases this arose spontaneously as the response of a national section to a regional development or to an outbreak of political violence, as, for example, in Bavaria in 1919, when the young Gertrud Baer personally intervened, with a handful of others, to mediate between right-wing Prussian troops and armed force from the extreme left, whose hostilities constituted a threat to the nascent Weimar Republic.[43] In other instances, a decision was taken to send a fact-finding mission to a troubled area, as when the British WIL investigated the situation in Ireland in 1920. The mission, which travelled the whole country, both north and south, included Ellen Wilkinson and Helena Swanwick, and issued an uncompromising report condemning the actions there of the British government, which was currently trying to keep order with the aid of the notorious Black and Tans.[44] Similarly, Emily Balch and others (including well-known black women) were sent to Haiti in 1926, Edith Pye and Camille Drevet to Indo-China and China in 1927, Mary Sheepshanks to the Ukraine in 1930 and Mrs Waern-Bugge of Sweden to Palestine in 1930;[45] and these are only a few of the fact-finding and bridge-building journeys carried out.

Sometimes WILPF deliberately held its own international congresses in troubled areas, giving support to beleaguered members from the region and allowing those who had travelled from other parts of the world a chance to see something of the situation first-hand; for example, the 1921 congress was held in Vienna, the centre of the dismantled Austro-Hungarian empire, rife with civil strife and minority problems, and the 1926 congress took place in Dublin.[46] During these years, several special conferences were convened by WILPF, not limited to WILPF members, including the Conference for a New Peace (1922); a Conference on Modern Methods of Warfare (1929); simultaneous conferences (1929) on Minorities and the League of Nations in London (for the experts) and in Vienna (for the people most

[42] Bussey and Tims, *Women's International League*, 76.

[43] Randall, *Improper*, 279; Bussey and Tims, *Women's International League*, 39.

[44] 'A "Sort of War" in Ireland: Report of Mission to Ireland by the Women's International League', (London: WIL, 1920, pamphlet), SCPC; Bussey and Tims, *Women's International League*, 41.

[45] Bussey and Tims, *Women's International League*, 58, 105–8. For the Haiti mission see also Randall, *Improper*, 303–7.

[46] Bussey and Tims, 38, 52–7.

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affected); and a conference on Opium and Narcotics (1930), which appears directly to have influenced the adoption by the League of Nations of a convention aimed at limiting the production of narcotics to medical needs.[47]

Throughout the 1920s, then, WILPF was active and productive, becoming increasingly well known and commanding considerable respect, not only for its views but for the reliability and thoroughness of its research and fact-finding. Differences of opinion there were – some of them fierce – and differences of emphasis between different national sections, but none sufficiently intractable to make the constitution inoperable or paralyse transnational action. The international executive elected at the congresses was remarkably varied and representative, including able women from many member countries, seldom dominated by any one country and usually having no more than two women from any one national section. Although, again, neither the congresses nor the executive were free from controversy, a general sense of the direction of work to be done prevailed, and if some wanted to put their energies towards public education and others to focus on action furthering concerns such as disarmament, treaty revision or the rights of minorities, there was work for all, and work which could be seen as complementary rather than antithetical.

The period covered here had seen hope for the future, but those who, like the women of WILPF, had made an informed study of international affairs well knew that the odds were heavily against them. After 1930, the situation deteriorated rapidly. The vital questions of the machinery of international peace, and of the internal peace and justice without which it could not endure, were unresolved, and, in particular, economic justice and stability were still far off. Clearly, there were still many issues for WILPF to work on, but the unity of purpose which had characterized its work in the twenties began to fail under the external pressures of the thirties. While this article does not go beyond 1930, it is worthy of note that the divisions in WILPF did not follow the gender expectations laid on pacifist women from the outset; their national concerns were not necessarily in the direction of defending their own governments, but frequently, as in the case of the German women, of demanding that more attention be paid to combating what those governments were doing. As fascism gained a hold, some WILPF members and sections reluctantly lost their faith in complete pacifism and looked instead to communism for a solution. Loss of confidence in the international section led to modifications in the constitution, moving it a step away from the transnational dream.[48]

[47] Bussey and Tims, *Women's International League*, ch. 6.

[48] Norman Ingram, *The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France, 1919–1939*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), chs. 10, 11. If the choice in Europe was seen as between pacifism and anti-fascism, the same dilemma presented itself in the United States on the question of isolationism versus intervention as the better route to peace, Pois, 'The U.S. WILPF'.

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Conclusion: gender and opposition to war

If gender be the term used for what women and men are culturally expected to be, the women of WILPF should be recognised as having stepped out beyond expectations, instead making of themselves what they chose. War assigns gender roles perhaps even more clearly than does peace. In conformity with the most ancient of norms, women figure as weepers, as motivators, as comforters, as healers of the wounded, as spoils of war, as mothers of the next fighting generation. More recent cultural expectations have enlarged their support function to include the making of armaments and serving in military forces. But both oppression and opportunity take place in a man's world.

All of these roles, examined more closely, turn out to be dictated by the expectations of the ruling (male) elite (and accepted as the preordained order by many women). By working for the 'minimum feminist programme', postwar suffrage feminists were trying to push the door wider and claim a say, for a start, in women's own affairs. The Inter-Allied Suffragists, as we have seen, asked the statesmen in Paris to allow them a voice wherever 'the special needs and responsibilities of women' were concerned.[49] Ironically, this demand might not have alarmed even some anti-suffragists. Mrs Humphry Ward – the leading woman opponent before the First World War of the women's vote in Britain – had conceded that, if it were practically possible, 'there would be a great deal to be said for a special franchise' which would limit women's votes to 'those matters where they were equally concerned with men', and keep them from those areas (such as foreign and imperial affairs) 'where [women's] ignorance is imposed by nature and irreparable'.[50] A more recent example of the continuing expectation that women's role in the public sphere will be limited to so-called 'women's issues', *and that the definition of what constitutes a women's issue will not be left to the women*, is provided by the 1979 firing of Bella Abzug as co-chair of the United States special presidential National Advisory Commission for Women because the women 'insisted on using that platform to talk about war and the economy'.[51]

The feminist pacifists – the women of WILPF – made the radical claim, like Bella Abzug, that the affairs in which women had an interest had no gender limitations, and that the peace of the world was at least as much their concern as it was that of men. They had ignored their assigned gender roles in wartime, and in peacetime they continued their defiance by simply behaving as if the expectations did not exist. They did not – as is a temptation arising particularly during war – take on male gender roles, although they moved into spheres traditionally reserved for men. They accepted some gender typing that might now be questioned, and especially during the war they made use of the rhetoric of suffering motherhood – which

[49] Fawcett, *What I Remember*, 253–6

[50] Mary Ward, *Speech by Mrs. Humphry Ward*, pamphlet (London: Women's National Anti-Suffrage League, 1908).

[51] Ann Snitow, 'A Gender Diary', in Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King, eds., *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 39.

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indeed reflected their experience. But their insistence on developing their own critique of international affairs was a challenge to the norm. They claimed to bring to the study a new dimension in part because of their female nature and in part because women had not been soaked for generations in the culture of combativeness. They asserted and demonstrated equality of interest and ability and saw no need to claim sameness of outlook. But the women of WILPF spent little time theorising about the basis of their activity; they just used the abilities they had to do what they saw needed doing. They spoke throughout as women and saw the part they would play as complementary to that of men, but they accepted no limitation as to the stage on which they would play that part. Despite all their efforts, they were relegated to the wings and to small bit parts. Nevertheless, they still made their voices heard, or acted as prompters – using their own text – and were not without effect. [52]

[52] For the concept of roles and spheres, see Vellacott, 'Historical Reflections on Votes, Brooms and Guns: Admission to Political Structures – on whose terms?', *Atlantis*, Vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 1987) 36–9; Ellen Dubois, 'The Radicalism of the Woman Suffrage Movement', *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 3 (1975–6), 63–71.

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