

audience and with a political purpose” (p. 36). And, more effusively still: “We can go to him for the beauty of his intelligence, unschooled as it was, and give him his proper place in the American renaissance, alongside Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, Melville, and Dickinson” (p. 37). High praise indeed!

But, as regards the matter instead of the manner, Kateb has severe reservations. The most momentous of these is that Lincoln “destroyed,” not once but twice, the Constitution he had sworn to uphold. He did this “first by suspension and then by a transformative amendment” (p. 64). In 1863 Lincoln suspended Habeas Corpus, issued the Emancipation Proclamation, and in 1865 initiated the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery in the United States. I cannot agree with Kateb’s use of the word “destroy” here, despite its (no doubt intended) dramatic impact on the reader. The Constitution makes provision for suspending Habeas Corpus in times of national emergency: “The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it” (Article I, Section 9, clause 2). Kateb is critical of Lincoln or anyone else who, invoking military or political “necessity,” would turn “rights” into “revocable privileges:” “A right is a right only when it is universal and absolute” (p. 107). But under the Constitution habeas corpus is not a “right” but—as the document itself says—a “privilege” that can be suspended *in extremis*. The only constitutional question that arose in Lincoln’s case was *who* had the authority to do that? Since its suspension is provided for in Article I, which enumerates the powers of Congress, Lincoln arguably erred in making an executive decision (although he did defend himself by saying that the Congress could if it chose override his decision; it did not). Nor did Lincoln “destroy” the Constitution by amending it, inasmuch as that document makes provision for amending itself (Article V).

Here as elsewhere Kateb is tugged, even torn, in different directions. He is, on the one hand, a liberal perfectionist (or, more precisely, absolutist) for whom rights are absolute and, on the other, one who recognizes that there is an ineluctable tragic dimension to political life inasmuch as one too often cannot avoid dirtying one’s hands. This ambivalence extends even to the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863. Lincoln knew and acknowledged that the right to own slaves was guaranteed by the Constitution, as was the duty of citizens to return runaway slaves to their owners. In issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, however, Lincoln in effect invited slaves to escape with the guarantee—contrary to the Constitution—that they will not be returned to their masters. Lincoln reasoned, rightly, that the South’s system of slave labor was propping and promoting its war effort, to the grave detriment of the Union. Not only did President Lincoln effectively violate the “takings clause” of the Bill of Rights—“nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation” (Amendment V)—but he

added northern insult to southern injury by further specifying that able-bodied former male slaves were eligible to serve in the Union army and navy (Final Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863, in Terence Ball, ed., *Abraham Lincoln: Political Writings and Speeches*, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 167–69). By war’s end more than one in ten—some 200,000—Union soldiers and sailors were of African ancestry.

Kateb chides Lincoln for not being an avowed abolitionist even as he acknowledges that no abolitionist could be nominated, still less elected (p. 87). He can’t resist the urge to wash Lincoln’s hands, or at least gesture in that direction. But if Lincoln was so soft or moderate on slavery, why did so many southerners think his election to the presidency an unmitigated disaster deserving the extreme measure of secession? That Kateb doesn’t address this crucial question is in my view a major shortcoming of an otherwise admirable book. Lincoln had joined the new Republican Party, which opposed extending slavery into the western territories, reasoning that if the institution could not expand it would die. Kateb summarily dismisses their “containment strategy” as a “fiction” and “a substitute for a strategy. There was no constitutional way out of slavery. . .” (p. 124). Lincoln “did not spell out the process of extinction” (p. 122). But he didn’t need to, because—as we can clearly see in various southern states’ resolutions on secession—southerners knew what Lincoln knew: If and when free states outnumber slave states slavery can be abolished by constitutional amendment. “Mississippi’s ‘Resolutions on Secession’ (November 30, 1860) was typical: Northerners ‘seek by an increase of abolition states ‘to acquire two thirds of both houses [of Congress]’ for the purpose of preparing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, abolishing slavery in the States.” According to the 1860 Census, fully 55% of Mississippi’s residents were slaves. One need not be a mathematical genius to see what advantages the three-fifths clause of the Constitution conferred on that and other southern states. Clearly, Southerners did not agree that the “containment” strategy was a “fiction”—far from it.

These and other shortcomings do little, however, to detract from Kateb’s all-too-timely meditation on Lincoln’s troubled—and still-troubling—political thoughts and actions. And as *provocateur* he succeeds wonderfully.

Arendt and America. By Richard H. King. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 412p.
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— Roy T. Tsao, *Brooklyn College, CUNY*

Richard H. King’s *Arendt and America* is a big book, the most ambitious and comprehensive study of Arendt to appear in some time. Its stated purpose is twofold: to examine “the impact of the New World on [Arendt’s] thought,” and to explore the “impact of Arendt’s thought

on American thought and culture” (p. 21). King pursues both aims simultaneously, following the arc of Arendt’s career from her emigration to the United States in 1941 (at the age of thirty-five) to her death in 1975.

Unlike many other well-known émigré authors of her generation, Arendt came to America with but few publications or academic credentials to her name. Her first major book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, was written after she had settled in this country, and published in the year she obtained U.S. citizenship, 1951. King makes effective use of little-studied writings from that epoch in her life to show that her basic attitudes toward American society and politics had already crystallized by that time.

King finds in those attitudes a duality strongly reminiscent of Tocqueville, whom he deems Arendt’s chief predecessor and guide in this matter. On the one hand, the absence of European-style class barriers and unprecedented economic prosperity gave the United States an increasingly homogeneous, conformist mass society. On the other hand, robust traditions of republican government made for a liberal constitutional order more vital and enduring than anything known to the nation-states of (continental) Europe. King makes the intriguing suggestion that Arendt’s kinship with Tocqueville extended to her self-understanding as a thinker and writer, insofar as she took it upon herself to educate Europeans about America’s distinctive political heritage.

Arendt and America provides a wealth of information concerning the milieu in which Arendt wrote, and a useful survey of her writings’ critical reception. For this reason alone, it deserves to become a standard reference for scholars in the field. By drawing attention to Arendt’s American context, the book offers a welcome corrective to the disproportionate emphasis some interpreters give to her debts to her teachers Heidegger and Jaspers. Yet readers who seek fresh traction on the finer points of Arendt’s thought, or fresh illumination into its obscurities, are likely to find King a frustrating guide.

King is an intellectual historian, not a political theorist. That difference might not mean much, but King is an intellectual historian of a certain sort, to judge from this book. More often than not, his chief concern is to locate Arendt in the known intellectual topography of the era, as defined by the interests and opinions of prominent contemporaries. When King can’t locate her on one map, he’ll try another (so long as it’s certifiably American). When he finds her on none, he tends to lose interest.

King writes at length on Arendt’s 1959 essay on school desegregation, “Reflections on Little Rock.” Much of what he has to say consists in endorsing the strictures laid upon that essay by previous critics, and deploring Arendt’s insufficiencies relative to the era’s most progressive thinkers on American race-relations. Of her 1970 essays on “On Violence” and “Civil Disobedience,” he has less to say than one might have expected, once he’s through with the topic

of their author’s failure to stay abreast of the New Left. He’s unable to muster much interest at all in her long essay on U.S. involvement in Vietnam, “Lying in Politics” (1971), which he gives just a page’s worth of perfunctory summary.

King is more enthusiastic about *On Revolution* (1963). He seizes on Arendt’s praise of the American Founders’ success in establishing a viable constitutional order, and concludes that “her political thought was . . . anchored in the work of the Framers” (p. 271). (By “Framers,” King appears to mean the Founders generally.) Here, too, King is concerned less with getting to the bottom of Arendt’s thinking than with fixing its position in relation to better-charted currents of American thought. As King sees it, *On Revolution* is significant mainly for having broken with a then-prevailing scholarly consensus about the American Founding, in a manner that anticipated a later wave of scholarship: “Arendt’s major historiographical claim in *On Revolution*,” he declares, is “that the origins of the American system were republican (civic humanist) rather than liberal” (p. 23).

King is so intent on making *On Revolution* out to be a recovery of American “republicanism” that he seems not to notice that she had other things on her mind in writing the book. King finds it noteworthy that the term “republicanism” occurs only once in the pages of Louis Hartz’s 1955 classic, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, a book that King takes to exemplify the then-dominant “liberal” reading of American history (p. 230). I’m sorry to have to point out that this is also the number of times that the term appears in *On Revolution*.

King is determined to see *On Revolution* as a precursor to the now-familiar “republican turn” in the historiography of the American Founding (p. 220). He finds Arendt referring to Machiavelli and to classical Rome, and so surmises that her interest in the “civic humanist” influences on the Founders must be much the same as J.G.A. Pocock’s in *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975). This won’t do. Pocock sought to trace the after-life of Florentine republican thought in the Anglo-American world of the seventeenth- and eighteenth centuries. Arendt had an altogether different agenda. It was her peculiar, persistent conviction that the “men of revolution” were misled and ill-served by their prior European antecedents, whether Machiavelli’s or Cicero’s. Much as she claimed to admire the Founders’ achievement, she tended to regard their theorizing as the stuff of hackneyed irrelevancies, utterly inadequate to what she judged genuine and important in their experience of revolution. A judgment like that is hardly intelligible except from the vantage of Arendt’s own theoretical enterprise. King’s procedures don’t offer much help with this.

Nor do those procedures seem so helpful when it comes to investigating Arendt’s “impact” (which takes up a good part of the book). A chapter that promises to “explore . . . the widespread impact of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* on American intellectual and academic life” (p. 21) turns out to consist almost solely of a survey of

the book's initial critical reception—that is to say, book-reviewers' assessments. For a book that's remained continuously in print since 1951, that makes for a skewed sample, to say the least. With some of Arendt's books, King casts his net more broadly, extending to assessments in more recent scholarly commentary. But that still leaves out a lot.

For instance: *The Origins of Totalitarianism* was a formative influence for Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ronald Reagan's ambassador to the U.N.,—and equally so for Samantha Power, Barack Obama's. Her writings have elicited thoughtful, searching responses from the poet Robert Lowell, the Catholic devotional writer Thomas Merton, and the crusading anti-war journalist Jonathan Schell. Her ideas are a recurrent point of reference in the writings of the social critic Christopher Lasch, the sociologist Richard Sennett, and the architecture critic Kenneth Frampton, to name just a few. She has been credited as an inspiration by scholars as various and diverse as the gender theorist Judith Butler, the constitutional jurist Bruce Ackerman, and even—yes—the historian J.G.A. Pocock.

Of those figures, only Pocock makes the cut in King's reckoning of Arendt's impact on American thought—and it's an exception that proves the rule. King makes much of the fact that Pocock singles out Arendt as a stimulus to his thinking in *The Machiavellian Moment*. But King misremembers the reference, and draws the wrong lesson. The book of Arendt's named by Pocock isn't *On Revolution*, as King would have it, but *The Human Condition* (to which King gives little attention). A small mistake, but a revealing one. It's no surprise that a scholar with Pocock's interests (and scruples) would find little to learn from Arendt's handling of early American thought. What's more interesting is that he'd care to name Arendt as a source of ideas, nonetheless. It's Arendt as a *thinker* whom Pocock found stimulating—and the same can be said of all the figures I just named. Every one of them surely found much in what she wrote to be wrong-headed or incomprehensible, yet they still looked to her for ideas and insights that they found nowhere else. *Arendt and America* would come closer to attaining its stated aims if it gave more attention to why that might be.

Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governances of Mobility. By Hagar Kotef. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015. 248p. \$84.95 cloth. \$23.95 paper

The Cross-Border Connection: Immigrants, Emigrants and Their Homelands. By Roger Waldinger. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. 240p. \$29.95.
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— Nanda Oudejans, *Tilburg University*

The important normative issues and societal challenges of our time revolve around borders. Globalization has

shifted our attention from the border as a mere geographical line that demarcates a state's territory to the more complex and even ambiguous functioning of borders. In particular, the movement of people has brought the relational character of borders to awareness: Borders serve to include *and* exclude, separating *and* uniting “here” and “there,” and even if boundaries close off an inside with respect to an outside, borders also always signal an openness to what lies beyond.

The two books under review here turn their gaze toward both sides of the border. Hagar Kotef's *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom* closely examines the implications of qualifying movement either as normal, regular, and safe or as abnormal, irregular, and excessive. Kotef offers a theoretical inquiry into movement as a manifestation of freedom and critically discusses the split between those whose free movement is preconditioned by the control and containment of others and those who are unfree and cannot change places. She meticulously maps this split onto the history and theory of political liberalism. In *The Cross-Border Connection*, Roger Waldinger in turn ties “this side” of the border with the “other side” by describing the different ways in which migrants continue to relate to their place of origin and vice versa, and how these relations change over time due to the jagged course a human life takes. It is to the credit of both books that they do not embrace the oversimplified view of globalization as giving rise to a deterritorialized, unbounded world but, instead, seek to critically understand the continuing relevance of borders.

Kotef presents us with a rich and multi-faced contribution to contemporary theories on movement, migration, and border security. Whereas most scholars working on these themes depart from Hannah Arendt's famous invocation of the right to have rights, Kotef felicitously takes her cue from Arendt's recovery of the spatiality of the law. As Arendt reminds us that the enjoyment of rights and freedom requires the “legal emplacement” of the individual (a notion prompted by Hans Lindahl), she clarifies that we can only move freely within the territorial and normative boundaries of the state. The central insight Kotef takes from Arendt is that movement can only be free within ordered space. Next to Arendt, Kotef draws on Foucault's inquiries into the relation among power, security, and the circulation of goods, things and persons that he presented in the courses he taught at Collège de France between 1978 and 1979. She expands upon Foucault's basic insight that the expansion of ever-wider circulations of things and persons requires the *integration* instead of *elimination* of threats into the normal order of movement lest movement not be brought to a stop. Both Arendt and Foucault inform the twofold central claim of *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom*: i) *Free* movement is always *ordered* movement, and ii) through the ordering of movement, different subjects emerge that can be