interests" (p. 5). These subterranean (yet very material) aspects of Deleuzian thought have provided important resources for scholars attempting to situate humans more materially in the world, decentering humans from history and politics. Scholars like Jane Bennett, inspired in part by the Deleuzian attention to worldly forces, have radically transformed contemporary notions of political action and actors. While sympathetic to these transformations, Tampio treats Deleuze less as the means of problematizing the privileged position of humanity and more as a critique of the assumptions of rationalists, such as Habermas or Rawls.

Tampio's introduction of Deleuze to readers familiar with liberalism invites them to go beyond his claims and to develop his points in ways that are more disruptive of liberalism, such as the role of evil or the power of capitalism. "In *The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom*," Deleuze explains in *Masochism* (1967, which contains his "Coldness and Cruelty,") "the libertine states that he finds excitement not in 'what is here,' but in 'what is not here,' the absent Object, 'the idea of evil'" (p. 28). Tampio's version of Deleuze, while exciting, also lacks a touch of evil, particularly as that evil might haunt liberalism. Tampio knows that gardens are messy but more than that, gardens contain antagonisms, struggles, and temptations. There is no evil snake lurking in this garden, no perverse enjoyments predicated on the refusal of joy to others. "A Deleuzian garden nurtures diversity, wildness, and hybrids," Tampio asserts, and it is difficult to disagree, but the garden's wildness can turn desperate and violent (p. 40). Those wild hybrids must occasionally appear terrifying, perverse, and self-destructive, and particularly frightening when they threaten liberalism.

Deleuze himself might be a (welcome) snake in the garden of liberalism. His dissolution of the autonomous individual (as a version, perhaps, of self-destruction) offers a profound opportunity to engage the individualism endemic to liberalism. "The goal of *A Thousand Plateaus"* may be as Tampio claims, "to envision a political order where individuals, and individuals assembled into groups, have the right to experiment in peace, on the condition that they do not harm others" (p. 72). But Deleuze undermines this claim as well, particularly through the sustained critique of the centering of politics around the individual. *A Thousand Plateaus* opens with Deleuze and Guattari suggesting that their goal in writing is to transform our conceptions of "I": "To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves" (p. 3). Tampio's project leaves open the further challenges that Deleuze can offer to key elements of liberalism, particularly in terms of the reliance on the power of "I" to hold forces and reactions together.

There is a modest scale to Tampio's critical approach, probably inspired by Deleuze's advocacy of a cautious micropolitics. This generally serves him well as he attempts to convince liberals that Deleuze resonates with Mill. Such a treatment runs the risk, however, of domesticating Deleuze. The book under review places most of its bets on provoking future engagements. It provides the terms necessary for liberals to work with and against Deleuze. As with Tampio's prior book, *Kantian Courage* (2012), this book sets up an interesting and counterintuitive remapping of the Enlightenment, one that entices the reader to pursue further its language and concerns.

Deleuze's Political Vision is the eighteenth volume in the Modernity and Political Thought series by Rowman & Littlefield. This series features important contemporary theorists thinking with and writing about a significant predecessor in order to engage current issues and concerns. One aspect of this series has remained constant: a commitment to engaging past authors as a way to imagine and inhabit more livable futures. *Deleuze's Political Vision* continues this commitment to a future more alive and active with a diverse range of experience.

Modern Democracy and the Theological-Political Problem in Spinoza, Rousseau, and Jefferson. By Lee Ward. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014. 228p. $110.00 cloth.
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— Megan Gallagher, *Whitman College*

Lee Ward's purpose in *Modern Democracy and the Theological-Political Problem* is to explore the relationship between the increasingly secular character of politics and the success of democracy, long maligned but now broadly posited as the best and most legitimate regime type. In so doing, he offers intriguing close readings of the book's titular figures on the intersections of democratic thought and the theological-political. Composed of an introduction, three substantive chapters, and a brief conclusion, the author argues that Spinoza, Rousseau, and Jefferson are responsible for setting democratic thought in a rationalist framework, one that specifically denies political authority to revelation, but which nonetheless makes space for a metaphysics based in natural law.

For these thinkers, the decline of clerical rule in political life left a vacuum formerly filled by divine will. Modernity is thus marked by a shift from clerical rule dictated by revelation to a democratic politics increasingly shaped by popular sovereignty. Yet even if one accepts the account of early modernity as subject to the relentless onslaught of secularism, democratic politics in the hands of Spinoza, Rousseau, and Jefferson does not fully reject the premises of faith-based politics. Instead, the three share a "confidence in popular government and a concomitant commitment to subject religious authorities to

secular rule [and] a fundamentally similar conception of nature and the nature of power," as well as the belief that "nature reasserted its moral claim in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries against orthodoxies of various kinds" (p. 2). In other words, secularization does not completely dismiss religion; rather, it establishes a new hierarchy in which religion is subordinate to politics and civil society.

For Ward, Spinoza, Rousseau, and Jefferson determine that revelation-based politics is not only unnecessary and stultifying but normatively undesirable—it encourages people's worst tendencies toward intolerance. In revelation's place, the titular thinkers cultivate the belief that democracy is grounded in natural rights, granted by God. Ward terms this belief a kind of metaphysics, specifically a metaphysics capable of the "ennobling of democracy," in Thomas Pangle's phrasing. Ward argues, chiefly in the conclusion, that post-modernism's noncommittal attitude toward democracy—what he memorably terms a "curious mixture of triumphalism and malaise" (p. 188)—overlooks both the centrality of metaphysics to the democratic project and the self-critical nature of modernity. The book's three chapters are thus tasked with dually establishing what we might call a secular metaphysics and the contributions of Ward's three thinkers to that line of thought.

According to Ward, who focuses on the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Spinoza believes religious authority claimed by the state—what Ward calls "the institutional problem of theocracy" - undermines several principles necessary for a people to thrive, such as reliance on individuals' rational judgment, toleration, and freedom. Such qualities are only realizable through a democratic government grounded in natural, and explicitly not anthropocentric, laws. Following the work of Jonathan Israel, Ward argues that Spinoza grounds democracy in natural law and seeks to eliminate reliance on religious authorities and their insistence on the centrality of revelation. Early modern democracy, with its privileging of reason over superstition, advances human happiness and civic toleration—but only insofar as it is "regulated by certain metaphysical principles that endorse cosmic justice and order" (p. 189).

The chapter on Rousseau all but drops the language of metaphysics, though it offers a provocative interpretation of one of the most thorniest aspects of the Genevan's political thought: the legislator. Ward argues that Rousseau's discussion of civil religion, though it does not appear until the end of Book IV of the *Social Contract*, offers readers a means of reinterpreting the role of the Legislator, of whom Rousseau writes in chapter 7 of Book II. Ward proposes that a *modern* legislator need not resemble Moses, with the latter's ability to claim divine inspiration. Rather, referring to Rousseau's own attempts at drafting legislation for the Corsicans and the Poles, Ward points out that a Christian inheritance is simply a fact of life with which a would-be legislator must contend. Yet in the eyes of Rousseau, Christianity has proven a dangerous source of intolerance and civil exclusion. Rousseau's solution to this paradox comes in his well-worn phrase, a "purely civil profession of faith." Ward goes on to imagine how a modern legislator, eager to achieve a secular state, might engender such a faith. In doing so, he thinks beyond the inherent tensions—or, unkindly, contradictions - of Rousseau's Legislator, a figure who must dissemble in order to persuade his flock.

The third chapter, also the weakest, focuses on Jefferson, who, like Rousseau, is said to bring "democracy down from the heavens to earth" (pp. 2, 83, 138). Ultimately, the chapter is largely descriptive, with Ward promising to show "how Jefferson was instrumental in changing American perceptions about democracy" (p. 137), a claim with which few would disagree. Setting out to reveal how Jefferson attempted to realize his ideals within practical party politics, specifically with regard to toleration, Ward's shift in focus from theory to practice underserves both. (This is in spite of a captivating section on the Jefferson Bible.) Jefferson is as much an inheritor of Locke as of Spinoza or Hobbes, which Ward acknowledges —but Locke does not fit comfortably in the story that has so far been told.

Taken together, the three main chapters alternately offer insights into an unconventional trio, a few of which I have summarized, and raise a number of concerns. With regard to the latter, one might ask to what degree increasing state secularism during the early modern period was a rejection of revelation, rather than a rejection of religion, *tout court*. The two are troublingly conflated at times (pp. 42, 125). Similarly, democracy is sometimes equated with, and reduced to, popular sovereignty (pp. 2, 88, 189). With popular sovereignty elsewhere identified as "the underlying theoretical connection between liberalism and modern democracy" (p. 8), this leaves the reader somewhat uncertain as to how the author defines democracy.

More pressingly, if it is already agreed upon by most historians of political thought that Spinoza, Rousseau, and Jefferson are, to varying degrees, democratic thinkers, then what is the particular contribution of this work? Is it the claim that they are the triumvirate of central importance? What is at stake in selecting these three thinkers and not, for example, Pierre Bayle, Benjamin Franklin, or Thomas Reid? This is not to suggest that I wish the author had written a different book entirely. Rather, the reader would like to know why she ought to read about these figures in particular. Is there some significant 'interaction effect' of Spinoza, Rousseau, and Jefferson that is meaningful to contemporary politics?

There are some gestures toward these questions in the introduction but Ward's view ultimately remains oblique. The book's format—distinct chapters that do little to

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thread their main ideas into a complete tapestry—contribute to these ambiguities. The absence of a concluding chapter bringing the individual thinkers into dialogue with one another is felt. The three chapters that constitute the majority of the work ultimately feel more like thematically linked essays than a sustained argument. Nonetheless, there are rich explorations of the titular thinkers that will be of interest to those working in early modern thought and the intersection of the religious and the political.

AMERICAN POLITICS

Forgotten Men and Fallen Women: The Cultural Politics of New Deal Narratives. By Holly Allen. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015. 272p. $45.00.
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— Gwendoline Alphonso, *Fairfield University*

Whereas the New Deal is seen to mark a transformative moment in American political development, by paying attention to its underlying civic narratives, Holly Allen in *Forgotten Men and Fallen Women* reveals the extent to which state expansion was also preservationist, anchoring longstanding and newer civic ideals onto the emergent New Deal state. The book is a welcome contribution to the growing focus on civic identities in American political development (APD), and the important role of racial and gendered ideational narratives in shaping American Statebuilding (Rogers Smith, *Politics of Peoplehood: the Role of Values, Interests, and Identities,* 2015, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History,* 1997, *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership,* 2003); Julie Novkov and Carol Nackenoff, eds., *Statebuilding from the Margins: Between Reconstruction and the New Deal*, 2014; Stephen Skowronek and Matthew Glassman eds., *Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making,* 2007).

Allen assembles Depression and World War II civic narratives centered on figures such as the "forgotten man," "fallen woman," "citizen soldier," and "civilian defender" and argues that these were deployed by federal officials to enlist popular support for the expansive New Deal state and for World War II programs. In six substantive chapters, she demonstrates the intertwining of the institutional histories of vital federal programs and their evolving civic narratives. She maps, for instance, the history of relief agencies during the Depression onto the discursive deployment (and evolution) of the "forgotten man" as a political figure by state actors. In addition to program *formation*, the book is strong in revealing how also the *practices* of state programs embodied and pivoted on civic narratives—for example, in structuring the location, design, and routine of Civilian Conservation Corps' (CCC) militaristic wilderness camps and transient camps under the Federal Transient Program (FTP).

The book purports to highlight the importance of civic stories in at least three ways (pp. 1–2): (a) as illustrations of the "gender and racial contours of U.S. civic culture" in the New Deal and World War II eras; (b) as discursive mechanisms by which state builders soothe "tension between residual and emergent sources of civic authority" by offering "affective assurance" to mobilize support for state programs (p. 3, 6); and (c) as the "crucial means through which ordinary people understand their place within systems of national political power" (p. 2). It accomplishes the first two more effectively than the third.

The book is convincing in its demonstration of the significance of race, gender, and sexuality in the construction of New Deal civic narratives and the juxtaposition of new, more liberal political ideals, alongside older, illiberal, ones. It is also effective in highlighting the importance of emotions in politics, as the means through which state narratives draw popular support for public programs. We see how politically successful civic narratives, such as the "forgotten man," "civilian protectors," and "citizen soldiers" were those that generated widespread affective satisfaction, often by scapegoating women and racial and sexual minorities which, in turn, engendered mass support for unprecedented programs of state expansion.

Although uneven across the chapters, the overall focus on affect in policymaking contributes an important, often overlooked, dimension to our understanding of ideas in policy and political development, suggesting that the affective capacity of certain ideas may be vital to their overarching policy relevance. Emotions are a possible bridge between liberal and illiberal impulses in structuring political development, connecting, what Rogers Smith has identified (*Stories of Peoplehood,* 2003) as backwards-looking (ascriptive-based) collective narratives to progressive policies. Individual emotions, such as "nostalgia," "passion," "courage," and "fear" have recently been the focus of several important works in political development and history (Ira Katzenelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time* (2013), Richard Bensel, *Passion and Preferences: William Jennings Bryant and the 1896 Democratic Convention,* 2008; Laura Lovett, *Conceiving the Future: Pronatalism, Reproduction, and the Family in the United States, 1890–1938,* 2007) and although she does not identify this literature, Allen's book directly contributes to this scholarship.

However, it is less clear how everyday people interact with prevailing civic narratives to "understand their place" within the political system. Despite attention to popular and counter-narratives, the centrality of government