

Her analysis of the Sino-British negotiations is quite original. She uses Sir Edward Heath's memoirs as evidence that Mao really cared about the return of Hong Kong: "During their meeting, Mao asked Heath for his wish list and Heath said among other things that when, not if, Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty, he hoped the deed would be accomplished with good grace. 'I want the hand-over of Hong Kong to the mainland when the Treaty expires in 1997 to be smooth and peaceful', to which Mao replied, 'That is what I also want.'" (p. 186). This extract fails to prove the Great Helmsman's determination, and it is far-fetched to deduce that this "contradicts prevailing conventional wisdom, which blamed Deng rather than Mao for the decision to resume sovereignty" (p. 186). I would rather say that it shows it was the British who raised the question of Hong Kong's return and not the Chinese. This is actually corroborated by Wong Man Fang (a cadre of the Xinhua office in Hong Kong) who asserts that when MacLehose raised the question during his trip to Peking in 1979, the Chinese were caught unprepared. Suzanne Pepper chooses another extract of his book as she points out "Huang indicates that MacLehose did not ask about post-1997 sovereignty in so many words during his 1979 encounter with Deng, but eased into the subject obliquely" (p. 186).

On the domestic front, she gives little importance to the 1989 events which are nevertheless very significant in the emergence of the Hong Kong democratic movement and still remembered every year in Victoria Park. But, as a whole, her description of the Patten days and of the early political life of the SAR is less controversial. She rightly shows the contradiction of many democrats: "For better and for worse, their instinctive decision to identify with the democracy movement in China also confirmed both their pre-eminent local appeal and Beijing's hostility to the demands for a faster pace of political reform in Hong Kong" (p. 216).

Pepper provides precise analyses of the results of the successive Legco elections, and of the Central government's interference in Hong Kong's internal affairs, especially against the democrats:

Beijing did try to assume the public did not matter, and the conservative coalition did its best to marginalize or otherwise discredit democracy advocates. But their political integrity has so far survived even if their unity has not, and the voters have remained surprisingly loyal despite many democratic errors, both forced and otherwise (p. 298).

In conclusion, despite its exaggerated anti-British stance, Pepper's book provides a necessary overview of a very important question in modern Chinese history: why did Hong Kong fail to democratize?

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Taiwan's Statesman: Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia

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Taiwan's former president Lee Teng-hui excites great emotions in people both within Taiwan and overseas. The first popularly elected president in a "Chinese" state, Lee worked hard with the then opposition to democratize Taiwan following the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo. Both during his presidency (1988–2000) and since, Lee has angered people in Taiwan who believe he betrayed the original Chinese mission of the Kuomintang state. The Chinese leadership in Beijing and American

policy-makers responsible for the US–China relationship rail against Lee as a “troublemaker,” the same term used for current Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian. But others have huge respect for Lee and the political miracles he wrought.

Richard Kagan originally had a rather negative assessment of Lee. On the basis of comments from his friends in Taiwan, Kagan felt, “I was not sure I would like him” (p. xi). However, after 18 hours of interviews with Lee as well as shadowing Lee for a week, Kagan came to admire him. This biography is a result of Kagan’s interviews and other researches.

Those of us who have interviewed Lee have often found our interview “tidbits” had actually been previously published in one form or another. In this context, Kagan makes two useful contributions. First, he analyses the influences of Zen Buddhism and “a transcendental and ecumenical form of Christianity” on Lee’s thought and, to some extent, on his actions. Kagan argues, for example, that Zen “both propelled and reinforced Lee’s expertise in agriculture” and that both religions are “grounded in a respect for place” (p. 157). Kagan is not always convincing in his arguments, but they are stimulating and worth reading.

Secondly, Kagan provides some insights into Lee’s time at Cornell University in the late 1960s when he wrote his award-winning PhD thesis on agricultural economics. Lee tended to stay out of politics and became known as “Mr Steak” for his hosting of barbecues, though he did have some contacts with “Taiwan Independence” persons (pp. 62–66 and Appendix C). Lee was, of course, interrogated for a week by the Taiwan Garrison Command upon his return to Taiwan. As the interrogators told Lee, only Chiang Ching-kuo can use you. In fact, that is what happened.

Sadly, however, the book also has some defects, and was weakly edited. As a specialist on Taiwan, I could follow Kagan’s arguments, but a person with little background would find it difficult. Errors sadly follow one another. Koxinga’s son surrendered Taiwan to the Qing in mid-1683, not 1682 (p. 24). Japan’s *kōminka* assimilation policy actually began after 1937 and Lee Teng-hui only received his Japanese name in 1940, not in 1923 when he was born (pp. 29–30). On p. 41, Kagan says “Lee has never visited China,” but on p. 44 he mentions a possible trip to Shanghai in 1946. On p. 59 he points to two key Taiwanese friends of Lee, discusses Gao Yu-shu (Henry), but never mentions the second person. On p. 73 he places Nixon’s visit to China in the summer of 1971 rather than in 1972. On p. 75, he dates Lee’s calling the Kuomintang an “alien regime” to 2002, when in fact Lee first made this comment to Shiba Ryōtarō in 1994 (see p. 108 where he gets it right). On p. 76 he does not seem to realize that the elimination of the seed-for-fertilizer programme enabled the farmers to pay cash, a much cheaper option. He gives the date of the key Kaohsiung Incident as 12 December 1979 rather than the actual 10 December (p. 82). Ma Ying-jeou served as Mayor of Taipei from 1998–2006 (not 1997–2007, p. 146). The DPP was founded in 1986, not 1988 (p. 147). Errors such as these reduce confidence in Kagan’s analyses. In addition, many sources are incorrectly cited and the romanization throughout the book is poor.

Kagan concludes, “many of my prejudices and preconceived ideas were challenged as interviews, documents and observations led to a kaleidoscope of new discoveries and ideas... Lee’s rich life... will remain the biographer’s challenge...” (p. 163). Indeed, this is true.

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