

Ultramontane Efforts in the Ottoman Empire during the 1860s and 1870s

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The attempts of Pope Pius IX to restrict the ecclesiastical rights of the Armenian Catholics with his bull Reversurus (1867) led to the Armenian schism in 1871. A factor which was decisive for the development of the relationship between the Armenian Catholic Church and the Ottoman empire, under whose rule the Church existed, was the influence of other powers. This article analyses the background of this relationship and its significance for the Armenian schism. For this purpose, first, the ecclesiastical rights of the Armenian Catholic Church during the period before the publication of Reversurus and their relation to the internal policy of the Ottoman empire are outlined. Second, the influence of the domestic and foreign policy of the Ottoman state on its relationship with its Armenian Catholic subjects is elucidated. In this way, it is shown that the historical background of the Armenian Catholic Church and the internal political circumstances of the Ottoman empire were intertwined and shaped the relationship between the Armenian Catholics and the Ottoman state. Despite this, relations between the Ottoman empire, the Holy See and other European empires came to exercise a predominant influence, leading by the end of the 1870s to the Armenian Catholic Church's enforced acquiescence in ecclesiastical change.

When he restricted the ecclesiastical rights of the Armenian Catholics in 1867, Pope Pius IX (1846–78) started a new Roman Catholic policy in the East. At first glance, the papal decision seemed to concern only the relationship between the Armenian Catholic Church and Rome. But the Armenian Catholic patriarchate and a large Armenian Catholic community were situated in the territories of the Ottoman empire.¹ Hence the papal decision was also closely intertwined with the domestic and foreign policy of the Ottoman state.

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¹ Since the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–9, Armenian territory had been split between the Ottoman and Russian empires. In the 1860s, there were about 27,000 Armenian Catholics in Constantinople and its surroundings, 8,000 in Syria, Mesopotamia and

This article begins by analysing the ecclesiastical rights of the Armenian Catholic Church. It then explores how these rights were related to the civil rights of the Ottoman Armenians, which helps to explain ecclesiastical changes in the East after 1867. Some light can then be shed on how papal policy moved the Armenian Catholic question from the ecclesiastical to the diplomatic level. This change in the relationship between the Holy See and the Armenian Catholics reveals ultramontane aspects to the policy of the Holy See as it engaged with the Ottoman empire.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL RIGHTS OF THE ARMENIAN CATHOLICS

The road by which the Armenian Catholics came into union with Rome was a long one. The Armenian Church, founded in 301, broke communion with the other Christian churches after the Council of Chalcedon in 451. During the following millennium, there were several attempts to bring the Armenian Church to accept the decisions of Chalcedon. The Council of Ferrara-Florence (1431–49) was one of the most remarkable of these, but its attempt to turn the Armenian Church into a uniate church, in communion with Rome but retaining its liturgy and traditions, failed. Finally, in 1742, the Chalcedonian minority of the Armenians officially came into union with Rome.²

Since the earliest attempts at union with Rome, the question of the ecclesiastical rights of the Eastern churches, including the Armenian Catholic Church, has been discussed several times. During the Council of Ferrara-Florence, Eugenius IV (1431–47) published the bull *Exultate Deo* regarding union with the Armenians.³ This discussed the question of the *Filioque* clause, the doctrine of the two natures of Christ and the authority of the councils and the pope. In addition, it defined the theological changes and the revisions of sacramental doctrine which were deemed essential for the union. However, the bull made no reference to any abolition of the

Armenia Minor, 12–14,000 in Austria, 28,150 in Russia, and smaller communities in Italy and elsewhere: Joseph Hergenröther, 'Die Rechtsverhältnisse der verschiedenen Riten innerhalb der katholischen Kirche', *Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht* 7 (1862), 169–200, at 174.

² For this process, see Xaçik Atanasean, *Vark' Abraham-Petros A. Arciwean katolikosi* (Beirut, 1959), 183–96.

³ *The General Councils of Latin Christendom from Constantinople IV (869/870) to Lateran V (1512–1517)*, CChr.COGD 2/ii, 1224–59.

ecclesiastical rights which formed part of the autonomous Armenian Church tradition.⁴ Another bull, *Laetentur caeli*, published at the same council, aimed to end the East-West schism of 1054;⁵ it tried to define the relationship between the Eastern rite communions and the Holy See, confirming the primacy of the pope as the successor of Christ but also affirming that the Eastern patriarchs should retain their rights and privileges. In 1566, Pius V (1566–72) published a bull in which he affirmed the distinctive features of the Oriental rites, but prohibited the mixing of different rites, characterizing this as a distortion of the ancient rite of the saints.⁶ Following union between the Armenian Catholics and Rome in 1742, the Holy See remained open towards the ecclesiastical rights of the Armenian Catholic Church. An important document was the bull of Benedict XIV (1740–58), *Allatae sunt*,⁷ which made clear that Rome's main purpose was the prohibition of the errors of Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches and other heretics in the Orient. At the same time, the pre-1054 Eastern rites should be preserved and respected, as previous popes had not wanted uniate churches to abandon their own rites and follow the Latin rite. Abolition of the Greek and other Eastern rites had never been Rome's aim.

The Holy See had not sought to restrict or change the ecclesiastical rights of the Armenians, and its tolerance was fundamental for the union. The Armenian Catholic Church was able to preserve its own election rules, regulations, hierarchy, administration, ecclesiastical language, liturgical formulations, ceremonies, celebrations

⁴ This tradition goes back to the mother Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, founded in 301. For more about it, see Tiran Nersoyan, *Armenian Church Historical Studies: Matters of Doctrine and Administration*, ed. and intro. Nerses Vrej Nersessian (New York, 1996).

⁵ CChr.COGD 2/ii, 1212–18.

⁶ Pius V, 'Revocatio facultatis quomodolibet concessae Graecis Latino ritu, & Latinis Graeco more celebrandi Missas, & divina Officia', 20 August 1566, in Aloysius Tomasetti et al., eds, *Bullarum diplomatum et privilegiorum sanctorum romanorum pontificum*, 27 vols (Turin, 1857–85), 7: 473–5.

⁷ 'De ritibus Orientalium conservandis, de celebratione in eccl. alius ritus et Calendario Gregoriano. Benedictus XIV, Allatae, 26. Julii 1755', in Theodor Granderath and Gerhard Schneemann, eds, *Acta et decreta sacrorum conciliorum recentiorum: Collectio Lacensis, Auctoribus presbyteris S. J. e domo B. V. M. sine labe conceptae ad Lacum*, 7 vols (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1870–90), 2: 534–7.

and other traditions.⁸ These privileges included the distinction of Eastern rites from the Latin rite, which made the union in some senses incomplete. The real reason for Rome's toleration of the ecclesiastical rights of the Armenian Catholic Church is debatable, but it seems clear that this was a strategy to accelerate the process of union.⁹ This became problematic over time. The Armenian patriarchs began to exercise their prerogatives before being confirmed by the popes through a *pallium*, and the Armenian Catholic Church tended to allow movements, reforms and decisions that displeased the Holy See.¹⁰ The latter concluded that it did not have enough influence over the Armenian Catholics and that the union of 1742 appeared as yet incomplete. This was the background to the measures taken by Pius IX to initiate a new reunification project in the East.

THE ARMENIAN CATHOLIC *MILLET* (1830) AND ITS ADMINISTRATION

The Holy See's new policy was decisive not only for the ecclesiastical rights of Armenian Catholics but also for their civil rights

⁸ The preservation of the Armenian Church tradition was closely connected with the national character of the Armenian Catholic Church: Boghos Levon Zekiyan, *L'Armenia e gli armeni. Polis lacerata e patria spirituale: la sfida di una sopravvivenza* (Milano, 2000).

⁹ The Roman Catholic church historian Klaus Unterburger explains the background of this policy: While the Oriental churches believed that they could thus preserve their ecclesiology, Rome understood by 'privileges and rights' something which might be revoked by the popes at any time: Klaus Unterburger, 'Internationalisierung als Bedrohungsszenarium des forcierten Ultramontanismus. Die Weichenstellungen an der päpstlichen Kurie in den 1860er-Jahren und das Apostolische Schreiben *Reversurus*', *IKZ* 106 (2016), 236–49, at 236–7.

¹⁰ For example, there were moves towards union between the Armenian Catholics and the Armenian Apostolic Church during the early nineteenth century (especially in 1810, 1817 and 1820): Vartan Artinian, *The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1863: A Study of its Historical Development* (Istanbul, 1988), 34–6. The Armenian Catholic patriarchate sometimes made decisions which provoked protest from Rome, such as the decision in 1861 of Patriarch Grigor Pētros VIII (1844–66), to appoint the *abbas generalis* of the Armenian Catholic order of Antonians as archbishop of the diocese of Antiochia. For Rome's countermeasures, see Bzommar, Les Archives du Couvent Notre Dame de Bzommar [hereafter: BZ], Les Archives du Couvent d'Antonins [hereafter: ACA], Box 6, Rāpāyēl Miasērean to an unknown recipient, 30 June 1866. In addition, the Roman Catholic church historian Theodor Granderath suggested that over the course of time the Oriental churches were growing increasingly autonomous, and that the popes began to consider it their duty to change the mode of election and so to limit the independence of these churches. In this interpretation, the Armenian Catholic denial of the pope's rights to intervene in this question amounted to a denial of his primacy: Theodor Granderath, *Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils*, ed. Konrad Kirch, 3 vols (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1903–6), 2: 327.

in the Ottoman empire. The self-government of the Armenian Catholic Church and its independence from foreign powers was the foundation upon which the relationship between the Ottoman state and the Armenian Catholics was maintained. Since the formation of the Armenian Catholic *millet* (an officially recognized religious community in the Ottoman empire) in 1830/1, this relationship had not been beneficial for Rome.¹¹ Although the establishment of the Armenian Catholic *millet* secured the Church's identity and political status in the empire, changes were soon introduced by the state which altered the structure of the *millet* and lessened the scope for Roman influence on Armenian Catholics. Moreover, because of the feudal nature of Ottoman society, Ottoman Armenians had limited freedom and rights, which restricted their traditional religious practice.¹² However, in 1839, under the pressure of the European great powers, the Ottoman government started the *Tanzîmât* reforms.¹³ Following the European model, these reforms aimed to improve the social situation of the oppressed classes. The edict *Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif* ('holy writing of Gülhane') issued in 1839 attempted to increase the security of the Ottoman subjects and guarantee their rights as well as to make the taxation system fairer.¹⁴ A further edict in 1846 secured the properties and rights of the Ottoman population.¹⁵ These reforms were deemed insufficiently effective, and after the Crimean war between the Ottoman, British, French and Russian empires (1853–6), which made the Ottoman empire more dependent upon the Western

¹¹ Kemal Beydilli, *II. Mahmud devri'nde katolik Ermeni cemâati v kilisesi'nin taninmasi (1830) / Recognition of the Armenian Catholic Community and the Church in the Reign of Mahmud II (1830)*, ed. Şinasi Tekin and Gönül Alpay Tekin, *Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures* 27 (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

¹² The Ottoman empire was divided into different classes: the ruling class (*Osmani*), servants of the sultan (*Askerî*) and subjects (*Reâyâ*); the *Reâyâs* had to pay high taxes, unlike the *Askerîs*: Suraiya Faroqhi, *Kultur und Alltag im osmanischen Reich. Vom Mittelalter bis zum Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 2nd edn (München, 2003), 72–3. In addition, the Ottoman government practised a theocratic system, in which the Armenians were treated as *Gavurs* (unbelievers): Kai Merten, *Untereinander, nicht nebeneinander. Das Zusammenleben religiöser und kultureller Gruppen im osmanischen Reich des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 2014), 402.

¹³ For more about the *Tanzîmât* reforms, see Dietrich Jung, 'Staatsbildung und Staatszerfall. Die osmanische Moderne und der europäische Staatenbildungsprozess', in Gabriele Clemens, ed., *Die Türkei und Europa* (Hamburg, 2007), 57–78.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 65.

¹⁵ BZ, ACA, box 2, 'Harazat e'argmanut'iw'n ardaradat patuirank'nerun, or Mēçlisi Ahk'eami Atliyēyin xorhōrdacur'eambō grvec'an, ew Ark'ayakan hramanawn al hratarakvec'an', 18 February 1846.

powers, new reforms were undertaken. In 1856 the edict *Hatt-i Hümayûn* ('the writing of the emperor') was published, which secured the autonomy and independent administration of the *millet*s in the Ottoman empire.¹⁶ Under the supervision of the Ottoman state, the Christian *millet*s were allowed to manage their own financial and legal affairs, and no foreign power had any right to interfere in their affairs. This edict was based on the principle of religious freedom and benefited the Christian communities, including the Armenian Catholic *millet*.

Another important event was the publication of the Armenian National Constitution (*Ermeni Patrikliđi Nizâmâtı*) in 1863.¹⁷ The purpose of the constitution was to separate the religious and civil arenas, to diminish the influence of the Armenian patriarchate in civil affairs and to establish a more democratic civil order through national and civil assemblies. This constitution was originally addressed to members of the Armenian Apostolic community (*Ermeni Millet*), but the model was extended to Catholic Armenians (*Katholik Millet*). After the establishment of the Armenian Catholic archbishop's seat in Constantinople,¹⁸ the Armenian Catholics in Constantinople and its surroundings had two heads. The first was the archbishop *primas*, who was responsible for religious affairs. The second was the *patrik* (civil head of the nation), who was appointed by the state in order to manage the civil affairs of the Armenian Catholics. In the provinces, the bishops¹⁹ were the heads of the dioceses, administering both civil and religious affairs. In addition, from 1847 the Armenian Catholics had separate assemblies for the clergy (*Ruhani meclis*) and for the laity (*Cismani meclis*).²⁰ While the clergy assembly was mainly responsible for ecclesiastical questions, the general or national assembly functioned as the intermediary between the state and the Armenian

¹⁶ BZ, ACA, box 2, 'T'argmanut' iwn kayserakan xat' t'i hiwmayunin or 1856 p'etrvav Ġin kardac'vec'aw barjragoyn duġa'.

¹⁷ H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia: Travels and Studies*, 2 vols (London, 1901), 2: 446–67 (App. I).

¹⁸ Despite the fact that in theory there was one Armenian Catholic Church with one patriarch, the archbishop *primas* was in fact more than an archbishop. Being appointed by the pope, he could act autonomously and was seen thus as another head alongside the patriarch. In addition to this, the fact that he had jurisdiction over the capital and its surroundings magnified his role.

¹⁹ These bishops had some autonomy within their dioceses, but they stood under the immediate primacy of the patriarch.

²⁰ Hacik Rafi Gazer, 'Bibliographie', *IKZ* 106 (2016), 323–8, at 324.

Catholic nation, and was concerned with questions such as the administrative matters to do with the Armenian Catholic population, their rights, and the laws pertaining to them. Both assemblies were closely connected.

REVERSURUS (1867) AND ITS RELATION TO THE INTERNAL POLICY OF
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The democratic developments within the Armenian Catholic *millet* diminished the Church's administrative role. They therefore ran counter to Rome's ecclesio-political interests in the East and its wish to strengthen the influence of the papacy over Catholic Armenians; this would serve the project of the Holy See, which was to cement the union with the Eastern churches under Roman jurisdiction. The situation became more difficult because of the increasing autonomy of the Armenian Catholic Church.²¹ In addition to this, there were similar problems also within other uniate churches.²² Pius IX was the first pope to take serious action in this area through the bull *Reversurus*, which restricted the administrative autonomy of the Armenian Catholic Church.²³

Before the publication of the bull, the head of the Armenian Catholic Church had been the patriarch, based in Bzommar, near Beirut. Besides the patriarchate, there were two administrative instruments, the synod of bishops and the patriarchal synod. Over time, the number of Armenian Catholics and of dioceses had grown, and in 1830 the seat of the archbishop *primas*, with jurisdiction in

²¹ For instance, the abbot general of the Armenian Catholic order of Antonians received the right to hold office for life and to head the diocese of Antiochia without permission from Rome. These decisions, which were supported by the Armenian Catholic patriarch, met with protest from the Holy See: see Mariam Kartashyan, 'Das armenische Schisma, seine transnationalen Auswirkungen und seine Rolle für die Beziehungen zwischen Armeniern, Altkatholiken und Anglikanern, in den 1870er Jahren' (PhD Dissertation, University of Bern, 2016), 68–9. Beside the increasing autonomy, the relation to other non-Catholic Christian communities was another problem for the Holy See. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century there had been moves within the Ottoman empire to unite the Catholic and the Apostolic Armenians, which were criticized by the Holy See: *ibid.* 66–7; see also n. 10 above.

²² For instance, the Melkite patriarch Gregory II Youssef (1864–97) complained of a lack of church discipline within the Eastern churches: Granderath, *Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils*, 1: 55. Granderath notes that the election of the bishops in the Eastern rites sometimes contravened the regulations governing the process: *ibid.* 2: 327.

²³ Granderath and Schneemann, eds, *Collectio Lacensis*, 2: 568–73.

Constantinople and its surroundings, had been established.²⁴ However, the patriarchate in Lebanon was more independent of Rome than was the archbishop *primas* in Constantinople: while the archbishop *primas* was chosen by the pope, the patriarch was elected by the synod of bishops. The bishops were elected by lower clergy and laymen. There was independence also in the administration of church property, which was under the control of the patriarchate. All this was changed by *Reversurus*. The two Armenian seats of Lebanon and Constantinople were united, with the seat of the patriarch being transferred to Constantinople.²⁵ A Latin-minded candidate, Anton Hasun (1809–84), was chosen as patriarch.²⁶ The election of his successor as patriarch, as well as the elections of the bishops, would depend on the decision of the pope. The patriarch was to be elected by the bishops alone, the lower clergy and laymen being excluded from the process. He could exercise his office only after his election had been confirmed by the pope. As for bishops, a list of three candidates would be sent to the pope. The pope had the right to choose one of them, but could also choose and confirm someone else as bishop. The property of the Church would be administered under the supervision of Rome. These administrative changes appeared to be a kind of reunification strategy on the jurisdictional level.

The context for this claim to power over the Armenian Catholic Church was the obvious failure of the efforts of Pius IX to strengthen his waning secular power through the apostolic constitution *Ineffabilis Deus*,²⁷ the encyclical *Quanta cura*²⁸ and the document attached to it, *Syllabus errorum*.²⁹ *Reversurus* was an important ecclesio-political step intended to increase the pope's power in the East and

²⁴ Ałek'sandr Palčean, *Patmut'iwn kat'olikē vardapetut'ean i hays ew miut'ean noc'a ond bromėakan ekelec'woy i p'lorentean siwnhodosi* (Vienna, 1878), 177.

²⁵ Because of the political importance of the capital, the transfer of the seat to Constantinople may be understood as a particular ecclesio-political strategy of Pius IX.

²⁶ Hasun tried to consolidate power, holding the office of *patrik* together with that of patriarch: Yovsēp' Askerean [Pōlos Pōynuēyean], *Hasunean katalakakanutiwn: Eresun ew hing amey patmutiwn Ger. Hasunean Anton vardapetin, skeal i kabanayutiēn minē. cpatriarkutiwnn* (Tiflis [Tiblisi], 1868), 503–4.

²⁷ Pius IX, 'Litterae apostolicae de dogmatica definitione immaculatae conceptionis Virginis Deiparae', in *Corpus actorum RR. Pontificum, Pii X Pontificis Maximi acta*, 2 parts in 9 vols (Graz, 1971; first publ. 1857), 1/i: 597–619.

²⁸ Pius IX, 'Quanta cura', *ibid.*, 1/iii: 687–700.

²⁹ Pius IX, 'Syllabus complectens praecipuos nostrae aetatis errores qui notantur in allocutionibus consistorialibus in encyclicis aliisque apostolicis litteris sanctissimi domini nostri Pii Papae IX', *ibid.* 701–17.

effectively to create the pope's own empire within the Ottoman empire. *Reversurus* would serve as a kind of model for *Pastor aeternus*, which asserted the pope's full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the whole Church, at the First Vatican Council (1869/70).³⁰ The publication of *Reversurus* was therefore an important step towards the promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility.

The new ultramontane policy of the Holy See towards the East threatened to remove the autonomy of the Armenian Catholics, which, given their political situation in the Ottoman state, posed a real danger for their security. Living with restricted rights, the Armenian Catholics were about to lose the right to choose the patriarchs and bishops who would best meet their religious and social needs. The influential laymen, the 'notables', some of whom had high positions in government, would no longer exercise any influence in the Church's administration. All this led to considerable discontent amongst the Armenians, and, soon after the publication of the bull, a large proportion of Armenian Catholics protested.³¹ However, the Holy See's new policy towards the Catholic Armenians was only a preliminary step, and *Reversurus* was intended to become a model for the other uniate Eastern churches; accordingly, protests soon followed from Catholic Chaldeans, Maronites, Melkites and Syrians.³²

The escalating tensions were dangerous for the Ottoman empire's internal policy, especially given the administrative structure of the *millets*. The election of church leaders and the administration of church property was to be managed by the patriarchate under the supervision of the state; it was a matter between the Ottoman empire and its subjects.³³ But in *Reversurus* the pope was claiming that his position was superior to that of the sultan. The Ottoman minister of war, Hüseyin Avni Paşa (1820–76), argued that the pope was seeking

³⁰ *The Oecumenical Councils of the Roman Catholic Church from Trent to Vatican II (1545–1965)*, CChr.COGD 3, 206–12.

³¹ The main protagonists of this protest were the monks of the Order of Antonians.

³² The reaction of the uniate Chaldeans, Maronites, Melkites and Syrians to this question will be described in my forthcoming article, 'Die Kirchenpolitik des römischen Stuhls während des Zusammenbruchs des Kirchenstaates (bis 1870)', *IKZ* 108 (2018). Jakub Osiecki shows that there were also protests against the pope's supreme jurisdictional power among Armenian Catholics in Artvin in the Russian empire, lasting until the beginning of the twentieth century: Jakub Osiecki, 'The Catholics of the Armenian Rite in Armenia and Georgia (1828–1909)', *IKZ* 106 (2016), 295–319.

³³ After election, the Armenian patriarch would be confirmed in office by the sultan through an official *berât* (licence): Claude Delaval Cobham, *The Patriarchs of Constantinople*, intro. Adrian Fortescue and H. T. F. Duckworth (Cambridge, 1911), 36–7.

to establish a new state within the Ottoman state.³⁴ Soon a schism among the Armenian Catholics, at the heart of which lay division between ultramontane and anti-ultramontane bishops, created another problem for the Ottoman government. The Armenian Catholic bishops were the intermediaries for the payment of taxes to the state, and the tax system was disrupted as, from the Ottoman point of view, the diocesan heads were divided between legal and illegal bishops.³⁵

THE CHURCH POLICY OF THE HOLY SEE IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

The ultramontane attempts of the Holy See in the East affected not only the domestic policy of the Ottoman empire, but also its foreign policy. The Western great powers realized that the situation created through *Reversurus* could result in increased Western influence in the East. Since the Treaty of Paris (1856), the Western powers had claimed the right to interfere as protectors on behalf of Ottoman Christians.³⁶ The eagerness of the Russian empire to act as their protector, with a view to expanding its territories, created competition and increased the motivation of the Western powers to assert their authority.³⁷ The political weakness of the Ottoman government and its apprehension in the face of the growth of Russian power forced it to take account of the position of the Western powers.

With all these forces at work, the Western powers had a clear interest in acting on the Armenian Catholic question. However, in the years following the publication of *Reversurus*, the Holy See did not receive much support from them.³⁸ While the Austrian government was trying to improve the position of the Holy See, as its protector in the Ottoman empire, the French government refrained from interfering. The Holy See initially tried to achieve a concordat with

³⁴ Anon., 'Constantinopel', *Deutscher Merkur* 5 (1874), 71.

³⁵ Gazer, 'Bibliographie', 326.

³⁶ Winfried Baumgart, 'Der Friede von Paris 1856. Studien zum Verhältnis von Kriegführung, Politik und Friedensbewahrung' (Habilitation dissertation, University of Bonn, 1970; publ. München, 1972).

³⁷ For more on this subject, see Dietrich Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus. Studien über den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswärtiger Politik 1860–1914*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 27 (Göttingen, 1977).

³⁸ I have explained the reasons for this in much greater detail elsewhere: Mariam Kartashyan, 'Die Rolle der europäischen Imperialmächte für den Verlauf des armenischen Schismas (1871–1879/1881)', *IKZ* 106 (2016), 273–94, at 278–87.

the Ottoman state on its own, which failed. The consequences of all this were the rejection of *Reversurus* and the ban of the ultramontane patriarch Anton Hasun by the Ottoman state.³⁹ However, in 1871 an anti-ultramontane bishop, Yakob Pahtiarean (1800–83), was elected as patriarch, and in 1872 Yovhan K'iwbelean (1820–1900) was elected as civil patriarch.⁴⁰ These events led to a schism between the Armenian Catholics and Rome.⁴¹

In 1873–4 the German government supported the anti-ultramontane Armenian Catholics, seeking to curb the influence of its political opponent in the East, France, which took on the role of protecting the interests of the Holy See in 1873.⁴² The anti-ultramontane mood in Germany created favourable conditions for this interference: from 1871, the *Kulturkampf* was in process, and until 1876 liberals dominated the German government. In addition, the newly formed German Old Catholic Church, which had close relationships to the anti-ultramontane Armenians,⁴³ used its connections to influence the German government in favour of the anti-ultramontane Armenian Catholic party.⁴⁴

Because of its diplomatic connection to Germany, in 1873 the Austrian government decided to retreat temporarily and not to act against the interests of the German government in the East.⁴⁵ The British empire also did not support papal interests: liberals dominated the British government until 1874, and several influential political and public figures, including prime minister W. E. Gladstone

³⁹ Małak'ia Ōrmanean, *Azgapatum*, ed. Tigran Karapetean and Šahē Ačēmean, 3 vols + 1 register vol. (Ējmiacin, 2001–2), 3: 4962.

⁴⁰ BZ, ACA, box 23, portfolio 26, Pōlos Pōynuēyean, “Ōragrut'iwkn”; box 174, portfolio Өntrut'iwñ Yakob Pahtiareani, Yovsēp' Šišmanean, [report about the elections], 12 February 1871; see also Ōrmanean, *Azgapatum*, 3: 4961.

⁴¹ According to Herman Schwedt, the main reasons for the schism were the development of European Catholicism and the religious and social conflicts of the Armenian Catholic community in the Ottoman empire: Herman H. Schwedt, ‘Weit hinten in der Türkei. Der Papst und das Schisma der armenischen Katholiken (1870–1888)’, *IKZ* 106 (2016), 250–72, at 272.

⁴² For more details about French and German interference, see Kartashyan, ‘Die Rolle der europäischen Imperialmächte’, 284–7.

⁴³ For more, see Kartashyan, ‘Das armenische Schisma’, 146–205.

⁴⁴ Unterburger shows that the internalization of the anti-ultramontane movements was seen as a threat in Rome: Unterburger, ‘Internationalisierung als Bedrohungsszenarium’, 248.

⁴⁵ Vienna, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Gesandtschaftsarchiv Konstantinopel, box 288, portfolio 1, no. 18, Gyula Andrassy to Zichy zu Zich, 25 April 1874.

(1809–98) and the historian and publicist John Acton (1834–1902), had friendly relationships with Ignaz von Döllinger and the Old Catholic movement in Germany.⁴⁶

However, from 1875 the political context in Europe began to change rapidly, strongly affecting the interests of the Western powers and the Ottoman empire.⁴⁷ The *Kulturkampf* in Germany weakened and subsided, and in 1876 the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck (1815–98), began to cooperate with the conservatives.⁴⁸ By 1878, steps were being taken towards reconciliation between the German government and the Holy See. As for the British empire, the conservatives took power in 1874, and the new prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli (1804–81), who had good relations with the Ottoman state, was not interested in the success of anti-ultramontanism in the East. Given these circumstances, the Austrian and French governments were able to act effectively to support the interests of the Holy See, and soon British diplomats began to support these interests as well.⁴⁹

Between 1875 and 1878, in the face of new conflicts between the Russian and Ottoman empires, the Eastern crisis escalated, and the Ottoman government became more dependent on the Western powers. This dependence arose because of an Ottoman economic crisis, but also from payments imposed by the Western powers, mainly by France and Britain.⁵⁰ Finally, the Ottoman political context changed when in 1876 Abdülhamid II (1842–1918) became sultan. The *Tanzîmât* reforms came to an end and the rights of Ottoman

⁴⁶ See Angela Berlis, 'Ignaz von Döllinger and the Anglicans', in Stewart J. Brown and Peter B. Nockles, eds, *The Oxford Movement: Europe and the Wider World 1830–1930* (Cambridge, 2012), 236–48, at 237.

⁴⁷ In a previous article, I analysed the reasons for the shift in Western policy. My aim was to show that the Western powers played a decisive role in the duration and conclusion of the Armenian schism: Kartashyan, 'Die Rolle der europäischen Imperialmächte', 287–92.

⁴⁸ Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 2 vols (München 2008), 2: 51–4.

⁴⁹ See the complaint of the French chargé d'affaires in Constantinople: La Courneuve, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Centre des Archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve, Correspondance politique Turquie, Mik. P 724, vol. 407, fols 258^v–259^v, Charles de Moüy to Louis Decazes, 31 January 1877.

⁵⁰ Berlin, Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Auswärtiges Amt des deutschen Reiches 1870–1945, 12409b, A 1090, 'Die türkischen Finanzen. Am Schlusse des Finanzjahres 1872/73', 13 March 1873.

Christians were curtailed.⁵¹ As a result, the Holy See's church policy in the East gained a new political dimension. In order not to promote an anti-Western alliance amongst anti-ultramontane Armenian Catholics, all great powers agreed to the sixty-second article of the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which supported the hierarchical rights of the pope in Ottoman territories and declared France the only protector of the Uniate Catholics in the East.⁵² Under pressure from the Ottoman government, the Armenian Catholic question was solved within a few years.⁵³ In 1879 the sultan published a *berât* confirming the appointment of the papal candidate, Anton Hasun, which officially ended the schism, and the anti-ultramontane Armenian Catholics had to abandon their previous position.⁵⁴ The situation of the other Eastern rite churches in the Ottoman empire was similar. Whilst the Maronites and other uniate churches gave ground relatively fast, the Chaldeans resisted Roman policy until about 1878. Like the Armenian Catholics, their protest ended under political pressure.⁵⁵

CONCLUSION

In the 1860s and 1870s, the ultramontane policy promoted by Pius IX was part of the Holy See's reunification project in the East. The bull *Reversurus*, as a part of this project, was an attempt to influence the relationship between the Armenian Catholic Church and the Ottoman empire. Papal policy aimed at achieving supreme power for the pope in both ecclesiastical and civil fields, and for this reason it came into conflict both with the interests of the Armenian Catholics and with the domestic policy of the Ottoman state. During the

⁵¹ He became known as the 'red sultan' for his oppression and massacres of Christians, especially Armenians, during his time in power: see, for example, S. V. Bedickian, *The Red Sultan's Soliloquy*, transl. Alice Stone Blackwell (Boston, MA, 1912).

⁵² 'Der Berliner Vertrag von 1878. Faksimile aus dem Reichsgesetzblatt', in Imanuel Geiss, ed., *Der Berliner Kongress 1878. Protokolle und Materialien* (Boppard am Rhein, 1978), 369–407.

⁵³ Schwedt shows the role of the Holy See's flexible church policy, which developed a strategy of gradual action in order to solve the Armenian question. One important step was the challenge to the Armenian Catholic patriarch Hasun, whose strategy was one of the main reasons for the conflict, to retreat from his position in 1880: Schwedt, 'Weit hinten in der Türkei', 250–72, at 268–9.

⁵⁴ BZ, ACA, box 38, portfolio 19, Pölos Pöynuëyrcan, 'Tesutüwnk'.

⁵⁵ Kartashyan, 'Die Kirchenpolitik des römischen Stuhls', offers a fuller discussion.

1870s, the ecclesiastical and civil rights of the Armenian Catholics were upheld and strengthened by the Ottoman state.

However, the ultramontane policy of the Holy See also affected the foreign policy of the Ottoman state. By the end of the 1870s, the shifting political contexts of Eastern and Western Europe proved more influential than the internal policy of the Ottoman empire, and this allowed Roman ultramontanism to prevail, supported by the Western empires and their international diplomacy. By 1881, the Armenian schism had been concluded to the benefit of the Holy See and its protectors.

It is clear from this that the Holy See's church policy in the 1860s and the 1870s, which sought to bring about a particular form of ecclesiastical union on the jurisdictional level with the uniate churches of the East, also forced the ecclesiastical question of the relationship between the Holy See and the Eastern churches into the arena of international diplomacy. In the end this development provided support for Rome's ultramontanism, leading to the conclusion of the schism in the East and the restoration of the relationship between the Armenian Catholic Church and the Holy See. Neither the Armenian Catholic Church nor the Ottoman empire could resist the ultramontane policies of the Holy See when these were backed by the Western powers, demonstrating the strong interconnection between churches and empires, as well as their spheres of influence in the East and the West during the 1860s and 1870s. The fact that empires sometimes resolved ecclesiastical questions and in so doing demonstrated decisively their authority over churches, as in this case, shows the importance of looking at nineteenth-century church history from the perspective of the history of empires.