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Membership, Mobilization, and Policy Adoption in the Gilded Age: The Case of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union

Abstract: Relatively little is known about how late nineteenth-century associations worked to get their policy goals adopted by state governments. We study this question here, considering the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and three policies it supported: scientific temperance instruction, increasing the age of consent, and prohibiting tobacco sales to minors. Overall, WCTU-supported legislation was more likely to succeed in states with unified Republican state legislatures, aided by neighboring state adoptions (scientific temperance) and greater WCTU membership (increasing age of consent and prohibiting tobacco sales to minors). These findings are supported by historical evidence, which reveals how WCTU leadership targeted particular states when lobbying for scientific temperance instruction laws and utilized its broad membership base to pressure state legislatures on the other two issues. In total, these results show how one late nineteenth-century membership group was able to facilitate the successful spread of its policies throughout the nation.

Keywords: Woman's Christian Temperance Union, voluntary associations, interest groups, pressure politics, policy diffusion

Hence, government has been a gruff bass solo of unequal law and degenerate politics, but woman shall restore the soprano of hope and the sweet alto of the *vox humana.*

—WCTU President Frances Willard, 1886 Annual Address

During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, the expansion of large, federated voluntary membership associations reshaped the social and political

JOURNAL OF POLICY HISTORY, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2021.
© Cambridge University Press 2021
doi:10.1017/S0898030621000166

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030621000166 Published online by Cambridge University Press

landscape. Countless scholars have studied the dynamics of this rising interest in associating with like-minded citizens across town, county, and state boundaries, noting that the great federations capitalized on the institutions of American democracy and the increasing modernization of the era to "help geographically mobile citizens create, coordinate, and sustain local voluntary groups as well as simultaneously generate sufficient clout to affect politics or societal mores beyond as well as within local communities."[1]

Existing quantitative studies largely focus on the development of these organizations, with less emphasis on their capacity to shape strategies to influence policy outcomes. Yet, there are a number of reasons to believe that politically-oriented, federated membership associations had a significant influence on nineteenth-century policy diffusion. While state legislatures during this era lacked both professional members and staffs, voluntary associations developed elaborate communications networks, had lobbyists or leaders experienced with pressuring government officials, and aggressively advocated for policy change. Particularly when political parties were not divided over the issues these associations put forward, effective interest-group activity could seize the day and result in legislative reform.

In this analysis, we begin to examine how associations influenced nineteenth-century policy adoptions at the state level by examining three issues—scientific temperance instruction, increasing the age of consent, and prohibiting tobacco sales to minors—actively supported by the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), the largest and most institutionalized women's group of this era. Historical evidence shows that the WCTU played an important role in influencing the vast majority of states to implement all three reforms by the turn of the century, but what conditions optimized the success of the WCTU's campaigns? Our results suggest that these policies found their strongest support in states

with unified Republican state legislatures; the WCTU appears to have venue-shopped for legislatures that were more likely to act on their desired reforms. When these favorable political conditions were met, the WCTU then leveraged its membership, both overall and per capita, to achieve increases in the age of consent and prevent tobacco sales to minors; policy adoption in geographically proximate states had the greatest secondary effect on scientific temperance instruction. In all three cases, the empirical results lend support to previous qualitative, historical findings, revealing how this very successful nineteenth-century voluntary association harnessed its capacity to facilitate policy change.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030621000166 Published online by Cambridge University Press

INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY ADOPTIONS IN THE LATE 1800S

The power and influence of politically-oriented associations, often aided by federated membership structures paralleling the organization of American government, has been well-documented across a broad range of issue areas.[2] On agriculture (the Grange, Farmers' Alliance, Colored Farmers' Alliance), veterans' benefits (the Grand Army of the Republic) labor rights (the Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor), and women's rights (the General Federation of Women's Clubs, National American Woman Suffrage Association), associations at the forefront of creating, advocating, and helping to pass legislation.

In many cases, these groups achieved substantial success lobbying Congress. Theda Skocpol and co-authors provide evidence of the General Federation of Women's Clubs' successes in achieving the passage of mothers' pensions in the early twentieth century, and Scott Ainsworth demonstrates the important role played by the Grand Army of the Republic in increasing Union war veterans' pensions.[3] Yet, much of the legislative work during the late nineteenth century was conducted at the state level. Interest groups likely played a direct role in aiding the passage of laws in state legislatures as well, but less is known about their mobilization and successes in these institutions.

Historical evidence favors an active role for interest groups for several reasons. First, late nineteenth-century state legislatures were not institutionalized and lacked professional members and staffs. There were no professional organizations of legislators, a greater number of bodies met on a part-time basis, and membership turnover was high.[4] Second, while partisanship clearly affected how state legislatures behaved during this era,[5] nineteenth-century state governments were viewed as "spare, with little administrative muscle."[6] If state policy was going to shift, the impulse was unlikely to come solely from legislative parties, as the legislatures were outdated bodies that "could not lead the citizenry toward a more progressive future."[7] Governors took up some of this slack,[8] but clearly, the high volume of legislation produced by state governments of this era did not come from governors alone.[9] In this environment, interest groups could enter the fray and provide the expertise and the push to turn proposed bills into laws.

Furthermore, national associations interested in particular legislative issues could then serve as a conduit for policy adoptions across the states. These associations attracted significant numbers of members and developed extensive communications networks and professional staffs trained to

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030621000166 Published online by Cambridge University Press

advocate for policy change—a task that citizen legislatures were ill-equipped to perform. But the policy diffusion literature provides only a few ideas about how groups may have filled this void. In fact, despite over eight hundred articles on policy diffusion written since Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry's seminal work on state lotteries, relatively little is known about policy diffusion prior to the twentieth century.[10]

This said, scholarship on modern policy diffusion provides insights that may help us to better evaluate why states adopted policies during this era. Many of these studies emphasize the role of geography in policy diffusion, whether through neighboring states[11] or regional patterns of policy adoptions.[12] Yet some scholars contest the importance of geography and find it less important than other factors such as state ideology[13] and partisanship.[14] Still others emphasize the importance of interest groups in spreading policies. Models capture this interest group participation in a variety of ways, including counts of lobbyists,[15] scholar-created measures of group concerns about policy areas,[16] membership,[17] and even model legislation.[18] The types of policies also matter in this process, with state governments learning from other governments on nonmorality policies while bending to the demands of citizens on morality policies.[19]

Taking into consideration the rise of federated voluntary associations, the nature of state governments, and the prospects for diffusion given the context of the era, it appears that the environment was ripe for membership associations to push reform demands through state legislatures. These early interest groups spanned the nation, and their federated structure likely allowed them to advocate for policies in state legislatures by relying on support from both national leaders and state-level membership. Unified state legislatures, or bodies where both houses were controlled by the same political party, were likely good targets, especially on issues of morality, where political parties appear more likely to bend to perceptions that citizens want change. And, efforts to influence states to adopt policies were potentially aided by geographic proximity. Even during an era where modern communication technology was still developing, neighboring legislatures learned from one another; legislators observed whether policies caused controversy in government and among the public, or garnered sympathy throughout the legislature and state. Interest groups served as a key conduit for this information, and thus, were likely key motivators of policy adoption.[20]

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The Three Policy Areas and the WCTU

To assess this theoretical portrayal, we consider a single major voluntary association that had broad capacity to get its policy goals adopted—the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). Founded in 1874 as a women's-only organization seeking to eradicate alcohol consumption and the liquor traffic, its early efforts focused solely on temperance and prohibition. Under its most notable president, Frances E. Willard, the group's agenda broadened to a "Do Everything" approach, including concerns related to "home protection": clean living, education, safeguards for women and children, and opposition to vice and obscenity. The WCTU used a variety of direct and indirect lobbying techniques to influence government policies on these subjects. In particular, the group was the leading organization petitioning the 55th Congress (1897–98) on moral issues.[21] However, the strategies it employed depended on the issue and the venue.

Here we consider three policy areas critical to Willard's "Do Everything" approach that required lobbying government: mandating scientific temperance education, increasing the age of consent, and barring tobacco purchases by children. The WCTU was a driving force for reform, and, as shown in Table 11, between 1882 and 1901 the vast majority of states had acted on all three policy areas, consistent with WCTU demands. Furthermore, a clear majority of these reforms were passed through unified and generally Republican-controlled state legislatures.[22] If we consider the years up to and including the first twenty states to adopt a law, 74 percent of scientific temperance instruction laws (1882–87), 78 percent of age-of-consent increases (1885–89), and 73 percent of anti-tobacco laws (1883–89) were passed by unified Republican legislatures. Divided legislatures passed 9 percent of age-of-consent laws and 4 percent of laws in each of the other areas. This means unified Democratic legislatures were adopters under 25 percent of the time (22 percent, 13 percent, and 23 percent, respectively). The descriptions below highlight what scholars know about the WCTU's efforts to achieve passage of these bills.

We begin with the policy area most connected to the WCTU's core mission of spreading anti-alcohol sentiment: scientific temperance education. The goal of this program was to influence the education of America's youth by legislating that students needed to be taught about the dangers of alcohol, supported not by moral claims, but by those of doctors and scientists. This "scientific" approach would then shape a new generation of Americans taught to abstain from drinking and, potentially, serve as advocates for prohibition.

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Historical work has noted the connection between Mary Hunt, superintendent of the WCTU's Department of Scientific Temperance Instruction (STI), and the rapid expansion of this policy. To succeed in this effort, "Mrs. Hunt designed a plan of action to acquire the necessary legislation. The plan stipulated that WCTU women should do all in their power to put pressure upon legislators and to have pro-temperance candidates nominated in election years."[23] Using the STI Department's resources, Hunt recruited state and local members to help implement her plan, which included staging "mock school boards" to prepare women for direct lobbying, sending women to schools to evaluate scientific temperance instruction, and setting up meetings where carriages, sent and paid for by the WCTU, brought local lawmakers to listen to their demands.[24] The plan worked well, with early successes in Vermont (1882), Michigan (1883), and New Hampshire (1883).[25]

Despite these successes, Hunt's goal was nationwide adoption, and she believed that winning approval in several key states was the lynchpin to the WCTU's success. Thus, in a report to the WCTU, Hunt argued that "a wise general in planning a conquest aims at strategic points."[26] In this case, her targets were New York (1884) and Pennsylvania (1885). The logic was straightforward: "If these great centers of population could be carried, other smaller States would, with less labor, fall in line."[27] Though the battle in Pennsylvania was more difficult, the strategy worked; every state passed STI legislation by 1901. In states that adopted weaker policies, the WCTU continued to lobby for further legislative changes to strengthen existing laws. However, backlash from some in the scientific community concerning the veracity of arguments made by Hunt and in Hunt-approved textbooks,[28] and from some educators, ultimately limited STI's implementation.[29] Still, scientific temperance instruction was so broadly adopted that it touched millions of Americans in some way. By most accounts, Hunt's leadership was the centerpiece of the policy adoption campaign, and her efforts can be described as those of a policy entrepreneur providing a legislative subsidy.[30]

Second, the WCTU sought to protect women and children, and especially young women. As such, the association demanded states increase the age of consent for sexual relationships. When the WCTU began to focus attention on the issue in the 1880s, the age of consent in most states was ten or twelve years of age.[31] The New York Committee for the Prevention of State Regulation of Vice was among the first to lobby for an increase in 1886 after receiving a WCTU report by member Georgia Mark.[32] Subsequently, the WCTU became the main driver of policy adoption on this issue. As Mary E. Odem wrote, "Because of its extensive political network, the WCTU was better able than any

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single organization to build a formidable national campaign that touched every state in the country."[33]

Beginning in 1885, the WCTU's Department for the Promotion of Social Purity rapidly expanded into state and local unions. Through petitions, lobbying, and by arousing public sentiment, the WCTU believed it could be the catalyst for changing the age of consent nationwide. In 1886, for example, a sample petition for contacting Congress and state legislatures to raise the age of consent to eighteen was published in President Frances Willard's Annual Address.[34] And, while, as Willard asserted, "This work must not, in the least, supersede our main effort, which is for prohibition,"[35] the effort proved quite successful, with most states increasing the age of consent by 1900 and all states doing so by 1920.[36] This is why political scientist James Morone wrote, "In its struggle to raise the age, the WCTU won some of its most unambiguous victories for home protection,"[37] and why other scholars argue that raising the age of consent was a true success for the WCTU.[38]

Third, the WCTU attacked another vice: tobacco use among children. As an outgrowth of their quest for a "pure" society, the association targeted tobacco generally and cigarettes specifically, though not necessarily with the same aplomb as they attacked alcohol or protected female chastity. Nevertheless, scholars note that the WCTU and "its splinter organizations were the requisite forces behind the initial cigarette prohibition movement in both the United States and Canada."[39] The WCTU formally organized against tobacco in 1883 through its Department of Narcotics.[40]

The WCTU had its greatest success in this area lobbying for legislation banning the sale and/or distribution of tobacco to children. On this subject, Marc Linder's voluminous work on anti-cigarette laws squarely places the WCTU in the center of the drive for anti-tobacco legislation aimed at minors, prior to the association's efforts to prohibit cigarettes entirely.[41] So connected was the group to this legislation that New York state legislators passed a law restricting tobacco sales to minors with the understanding that the WCTU would help enforce the law.[42] And, the group at least tried to oblige; reports from the Department of Narcotics reveal that, after petitioning legislatures to change the laws successfully, women were encouraged to help enforce the laws by monitoring their local communities.[43]

Taken together, these three issue areas demonstrate how President Frances Willard's calls to "Do Everything" motivated leaders and activists to write legislation, pressure politicians, and influence other associations and citizens to communicate with policymakers. Ultimately, the WCTU was successful at converting these policy goals into legislative successes, but exactly

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how and why the WCTU was able to achieve these victories merits further investigation.

All three of these issues are largely moral issues, and as Gaines Foster notes, this type of "legislation had become a matter of pressure or interest-group, rather than partisan, politics."[44] Thus, state WCTU membership might matter, as a larger number of active women, petitioning the legislature and contacting politicians, could have caused legislators to react. In addition, modern findings suggest that stronger citizen groups can push through policy adoptions more easily on moral issues than nonmoral ones. Yet legislation is typically easier to pass through a unified legislature. The evidence in Table 1 suggests that perhaps the WCTU targeted states with more receptive legislatures first; these often were Republican-led legislatures. Although A. Lawrence Lowell's classic study suggested that party-line voting was not that high in state legislatures of the era,[45] there is evidence suggesting that Republican legislators tended to be more supportive of morally-focused legislation than Democratic ones.[46] Additionally, perhaps there was some effect from neighboring states too because Republican-led legislatures tended to be located near other Republican-led legislatures. If a proximate state had already passed legislation in an issue area, it could have helped the WCTU's lobbying efforts by empowering the women and inspiring legislators on the subject. Given these possibilities, we must move beyond historical accounts alone and to a quantitative approach in order to more fully decipher which factors mattered most to the WCTU's lobbying efforts.

DATA AND MODELS

To begin, we collected data on policy adoptions from various sources. Data on the passage of scientific temperance came largely from Mary Hunt's own work,[47] supplemented by WCTU reports and state legislative journals for the remaining states (Arkansas, Virginia, Georgia, and Utah). Age-of-consent laws were taken, in part, from Susan B. Anthony and Ida Husted Harper's *The History of Woman Suffrage, Volume IV*,[48] as referenced in Mary E. Odem's work,[49] with additional guidance from David Pivar and state records.[50] Because what counted as an "age-of-consent" law varied in the eyes of activists,[51] we paid particular attention to laws that defined as rape all sexual activity occurring prior to a particular age.[52] These statutes typically increased the age of consent from the English common-law standard of ten or twelve, with the exception being Oregon, where the age was fourteen at the start of the WCTU's efforts. Laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco to minors were partially

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Table 1. Year of Passage, by State and Type of Legislation

Year	Scientific Temperance	Age of Consent	Anti-Tobacco
1882	**VT**	-----	-----
1883	**MI, NH**	-----	*NJ*
1884	**NY, RI**	-----	None
1885	AL, **KS, MA, ME,** MO, **NE, NV, OR, PA, WI**	**NE**	**NE**
1886	**CT**, **IA**, MD	**IA, MA, VT**	**MA**, MD
1887	*CA*, **CO**, DE, **MN**, WV	**CT, IL, KS, ME, MI, NH, NJ, NY**, *OH*, **PA, WI**	**IL, NV**
1888	LA, **OH**	None	**OH, VT**
1889	FL, **IL,** *MT*	CA, MO, **NV**, *RI*	AR, **CT,** GA, IN, **KS, ME, MI, MN, NH, NY, OR, PA,** SC, **WA**
1890	**ID, ND, SD, WA, WY**	**WY,** MD **ND, SD**	AL, **ID,** KY, MS, **ND, SD,** VA, **WY**
1891	NC	**CO,** MN, TX	**CA, CO**, NC, WI, WV
1892	MS	None	**RI**
1893	KY, TX	AR, *ID,* IN, TN,	DE
1894	**NJ**	None	**IA**
1895	**IN**, SC, TN	**MT, OR**, NC, SC	**MT**
1896	None	LA, **UT**, VA	None
1897	**UT**	AL, WA	None
1898	None	None	None
1899	AR	None	TX
1900	VA	None	LA
1901	GA	**WV**	None

Sources: Various publications. **BOLD** states are those with unified Republican legislatures. *Italicized* states are those with divided governments. Others are Democratic legislatures.

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listed in a publication by Clark Bell,[53] though due to its incomplete nature, we checked and obtained data on other states from legislative records.

To estimate the probability of bill passage in a given year, we construct a state-year dataset, with each observation either coded as adopting (1) or failing to adopt (0) the policy. This is consistent with modeling in the policy-diffusion literature. This data structure allows us to estimate logit models.[54] Upon passage, a state drops out of the dataset. For these three policy areas and during the time period studied, no state eliminated a law once passed, so no state reappears again after passing a law. Territories that became states are included in the dataset only after statehood. We also model the three policy areas separately because historical evidence suggests that the WCTU's tactics were not identical across the three areas. Thus, we expect that the effects of our predictors may vary with issue area.

In studying bill adoption, the timing of legislative meetings is important. Some state legislatures met yearly, while others met biennially. Some biennial legislatures, moreover, still met yearly through adjourned sessions. And during the time period we studied, some states altered their meeting dates and meeting frequencies. Previous diffusion models have handled these concerns in three ways: a dummy variable for no legislative session, eliminating state-years when there was no meeting, or acknowledging the problem but moving forward without any controls.[55] Here we choose only to include the years in which a state legislature met at least once, determined by the presence of state legislative reports available in archives.[56] This way, a state-year in the models truly indicates a real possibility of bill passage.

We consider three key predictors that allow us to examine the determinants of the WCTU's legislative success. First, absent modern measures of lobbying registration, we measure interest-group strength using state WCTU dues. These data were obtained from the national proceedings of the WCTU from 1882 to 1901. We use this information to calculate two measures of state WCTU strength: state dues paid to the national body on a per-member basis, and a per capita measurement of state dues. The former is a raw measure of association size, measured in total dollars given to the national body; it ranges from 0 to 2,251.4, with a mean of 307.07 and a standard deviation of 425.22.[57] The latter measures the concentration of the WCTU relative to the state's total population, measured by dividing WCTU dues by state population and multiplying by 1,000 to create a scale ranging from 0 (no group presence) to a maximum of .94 (with a mean of .22 and a standard deviation of .19).[58] Either of these variables could have a potentially significant effect on policy adoptions. On one hand, it is possible that the

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states with the largest WCTU associations had greater political power, and thus were better equipped to lobby state governments to change policy. On the other hand, it may be that per capita WCTU strength allowed groups to have greater clout in the legislature as well as facilitating resource sharing with other states' unions.

Second, we consider whether the state legislature was under unified under Republican control (1) or not (0); this measure was calculated from Michael J. Dubin's work on the partisanship of state governments.[59] We believe unified control, which typically facilitates agreement and expedites legislative enactment, will be particularly important in cases where the Republican Party controls both houses of the legislature, since its members were likely more sympathetic to morality politics, in general, and the WCTU, in particular. It is important to underscore that national and state Republican parties were *not* the originators of these laws. However, the Republican Party was much more receptive to women's participation on some subjects (including education and the protection of women), and the WCTU's white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant image correlated well with the Republican Party's demographic base. Furthermore, even when the WCTU formally supported the Prohibition Party, the organization was quite Republican in orientation.[60] This is evidenced by the WCTU working closely with Republicans, including Henry W. Blair of New Hampshire, the first representative to introduce a prohibition amendment in Congress. Blair of New Hampshire, the first representative to introduce a prohibition amendment in Congress.

Third, we consider the proportion of neighboring states that adopted the policy in previous years.

These proportions are calculated by the authors and range from 0 (no neighboring states adopted) to 1 (all neighboring states adopted).[61] These proportions are somewhat more difficult to measure in this era because of territories. For scientific temperance, we include territories in the measurement because the national government passed a scientific temperance law that applied to all territories in 1886. This national intervention potentially influenced the behavior of neighboring states. But because the federal government did not intervene on age-of-consent laws or anti-tobacco legislation for minors, and because territories were not states, we do not include territorial action on these subjects in neighboring state calculations.

Finally, to control for the likelihood of passage following both linear and nonlinear trends, we also include time trend and time-trend squared variables, which begin in the first year of bill passage.

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Including these indicators is common practice in the diffusion literature and is intended to ensure that the effects of neighboring state adoptions, which increase over time, are modeled independently.[62]

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The first set of models is presented in Table 2.[63] These models confirm what Table 1 suggested: unified Republican governments are always positive, significant predictors of policy adoption. This is consistent with the WCTU's relationship to the party; the association benefitted from legislative bodies more receptive to its goals. The effect of Republican legislatures on policy adoption, along with the relative weakness of WCTU state organizations, also explains why adoptions in all three areas were slower to occur in the South, as shown in Table 1.[64] As alternative model specifications shown in Appendix Table A reveal—which include a dummy variable for the South (states that seceded during the Civil War were coded as 1)—these delays were not the result of a state simply being southern and the social and cultural differences particular to the region.

To investigate the predictive power of Republican control, we estimated predicted probabilities with all other predictors at their mean values.[65] In non-Republican legislatures, the probability of adopting scientific temperance legislation is .08; in a unified Republican legislature, it increases to .49. The strength of this effect is likely at least in part due to Mary Hunt's lobbying efforts; she ushered most of these bills through state legislatures personally, and her choices were potentially made with partisanship in mind. We see similar, although more modest, changes in the other policy areas. For age-of-consent, the increase is from .08 to .29; for anti-tobacco for children, it is from .05 to .19. Substantively, then, in unified Republican legislatures, our policies had approximately one-in-two, one-in-four, and one-in-five chances of passage. In nonunified Republican legislatures, these probabilities dropped below one in ten.

Our initial models, however, provide little support for our expectations regarding interest-group strength and neighboring state adoptions. WCTU membership is only significant in the age of consent, unadjusted dues model. Neighboring state adoptions are never significant. For both scientific temperance and anti-tobacco legislation, then, unified Republican legislatures are the

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Table 2. Diffusion of Scientific Temperance Instruction, Age of Consent, and Anti-Tobacco for Children Legislation

Predictors	Scientific Temperance, Model #1	Scientific Temperance, Model #2	Age of Consent, Model #1	Age of Consent, Model #2	Anti-Tobacco Model #1	Anti-Tobacco, Model #2
Unified Republican Govt.	2.45 (.52)*	2.37 (.54)*	1.51 (.47)*	1.35 (.46)*	1.60 (.45)*	1.48 (.48)*
WCTU Dues (per 1000)	−1.07 (.99)	-----	6.46 (1.73)*	------	.68 (.57)	------
Per Capita WCTU Dues	-----	−.28 (1.80)	-----	1.97 (1.37)	-----	1.52 (1.28)
Neighbor Proportion	.84 (.84)	.65 (.87)	.87 (.73)	1.13 (.74)	−1.42 (.88)	−1.58 (.91)
Time	.35 (.18)	.33 (.19)	.51 (.21)*	.27 (.18)	1.31 (.30)*	1.27 (.30)*
Time Sq.	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.02 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.05 (.01)*	−.05 (.01)*
Constant	−4.11 (.79)*	−4.09 (.79)*	−5.24 (.98)*	−3.59 (.71)*	−7.67 (1.33)*	−7.58 (1.32)*
	N=221 Pseudo R–Sq.=.20	N=221 Pseudo RSq.=.20	N=212 Pseudo RSq.=.26	N=212 Pseudo RSq.=.15	N=237 Pseudo RSq.=.25	N=237 Pseudo RSq.=.25

*p<.05, two-tailed test. Models are logistic regression. Scientific temperance models range from 1882 to 1901; age of consent, 1885 to 1901; anti-tobacco for children, 1883 to 1901.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030621000166 Published online by Cambridge University Press

best predictor of successful adoption. For age of consent, unadjusted WCTU dues also played an important role in predicting the probability of passage.

It appears, then, that state legislative venue shopping was an important element of the WCTU's plan to achieve moral reform and home protection. But we must also consider if, in the absence of predictors for state legislative control, there were systematic secondary factors that influenced the success of WCTU-supported policies.[66] It may be, for example, that these models reveal evidence that geography and the strength of a state's WCTU also influenced the likelihood of policy adoption. These models are shown in Table 3.

There are important differences in our three cases. The adoption of scientific temperance instruction is never significantly affected by WCTU strength, though the proportion of neighboring states that adopted is significant in the unadjusted WCTU dues model. For age-of-consent and anti-tobacco legislation, both WCTU dues measurements are positive, significant predictors of passage, though neighboring state adoptions never reach statistical significance at the $p<.05$ level. Thus, aside from scientific temperance, which appears to be a unique case, we find support for our expectations about the role of interest groups in nineteenth-century policy diffusion. However, we find much more limited support for geographic diffusion:

> To visualize these relationships, we plot marginal effects using the unadjusted WCTU dues model for scientific temperance instruction (Fig. 1), and both WCTU models for age-of-consent (Fig. 2) and anti-tobacco legislation (Fig. 3). Time trends were set to four years for scientific temperance (1885), three years for age-of-consent (1887), and seven years for anti-tobacco legislation targeted at children (1889), which were the years when each policy's likelihood of passage was strongest.

Other variables were held to their mean values.

Figure 1 illustrates how the probability of adopting scientific temperance legislation changes as neighboring states adopt the law, with WCTU dues held at its mean value. When no neighboring states have passed a law, the predicted probability of bill passage is .11; when 60 percent of neighboring states have done so, the probability of adoption increases to .33; and if all neighboring states have passed the law, the probability increases to .56. But confidence intervals overlap, except at the two extremes of no neighbors and all neighbors

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030621000166 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030621000166 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Table 3. Diffusion of Scientific Temperance Instruction, Age of Consent, and Anti-Tobacco for Children Legislation, Excluding Legislative Control

Predictors	Scientific Temperance, Model #1	Scientific Temperance, Model #2	Age of Consent, Model #1	Age of Consent, Model #2	Anti-Tobacco, Model #1	Anti-Tobacco, Model #2
WCTU Dues (per 1000)	−.15 (.92)	-----	6.35 (1.58)*	-----	1.32 (.58)*	-----
Per Capita WCTU Dues	-----	2.52 (1.54)	-----	3.56 (1.26)*	-----	3.31 (1.11)*
Neighbor Proportion	2.37 (.76)*	1.55 (.84)	1.35 (.70)	1.20 (.73)	−.95 (.82)	−1.55 (.87)
Time	−.02 (.15)	−.03 (.15)	.32 (.20)	.12 (.17)	1.13 (.27)*	1.09 (.27)*
Time Sq.	−.003 (.007)	.001 (.008)	−.02 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.05 (.01)*	−.05 (.01)*
Constant	−1.99 (.01)	−2.11 (.52)*	−3.91 (.79)*	−2.78 (.62)[1]*	−6.18 (1.13)*	−6.36 (1.16)*
	N=221 Pseudo R− Sq.=.08	N=221 Pseudo R− Sq.=.09	N=212 Pseudo R− Sq.=.20	N=212 Pseudo R− Sq.=.11	N=237 Pseudo R− Sq.=.19	N=237 Pseudo R− Sq.=.21

*p<.05, two-tailed test. Models are logistic regression. Scientific temperance models range from 1882 to 1901; age of consent, 1885 to 1901; anti-tobacco for children, 1883 to 1901.



Figure 1. Scientific temperance instruction, marginal effects plot for neighbor adoptions
*Calculated from Table #3, Scientific Temperance Model #1.

having passed scientific temperance legislation. In short, there is evidence of some neighbor adoption effect in this policy area.

Figure 2 reveals that a state's probability of passing an age-of-consent law is strongly affected by both types of WCTU dues. WCTU membership clearly affected policy adoptions in this area, as seen in the left part of the figure—note that this was also the one instance in where WCTU dues mattered when unified Republican legislatures were considered. When state payments to the national body were $100 or less per year (1,000 members), the probability of bill adoption was around .11; when these payments hit $400 a year (4,000 members), the probability jumped to .44; and in strong WCTU states that paid $700 or over (7,000 members), the probability was .84 or higher. But per capita state dues to the national body also mattered, as shown on the right side of the figure. Though the strength of its effect is not as dramatic, and there is more overlap in the confidence intervals, as one moves from a state with per capita WCTU dues of .2 (near the mean value on the adjusted scale) to .5 (between one and two standard deviations above the mean), the probability of bill adoption increased by .21. Thus, we can conclude that interest-group size, and its relative strength to some degree, influenced state legislative adoption of

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

Figure 2. Age of consent, marginal effects plot for WCTU state association dues to the national organization (unadjusted and per capita)
*Calculated from Table 3, Age of Consent Models #1 and #2.

age-of-consent laws. The presence of a public opinion effect on this legislative issue may owe to its particularly moral nature.

Figure 3 replicates the approach taken in Figure 2, with unadjusted dues on the left side of the figure and per capita dues on the right. Once more, as WCTU dues increase, the probability of an anti-tobacco bill being adopted increases. With unadjusted dues at $100, the probability of bill adoption is approximately .3; with dues around $400, the probability is .38; and at $700 or over, the probability is .48 or higher, although confidence intervals reveal some uncertainty in the predictions. Here, however, the probability change is stronger with per capita dues. The probability of bill adoption increases by .24 as one moves from per capita dues of .2 to .5. Thus, for tobacco legislation, it was the WCTU's relative strength in a state, and to some degree its sheer size, that affected policy adoption. This suggests that the group may have been strategic in thinking about its legislative influence, both in terms of the capacity to have members appear at statehouses and sign petitions and also their ability to claim to speak for a significant percentage of the state's citizens.

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

Figure 3. Anti-tobacco for children, marginal effects plot for WCTU state association dues to the national organization state association dues to the national organization (unadjusted and per capita)
*Calculated from Table 3, Anti-Tobacco Models #1 and #2.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Overall, these results shed light on the conditions that made the Woman's Christian Temperance Union's efforts at policy reform successful when it came to scientific temperance instruction, increasing the age of consent, and banning youth from purchasing tobacco products. First and foremost, the prominent role played by unified Republican legislatures—especially when combined with qualitative evidence—suggests that the WCTU sought out venues that were likely to be receptive to its message. This is clearly underscored in Table 1, and for scientific temperance education, where Republican legislatures had a one-in-two probability of adopting the policy in any given session.

Second, empirical evidence shows that this focus on unified Republican legislatures was supported at times by geographic proximity and membership. For the former, Mary Hunt intentionally targeted states that she thought might influence other states to adopt scientific temperance legislation, and this

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appears to have worked to some degree.[67] While we cannot ascertain with available evidence if she intended to target specific Republican legislatures first to ease her efforts in neighboring states, the empirical results suggest that unified Republican legislatures were more sympathetic to Hunt's efforts and that these legislative victories made passage more likely in neighboring states. For the latter, stronger state-level membership—whether absolute or per capita—helped the WCTU's efforts to convince state legislatures to adopt increases in the age of consent and to ban youth from purchasing tobacco products. Since petitioning was a key component of the WCTU's lobbying strategy for both issues, having a larger pool of workers and potential signatories was important.

In summary, the present analysis reveals the key factors that allowed a large, politically-oriented federation like the WCTU to successfully spread its policies across the United States. As a case study of a single association, though, the findings here needed to be tested on a broader range of issues and associations. Here, we consider a women's association's efforts to pass policies related to the education and protection of children. It may be that this altered the dynamics of policy adoption. Therefore, future scholarship on nonmorality policy adoptions during this era appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research. Although it seems likely that state legislative partisanship, group strength, and geographic proximity would influence diffusion in other policy areas, too, the relative impact of these factors may vary with issue area. The importance of these factors is likely regulated by counter-mobilization against policy adoptions, which should also be taken into account. While the policies studied here were successfully adopted by almost all states over a relatively short period, and evidence suggests resistance was present but not necessarily aggressive or even mobilized (anecdotally, age-of-consent legislation appears to have faced the most backlash), future studies should place more emphasis on gauging how forces opposed to policies succeeded in stemming, or failed to stem, the tide of their adoptions.

It may also be that a women's group lobbying for policy change—by the very virtue of its members' disenfranchisement—was regarded differently than other associations of the time. Did men's voluntary associations, or associations allowing both men and women to join, employ similar or different tactics? Additionally, did other women's associations see the same levels of success when pursuing state policy adoptions? And what about business associations, which came on the scene during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?[68] What methods did they use, and was

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diffusion easier or harder for them? Once more, though, it seems probable that men's and business associations would consider state legislative partisanship, the strength of their organizations in a state, and the policy environment in neighboring states when considering which states to emphasize in their quests to get desired policy goals turned into law. The approach used here to study the WCTU and these three policy areas should be applicable to a wider sample of associations and laws, and the results presented here provide future scholarship with guidance on how to study policy adoptions during this era.

In total, it appears that the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, whether through the leadership of policy elites such as Mary Hunt or the efforts of its general membership, was able to strategically mobilize first in states with unified Republican state legislatures to win policy adoption in all three policy areas studied. This shows how the largest woman's voluntary association of the late nineteenth century was a major political force, able to play a role in motivating state governments to adopt legislation key to its home protection agenda. In the end, the WCTU understood how to be successful in lobbying and was able to "Do Everything" because of it.

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High Point University, USA

NOTES

1. Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson, "A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Volunteerism in the United States, *American Political Science Review* 94 (September 2000): 527–46, quote at 541.

2. See Gerald Gamm and Robert D. Putnam, "The Growth of Voluntary Associations in America, 1840–1940," Organizers"; Jocelyn Elise Crowley and Theda Skocpol, "The Rush to Organize: Explaining Associational Formation in the United States, 1860s–1920s," *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (October 2001): 813–29; Adam Chamberlain, Alixandra B. Yanus, and Nicholas Pyeatt, "From Reconstruction to Reform: Modernization and the Interest Group State, 1875–1900," *Social Science History* 41(Winter 2017): 705–30.

3. Theda Skocpol, Marjorie Abend-Wein, Christopher Howard, and Susan Goodrich Lehmann, "Women's Associations and the Enactment of Mothers' Pensions in the United States," *American Political Science Review* 87 (September 1993): 686–701; Scott Ainsworth, "Lobbyists as Interest Group Entrepreneurs: The Mobilization of Union Veterans," *American Review of Politics* 16 (July 1995): 107–29; Scott Ainsworth, "Electoral Strength and the Emergence of Group Influence in the Late 1800s: The Grand Army of the Republic," *American Politics Quarterly* 23 (July 1995): 319–38.

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4. Jon C. Teaford, *The Rise of the States: Evolution of American State Government* (Baltimore, 2002); Peverill Squire and Keith E. Hamm, *101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures, and the Future of Legislative Studies* (Columbus, 2005); Peverill Squire, *The Evolution of American Legislatures: Colonies, Territories, and States, 1619–2009* (Ann Arbor, 2012).

5. Erik J. Engstrom, "Stacking the States, Stacking the House: The Partisan Consequences of Congressional Redistricting in the Nineteenth Century," *American Political Science Review* 100 (August 2006): 419–27; Seth Masket, "It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 1849–2006," *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (July 2007): 482–97.

6. Teaford, *The Rise of the States*, 5.

7. Ibid., 17.

8. Ibid., 17–20.

9. Ibid., 13–14.

10. Erin R. Graham, Charles R. Shipan, and Craig Volden, "The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science," *British Journal of Political Science* 43 (July 2013), 673–701; Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry, "State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 84 (June 1990): 395–415. But on pre–World War II diffusion, see Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States," *American Political Science Review* 63 (September 1969): 880–99; Virginia Gray, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," *American Political Science Review* 67 (December 1973), 1174–85; Susan Welch and Kay Thompson, "The Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy Innovation," *American Journal of Political Science* 24 (November 1980), 715–29.

11. Examples include Dorothy M. Daley and James C. Garand, "Horizontal Diffusion, Vertical Diffusion, and Internal Pressure in State Environmental Policymaking, 1989-1998," *American Politics Research* 33 (September 2005), 615–44; Todd Makse and Craig Volden, "The Role of Policy Attributes in Diffusion of Innovations," *Journal of Politics* 73 (January 2011): 108–24.

12. For example, Daniel J. Mallinson, "Policy Diffusion in the American States: Learning, Competition, and Conformity." Paper prepared for the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2109083.

13. Lawrence J. Grossback, Sean Nicholson-Crotty, and David A. M. Peterson, "Ideology and Learning in Policy Diffusion," *American Politics Research* 32 (September 2004): 521–45; Daniel C. Matisoff, "The Adoption of State Climate Change Policies and Renewable Portfolio Standards: Regional Diffusion or Internal Determinants?," *Review of Policy Research* 25 (December 2008), 527–46; Daniel J. Mallinson, "Who Are Your Neighbors? The Role of Ideology and Decline of Geographic Proximity in the Diffusion of Policy Innovations," *Policy Studies Journal.* Published online (2019) before print, https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12351.

14. Craig Volden, "States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children's Health Insurance Program," *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (April 2006): 294–312; Fabrizio Gilardi, "Who Learns from What in Policy Diffusion Processes?," *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (July 2010): 650–66.

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15. Charles R. Shipan and Craig Volden, "The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (October 2008): 840–57.

16. Michael Mintrom, "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (July 1997): 738–70.

17. Donald P. Haider-Markel, "Policy Diffusion as a Geographical Expansion of the Scope of Political Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the 1990s," *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 1 (March 2001): 5–26.

18. Kristin N. Garrett and Joshua M. Jansa, "Interest Group Influence in Policy Diffusion Networks," *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 15 (September 2015): 387–417.

19. Christopher Z. Mooney and Mei-Hsin Lee, "The Temporal Diffusion of Morality Policy: The Case of Death Penalty Legislation in the American States," *Policy Studies Journal* 27 (November 1999), 766–80; Haider-Markel, "Policy Diffusion as a Geographical Expansion."

20. Welch and Thompson, "The Impact of Federal Incentives," 727.

21. Gaines M. Foster, *Moral Reconstruction: Christian Lobbyists and the Federal Legislation of Morality, 1865–1920* (Chapel Hill, 2002), 253. On women petitioning, see also Daniel Carpenter and Colin D. Moore, "When Canvassers Became Activists: Antislavery Petitioning and the Political Mobilization of American Women," *American Political Science Review* 108 (August 2014): 479–98.

22. Data derived from Michael J. Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year-by-Year Summary, 17962006* (Jefferson, NC, 2007).

23. Norton Mezvinsky, "Scientific Temperance Instruction in the Schools," *History of Education Quarterly* 1 (March 1961): 48–56, quote at 49.

24. Jonathan Zimmerman, "'The Queen of the Lobby': Mary Hunt, Scientific Temperance, and the Dilemma of Democratic Education in America, 1879–1906," *History of Education Quarterly* 32 (Spring 1992): 1–30, specifically pp. 9 and 2.

25. The WCTU also influenced education policy in Canada. See Nancy M. Sheehan, "Temperance, Education and the WCTU in Alberta, 1905–1930," *Journal of Educational Thought* 14 (August 1980): 108–24; Nancy M. Sheehan, "The WCTU and Educational Strategies on the Canadian Prairie," *History of Education Quarterly* 24 (Spring 1984): 101–19; Nancy M. Sheehan, "National Pressure Groups and Provincial Curriculum Policy: Temperance in Nova Scotia Schools, 1880–1930," *Canadian Journal of Education* 9 (January 1984): 73–88.

26. Mary H. Hunt, *An Epoch of the Nineteenth Century* (Boston: P.F. Foster & Co., 1897), 9.

27. Ibid., 9.

28. Philip J. Pauly, "The Struggle for Ignorance about Alcohol: American Physiologists, Wilbur Olin Atwater, and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 64 (October 1990), 366–92; Jonathan Zimmerman, "'When the Doctors Disagree': Scientific Temperance and Scientific Authority, 1891–1906," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 48 (April 1993): 171–97.

29. Mezvinsky, "Scientific Temperance Instruction"; Zimmerman, "'The Queen of the Lobby.'"

30. One quantitative study has examined the relationship between the WCTU and scientific temperance, though not on the subject of passing such laws. Hiatt, Sine, and

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Tolbert used WCTU membership and the presence of scientific temperance instruction to study brewery failures and the rise of soft-drink manufacturers. In their models, both positively affected the number of brewery failures while scientific temperance instruction positively influenced the number of soft-drink manufacturers. The authors clearly understood the connection between the two variables (642), but the effects on these two unique dependent variables were independent despite a .658 correlation (653) between the WCTU and scientific temperance instruction. See Shon R. Hiatt, Wesley D. Sine, and Pamela S. Tolbert, "From Pabst to Pepsi: The Deinstitutionalization of Social Practices and the Creation of Entrepreneurial Opportunities," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 54 (December 2009): 635–67. On lobbying as a legislative subsidy, see Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff, "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," *American Political Science Review* 100 (February 2006): 69–84.

31. Delaware was at seven years of age, and Oregon was at fourteen.

32. Mary E. Odem, *Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and Policing Adolescent Female Sexuality in the United States, 1885–1920* (Chapel Hill, 1995), 13.

33. Ibid., 15.

34. Woman's Christian Temperance Union, *Minutes of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union at the Thirteenth Annual Meeting* (Chicago: Woman's Temperance Publishing Association, 1886), 77.

35. Ibid., 77.

36. Odem, *Delinquent Daughters*, 15 and 37.

37. James A. Morone, *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History* (New Haven, 2003), 248.

38. See Ruth Birgitta Anderson Bordin, *Woman and Temperance: The Quest for Power and Liberty, 1873–1900* (Philadelphia, 1981); Jane E. Larson, "'Even a Worm Will Turn at Last': Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America," *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities* 9 (1997), 1–71.

39. Lee J. Alston, Ruth Dupré, and Tomas Nonnenmacher, "Social Reformers and Regulation: The Prohibition of Cigarettes in the United States and Canada," *Explorations in Economic History* 39 (October 2002): 425–55, quote at 435.

40. Cassandra Tate, *Cigarette Wars: The Triumph of "The Little White Slaver"* (New York, 1999), 27; Woman's Christian Temperance Union, *Minutes of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union at the Tenth Annual Meeting* (Chicago: Woman's Temperance Publishing Association, 1883).

41. Marc Linder, *"Inherently Bad, and Bad Only": A History of State-Level Regulation of Cigarettes and Smoking in the United States Since the 1880s,* vol. 1: An In-Depth National Study Embedding Ultra-Thick Description of a Representative State (Iowa). (Iowa City: Self-published online by scholar at the University of Iowa. Available at https://ir.uiowa.edu/books/2/).

42. Dorie E. Apollonio and Stanton A. Glantz, "Minimum Ages of Legal Access for Tobacco in the United States from 1863 to 2015," *American Journal of Public Health* 106 (July 2016): 1200–1207, specifically 1200.

43. Woman's Christian Temperance Union, *Minutes of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting* (Chicago: Woman's Temperance Publishing Association, 1890), 187. Eventually, the WCTU's effort to restrict tobacco

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and cigarette use became closely connected with Lucy Page Gaston, whose desire to end cigarettes led to the creation of a new organization in 1899, the National Anti-Cigarette League (which became the Anti-Cigarette League of America).

44. Foster, *Moral Reconstruction*, 160.

45. A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America," *Annual Report of the American Historical Society for the Year* 1901 (1902), 319–542.

46. Foster, *Moral Reconstruction*, esp. 35, 39, 80, and throughout the book.

47. Mary Hunt, *A History of the First Decade of the Department of Scientific Temperance Instruction in Schools and Colleges, of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, in Three Parts*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Washington Press, Geo. E. Crosby & Co., Printers, 1892); Mary Hunt, *An Epoch of the Nineteenth Century* (Boston: 23 Trill Street, 1897).

48. Susan B. Anthony and Ida Husted Harper, *The History of Woman Suffrage,* vol. 4 (Rochester: Published by Susan B. Anthony, 1902), 465–1011.

49. Odem, *Delinquent Daughters.*

50. David J. Pivar, *Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1868–1900* (Westport, CT, 1973), 141–42.

51. Woman's Christian Temperance Union, *Report of Twenty-Second Annual Convention of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union* (Chicago: Woman's Temperance Publishing Association, 1895), 298–99; William D. P. Bliss, *The Encyclopedia of Social Reform* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1897), 9–11.

52. By this definition, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, and Mississippi did not pass age-of-consent laws prior to 1901. As a territory, the age of consent in Washington was sixteen, but this was found to be unconstitutional; the age was then officially twelve until it was increased to eighteen in 1897.

53. Clark Bell, *Medico-Legal Studies*, vol. 6 (New York: The Medico-Legal Journal, 1902), 51–65.

54. See Berry and Berry, "State Lottery Adoptions."

55. Representative citations of these approaches are, respectively: Garry Young and Andrea Sarzynski, "The Adoption of Solar Energy Financial Incentives Across the States, 1974–2007," *George Washington Institute of Public Policy* (2019). Available at https://gwipp.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2181/f/downloads/Working_Paper_039_SolarEnergy.pdf; Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari, "Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of State Education Reforms," *Journal of Politics* 60 (February 1998): 126–48; Frederick J. Boehmke and Paul Skinner, "State Policy Innovativeness Revisited," *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 12 (September 2012): 303–29.

56. The one oddity is Kentucky, which began its legislative session on December 31. Since laws could pass on that day, we counted this as a 1.

57. The state association owed the national organization .05 in 1883 and 1884 and .10 per member from 1885 onward. We use the totals as presented in WCTU proceedings here, though scientific temperance and anti-tobacco models were tested after adjusting the 1883 and 1884 dues to align with the .10 per member standard. These models are almost exactly the same as those presented here, with no changes in statistical or substantive results.

58. These calculations were based on population or population averages, using the 1880 state population for 1882; the average of the 1880 and 1890 state populations for 1883–87;

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the 1890 state population for 1888–92; the average of the 1890 and 1900 state populations for 1893–97; and the 1900 population for 1898–1901.

59. Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures.* Since he reports the post-election legislative composition, we adjusted his numbers to correspond to the year in which a legislature meets. For example, Vermont held elections in the early fall and the legislature met that same year, so the results of the 1886 election correspond with the 1886 legislative meeting; a few other states followed that example. Most commonly, however, states held their legislative elections during the prior year, so members elected in 1886 would convene in 1887.

60. Melanie S. Gustafson, *Women and the Republican Party, 1854–1924* (Champaign, 2001); James D. Ivy, "'The Lone Star States Surrenders to a Lone Woman': Frances Willard's Forgotten 1882 Texas Temperance Tour," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 102 (July 1998): 44–61; Adam Chamberlain, Alixandra B. Yanus, and Nicholas Pyeatt, "The Connection Between the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and the Prohibition Party," *SAGE Open* 6 (December 2006): 1–8.

61. Some might question why we do not use regional measures, as in Daniel J. Mallinson's work. Given the limited communication between state legislatures of the era, and the ease with which an association's membership could more easily work with those in neighboring states, our expectation is that neighboring states (those that share a border) should affect one another more than a state in the same region as another state that does not border it. The assumption, then, is that, Alabama and Mississippi were more likely to be influenced by one another than Alabama and North Carolina.

62. For example, see Christopher Z. Mooney, "Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion," *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (March 2001): 103–24, esp. 107.

63. In Appendix Table B, we drop territories that became states from the calculations. The only significant change is for age-of-consent, where per capita WCTU dues are significant at the $p<.05$ level when unified Republican legislatures are included.

64. The speed with which women's organizations developed in the region is a point raised by Marjorie Spruill Wheelers' work, which argues that suffrage organizing was delayed in the South, and Adam Chamberlain, Alixandra Yanus, and Nicholas Pyeatt, whose research reveals that the WCTU and other women's national associations found support in the South but did not expand rapidly in them. Furthermore, the region's weak state legislative capacity and a climate unfavorable to women's political activism likely compounded the effects of partisanship and organizational strength. This is particularly interesting in relation to scientific temperance, as the region's women were important in the push for local option for determining prohibition, or the idea that citizens could determine, by vote in local jurisdictions, whether alcohol sales would be allowed or banned. The WCTU, a strong supporter of national and statewide prohibition, had a mixed view on local option; while it would participate in local efforts, its leaders still believed that national prohibition was the ultimate goal. Teaching children that alcohol was dangerous could pave the way to national prohibition by changing the hearts and minds of a generation; local option could only provide piecemeal reform that could, in the future, be reversed. Perhaps these points play a role in the South's slow adoption of STI legislation, too. In the South, where WCTU organizations were weaker and where sympathetic Republican legislatures were extremely scarce, and where states were general less interested in education policy and

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more supportive of local control, the various factors noted here reduced the likelihood of early policy success for STI, so Hunt's efforts found more supportive audiences elsewhere and southern WCTU efforts instead focused on other types of policy work. See Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, *New Women of the New South: The Leaders of the Suffrage Movement in the Southern States* (New York, 1993), 3–37; Adam Chamberlain, Alixandra B. Yanus, and Nicholas Pyeatt, "The Southern Question: American Voluntary Association Development, 1876–1920," *Political Science Quarterly* 135 (Spring 2020), 103–29, esp. 110–18. Ann-Marie E. Szymanski, *Pathways to Prohibition: Radicals, Moderates, and Social Movement Outcomes* (Durham, 2003), 110–21.

65. Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, "CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results," *Journal of Statistical Software* (2003). Copy at http://j.mp/20Sx5Pc.

66. We also tested models (not shown, but available upon request) that interacted Republican unified control with the WCTU measures. None of the interactions were significant on their own, and marginal effects plots reveal that the only substantively significant interactive effect was for unadjusted WCTU dues and Republican control for age-of-consent increases at certain points. At low levels of WCTU dues, increasing from $0 to $400, significantly increased the probability that a Republican unified legislature passed an age-of-consent bill from around .17 to .40; thereafter, the probability decreases until the interactive effect is no longer significantly different than 0 at $600 in dues.

67. Pauly, "The Struggle for Ignorance"; Zimmerman, "'When the Doctors Disagree.'"

68. See Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York, 1967).

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APPENDIX

Appendix Table A: Diffusion of Scientific Temperance Instruction, Age of Consent, and Anti-Tobacco for Children Legislation, with South Dummy

Predictors	Scientific Temperance, Model #1	Scientific Temperance, Model #2	Age of Consent, Model #1	Age of Consent, Model #2	AntiTobacco, Model #1	AntiTobacco, Model #2
Unified Republican Govt.	1.99 (.55)*	2.04 (.57)*	1.49 (.56)*	1.13 (.51)*	1.34 (.54)*	1.30 (.55)*
WCTU Dues (per 1000)	−1.63 (1.07)	-----	6.43 (1.82)*	-----	.63 (.57)	-----
Per Capita WCTU Dues	-----	−1.33 (1.92)	-----	1.67 (1.38)	-----	1.29 (1.32)
Neighbor Proportion	.46 (.87)	.41 (.89)	.85 (.82)	.85 (.80)	−1.69 (.95)	−1.78 (.96)
South	−1.18 (.66)	−1.02 (.67)	−.04 (.70)	−.57 (.64)	−.51 (.61)	−.42 (.64)
Time	.42 (.19)*	.40 (.20)*	.51 (.22)*	.29 (.19)	1.34 (.30)*	1.31 (.30)*
Time Sq.	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.02 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.06 (.01)*	−.05 (.01)*
Constant	−3.69 (.81)*	−3.77 (.81)*	−5.22 (1.06)*	−3.33 (.76)*	−7.52 (1.34)*	−7.46 (1.33)*
	N=221	N=221	N=212	N=212	N=237	N=237
	Pseudo R−Sq.=.22	Pseudo R−Sq.=.21	Pseudo R−Sq.=.26	Pseudo R−Sq.=.15	Pseudo R− Sq.=.26	Pseudo R−Sq.=.26

*$p<.05$, two-tailed test. Models are logistic regression. Scientific temperance models range from 1882 to 1901; age of consent, 1882 to 1901; anti-tobacco for children, 1883 to 1901.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030621000166 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Appendix Table B: Diffusion of scientific temperance instruction, age of consent, and anti-tobacco for children legislation, without states that were territories at the start of the time period

Predictors	Scientific Temperance, Model #1	Scientific Temperance, Model #2	Age of Consent, Model #1	Age of Consent, Model #2	Anti-Tobacco, Model #1	Anti-Tobacco, Model #2
Unified Republican Govt.	3.02 (.67)*	2.68 (.63)*	1.76 (.61)*	1.70 (.56)*	1.54 (.53)*	1.43 (.54)*
WCTU Dues (per 1000)	−1.35 (1.09)	-----	7.45 (1.93)*	-----	.71 (.59)	-----
Per Capita WCTU Dues	-----	.83 (2.12)	-----	3.20 (1.55)*	-----	1.97 (1.42)
Neighbor Proportion	.63 (.94)	.08 (1.00)	.12 (.86)	.04 (.87)	−1.43 (.98)	−1.87 (1.05)
Time	.46 (.21)*	.39 (.20)	.61 (.26)*	.43 (.22)	1.25 (.31)*	1.26 (.32)*
Time Sq.	−.02 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	−.03 (.01)	−.02 (.01)	−.05 (.01)*	−.05 (.01)*
Constant	−4.77 (.99)*	−4.54 (.94)*	−5.69 (1.15)*	−4.22 (.89)*	−7.45 (1.40)*	−7.61 (1.42)*
	N=210	N=210	N=193	N=193	N=222	N=222
	Pseudo R–Sq.=.19	Pseudo R–Sq.=.19	Pseudo R–Sq.=.28	Pseudo R–Sq.=.16	Pseudo R–Sq.=.23	Pseudo R–Sq.=.23

*p<.05, two-tailed test. Models are logistic regression. Scientific temperance models range from 1882 to 1901; age of consent, 1882 to 1901; anti-tobacco for children, 1883 to 1901.