

art in Rome (such as the pyramid of Cestius, Tomb Z beneath St Peter's, the 'Aula Isiaca', and the 'Basilica' of Junius Bassus). She rightly rejects the Isis cult as an overarching explanation. As she points out, much of the 'Egyptian' imagery was combined with other more conventional Graeco-Roman images; to concentrate purely on the exotic elements or to record and catalogue them out of context, as much art history has tended to do, is to distort their meaning and significance. What was being created was something new — a 'Roman cosmopolitan' style. Vout plausibly suggests that the artists and patrons saw Egyptianizing iconography as a mechanism for referring to the afterlife. She makes a powerful case for the need to explore meaning in terms of genre or functional category: 'not Egyptianizing versus Hellenizing, but domestic, imperial, funerary' (202). The same sort of tantalizing amalgam is presented by major works of early Christian art in Rome, where, for example, the casket of the Esquiline Treasure combines Venus and eros with an inscription exhorting the owner to live in Christ. Jaś Elsner's important chapter goes beyond the usual discussions to argue that a key aspect of Christian art in Rome in the fourth century A.D. was its attempt to appropriate one of the most distinctive features of pagan cults, their localism (the way they were rooted in specific communities). The purpose of the Roman Church was to assert its claim to primacy in the Christian world and it sought to do this by rooting the Church in Rome's past. Hence Peter and Paul figure prominently in the art of the period. Here too was the impetus for Pope Damasus' frenetic activity in the mid-fourth century to establish the cults of saints and identify martyr-sites in the city.

The written texts remain one of the key ways we come to understand Rome. Mary Beard, in a taster for her much-anticipated study of the Roman triumph, emphasizes just how much of what we claim to know about the Roman triumph rests upon a limited number of texts. She emphasizes the performance aspects of the triumphal procession, viewing it as a form of street theatre. Like all theatre this involved an issue of belief (so Pompey is described by Appian, *Mith.* 117, as wearing the cloak of Alexander the Great at his triumph 'if anyone can believe that'). This in turn opens the way of the sceptic to undermine the effect (as for example in the 'false' triumphs of Gaius and Domitian (Suet., *Gaius* 47 and Tac., *Agr.* 39)). Richard Miles points to the curious way in which the rivalry between Rome and Punic Carthage moulded literary references to Carthage for centuries after the destruction of the city and, indeed, after the creation of the Roman city on the same site. As Roman Carthage became a rich and influential city through its key role in the North African corn trade, so it also became an attractive base for challengers to imperial authority (Papius Dionysius in A.D. 190, the Gordians in A.D. 238, Domitius Alexander in A.D. 308) — Punic perfidy and rivalry with Rome re-emerge in the texts. Greg Woolf, for his part, explores the ways in which Rome was reinvented as a cultural capital. This suited an élite, whose real power had slipped away to reside with the emperor. Poets and writers played up to their desire to represent themselves as at the forefront of culture. Woolf has a healthy scepticism of the real depth of cultural knowledge of the élite, and he has an acute analysis of Pliny the Younger's creation of himself as a man of letters. The whole essay goes a long way to explaining why Latin literature, both in Rome and the provinces, became a literature centred on the city and the preoccupations of its élite.

Space might have been found for consideration of plebeian culture in cosmopolitan Rome (Nicholas Horsfall, *La Cultura della Plebs Romana* (1996) has shown the possibilities) and the effects of the cosmopolitan make-up of the population on political and public life. But this remains a rich and rewarding collection, which amply demonstrates that the recognition of the cosmopolitan nature of the city of Rome opens up the possibility of new literary, archaeological, historical, and artistic narratives of the city. It is worthy of its dedicatee, although the contributors would be the first to recognize that he would not necessarily agree with all of what they have to say.

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G. DALY, *CANNAE: THE EXPERIENCE OF BATTLE IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR*. London: Routledge, 2002. Pp. xviii + 253, 10 figs, 7 maps. ISBN 0-415-26147-3. £45.00.

A. GOLDSWORTHY, *CANNAE*. London: Cassell, 2001. Pp. 201, numerous illus. ISBN 0-304-35714-6. £14.99.

Keegan's classic study, *The Face of Battle* (1976), has had a transforming impact on the study of ancient warfare by focusing attention on combatants' experience in battle. The most notable

applications of the Keegan method to antiquity have so far dealt not with individual battles, but more broadly with the warfare of particular societies, for example Hanson's work on Greek hoplite warfare or Goldsworthy's own *The Roman Army at War, 100 BC–AD 200* (1996). The two works under review both apply the method to a single conflict, perhaps the most celebrated and discussed of all ancient battles. Though there is considerable agreement between them, each makes a distinctive contribution, and both are fine demonstrations of how much can be achieved by applying the Keegan model.

Polybius provides almost all of our usable information on the Battle of Cannae, since most of the variant material in Livy and later writers is clearly unreliable. Polybius' narrative has evident limitations (well brought out by Daly, 18ff.) — political prejudices, a tendency to schematize and simplify, emphasis on Cannae as the nadir of Roman fortunes, which perhaps accounts for the exaggerated casualty figures. Both D. and G. draw extensively on the warfare of Rome and other societies to build up a much richer account than Polybius provides of what the battle may have been like.

G.'s work, in Cassell's 'Fields of Battle' series, is fluently written and excellently presented and illustrated (though the river Aufidus is consistently misspelt 'Aufidius'). G. organizes his material in a broadly chronological fashion, but D., whose careful discussion is a revised version of his Dublin doctoral dissertation, adopts a multi-faceted approach. His opening chapters sketch the events leading up to Cannae and concisely survey the traditional issues of scholarly debate about the battle; the next two chapters examine the Roman and Carthaginian armies of the period; and in the final two chapters D. turns to reconstructing the experience of battle, first for the commanders and then for the soldiers. While D.'s work is in some respects more wide-ranging than G.'s, its organization has perhaps led him to be somewhat too succinct in his treatment of some topics, for example the commanders' battle plans. Here G. is fuller (102–13), with perceptive remarks on how the Roman commanders planned to win the battle and how far Hannibal may have modified his plan in response to the Romans' troop deployments. Both D. and G. recognize that the battle must have taken place on the right bank of the Aufidus and that the course of the river has changed over time. G. (86–93) argues powerfully for Connolly's view that in 216 B.C. the river ran some way to the west of its present course and the battle took place between the river and the Cannae ridge: as he points out, this site would have had the advantage for the Romans of providing natural protection for each flank. It would, however, be cramped, and D. (32–5) may be right to opt for Kromayer's location on the slope east of Cannae hill, with the river on approximately its present-day course.

Troop numbers and deployment must remain the nub of any reconstruction of the battle. Like most recent enquirers, D. and G. both accept Polybius' claim that the Romans fielded eight legions, rejecting the variant four-legion tradition reported by Livy and followed by De Sanctis and Brunt, above all because they believe that the Romans must have sought numerical superiority in infantry after their earlier defeats. Both explain Polybius' statements on the Carthaginian infantry deployment by supposing that the Libyans on the flanks were deployed in column (perhaps concealed, as G. suggests (111)) and that, despite their great superiority in numbers, the width of the Roman infantry line was no greater than that of Hannibal's Gallic and Spanish infantry. D. (157–66) conjectures that each line was 840 men wide, with the Romans 58 men deep and even the comparatively thinly deployed Gauls and Spanish an average of 26 men deep, while G. (99) thinks that the Romans may have been deployed as many as 74 ranks deep. Such reconstructions may be the best way of making sense of Polybius' account. However, in some respects they go beyond what he says (e.g. the postulated Libyan columns), and one may wonder about the plausibility of such extraordinarily compact deployments. Admirable as these attempts to recover the combatants' experience are, they continue to depend on assuming the essential accuracy of Polybius' schematic account.

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D. HOYOS, *HANNIBAL'S DYNASTY: POWER AND POLITICS IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, 247–183 B.C.* London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. vii + 304, illus. ISBN 0-415-29911-x. £50.00/US\$96.95/€75.00.

The latest book concerning the life of Rome's great adversary Hannibal, by Dexter Hoyos, was highly anticipated for a number of reasons. It was primarily awaited as a follow-up to the author's 1998 work, *Unplanned Wars*, that breathed life into old, yet still relevant, scholarly