important Africanists such as Barkan, whose careful analysis of Kenyan politics demonstrated that one-party elections were essentially referenda on the development performance of the member of Parliament. Significantly, Kramon also includes comparativists and those who understand politics from a more anthropological approach, such as Frederick Schaffer, whose analysis of the way in which individuals understand vote buying has inspired a new wave of research on the meaning that these political rituals have for those who participate in them.

Second, the idea that electoral exchanges are really about demonstrating credibility is embedded within a broader "informational" approach. In Chapter 3, which fleshes out the theoretical framework of the book, Kramon explains why he finds "transactional" approaches to clientelism to be too narrow. Rather than conceptualizing vote buying as the simple purchasing of electoral support, he argues that "politicians distribute electoral handouts to convey information to voters who are uncertain about which candidates will best serve their interests" (p. 48). In other words, their aim "is not to buy something, but rather to send signals about the kind of politician that they are" (p. 49). This is a persuasive approach because it roots clientelistic exchanges in a much broader web of cultural and social understanding, that is, in relation to practices of gift giving, local beliefs about what constitutes good leadership, and the developmental focus of first-past-the-post constituency-based elections.

Third, the book uses a range of complementary methodological approaches to test key propositions. Survey data is used throughout, as is qualitative analysis of the Kenyan case, and in chapters five and seven this is supplemented by experimental evidence – from field experiments that used radio recordings of hypothetical candidates – that will ease the mind of those who worry about causality and endogeneity. Taken together, this represents a strong and persuasive evidence base for Kramon's argument.

Finally, it is worth noting that the prose is particularly fine. As a result, complex arguments are made accessible to both seasoned academics and new students, something that should ease the book's journey onto comparative politics reading lists at both undergraduate and Masters levels.

Of course, no manuscript is perfect, and there are avenues that Kramon could profitably have gone down but instead passes over in order to present a tight and focused monograph. Most obviously, the title of the book follows a recent trend in that it frames an in-depth study of one county as an argument about Africa. It is likely that many of the arguments here can be extended beyond the Kenyan case, especially in Anglophone first-past-the-post political systems, but very little is done in the introduction or conclusion to substantiate the shift from "Kenya" to "Africa." This is significant, as the same argument may not apply nearly as well in proportional electoral systems, or in countries in which "Big Man" politics is less developed, or indeed in states with a stronger party system. The absence of a more thorough effort to test the argument in other countries, or to set out clearer scope conditions, means that the reader is not always quite sure how far Kramon wishes to push his claims, or how far they can travel. Broad titles no doubt increase a book's appeal, but they also risk homogenizing a very diverse continent.

Less obviously, there are some valuable literatures that do not make it into the book, but which would have strengthened the discussion. Following Schaffer further, for example, could have led to a deeper analysis of the impact of norms. It is clear that both "transactional" and "informational" approaches have much to tell us about when and how leaders make handouts, but it is also possible that candidates are constrained by the expectations of voters, and that these are changing in important ways. Kramon does a good job of talking about what voters want and how this is shaped by past experience, but says little about how attitudes toward the legitimacy of different forms of clientelistic exchange may be shaped by recent electoral experience and civic education programs that emphasize the importance of not selling one's vote, which have the potential to reshape what it means to be a good leader. In this regard, it would have enriched the argument to engage with the work of Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan and colleagues on corruption and "practical norms," and on the reasons why so many people publicly denounce a system that they themselves participate in and help to sustain. It is precisely this tension that lies at the heart of electoral clientelism.

These points do not detract from the quality and relevance of Kramon's analysis, however. He has pushed the debate in a valuable new direction, and it is for others to follow his lead and fill in the remaining gaps. In doing so, they will often have cause to return to *Money for Votes*, which, with its striking combination of clarity and innovation, will serve as a key touchstone in the debate for years to come.

**Constituent Assemblies**. Edited by Jon Elster, Roberto Gargarella, Vatsal Naresh, and Bjørn Erik Rasch. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 252p. $110.00 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592719000562

— Wayne D. Moore, *Virginia Tech*

This collection of essays contributes to the study of constitutional reform from comparative perspective. Its particular focus is on the roles of constituent assemblies in drafting new or revised constitutional texts, primarily at the national level. Considering its relative compactness compared to similar works, this volume has commendable scope geographically, temporally, and theoretically.

*Constituent Assemblies* has nine primary chapters, along with a brief introductory chapter. The introduction identifies some of the distinctive characteristics of constituent assemblies, relatively broadly conceived, and classifies them according to a number of criteria. The focus is on the "making" (in the sense of "framing") by popularly elected or otherwise constituted "assemblies" of "non-sham" national constitutions in the modern era (p. 3). The editors distinguish such assemblies on the basis of their size, duration, authority, internal rules and procedures, and relationships to popular political activities and ordinary legislative assemblies. The contributors, in turn, explore limitations on the independence of constituent assemblies and highlight examples of constitutional failure along with successful episodes of constitutional framing.

Chapter 1, by Robert Gargarella, examines problems of constitution making in plural societies, using examples from Latin America. He criticizes, in particular, the use by constituent assemblies of an "accumulation strategy" aimed at accommodating the competing demands of rival factions in ways that lead to persistent constitutional tensions. Gabriel Negretto argues in Chapter 2 that constituent *conventions* are not inherently superior to all forms of constituent *legislatures*, either from the point of view of democratic legitimacy or rational decision making. Likewise drawing on examples from Latin America, he endorses several strategies to reduce the risks of partisan majorities capturing state power through the actions of constitution-framing conventions or legislatures.

In one of the more theoretically rich chapters, Hanna Lerner argues (Chapter 3) that distinctions between "higher law" and "ordinary politics" break down in societies divided over fundamental matters of political identity. Among other things, she suggests that factors *internal* to the functioning of constituent assemblies are less substantial in facilitating the enactment of a democratic and inclusionary constitution in such societies than are *external* factors (p. 61). More specifically, she examines the roles of preconstitutional agreements in influencing the drafting process successfully in some cases (postpartition India, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia) but unsuccessfully in others (prepartition India, Israel, Indonesia, and Egypt).

Mara Malagodi engages similar issues in Chapter 4, which seeks to account for the failure of two constituent assemblies—those in Pakistan (1947–54) and Nepal (2008–12)—and traces the long-term impacts of these failures. Malagodi's central claim is that the initial constituent assemblies in these nations failed because of the interplay of specific structural and contextual factors in the constitution-making process, along with the behavior of key political leaders who were threatened by the processes of constitutional reform. According to this author, the dissolution of the constituent assemblies by executive actions subsequently ratified by judicial decisions had long-term destabilizing effects in these nations, in addition to being major setbacks for democratic engagement.

In Chapter 5, Udit Bhatia counters the conventional view that India's constitution, by establishing universal adult suffrage, marked a clear break from India's colonial past and suspicions about the people's capacity for democratic citizenship. He argues instead that the founders of the Indian Constitution drew on provisions found in American, British, and Irish constitutions to deprive purportedly incompetent citizens of political power and to bolster the power of those viewed as more competent. He suggests that this tension between democratic ideals and anxieties about the competence of the citizenry has persisted across political space and time.

In his chapter on constitution making in Iceland, Thorvaldur Gylfason argues that "the chain of [democratic] political legitimacy . . . is on the verge of being broken" (p. 182). Gylfason details a convoluted series of events in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crises—including the drafting in 2011 of a proposed new constitution (the "constitutional bill") for Iceland by a council (on which he served) chosen by the parliament based on popular elections; approval of the bill and some of its key provisions in a nonbinding 2012 national referendum; and weakening of the bill's provisions by a constitutional committee (which met from 2013 to 2016) that, he claims, was designed to fail. Gylfason criticizes Iceland's parliament for refusing to give effect to "the will of the people" as expressed in the 2012 referendum (p. 180).

Chapter 8 examines relationships between constitution-making processes and outputs from those processes. More specifically, the authors support a position that constitutions written by constitutional assemblies/legislatures or sitting legislatures "are more likely to result in strong legislative involvement in government formation[,] while constitutions written by the executive are more likely to result in no or weak investiture rules" (pp. 194, 200). The chapter thus supports the intuitive expectation that "political interests and outcomes are not just shaped by constitutions, but also shape constitutions" (p. 202).

The final chapter, by Jon Elster, offers a wide-ranging micro-level account (at the level of the individual) of the political psychology of constitution making. In this chapter, Elster explores relationships among reason; personal, group, and institutional interests; passions and emotions including fear, enthusiasm, anger, urgency, and pridefulness; prejudice; and belief formation. Drawing on his treatment of these elements of individual decision making, he hypothesizes that constitutions tend to be flawed in relation to norms of impartiality and other political ideals.

Issues of political psychology also run through Elster's earlier chapter on the making of the Norwegian



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Constitution of 1814. In Chapter 6, Elster argues that unrealistic beliefs about what was politically possible were largely self-fulfilling. In that connection, he emphasizes how the constitution's framers were influenced by a variety of emotions and other behavioral factors, not only reason and rationality. In this case, the outcome was favorable: "Enthusiasm, aided by luck, may work wonders" (p. 159).

As indicated, the chapters as a whole cover a good bit of theoretical, geographical, and temporal terrain. The inclusion of chapters that focus on problems of constitutional framing in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia is especially refreshing. Among other things, these chapters explicitly and implicitly engage important questions about the viability of constitutionalism in regimes with authoritarian, nonliberal, or weak liberal-democratic traditions, cultures, and institutions. Relatedly, the essays in *Constituent Assemblies* are also valuable to the extent that they highlight the potentiality and actuality of constitutional failures and not only tout alleged successes. The volume also offers sustained analysis, across several fronts, of relationships among constitution-framing structures and processes, broader political and social norms and institutions, human choice, and historical contingency. Thus, it complements and supplements existing literatures on constitutional framing and constitutional development.

The volume's primary limitations are largely a function of its genre. This collection of essays does not purport to provide an exhaustive treatment of constituent assemblies, and there are some disjunctions among the analytic approaches of the various authors. An advantage of this genre, on the other hand, is that it offers a range of perspectives toward an institution that continues to play important roles in constitutional development throughout the world. In addition, the primary chapters, along with the introduction, point interested readers toward additional materials on constituent assemblies and constitutional reform more generally.

Overall, the introduction does a good job providing a conceptual overview of constituent assemblies, highlighting the distinctive contributions of the chapters, and emphasizing recurring threads of analysis. Even so, I would have appreciated a more robust treatment, especially in the introduction, of problems of constitutional authority and legitimacy. More specifically, as a complement to its treatment of stages of popular involvement in constitutional founding, the introduction might have addressed more fully the relationships between normative commitments to popular sovereignty, democracy, and popular representation, on the one hand, and practices of constitutional reform involving constituent assemblies, on the other. It also would have been helpful if the introduction had situated the roles of constitution-drafting bodies in relation to problems of constitutional implementation and enforcement beyond the framing and ratification stages. Rounding out the introduction along these lines would have been fitting, considering that many of the chapters explicitly or implicitly engage these issues; and they have been analyzed extensively elsewhere by several of the contributing authors. Regardless, specialists and generalists alike will benefit from reading *Constituent Assemblies*.

**Party Institutionalization and Women's Representation in Democratic Brazil**. By Kristin N. Wylie. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 290p. $99.99 cloth.
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— Mona Lena Krook, *Rutgers University*

The case of Brazil has long presented a puzzle to scholars of women's political representation. Despite significant social and economic progress, strong women's movements, and declining voter bias against female leaders, the country still elected less than 10% women to its lower house in 2014. This not only compared unfavorably to the world average at the time of 22%, but also made the country an outlier within Latin America, the region of the world that elected the most female parliamentarians on average. This is despite the fact that Brazil, like other countries in the region, adopted a 30% gender quota law in 1998, and elected its first female president in 2010.

Existing research largely attributes the failure of quotas in Brazil to the country's open-list proportional representation (PR) electoral system (e.g., Luis F. Miguel, "Political Representation and Gender in Brazil," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 27[2], 2008). As scholars like Melody Ellis Valdini ("Electoral Institutions and the Manifestation of Bias," *Politics & Gender* 9[1], 2013) have shown, open-list PR incentivizes intraparty competition, typically enabling those from dominant social groups to gain election over their copartisans. Simply nominating more women, therefore, does not necessarily mean that more women will be elected. Focusing on electoral rules, however, tells only part of the story: Peru, which also uses open-list PR, has made dramatic strides in increasing women's political representation since introducing its own 30% quota law in 1997.

In *Party Institutionalization and Women's Representation in Democratic Brazil*, Kristin N. Wylie provides the most detailed and thorough investigation of this issue to date, proposing an alternative explanation focused on political parties. Against much of the Brazilianist literature, which plays down the theoretical relevance of parties for understanding electoral outcomes, Wylie argues that increasing women's representation requires that parties have both the capacity and the will to promote women's candidacies. More institutionalized parties, she proposes, are able to provide crucial psychological, organizational, and material support to women, while those with more