

The Concept of Gender: Research Implications for Political Science

What does it mean to use gender as a category of analysis in political science? This is a question of fundamental concern for scholars of gender and politics, perhaps the fundamental question. In this section of the journal, we present essays that reflect the perspectives of six of the leading scholars in the field. These essays grew out of an organized roundtable at the 1997 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., titled "The Concept of Gender: Research Implications for Political Science." We hope these first "Critical Perspectives" will provoke future discussion and dialogue.

A Common Language of Gender?

Karen Beckwith, The College of Wooster

Finding Gender

Nancy Burns, University of Michigan

Engendering Political Science: An Immodest Proposal

Mary Hawkesworth, Rutgers University

What It Means to Study Gender and the State

Mala Htun, The New School for Social Research

Defending Modernity? High Politics, Feminist Anti-Modernism and the Place of Gender

Julia Adams, Yale University, and Ann Shola Orloff,
Northwestern University

A Common Language of Gender?

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Is there a common language of gender in political science research? One might expect the answer to be *no*, given the wide range of ways in which scholars employ the concept of gender in empirical and theoretical research. I maintain, however, that a common language of gender does exist and that we must articulate it in explicit terms in order to advance the way we build knowledge in this field. In this contribution to "Critical Perspectives on Gender and Politics," I suggest two ways in which to employ "gender" as part of a common language that the sub-field can employ for the purposes of empirical political research: gender as a category and as a process.

Women and Politics Research

It is a commonplace to observe that the post-1972 focus on women and politics involved empirical analysis, with men as a comparison (and occasionally primary reference) group. Early studies of women and politics relied on an "add women and stir" model. Survey research and computer technology provided the basis for statistical analyses of women and politics, with a behavioral political approach. The initial focus of this research concerned conventional and electoral behavior. Moreover, early research on women centered on aggregate analysis that obscured the multiplicity of women's experiences. Commonplace though these observations may be, however, this early body of research also established "women" as a politically relevant group whose inclusion in political science research was necessary for drawing generalizations, and whose exclusion from such arenas of study has no scholarly merit. Research that draws conclusions about governance on the basis of male political rulers and attitudinal research that fails to disaggregate by sex is fundamentally flawed. In short, the excluded other half has become the necessary included.

The need for research on women and politics persists. Much of the early empirical scholarship was undertaken with an eye toward feminist theory, toward high-level feminist theorizing, and toward issues of gender, women, and power. Such work served to expand our knowledge and to advance our understanding not just of women and politics but of gendered politics as well. We still lack a wide range of knowledge, especially comparative and longitudinal, about women's political behavior, politi-

cal beliefs and attitudes, means of organizing, behavior in governmental office, experience in campaigning, response to power inequalities, and exclusion from political power—among other concerns. The subfield of women and politics research still requires this basic, investigatory, cumulative research. The virtue of a women and politics approach is that it focuses on women, however that term may be conceived or operationalized. “Where are the women?” was the original central question, one which we must continue to ask. In this regard, our major concern with women and politics has not been precluded by, or surpassed by, a focus on gender.

Even the earliest women and politics scholarship questioned our understanding of “politics” and the “political.” The recognition that politics was more than governments, institutions, and constitutions expanded our focus (and the behavioral revolution, attacking the traditional focus on states and constitutions, was an ally of this move). Voluntary association activism, neighborhood organizing, civic engagement, and community-level involvement quickly came within the realm of politics and the political. Concomitantly, social movements and collective action drew scholars to attend to reemerging feminist movements and to women’s activism in social movements more generally (in the United States, the Black Civil Rights movements in particular). Political protest, innovative organizational forms, solidarity-creating activities, and formation of collective identities were similarly encompassed in an expanded understanding of politics. In all of these arenas and activities, women were found, explicitly and implicitly, making politics and exercising/challenging/resisting political power. One of the most important contributions of the study of women and politics has been to question conventional, institution-focused, state-centric definitions of politics, and to extend the boundaries of what has been considered “political” in the discipline of political science.

A second and equally important contribution has been to disaggregate the meaning of “women.” If “politics” and the “political” have been problematized, so too has women as a politically relevant group. “Women,” in women and politics research, are no longer treated as a monolithic, undifferentiated constituency of identified, shared, implicitly homogeneous preferences. Driven by feminist theory, scholarship on women of color, and canonical studies of racialized politics, women and politics research has moved away from essentializing women and toward a critical analysis of the ways in which non-gender-specific constructions of dominance and subordination inform, reinforce, interact

with, and undermine women's political power and practice of politics. The complexities of differences among women have been studied within single geopolitical boundaries but also in comparative perspective. In particular, the scholarship on comparative women and politics has evidenced the complexities and nuances of differences between and among women, nonetheless emerging with findings of similarity in political preferences, forms of mobilization, and relationship with states, among others. If "where are the women?" was the original central question, "which women?" quickly became an expanded focus.

Gender and Politics Research

The foundational work on women and politics has been joined, but not superseded, by a focus on gender and politics. It is not yet clear that we have a common language about gender in the subfield, and disciplinary articulations of gender have changed across time. From Wilma Rule Krauss's earliest discussion of "gender" in the *American Political Science Review* in 1974 to Iris Marion Young's "Gender as Seriality" (1994) to Joni Lovenduski's "Gendering Research" (1998) and beyond, gender in political science scholarship has been conceptualized along a range of understandings, from simple synonym for sex to culturally specific dynamic interactions. Nonetheless, overall, these various meanings and uses share two understandings.

First, male and female, as categories of "sex," do not lead inexorably to any particular practices or meanings and, hence, do not directly embody politics or political practice. That is, the existence of bodies imbued with male or female secondary sex characteristics do not lead inexorably to any particular practices or meanings. Whatever meanings *sex* might have are constructed and not physical imperatives. Because, as Anne Fausto-Sterling argues, "our bodies physically imbibe culture" (2005: 1495), we can employ sex as an analytical marker of convenience, rather than as a secure physical foundation upon which to map difference.¹

Second, male and female as values of a variable *sex* do not translate perfectly into a universal, transparent, bimodal distinction between masculine and feminine; rather, "masculine" and "feminine" are indicators of the outer boundaries of constellations of meanings that are politically

1. Space limitations preclude a full discussion of the physical meanings of sex, but suffice it to say that a body of feminist scholarship in the sciences should disillusion any who might have been confident that "sex" has universally clear, identifiable, dichotomized, biological or physical markers between male and female. Sex is not a safe port from which gender can happily embark.

contextualized and constructed. Furthermore, categories of masculine and feminine are not mutually exclusive, but rather are mutually implicated. We might think of this agreement as a third shift in focus: What is the political scientific utility of meanings of “women” and “men”? What exactly do we mean by “women” and by “men”?

Our common language of gender, however, is not yet fully established, even with these two agreements. We have not had the full debate, in empirical political research, on what we mean by sex and whether sex is inexorably biologically embodied. Nonetheless, gendered empirical political research need not wait for such a debate.

I propose two meanings of gender that can serve as at least part of our common language: gender as category and gender as process. By gender as category, I mean the multidimensional mapping of socially constructed, fluid, politically relevant identities, values, conventions, and practices conceived of as masculine and/or feminine, with the recognition that masculinity and femininity correspond only fleetingly and roughly to “male” and “female.” Using gender as a category permits us to delineate specific contexts in which feminine and masculine behaviors, actions, attitudes, and preferences, for example, result in particular outcomes, such as military intervention, social movement success, and electoral choice, among others.

Gender in these cases is different from a simple dichotomy of male and female, men and women. For example, Elizabeth Faue’s work on “muscular unionism” (1991) and Julie Guard’s analysis of “feisty femininity” (2004) illustrate how gender differences, not perfectly synonymous with sex, constrain or facilitate political actors’ (in these cases, union members in the United States and in Canada) success in achieving union objectives. In my own work (2001), I found that male miners in the 1989–90 Pittston Coal Strike (United States) reframed their mining masculinity in response to new conditions of union-corporation conflict as a strategy for winning a strike. In each of these cases, the central category is gender rather than sex, and in each case, gender reveals more specifically how human actors position themselves politically in terms of masculinity and femininity, even in situations where most of the actors are, for example, men, and where sex differences may originally appear unimportant or even irrelevant.²

2. One of my favorite examples of the necessity of thinking about gender rather than sex is Gloria Steinem’s accusation that Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) was a “female impersonator” (Wilcox 1994, 15).

As the previous examples suggest, employing gender as the analytical category also permits, as it were, meaningful single-sex research. Gender points us to situations where all the actors are male (e.g., the military), or where the primary actors are female (e.g., care work), and permits us to investigate the political construction and ramifications of variations of masculinity and femininity within these contexts. For example, to what extent do U.S. military spokesmen employ a feminized rhetoric in public announcements concerning troop deaths to minimize opposition to the U.S. presence in Iraq? What underlying masculinities might be invoked in Britain and the United States to mobilize male support for military intervention in Iraq? How might conventional understandings of femininities in France have been employed to mobilize some women's and girls' support for wearing headscarves in public schools and to mobilize other women and girls in opposition? Answering such questions will lead us to consider not women and/or men (although they may) as much as they will help us to understand variations in cultural codes that apply to gender and that underlie and inform the political.

Gender also functions as process. Indeed, the fluidity of gender as a category leads fairly quickly to gendered research involving process. By "process," I mean behaviors, conventions, practices, and dynamics engaged in by individuals, organizations, movements, institutions, and nations. Gender as process has two major manifestations in recent gender and politics research: 1) as the differential effects of structures and policies upon women and men, and 2) as the means by which masculine and feminine actors (often men and women, but not perfectly congruent, and often individuals but also structures) actively work to produce favorable gendered outcomes. Each of these two manifestations of gender as process requires at least some brief elaboration.

First, gender as process is manifested as the differential effects of apparently gender-neutral structures and policies upon women and men, and upon masculine and/or feminine actors. Gender can be seen, for example, in the workings of electoral systems to advance or to hinder female candidates for elective office. Electoral rules, negotiated historically among men representing organized, masculinized interests, can be "played," as it were, in limited ways by individual and organized women to gain access to office. The extensive literature that identifies proportional representation, party lists, district magnitude, and left parties as factors facilitating women's access to elective office is exemplary of highly developed scholarship employing (sometimes only implicitly) gender as process (Caul 1999; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Kittilson 2001; Lov-

enduski and Norris 1993; Matland 1998; Matland and Studlar 1998; Studlar and McAllister 1998, 2002; Welch and Studlar 1996). Gender as process has also been employed in the scholarship on transitions to democracy. Recent research on transitions has focused on how political structures, again established and maintained primarily by men, and masculinized in their practice, have been superseded by new political forms that affect men and women differently (Bose 1995; Kuehnast and Nechmias 2004; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Rai 2003; Waylen 1994). Research employing gender as process centers on the idea that institutions and structures are themselves gendered and have differential implications for women and for men.

How does the political construct gender? Public practice shapes private behavior and possibilities. For example, the state engages in the normalization, authorization, legalization, and otherwise privileging of heterosexual marriage, with division of marital powers according to gendered actors known as “husband” and “wife.” In these cases, distinctions of masculine and feminine, connected if loosely to sex distinctions, construct gendered relations of political dominance and subordination.

Second, gender as process suggests not only that institutions and politics are gendered but also that they *can be* gendered; that is, that activist feminists, religious fundamentalists, social movements, and political parties can work to instate practices and rules that recast the gendered nature of the political. This type of research involves investigations of “how cultural codes of masculinity are built into public institutions” (Lovenski 1998: 339), and of strategic behavior by political actors to masculinize and/or to feminize political structures, rules, and norms, for example, literally to regender state power, policymaking, and state legal constructions and their interpretations. In short, gender as process can reveal how the specific behaviors of appropriately feminine and masculine actors influence the political.

Recent research has employed gender as process to demonstrate, for instance, female agency in regendering state processes and institutions (see, for example, Brown, Donaghy, and Mackay 2002; Chappell 2002; Dobrowolsky 2003; Dobrowolsky and Hart 2003; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Tremblay and Trimble 2003). These studies do not depend on women as the exclusive actors but, rather, on the process of actively gendering institutions—which can shape masculinities and femininities that have political ramifications for actually identified women and men. This work explicitly asks questions about how gender constructs the state. How do women’s collective action and protest shape state institutions? How

do the understandings of masculinity and physical embodiment shape public policies that are gendered in their impacts? Who has the capacity, time, talent, resources, confidence to be a candidate? Whose employment history, or family history, links him or her to powerful others who have influence with the state? Whose organized votes provide crucial leverage in electoral contests? Asking these questions can provide answers not about (or not only about) women and men but about the more complicated means by which political power is constructed and functions in gendered terms.

Conclusion

What do we mean when we talk about gender in empirical political science research? Can we approach a common language of gender? It is impossible to talk about gender without talking about women and about men, even as we recognize that “gender is not a synonym for women” (Carver 1996). As Lovenduski argues, “it is impossible to imagine how gendered research can do without the dichotomous variable of sex. The uses of sex and gender must be explicit if effective research is to be designed”—with her caveat that sex be “used as a dichotomous variable only in a closely specified, gendered context” (Lovenduski 1998, 340).

There now seems to be growing agreement that the distinction between women and politics, and gender and politics, research is a fluid boundary of reciprocation of method and findings. Scholars move easily between languages of “women” and “femininity,” and “men,” “male,” and “masculine,” evidencing this continuing connection between the language of (a socially constructed and implicated) women and politics and the language of “gender.” Craig Murphy evidences this, for international relations, writing: “The new literature contributes to international relations by demonstrating, first, the continuous involvement of women in world politics, and, second, the roles gender has played both in international relations per se as well as in the academic study of international relations as one of the social sciences” (Murphy 1996, 515).

I propose that as we maintain our connections to women and politics research, we talk about gender as both category and process as the basis for our common language in empirical political research. This common language not only distinguishes gender *from* sex but also serves as a tool for mapping gender *to* sex in carefully, fully specified contexts. Gender as a concept for political research can function both dynamically and

categorically, and can be crafted for comparative and longitudinal research, as well as for cross-sectional and single-case studies.

Furthermore, gender as category and process offers the strong opportunity of linking gender and politics research with the burgeoning scholarship on race and racialization. Social constructionist approaches to race and analyses of racialized politics and political processes can enrich gendered political analysis and provide additional models of political research that move beyond dichotomy and difference to a more dynamic and specified analysis of institutions and actors while situating our work in a multiracial (and racialized) political context (see Burack 2004; Collins 2004; Craig 2002; Gilkes 2001; Harris-Lacewell 2003; Hawkesworth 2003; Randolph and Tate 2003; Ross 1998; Smooth 2001; Tate 2003).

This double conceptualization of category and process may also serve to protect gender and politics research from invisibilizing women (and men) of color. An advantage of women and politics research is its established recognition and problematization of women as female actors with diverse and often conflicting interests fractured and conjoined by race, ethnicity, sexuality, age, generation, and other social and identity locations that have political implications. Gendered political research must carry with it the recognition that femininities and masculinities are plural, specific in their practice and content, with potentially different political implications (again, see, for example, Hawkesworth 2003).

Gender as a concept—categorical and process—can be employed to reveal and to understand the means and pathways by which categories of feminine and masculine are mapped to individual human beings, groups of people, institutions, and practices. We should be able to speak a common language of gender, bringing with us women and men, their complexities, and their politics.

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Finding Gender

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How do we find gender in data from individuals?

I should start by saying what I mean by gender. I take gender to be, in part, the "values, norms and demands the female human being—precisely because she is female—comes up against in her encounter with the Other" (Moi 1999, 79). And, in part, it is what women and men make of the systematic way social interactions, structures, and institutions are organized around gender.

Finding gender in data requires understanding a few important features of its social organization (Gurin 1985; Jackman 1994). These features are easiest to see in contrast with race. These features of social organization—largely enabled by an intimacy that is usually absent in

modern racial formations in the United States—affect the forms the “values, norms and demands” I just mentioned take.

By contrast with race, gender is both more in the open and more invisible. It is more in the open in the sense that ordinary Americans are often more comfortable making essentialist claims about gender than they are about race (Burns and Kinder 2003). And it is more invisible in that distinctions of sex are more naturalized, less questioned, than distinctions of race. It is also more invisible because its hierarchy is made through often-subtle cumulation of often-small advantages across a host of different institutional spaces—at work, in the family, in school, in religious institutions (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Its cumulation is subtle because of the range of seemingly disconnected institutions where it operates, because intimacy conditions the size and nature of the advantages, because intimacy often makes it hard to see the disadvantages in the first place, and because it is often easy to explain away the disadvantage by the arrangements that are taken as necessary for child-bearing and childrearing.

The ways gender is more invisible than race make it harder to see gender at the individual level and especially in the cross-section than it would otherwise be, but these differences with other social formations are, to my mind, research opportunities. I will take up each of the aspects of invisibility in turn.

First, gender arrangements are often naturalized, seen as the way things must be. That makes trouble, for example, for understanding elite-mass linkages because there is often simply no worked-out language people use to talk about gender and politics. Of course, social movements have tried to make some kinds of language—especially languages of structural disadvantage—commonplace (Goffman 1977). Despite these efforts, politicians often seem unable to find words when faced with gender issues. That lack of words opens up a host of comparative research questions: What, for example, are the consequences for ordinary understandings of policy when elites are articulate about disadvantage and when they simply do not know what to say? Does it matter that—to my mind—ordinary and elite Americans are practiced with languages of race and not at all practiced with languages of gender? And, as Erving Goffman asked, can we explain “the way in which these differences were (and are) put forward as a warrant for our social arrangements, and most important of all, the way in which the institutional workings of society ensured that this accounting would seem sound” (1977, 302)?

Second, gender happens in a host of social institutions. It is made and remade across these institutions in ways that build linkages across institutions. So an advantage or disadvantage that comes from a gender formation in one space can have far-reaching consequences by shaping outcomes in other places. The cause of any gender advantage or disadvantage, then, might be proximate or it could be quite distant. Without taking simultaneous account of the host of institutions in which women and men operate, scholars are not likely to understand the causes and scope of disadvantage.

Third, intimacy makes trouble in a number of ways. Because of it, there is probably not as much systematic violence as with some other hierarchies, and so the hierarchy sometimes works more subtly. By working often through psychological intimidation, coercion, and acquiescence, gender hierarchies are recipes for the morselization of experience, for enabling people to explain any individual outcome as the product of individual and idiosyncratic circumstance and not as a consequence of large-scale structural forces like discrimination. To be visible, these cumulated wrongs must be added up—either over institutions or over time. A single snapshot can miss them unless that snapshot is viewed in the context of a structural account of disadvantage. Otherwise, disadvantage may be hard to see and easy to explain away. Without one of these two approaches—adding up or setting within a structural account—disadvantage, even disadvantage that is perpetrated with violence, can seem like a choice. (In some sense, this is the burden of Catherine MacKinnon's arguments about difference and dominance [MacKinnon 1987].)

Of course, as I mentioned earlier, gender is also more out in the open than race, and that too has consequences for research. In work that we have done, Donald Kinder and I found that when ordinary Americans build folk theories of gender—when they do find language for gender—their theories often sound old-fashioned by comparison with the theories they construct for race (Burns and Kinder 2003). The terms of the debate center on essentialism—its acceptance or its rejection. With race, by contrast, the theories are elaborate, multifaceted, and about structural or cultural difference. The ordinary people we talked to in our work were quite comfortable saying that gender differences in a range of different outcomes are part of God's plan for women and men. This sort of essentialized language is nearly invisible when these same people are talking about race.

When we investigate gender in any setting, I think we need to have these, and I am sure other, features of gender formation squarely in mind.

These features should shape our research questions, our research designs, and our strategies of analysis. And the comparative leverage they give us—because they demand that we think about the specificity of gender formations and the ways the formations we care about are different from other forms of social organization—will strengthen our insights and our contributions.

I should conclude with a small set of ideas that grow out of what I have just said, a set of ideas that have affected how I think about studying gender in the individual-level data I so often put to use in my own work.

The first two points are ones I have already mentioned: first, that gender is easier to see over space and time, after the researcher does the work of adding up the many often-small wrongs through which gender inequalities are manifest; and second, that the influences of gender often come from the ways it shapes people's lives in institutions outside the ones we study, and it is the researcher's job to link these institutions.

The third point grows out of the point I started to make about the potential for specific gender formations. It is unlikely that there is only one way gender is arranged in the United States. And so it is unlikely that we'll succeed in our research if we pretend that all women or all men share a vast quantity of life experiences. In the end, there are only a few ways that scholars have succeeded when they have treated gender as an average experience (I am thinking here of MacKinnon [1987] and Jackman [1994]). There are two consequences of this third point for our analyses. First off, we have to theorize and model the ways gender works homogeneously *and* heterogeneously, not because heterogeneity is a goal in itself, but rather because we will get the story wrong if we focus solely on the things that all women or all men share. Instead, we might think of the things that some women or some men share at some times and places (see, for example, Young 1994). And, second, because gender is usually not an average experience, we are not going to be able to read the consequences of gender formations from a single coefficient on whether the person is a woman or a man. Instead, we will want to structure our analyses to pinpoint gender in a pattern of coefficients that represent the paths, the experiences, the mechanisms through which gender formations operate. Of course, that means we must explicitly theorize those paths, those experiences, those mechanisms in the very first place.

In the end, I am excited about the places gender scholarship is going, and I am thrilled at the ways gender scholars are working to develop the theoretical tools, the research designs, and the analytical tools that enable them to carry their rich understandings of gender to data and—

because they are the data with which I mostly work—to individual-level data in particular, where I think the task is an especially challenging one (Burns 2002).

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Engendering Political Science: An Immodest Proposal

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Since its emergence in the 1970s, feminist scholarship has claimed to be corrective and transformative. Through original research about the experiences of the majority of the world's population, that is, women, feminist scholars have sought to correct omissions and distortions that permeate political science. Through the use of gender as an analytical tool, they have illuminated social and political relations neglected by mainstream accounts, advanced alternative explanations of political phenomena, demonstrated the defects of competing hypotheses, and debunked opposing views. Despite such impressive accomplishments, feminist political science has not become a dominant paradigm within the discipline. Few doctoral programs allow students to develop areas of concentration in feminist approaches to political studies. Few routinely

include feminist scholarship in proseminars in American politics, comparative politics, international relations, political theory, public law, or public policy. None requires familiarity with leading feminist scholarship as a criterion of professional competence.

Should feminist studies of politics be required reading for those who claim the mantle of political science? Do feminist methods offer the discipline insights that are not available from other methodological approaches? Do feminist “conjectures and refutations” of dominant paradigms deserve more serious incorporation into undergraduate and graduate curricula in political science? I will argue that they do. Toward that end, I will trace the emergence of gender as analytic category in feminist scholarship and identify some of the challenges that use of gender as an analytic category poses to core disciplinary concepts.

Gender: From an Account of Identity Formation to Analytic Category

Over the past three decades, the concept of gender has undergone a metamorphosis within feminist scholarship. Although originally a linguistic category denoting a system of subdivision within a grammatical class (Corbett 1991), the concept of gender was adopted by feminist scholars to distinguish culturally specific characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity from biological features associated with sex (male and female chromosomes, hormones, as well as internal and external sexual and reproductive organs). In early feminist works, gender was used to repudiate biological determinism by demonstrating the range of variation in cultural constructions of femininity and masculinity. In subsequent works, gender has been used to analyze the social organization of relationships between men and women (Barrett 1980; MacKinnon 1987; Rubin 1975), to investigate the reification of human differences (Hawkesworth 1990; Shanley and Pateman 1991; Vetterling-Bruggin 1982), to conceptualize the semiotics of the body, sex, and sexuality (Doane 1987; de Lauretis 1984; Silverman 1988; Suleiman 1985), to explain the distribution of burdens and benefits in society (Boneparth and Stoper 1988; Connell 1987; Walby 1986), to illustrate the microtechniques of power (Bartky 1988; de Lauretis 1987; Sawicki 1991), to illuminate the structure of the psyche (Chodorow 1978), and to account for individual identity and aspiration (Butler 1990; Epperson 1988).

Interdisciplinary feminist scholars have used the concept of gender in markedly different ways. Gender has been analyzed as an attribute of

individuals (Bem 1974, 1983), as an interpersonal relation (Spelman 1988), and as a mode of social organization (Eisenstein 1979; Firestone 1970). Gender has been defined in terms of status (Lopata and Thorne 1978), sex roles (Amundsen 1971; Epstein 1971; Janeway 1971), and sexual stereotypes (Anderson 1983; Friedan 1963). It has been conceived as a structure of consciousness (Rowbotham 1973), as triangulated psyche (Chodorow 1978); and as internalized ideology (Barrett 1980; Grant 1993). It has been discussed as a product of attribution (Kessler and McKenna 1978), socialization (Gilligan 1982; Ruddick 1980), disciplinary practices (Butler 1990; Singer 1993), and accustomed stance (Devor 1989). Gender has been depicted as an effect of language (Daly 1978; Spender 1980), a matter of behavioral conformity (Amundsen 1971; Epstein 1971), a structural feature of labor, power, and cathexis (Connell, 1987), and a mode of perception (Bem 1993; Kessler and McKenna 1978). Gender has been cast in terms of a binary opposition, variable and varying continua, and a layering of personality. It has been characterized as difference (Irigaray 1985a, 1985b) and as relations of power manifested in domination and subordination (Gordon 1988; MacKinnon, 1987). It has been construed in the passive mode of seriality (Young 1994), in the active mode as a process creating interdependence (Levi-Stauss 1969, 1971; Smith 1992), or as an instrument of segregation and exclusion. (Davis 1981; Collins 1990). Gender has been denounced as a prison-house (Cornell and Thurschwell 1986) and embraced as inherently liberating (Irigaray 1985b; Smith 1992). It has been identified as a universal phenomenon (Lerner 1986) and as an historically specific consequence of modernity's increasing sexualization of women (Laqueur 1990; Riley 1988).

As debates about the nature of gender as lived experience proliferated, several feminist scholars developed a new way of understanding gender—as an analytic category (Lakatos 1970). In an important and influential essay, Joan Scott defined gender as a concept involving two interrelated but analytically distinct parts: “Gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power” (Scott 1986, 1067). In explicating gender as a constitutive element of social relationships, she emphasizes that gender operates in multiple fields, including culturally available symbols that evoke multiple representations, normative concepts that set forth interpretations of the meanings of symbols, social institutions and organizations, and subjective identity (1067–68). According to Scott, gender is a useful category of

analysis because it “provides a way to decode meaning and to understand the complex connections among various forms of human interaction” (1070).

Sandra Harding also advanced an account of gender as an analytic category: “In virtually every culture, gender difference is a pivotal way in which humans identify themselves as persons, organize social relations, and symbolize meaningful natural and social events and processes” (Harding 1986, 18). Thus, she argues that feminists must theorize gender, conceiving it as “an analytic category within which humans think about and organize their social activity rather than as a natural consequence of sex difference, or even merely as a social variable assigned to individual people in different ways from culture to culture” (17). Recognizing that gender appears only in culturally specific forms, Harding, like Scott, emphasized that gender as an analytic category illuminates crucial cultural processes in need of further investigation:

Gendered social life is produced through three distinct processes: it is the result of assigning dualistic gender metaphors to various perceived dichotomies that rarely have anything to do with sex differences (gender symbolism); it is the consequence of appealing to these gender dualisms to organize social activity, dividing necessary social activities between different groups of humans (gender structure); it is a form of socially constructed individual identity only imperfectly correlated with either the reality or the perception of sex differences (individual gender). (17–18)

According to Harding, feminist investigations of gender symbolism, gender structure, and individual gender could challenge the basic presuppositions of social science.

Gender as an Analytical Category in Political Science

Taking their cue from Scott and Harding, feminist scholars within political science have also deployed gender as an analytical category. In contrast to narrow understandings of gender as cultural constructions of masculinity and femininity, gender as an analytic category functions as a heuristic device that illuminates areas for inquiry, frames questions for investigation, identifies puzzles in need of exploration, and provides concepts, definitions, and hypotheses to guide research (Hawkesworth 1997). Within political science, feminist scholars have investigated the effects of gender on voting behavior, electoral politics, and the operations of particular institutions, such as political parties, legislatures, bureaucratic

agencies, and the courts (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Flammang 1997; Freeman 2000; Rosenthal 2002; Swers 2002; Thomas 1994). They have also examined the effects of gender on policymaking and implementation (Mazur 2002).

Within the field of women and politics, for example, scholars seeking to discover whether there are differences between male and female legislators have demonstrated that women legislators not only give higher priority than male legislators to issues such as women's rights, education, health care, families and children, the environment, and gun control, but also are willing to devote considerable effort in committee and on the floor to securing passage of progressive legislation in these areas (e.g., Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dodson et al. 1995; Kathlene 1989; Rosenthal 2002; Swers 2002; Thomas 1994). Women and politics scholars have also investigated women's legislative and leadership styles, suggesting that women pursue cooperative legislative strategies while men prefer competitive, zero-sum tactics; and women are more oriented toward consensus, preferring less hierarchical, more participatory, and more collaborative approaches than their male counterparts (Jewell and Whicker 1994; Rosenthal 2000, Tamerius 1995; Thomas 1994). Several scholars have investigated the tensions that arise between the preferred legislative and leadership strategies of women and the institutional norms that conflate male behavioral preferences with "professionalism" and "political savvy" (Jeydel and Taylor 2003; Kathlene 1994; Kenney 1996; Rosenthal 2000). This scholarship has made it clear that neither legislative priorities nor the standard operating procedures of legislative institutions is gender inclusive or gender neutral.

Contesting notions that gender differences such as these are "natural" or "given," feminist scholars have also sought to discover how these differences are produced, maintained, challenged, and reproduced. Drawing upon insights from critical race theorists and feminist theorists, feminist political scientists have sought to illuminate processes of racialization and gendering through which relations of power and forms of inequality are constructed, shaping the identities of individuals and the practices of institutions (Hawkesworth 2003a; Smooth 2001). By means of detailed studies of laws, norms, and organizational practices that enforced racial segregation and separate spheres for men and women, scholars have excavated the political processes through which hierarchies of difference have been produced and maintained. They have demonstrated that the imputed "natural" interests and abilities of women and men of various races are the result of state-prescribed lim-

itations in education, occupation, immigration, citizenship, and office-holding (e.g., Connell 1987; Flammang 1997; Haney Lopez 1996; Siltanen 1994). Politics has produced race and gender not only by creating and maintaining raced and gendered divisions within the population but also by defining race and gender characteristics and according differential rights on the basis of those definitions (Yanow 2003). In *White by Law*, for example, Haney Lopez has demonstrated that through the direct control of human behavior and by shaping public understanding, “law translates ideas about race into material and societal conditions that entrench those ideas” (Haney Lopez 1996, 19). Thus, immigration and miscegenation laws have produced the physical appearance of the nation’s population by constraining reproductive choices. Laws, court decisions, and census categories defining who is “white” and who is “nonwhite” have ascribed racialized meanings to physical features and ancestry (Haney Lopez 1996, 14–15; Yanow 2003). Law has also produced certain behaviors and attitudes associated with women of multiple races and men of color through exclusions from citizenship and officeholding, the legalization of unequal treatment, and differential access to social benefits (Abramovitz 1996; Fraser 1989; Haney Lopez 1996; Mink 1995).

Developing a “theory of gendered institutions,” feminist scholars have begun to map the manifold ways in which gender power and disadvantage are created and maintained not only through law but also through institutional processes, practices, images, ideologies, and distributional mechanisms (Acker 1989, 1992; Kenney 1996; Steinberg 1992). They have shown how organizational practices play a central role in recreating and entrenching gender hierarchies, gender symbols, and gendered identities (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995). The theory of gendered institutions has been important in drawing attention to the structuring practices, standard operating procedures, rules, and regulations that disadvantage women within contemporary organizations. It has also helped to shape a concept of “gender power.”

Feminist scholars working across a range of subfields, including political theory, political economy, international relations, comparative politics, and American politics, have helped to forge a conception of gender power as a set of asymmetrical relations between men and women that permeates international regimes, state systems, financial and economic processes, development policies, institutional structures, symbol systems, and interpersonal relations (Brooks, forthcoming; Enloe 1990, 1993, 2000; Kabeer 2003; Kelly et al. 2001; Peterson 1992, 2003; Peterson and

Runyon 1999; Tickner 2001). Gender power generates and sustains practices of inequality that advantage men and disadvantage women. Embedded in organizational rules, routines, and policies, gender power normalizes male dominance and renders women, along with their needs and interests, invisible. Operating independently of individual volition or intention, gender power sustains prohibitions, exclusions, denigrations, and obstructions that circumscribe women's lives.

Gender as an analytic category illuminates gender power and gendered institutions and delineates a research agenda that quite literally did not exist 30 years ago. The scholarship that has emerged in conjunction with this research agenda calls into question many received views within the discipline of political science. To demonstrate how research using gender as an analytic category contests some of the foundational assumptions of political science and identifies new questions for research, the final section of this essay will provide a brief overview of feminist engagements with four competing conceptions of power.

Critiques of Gendered Conceptions of Power

According to Jeffrey Isaac, "The concept of power is at the heart of political enquiry. Indeed, it is probably the central concept of both descriptive and normative analysis" (Isaac 2003, 54). Like many core concepts, however, there is little agreement about how power should be defined, and less about how it should be operationalized for empirical investigations. Isaac (1987, 2003) has provided a helpful taxonomy of power that distinguishes voluntarist, hermeneutic, structural, and poststructural conceptions. Borrowing his conceptual framework to map a variety of approaches to the study of power in political science, I will show how feminist deployments of gender as an analytic category raise important questions about the adequacy of some of these conceptualizations of power, while creatively appropriating other conceptions to illuminate dimensions of political life that remain invisible within dominant disciplinary paradigms.

Rooted in social contract theory and the methodological individualism that informs behaviorist and rational choice approaches to the study of politics, the "voluntarist" conception of power might be characterized as a staple of modernity. Initially conceived by Hobbes, the voluntarist conception ties power to the voluntary intentions and strategies of individuals who seek to promote their interests. Within this frame, power is

nothing other than “the present means to some future apparent good” (*Leviathan*, Part I, Chap. 10, p. 150). Situated in a world of conflicting wills and scarce resources, the Hobbesian individual often uses power to eliminate obstacles to the satisfaction of desire. And since the obstacles to be overcome frequently include the wills of other individuals, the voluntarist conception of power has been construed within political science as the capacity to get others to do what they would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957; Lasswell 1950). Thus, the individual’s means to attain desired ends slides easily into coercion: power as the force to accomplish one’s objectives, or perhaps less brutally, power as the capacity to secure compliance by manipulation of rewards and punishments.

Despite its individualist premises, the Hobbesian voluntarist conception of power has also been adapted by “realists” and “neorealists” within international relations to provide an account of the fundamental operations of the international system. Taking Hobbes’s depiction of the “war of all against all” as a paradigm for international relations, realists posit “anarchy” as the inevitable condition of the relation between sovereign states. Arguing that the rational response of states to anarchy is to maximize power, realists conflate “national interest” with the pursuit of power and define international politics as an unceasing struggle for power in a realm devoid of an absolute sovereign capable of enforcing agreements.

Feminist scholars have developed detailed critiques of the voluntarist conception of power, demonstrating that it depends upon a defective and markedly androcentric conception of human nature; it equates individual action and international affairs with a particular model of “abstract masculinity”; it legitimates immoral and amoral action on the part of individuals and states; and it remains oblivious to the social conventions that structure human relationships and the relations among states (Di Stefano 1991; Pateman 1988; Steans 1998; Tickner 1991, 1992).

Feminist scholars have also pointed out that the voluntarist conception of power arbitrarily restricts the research agenda of political scientists, preventing certain political questions from being perceived and empirically investigated. For example, although according to the Interparliamentary Union, 85% of the seats in national legislatures and more than 99% of the offices of president, prime minister, and foreign secretary are currently in the hands of men, the absence of women from national and international decisionmaking is a “nonquestion,” according to the voluntarist model of power. For it is assumed that the answer is already known: individual choice mediated by the contest of conflicting wills is the explanation for the distribution of decision-making power.

Over the past 30 years, feminist scholars have proven that “individual choice” explanations for women’s underrepresentation in elective and appointive offices are woefully inadequate and only serve to mask the potent operations of gender power and gender structure (Chappell 2002; Flammang 1997; Mazur 2002; McDonagh 2002; Peterson and Runyan 1999; Rule and Zimmerman 1994). These detailed studies illuminate an additional failing of the voluntarist conception of power: it cannot explain how or why agents are able to exercise the power that they do exercise. It is oblivious to forces that shape individual “preferences” or “determine” the will. It is oblivious to institutional contexts that enable and constrain individual action. It is oblivious to structural forces that ensure that individuals are not equally unfettered subjects. It masks recurrent patterns of constraint upon individual choice linked to race, gender, class, nationality, and sexuality.

As an alternative to the voluntarist model of power, the “hermeneutic” conception developed within the tradition of German phenomenology “conceives power as constituted in the shared meanings of given communities” (Isaac 2003, 58). Attuned to the varying symbolic and normative constructs that shape the practical rationalities of situated social agents, the hermeneutic model of power is keenly aware of the intersubjective conventions that make action, in general, and the use of power, in particular, possible and intelligible.

Some feminist scholars have appropriated the hermeneutic conception of power to investigate the political effects of gender symbolism, that is, the coding of certain forms of human conduct as inherently masculine or feminine. They have suggested that gender symbolism generates a logic of appropriate behavior that shapes individuals’ self-understandings and aspirations, thereby structuring social and political opportunities. When rationality, competence, and leadership are coded as inherently masculine characteristics, for example, male power is naturalized and legitimated. When the nation is symbolized as a woman and men are exhorted to risk their lives to defend and protect “her,” norms of citizenship and soldiering are masculinized. When nationalist narratives privilege the roles of men as “founding fathers,” women’s contributions to nation building are erased. When these invented pasts are institutionalized within founding myths, notions of the “national family” reinscribe fathers’ rule and mothers’ obedience as natural, even as they create and legitimate new race and gender hierarchies. When “national security” is promoted by increasing militarization, the growing physical insecurity of women in areas adjacent to military bases and in areas of

conflict is eclipsed, driving a wedge between the interests of states and the physical well-being of women (Enloe 1990, 1993, 2000; McClintock 1995; Peterson and Runyon 1999). Advancing cogent accounts of subtle processes through which male dominance is naturalized, feminist scholars demonstrate how gender power is embedded in intersubjective value systems and structures of belief, which constitute the identities and aspirations of gendered political agents, thereby constraining the possibilities for individual choice and action.

Other feminist scholars have attempted to link gendered asymmetries of power in beliefs and values to structural features of social and political life. They draw insights from a structural model of power, which emphasizes that practices of inequality become embedded in institutions and structures in ways that enable male advantage to operate independently of the will of particular agents. Developing concepts of gender structure and gendered institutions, feminist scholars have sought to demonstrate how male dominance in political institutions of the nation-state and in the international arena has been converted into rules, routines, practices, and policies that serve and promote men's interests, normalize a male monopoly of power, and create political opportunity structures that favor men.

Studies of political parties in South Asia, Australia, Canada, Europe, Latin America, and the United States, for example, have demonstrated that male-dominant party elites have been remarkably resourceful in shifting the locus of power from formal to informal mechanisms when women have gained access to formal decision-making sites (Alvarez 1990; Basu 1995; Chappell 2002; Freeman 2000; Jaquette 1989; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Kelly et al., 2001). Parties that differ from one another in ideological commitments and policy objectives have been remarkably similar and consistent in allowing male gatekeepers to structure candidate selection processes to prevent women from being chosen for open, safe, or winnable seats in legislative races. Patronage practices within political parties also manifest pervasive gender bias.

Feminist studies of national parliaments and legislatures have revealed the operation of powerful gender norms. The standard operating procedures of parliaments in Britain, Canada, and Australia, for example, feature loud, aggressive, and combative behavior, such as screaming, shouting, and sneering that can create "no-win" situations for women members. For women who adopt this combative style are ridiculed and patronized by their male counterparts, while women who opt for a more demure, consultative, and collaborative style are labeled "weak" or "un-

fit” for the job. Indeed, Chappell (2002) has documented patterns of gender harassment in parliamentary systems as women who rise to speak are greeted with increased heckling, coughing, hissing, kiss blowing, and mimicry in falsetto voices. Within in the U.S., women legislators who refuse to adopt coercive negotiating strategies are often characterized by their male counterparts as failing to understand the rules of the game (Rosenthal 2000). Women chairing legislative committees confront forms of opposition in hearings—challenges to their authority, refusal to respect their rulings—that men in comparable positions of authority do not confront (Kathlene 1994). Male legislators often perceive women legislators in terms of raced and gendered stereotypes incompatible with the men’s conceptions of “power players” (Rosenthal 2000; Smooth 2001; Thomas 1994).

In documenting the operation of gender power within the official institutions of state, feminist scholars have provided powerful evidence that there are political dynamics at work within these institutions that have not been recognized by mainstream approaches. They have also demonstrated that the raced and gendered hierarchies created, maintained, and reproduced within the institutions of state have palpable effects on policymaking and on domestic and foreign policies. To advance an account of political life that omits these raced and gendered dynamics, then, does not foster objective or value-neutral inquiry. On the contrary, when political scientists ignore the operations of gender power documented by feminist scholars, their omissions accredit and perpetuate distorted accounts of the political world.

The relation of political scientists to the political world they seek to describe and explain has been the subject of recurrent debate (Gunnell 1998; Moon 1975). Poststructuralists inspired by the insights of Michel Foucault have suggested that every scientific discourse is productive, generating power-knowledge constellations that create a world in its own image. Feminist scholars working within a poststructuralist frame have suggested that political science itself is a constitutive discourse (Hawkesworth 2003b). The conceptual apparatus of the discipline contributes to the production of the political subject, understood simultaneously as one who is subjected and one who resists subjugation. Disciplinary accounts of politics, law, tradition, and war produce gendered political subjects who both conform and resist gendered divisions of power and opportunity. Failure to recognize the discipline’s own relation to the twinned operations of gendered subjugation and resistance can leave political scientists at a loss to explain some of the most profound transformations of political life.

For example, mainstream political scientists are ill-equipped to explain the sustained mobilizations of Brazilian women who comprised 80% of the activists who ousted military rule in Brazil (Alvarez 1990) or the collective struggles of Korean women against state violence and economic exploitation that helped break down military rule in South Korea in the 1980s. Minimally, the replication of gender bias in political science impedes the discipline's ability to explain the political world. More alarmingly, the perpetuation of definitions of politics, power, and international relations that privilege the intellectual investigation of masculinist practices in male-dominant sites as the protected preserve of political science reproduces and legitimates male power and gender injustice.

While the failure of political science to engage feminist scholarship might be dismissed as just another example of the discipline's conservatism, I want to press a stronger claim. By refusing to read and engage feminist scholarship that challenges basic presuppositions of the discipline, political scientists violate norms of objectivity and systematicity that support the characterization of their own research as "scientific." By refusing to countenance feminist refutations of received views and insulating their own hypotheses from counterevidence advanced by feminist scholars, political scientists violate the logic of science developed by Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos, which is routinely presented in "Scope and Methods" classes to vindicate the scientific study of politics (Popper 1972a, 1972b). In failing to live up to the criteria of scientific inquiry that they themselves espouse, mainstream political scientists help to reproduce a world of male dominance even as they deploy conceptions of neutral observation, detached inquiry, and objective analysis to disguise and conceal their productive roles. If political scientists wish to avoid the unwitting replication of male dominance, they ought to begin to engage seriously feminist scholarship and to learn to deploy gender as an analytic category in their own research.

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What It Means to Study Gender and the State

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At the 2005 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Claudine Gay and Wendy Smooth organized a roundtable to reflect on the politics of studying gender. In my intervention there, I argued that pervasive ignorance of what gender is results in misrecognition of the work we do. Most people do not know what it means to study gender. When we say gender they think we mean women, sexuality, feminist theory, an epistemological position, or a political movement. Such misrecognition marginalizes our research, creating problems for publishing and promotion. How can we combat it? By arming ourselves intellectually.

In organizing this symposium, the editors of *Politics & Gender* are taking the right approach. We need more precisely to specify the gender concept and the research agenda that flows from it. In this article, I propose one interpretation of what gender is and what it implies for the way we should study gender and the state. Far from a marginal enterprise, gender is central to political science and the tools of our discipline are needed to understand it better.

Much confusion arises from uncertainty over whether gender is an *identity* or whether it is a set of *social norms, practices, stereotypes, and/or institutions*. Against a great deal of work in political science and across academic disciplines conforming to the first view of gender as an identity, I insist on the second: gender is better understood as a *social position* and *attribute of social structures*. This conceptualization offers better ways to imagine human subjectivity. It also focuses our attention on the systematic, and researchable, engines of gender in society and the state.

These arguments are not terribly original; they are largely spelled out in Toril Moi's 1999 essay "What Is a Woman?" and Iris Marion Young's response (2002). Moi shows that gender fails as a theory of human identity, while Young demonstrates how it is still useful as a lens to analyze society. I use their arguments to develop a theory conceptualizing gender not as an attribute of individuals but as a feature of social structures and institutions. I show that gender works along three dimensions: the sexual division of labor, normative heterosexuality, and war and militarism. These institutions, which position human subjects in unequal and hierarchical relations of power and meaning, are not just analytical constructs but concrete parts of our daily lives. They include laws on mar-

riage, property, inheritance, and parenting; social welfare policies; criminal codes; the male-dominated military and other means through which the state monopolizes the legitimate means of coercion; the national security industry; and recognition of heterosexual coupling and the nuclear family as sites of rights and status. After reviewing the claims of Moi and Young, I describe the mechanisms of gender of interest to political scientists, particularly those working on gender and the state.

In "What Is a Woman?" Moi argues that the sex/gender distinction and its concept of gender have helped to combat biological determinism but cannot answer the question of what a woman or a man is. Rather than resort to the response supplied by identity politics (a "woman" is someone with a particular "gender identity"), we need to "stop thinking in terms of gender altogether" (Moi 1999, 112). When we imagine a woman as sex, or as gender, or as sex plus gender, we tend to reduce her to her sexual difference, which is "the antithesis of everything feminism ought to stand for" (35).

Moi recalls that the gender concept arose to contest the "pervasiveness of sex," or the idea that social norms and arrangements arose naturally and inevitably from sex differences. By distinguishing between sex and gender, or biology and culture, feminists combated biologically determinist notions of women's roles and succeeded in exposing the contingency of their oppression. Subsequently, poststructuralist feminism criticized the way these earlier perspectives that, by emphasizing the distinction between sex and gender, treated biology (sex) as a fixed essence while historicizing only gender. By contrast, Judith Butler has argued, sex (including the body) is not the source of gender but the effect of it. The discourse we know as gender constructs sex as binary, biological, and fixed in order to justify heterosexuality (Butler 1990).

Moi argues that these developments in gender theory replaced biologically essentialist understandings of women with gender essentialist ones. Proposing that the sexed body is discursively constructed is just as reductionist as the idea that having a certain body should determine one's character and lot in life. Both perspectives deny that "a woman is a concrete, embodied human being (of a certain age, nationality, race, class, and with a wholly unique store of experiences)" (Moi 1999, 111). The incompleteness of gender as a description of a woman cannot be remedied by adding new attributes, however, since from the side of the bearer, being a woman is not separable from being white, Catholic, handicapped, young, or poor.

There needs to be a way to bring the body back into our understanding of sexually-differentiated subjectivity without falling into the assump-

tions of biological determinism. To say that our body grounds our experience of the world does not need to mean that specific bodies need be associated only with certain types of experiences. We also need to acknowledge that much of our lives may have little to do with sex and/or gender differences. As Moi points out, “Women’s bodies are human as well as female. Women have interests, capacities, and ambitions that reach far beyond the realm of sexual differences. . . . Any given woman will transcend the category of femininity, however it is defined” (1999, 8).

To develop an account of what it means to be a woman (or a man), Moi resuscitates the notion of the “lived body” from Simone de Beauvoir and existential phenomenology. In Beauvoir’s thinking, the male or female body is a *situation*: it is the ground of our lived experience and subjectivity. It is “our grasp on the world and a sketch of our projects” (Moi, 1999, 62), “our general medium for having a world” (63), and the “radiation of a subjectivity” (77). Being a woman implies having a female body, but “the meaning of a woman’s body is bound up with the way she uses her freedom. . . . Greater freedom will produce new ways of being a woman, new ways of experiencing the possibilities of a woman’s body” (65–66). Being a woman is thus a historical phenomenon, the interaction of our subjective projects and the external circumstances we encounter in their realization.

Why cannot these ideas be captured by the contemporary term “identity”? Moi claims that Beauvoir never discusses identity “because she thinks of the individual’s subjectivity as interwoven with the conditions in which she lives. . . . [T]here can be no ‘identity’ divorced from the world the subject is experiencing” (Moi 1999, 81). Lived experience is always situated, but also contains “an inner dimension of freedom” that shapes the meaning of what it is to be a woman in unique ways. Rather than offer a coherent theory of subjectivity, “gender identity” thus imposes “a reifying or objectifying closure on our steadily changing and fluctuating experience of ourselves in the world” (81–82).

If we are convinced by Moi that the gender concept cannot help us understand what it is to be a woman or a man, does this mean it should be discarded? No, responds Iris Young (2002). She agrees that the concept of the lived body has several advantages: in particular, it avoids the “additive character that identities appear to have” when we use general categories like gender, race, ethnicity, and so forth to describe individuals, leaving a “mystery both about how persons are individualized, and how these different group identities combine in the person” (2002, 417). The lived body concept, by contrast, sees each person as distinctive, with

“specific features, capacities, and desires” (417). It therefore works better than gender as an account of subjectivity and experience.

We still need gender, however, to theorize structural processes that position individual subjects in unequal relations of power. Most men and women encounter asymmetrical opportunities and constraints. In much of the world, women are more likely to be poor, be disenfranchised, suffer from violence and discrimination, and be subjected to disparaging cultural stereotypes. As feminists have long argued, these conditions of oppression owe not to nature but to macrolevel social structures, including institutions, rules, and norms or what Beauvoir and Moi refer to as “myths.”

The concept of gender is indispensable for analyzing such institutionalized asymmetries. Young’s major claim is that gender is “an attribute of social structures more than of persons” (2002, 422). It is “a particular form of the social positioning of lived bodies in relation to one another” (422). Women and men are each “passively grouped” by gendered structures regardless of their individual features and choices.

Going further, she proposes that gender works along three irreducible axes:

1. *The sexual division of labor*, or the allocation of productive and reproductive activities by sex. In most modern societies, for example, the work of childrearing, caring for the sick and elderly, and maintaining the household is performed by women for no pay in the relative privacy of the household or family compound. Men, by contrast, are held responsible for earning money in the public sphere, running governments, and managing relations with other families.
2. *Normative heterosexuality*, or the presumption that affective partnerships and family units are based on the sexual bond between a woman and a man. This requires the dichotomization of the human species into two opposite sexes with associated feminine and masculine characteristics.
3. *Hierarchies of power*, by which Young means “an institutionalized valuation of particular associations of maleness or masculinity” (2005, 425), notably in systems of organized violence. I prefer to name this third axis “*war and militarism*” to refer to the specific ways in which interstate warfare, which requires conscripting an army, cultivating martial values, and fortifying defenses, ascribes masculine virtues to fighters and their leaders while imputing feminine features to those who stay behind and are protected.

The sexual division of labor, normative heterosexuality, and war and militarism are the three major, though not the only, institutions where gender resides. They vary across societies and likely affect different men and women in different ways.

Rather than an attribute of individuals, gender characterizes these large-scale social structures and processes. Studying gender means analyzing how they work, the role of the state in sustaining them, the revealing claims of those who contest their oppressions, and gender's specific products and effects, such as women's lower wages, sex segregation in employment, and male dominance of political life. The study of gender is not the study of individual women or men and their civic organizations. It is not synonymous with feminist theory, the status of women in the professions, nonpositivist epistemology, or the claims of feminism as an emancipatory movement. In particular, the study of gender and politics is not equivalent to the study of women in politics (though studying women and their organizations may reveal something about gender). Women are often affected by gender, but they are neither its cause nor its limit.

What does this conceptualization imply for political science?

In the first place, we should be relieved. The notion of gender as a social position and attribute of social structures puts us on familiar terrain. We are better trained to study structures and institutions than human identities and subjectivities. And the gendered nature of these institutions is not visible only with a special methodology or interdisciplinary approach. It is rather simple to comprehend. Look at the cabinet ministers picked by President Vicente Fox of Mexico, for example: 18 of 19 are men. What other evidence do we need that the executive is gendered? We do not need a "gender perspective" to notice this for it is right there in front of our eyes!

What is more, do any of these ministers—male or female—have small children who accompany them to work or whose dependence is evident in their public lives? Not if they want to keep their jobs and avoid public ridicule. Most professional adults are involved in complex relations of care and dependency whose existence is almost always publicly invisible. Since the requirements for career success were not designed with caregiving in mind, those who choose (or are pressured into) it—generally women—often forsake public pursuits. And the normative feminization of care work makes men reluctant to embrace it. This is the work of the sexual division of labor, a resilient pillar of the gender system.

Many people do not recognize how obvious gender is because they think it means women: if women are not there it is not gendered. In this view, we need to “add a gender perspective” to explain where the women are, notice their hidden activities, and denounce the injustice of their exclusion. On the contrary, I propose that it is ontologically impossible *not* to have a gender perspective: It is implicit in all domains of academic inquiry. The more interesting question then becomes: what research agendas and hypotheses will lead us toward a better understanding of gender?

Disaggregating gender into three axes helps bring a research agenda into focus and offers a framework to classify existing work. In the rest of this article, I identify specific topics that could be analyzed by those political scientists who, like me, are primarily concerned with the state and its affiliated political institutions—the legislature, the courts, and political parties. Through its laws and policies, symbolic power, the statements and behavior of officials, and subtle patterning of society, the state upholds the sexual division of labor, normative heterosexuality, and war and militarism. Studying gender and the state means analyzing how, why, and where.

Consider the various ways the state props up the sexual division of labor. Perhaps the most obvious mechanism is through family law. For centuries until the egalitarian turns of the 1960s and 1970s, family laws entrenched male authority and women’s subordinate position. These laws explicitly named men as the head of household and chief decision maker while precluding women from exercising a profession, testifying in court, enrolling children in school, and the like without his permission (Charad 2001; Glendon 1989; Htun 2003). Grounds for divorce, criteria to establish adultery, rules on custody, and the like were similarly asymmetrical: they were premised on, and reinforced, men’s freedom and married women’s submission. Even after old laws changed, the cultural norms they forged lived on: witness the honor defense used throughout the 1990s in Brazil to absolve husbands of murdering their adulterous wives (Linhares Barsted and Hermann 1995).

The entire apparatus of laws on reproduction, abortion, and contraception have had a similar effect. Restrictions on reproductive freedom—in place in most countries of the world—legitimize biologically deterministic views of women’s appropriate activities and lot in life. Underlying the battle over abortion, for example, are two competing views of motherhood: the pro-choice position, which sees it as elective, and the pro-life one, which insists that motherhood is compulsory (Luker 1985). By criminalizing abortion—and limiting its availability—the state tells women

that pregnancy — and the caregiving it entails — must take precedence over their other choices. It neglects to impose the same responsibility on men.

Social welfare policies, even the most egalitarian ones, have perpetuated, rather than relieved, the allocation of work by sex. Few welfare states are based on the old model of the male breadwinner, and most seek either to relieve women of caregiving (so that they may work for pay) or compensate them for it (to reduce dependence on men). Yet no place has succeeded in elevating the status of care work so that men, too, are attracted to it. On the contrary, liberal welfare states have tended to delegate this activity to low-wage workers and illegal immigrants. Social democratic welfare states, by paying for day care, housing subsidies, and maternity and sick leave, have transferred women's dependency on the family and the market to the state. A division of labor persists: men are still the agents holding positions of power, while women are "clients without having gained the status of citizens" and, notably, those who run public caregiving bureaucracies (Fraser 1996; Hernes 1988; Skjele and Siim 2000).

Liberalism — the normative tradition underlying modern Western states and their democratic polities — has long offered justification for policies that uphold the sexual division of labor. (At the same time, however, its notions of individual rights and equality give grounds to contest sex oppression). As a philosophy that circumscribes the limits of state power, liberalism rests on the division of life into public and private domains. Gender was not incidental to this demarcation but constitutive of it. As Joan Landes has shown, for example, the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere in revolutionary France was premised on the exclusion of women (Landes 1988). Nor is the public–private dichotomy without consequence for gendered rights: liberal reluctance to intervene in the family and hold it to a public standard of justice, for example, allows domestic abuse and inequity to continue with impunity (Okin 1989; Olsen 1985).

To be sure, liberal states are not the only ones guilty of allocating rights, privileges, and differential status valuations by sex. The disparity in living conditions and formal rights between men and women is greatest where governments make little effort to respect liberal principles and deny equality even rhetorically, for example, in much of the Middle East (Saudi Arabia being the most egregious example). Fascist regimes and military dictatorships have elevated motherhood, but not fatherhood, to a national ideology. Even those socialist states that attempted to crush the sexual division of labor — at least in rhetoric — failed miserably. Rather

than promote women's emancipation, socialist regimes left a legacy of their enduring subservience to men. At least liberalism offers women avenues to contest gender structures. Socialism's proscription of unofficial political activity left few avenues to contest it (Htun forthcoming; Molyneux 1985).

In addition to enforcing the sexual division of labor, states uphold gender by privileging heterosexual coupling and partnerships. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted a fundamental constitutional right to marry, almost every state in the nation denies it to couples of the same sex (Gerstmann 2003). This posture, which isolates the United States from the growing Western trend toward recognition of same-sex unions, withholds the basic social status and privileges routinely granted to heterosexual partners. What is more, before *Lawrence v. Texas*, antisodomy laws, though rarely enforced, officially stigmatized any deviations from the heterosexual norm. The state's approach legitimizes homophobic attitudes and creates a climate precluding openness about sexual orientation. These moral and ideological agendas, moreover, interfere in the optimal regulation of sexual behavior (Posner 1992).

By conferring privileges on married couples (regardless of their sex), the state upholds marriage as the basis of rights. Some advocates of gay rights therefore reject the demand for same-sex partnerships. Why entrench the importance of marriage, which just ends up discriminating against nonmarried persons? Why not reject marriage altogether and the regulation of sexuality it implies (Butler 2002; Warner 2002)? States have historically been invested in the control of sexuality, not least in order to ensure orderly procreation and the transmission of property, title, and power across generations. What oppressions and incentives for social control has this generated? What is more, official regulation of kinship has assumed that it is inherently heterosexual. But is it? Texts from classical anthropology provide us with examples of alternative forms of social organization in which procreative lineages and sexual relationships are distinct. The movement for equal marriage rights and its attendant philosophical debate is forcing us to consider these deeper questions.

The third dimension of the gendered state is its sponsorship of war and militarism. Almost every fighting force throughout history has consisted of men (Goldstein 2001). Women have been conspicuously absent—and excluded—from armies in every society. The dichotomy between masculine men who fight and feminine women who need protection defines public life. Not only are military leaders male and masculine, but so too

the politicians best able to lead a country to war and insure its adequate defense. Virtues of femininity—tears, compassion, deliberation—are considered ill suited for managing the modern state.

Why is war gendered? One explanation offered by Joshua Goldstein starts from the observation that war is hell (2001). Soldiers do not want to fight but must be cajoled into it by tropes of manliness. Being a man requires suppressing the human impulse to retreat and surrender. Cultures thus develop norms of masculinity to maintain and enforce discipline in a standing army.

Could it be, however, that masculinity is a mere excuse to preserve male dominance of such a prestigious and lucrative enterprise as war? In her critique of Goldstein, Elizabeth Kier (2003) suggests that rather than having any operational purpose, militarized masculinity serves just to preclude women from entering the armed forces' elite male club. Sex discrimination, rather than combating effectiveness, explains the gendering of war. Buying into the masculinity theory merely fortifies the obstacles to full equality in the military that women face.

These are just some examples of relationship between gender and the state. They highlight questions to ask and avenues to probe. Above all, they show that understanding gender does not require a theory of gender identity. Gender's effects—seen in the differences in rights, opportunities, and living situations between most women and most men—are determined by the institutions described here. Yet gender does not define us nor account fully for our subjective experiences. As Moi points out, each individual is much more than the sum of her gender position and her sexed body. We need to investigate those social and political institutions—the state foremost among them—in which gender is embedded and transmitted over time. These institutions—not our individual attributes—engender our lives.

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Defending Modernity? High Politics, Feminist Anti-Modernism, and the Place of Gender

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In the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq, gender has become even more obviously important for understanding contemporary world politics, including armed conflict and war. Gender is an explicit structuring principle of contemporary conflicts between Western powers and an Islamist fundamentalism energized by opposition to the

freedoms enjoyed by Western women¹ and committed to the imposition of a version of *sharia* that explicitly denies to women rights equal to men's.

Work on gender across the social sciences has for the last decade or two been preoccupied by issues far from the macropolitical questions that concerned the feminists of the 1970s and early 1980s.² A broad range of theoretical transformations—embracing versions of the linguistic and cultural turns, poststructuralism, and psychoanalysis—turned our collective gaze to bodies, the formation of subjects, discourses, and identities. These shifts certainly engaged questions of power. But they could not, on their own, generate the kinds of theoretical understandings of political institutions and contexts that are rather clearly demanded by recent world events. Gender analysis at the macropolitical level has also been undermined by the decline of grand theory; the shifting center of gravity within gender studies itself toward the humanities, away from social science; and the crisis of confidence among many feminists over the use of the category of “woman,” in response to criticisms raised by theorists of intersectionality and those who follow the strong Foucauldian program of assimilating all conceptual categories to projects of power and exclusion. Still, some political scientists and political and historical sociologists never stopped analyzing high politics and gender. They—or should we say “we, collectively”?—can help lead the way toward a reengagement with high politics in the cross-cutting field of gender studies while continuing our efforts to gender the study of politics within our own disciplines and subdisciplines.

First, however, there are some crucial arguments to be engaged among those who *have* been attuned to the macro level of politics. Certain disturbing analytic trends, widely represented among those political scientists and sociologists, are making it difficult to understand and actively address contemporary events and phenomena. Most fundamentally, we will argue here, too many academics are refusing to draw critical analytical distinctions between modernity and its alternatives. Nor do they place these differences in the crucial social and historical contexts of intrastate

1. We are well aware that this is a generalization, and that there are instances—too numerous for any feminist—of the deprivation or incomplete extension of “Western” women’s rights. It is not the defects of a women’s rights-giving regime that Islamists target, however, but the extension of rights allowing women a place in the public sphere, equality with men under family law, and so on, in the first place. The term “Islamist” is here taken to mean a politics that envisions Islam not only as a religion but also as the basis for both state power and fundamental societal and intersocietal transformation.

2. We have in mind, for example, the attempt to develop a specifically gendered theory of the state or to understand gender systems as having logics parallel to capitalism (see, e.g., MacKinnon 1982; Rubin 1975; Sargent 1981).

command and control—that is, the ways that states hold together internally—and of interstate conflict and cooperation, the basic structuring of “us versus them,” which obviously includes questions of gender. For that reason, there is an eerie timelessness and spatial deracination in the claims and generalizations about the symbolic operations of gender and statehood, particularly in how the term patriarchy, or politics conducted under the sign of the father, is invoked. Iris Marion Young’s (2003) recent article on masculine protection and politics is a telling example of these forms of reasoning, which one could call “feminist antimodernism.” Young’s intervention is particularly important not only because of her general intellectual influence but also because it was composed at a formative moment, not long after 9/11, and was a lead article in *Signs*, the flagship journal in gender studies, in which, in the recent past, articles focusing on high politics have occupied a relatively limited space.

Young recognizes the centrality of gender and discursive political logics to contemporary global conflicts. She takes issue with early feminist understandings of war-making flowing directly from deformed masculine personalities and with those who insist on a single masculinist logic, that of “domination.” Instead, she would like to identify an additional set of gendered meanings of masculinity, which she calls “the logic of masculine protection.” This set organizes interpretations of recent political events, including the passage of the U.S. Patriot Act and the invasion of Afghanistan, which followed the events of September 11, 2001, when “a marauding gang of outsiders attacked buildings in New York and Washington with living bombs, killing thousands in barely an instant and terrifying large number of people in the country” (Young 2003, 10). She is trying to explain why there has been popular support or at least a reasonable degree of popular consent to the responses of the American government, including the Patriot Act and the Afghanistan invasion. She argues that American citizens, just like women and children under the guard or aegis of a household patriarch, have traded their democratic freedoms for promises of protection. These are, she thinks, not only false promises but the basis of a protection racket, because the threats are illusory, exaggerated, or even generated by the protector himself: “The Bush administration has repeatedly appealed to the primacy of its role as protector of innocent citizens and liberator of women and children to justify consolidating and centralizing executive power at home and dominative war abroad” (2003, 10). The end result of an “assertion of dictatorial power” is an American “security state” that “has slipped too far down the authoritarian continuum” (2003, 12, 10).

The other side of Young's analysis stresses the United States as "war-maker" (Young 2003, 17) and the Bush administration as cynically manipulating the rhetoric of women's rights to further an essentially imperialist project in Afghanistan (see also Cohn and Enloe 2003). American citizens, she says, and some feminists have not only consented to this project but have helped lay the ideological basis for it: "Even before the war it seemed to me, however, and still seems to me, that feminist focus on women under the Taliban constructed these women as exoticized others and paradigmatic victims in need of salvation by Western feminists, and it conveniently deflected attention from perhaps more intractable and mundane problems of gender-based violence, domination, and poverty in many other parts of the world, including the enlightened West" (Young 2003, 18–19). She conveys two points. U.S. feminists are as guilty of deploying the logic of "masculinist protection" as is the U.S. government. She also condemns what she takes to be a reflex of modernity: the necessary consignment of formerly colonized and peripheral women to the category of "other," and the elevation of "modern" forms of life above others.

Young sees her project of understanding and critiquing the linkage between a particular form of "male domination and militarism" (Young 2003, 1) as drawing on several sources of inspiration. One is the American and European women's peace movement of the 1970s and early 1980s, which, she thinks, saw through the Cold War protection racket, its acuity reminiscent of Mae West's bon mot, and the epigram that opens Young's article: "Every man I meet wants to protect me. I can't figure out what from" (2003, 1). The second source is the democratic theory that she would propose as an alternative to the logic of masculinist protection, founded in an understanding of politics that Thomas Hobbes might recognize as his own. Finally, she is influenced by one strand of feminist work that underlines the multiplicity of forms of masculinity and power, and the analytical separation of gendered meanings and gendered bodies.

We like the fact that Young recognizes that political commitments are unlikely to flow from some crude "desire to dominate"—or even to torture and kill—as popular left-wing commentators often allege about everyday Bush voters,³ in the flip side of a typical Ann Coulter

3. See, for example, Katha Pollitt, in a November 3, 2004, column in *The Nation*, fulminating about the American elections: "Maybe this time the voters chose what they actually want: Nationalism, pre-emptive war, order not justice, 'safety' through torture, backlash against women and gays, a gulf between haves and have-nots, government largesse for their churches and a my-way-or-the-highway President."

diatribe about liberals' propensity toward treason. We also admire her attempt to develop the insight, beautifully articulated by Jean Bethke Elshtain in the chapters on men in her book *Women and War* (1995), that there is more than one possible logic of masculinity or multiple signs, valences, and practices associated with that of "the father." There are problems even here, however, for Young is silent on the "how-tos" of cultural interpretation. How do we distinguish one cultural logic from another? Even in a text, how would we assess the presence of multiple or contending logics? This would seem to be a strength of feminist political theory as an enterprise, which has given feminists many alternative readings of classic political theory, whether of emancipatory elements or hidden scripts of domination. But there are no pointers offered here. In addition, what constitutes valid evidence for the claim that a given logic inheres in the upper reaches of a state? And what about Young's further assumption that these discourses resonate with their intended audience? Here is a place where some public opinion research would be very useful! Or at least, some modesty about claims about who is or is not interpellated—who does or does not resonate to such language—is in order. But she offers no theory of interpretation, and does not give us the wherewithal to apply her insights with regard to the concepts of patriarchy (father-rule) to current politics, whether at the level of states or subjects. These may seem like big problems, and they are. But they do not yet capture the heart of our disagreement.

Even as Young attempts to introduce some needed differentiation into our conceptions of masculinity, she takes an essentially ahistorical approach. Her analysis limns a timeless version of a Hobbesian landscape in which the character of states, sovereigns, patriarchs, and their flocks are not theorized, and this means that she cannot differentiate between the symbolizations and practices of masculinity and femininity in different settings and eras. That is most evident in her remarks on the problems of women under the Taliban versus those in "the West," quoted earlier. Yet the differences were stark. Women were coded as internal Others in the most extreme fashion in Taliban ideology; they were even systematically put to death on the basis of attributes ascribed to femininity itself. This is a form of genocide, in our view, consistent with the United Nations definition. How is a feminist focus, whether Western or not, on this systematic oppression—including mass murder—necessarily a construction of "these women as exoticized others and paradigmatic victims in need of salvation" or necessarily a deflection of attention from

“more mundane” problems of gender inequality?⁴ How can such serious differences simply be analytically submerged in notions that one patriarchy is just as bad as the other? Young is here representative of much new feminist writing, in which the once taken-for-granted association between modernization and progress toward gender equality, and the correlative ideological link between so-called traditional styles of life and masculine domination, have come under attack. Modernity has also been understood as ineluctably linked to racist imperial projects, in which “Western women” have often been enlisted or have even been the standard-bearers. Thus, it is not surprising that some analysts are ready to excoriate all things modern and even to dismiss modernity—*any* modernity—as a political destination as they construe the politics of the day.

There is, of course, a strong counterperspective on gender, patriarchy, and modernity in political science and sociology, and that is modernization theory. For Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2003), and the legions of modernization theorists with similar views if less well worked-out analyses, modernity and modernization clearly imply progress on gender equality and women’s autonomy, individual rights, and basic humanity. We think that they are onto something. Feminists should not so readily dismiss the persuasive empirical evidence presented by Inglehart and Norris, as well as others (e.g., Bergmann [1986] 2005; Jackson 1998), linking a number of indicators of women’s freedom, autonomy, economic capacities, literacy, and education, on the one hand, and capitalist industrialization, urbanization, and the expansion of democracy, on the other. These latter processes, along with some others often bundled together under an umbrella concept of “modernization,” are surely part of any broad understanding of modernity. But Inglehart and Norris also underline the significant cross-national differences around questions of

4. Carol Cohn’s *Signs* interview with Cynthia Enloe, a pioneer of feminist international relations scholarship, exemplifies this false opposition (Cohn and Enloe 2003). Enloe responds to a question about whether she is interested in understanding the 9/11 terrorists as follows: “September 11 engaged my emotions, a sense of horror, and a sense of worry about people I knew in New York. But the terrorists who hijacked those three planes? They aren’t the main objects of my curiosity, because I think they are more the symptom than the cause. And I think ultimately they are nowhere near as capable of affecting our ideas, our lives, the structures and cultures in which we live, as a lot of other people who look not very narratively interesting. I’m pretty interested in bland people, people whose blandness is part of what’s interesting about them—the rank-and-file men in conventional armies, the women who work as secretaries in aerospace corporations. Or Kenneth Lay, the CEO of Enron; nobody till last winter thought he was as interesting as Timothy McVeigh. I’m interested in Kenneth Lay and the culture he and his colleagues helped create that destroyed everybody’s pensions. So, yes, I put up a bit of an intellectual firewall between my curiosity and certain popular—and statecrafted—diversionary narratives” (Cohn and Enloe 2003, 1198).

gender—“it’s the women, stupid,” as they put it pithily in the title of an article in *Ms.* magazine (Norris and Inglehart 2004)—that have not typically been highlighted in standard modernization-theoretic accounts and in fact pose real challenges to them. In their view, there really is an epochal clash of civilizations—traditional Islamic versus the modern West—and that clash is centered on gender, including women’s capacity to participate in public life and politics, and to hold power, rather than on differences over the general value of democracy as some others (most influentially, Huntington 1996) have argued (Norris and Inglehart 2002). Note, too, that Inglehart and Norris are investigating the opinions of people living in Islamic societies, not those interpellated by radical Islamist modes of thought.

Inglehart and Norris supply a startling array of evidence about differences in public opinion regarding gender equality and sexual mores, particularly as they inflect women’s political participation and leadership. They show us snapshots of public opinion of different cohorts, contrasting the lack of change across cohorts in Islamic societies to the increasing liberalization around gender and sexuality in the West, and therefore registering a large and widening gap. How to explain the gap? In an analytic move adopted by many modernization theorists confronted by recalcitrant data, Inglehart and Norris appeal to the notion of cultural—in this case, religious and evaluative—differences beyond or at seeming odds with the level of modernization. To wit: “[W]e anticipate that religious legacies will leave a strong imprint on contemporary values. In particular, controlling for a society’s level of GNP per capita and the structure of the workforce, we expect that the publics of Islamic societies will be less supportive of gender equality than the publics of other societies” (2003, 19). “In particular,” they sum up, “an Islamic religious heritage is one of the most powerful barriers to the rising tide of gender equality” (*ibid.*, 71). How it is that “basic values” (*ibid.*, 20) could simultaneously move and not move in tandem with modernization is not explained. Furthermore, they go so far as to imply that gender equality, including its encoding in politics, will flow relatively unproblematically from modernization—if only in non-Islamic societies. We are by no means ready to make such a blanket claim.

Although we believe the links between women’s and gender emancipation, politics and modernity are extremely significant and applaud Inglehart and Norris’s efforts to bring them to our collective attention, we see two major problems with their overall formulation, at least as it bears on the present problem at hand. They assume, first of all, that modernity

is a unitary and beneficent tide, one that may “ebb and flow” (2003, 163) but otherwise simply sweeps away the immobile traditions that precede it. We sympathize with the many critics who have pointed out the greater complexity of the concept and experience of modernity. Modernity considered solely as an idea incorporates a whole series of subconcepts (e.g., individualism; science; capitalism; industry; the city; rationality; the cutting edge; the “now”; democracy; rights; and so on) and associations, positive and negative. In future developments, they will likely not be bundled together as they have been in the original Western historical trajectory. That is in part what the very uneven literature on “alternative modernities” adumbrates (e.g., Goankar 2001). The modern era has also birthed monstrous phenomena—slavery, industrialized genocide, and war—alongside the favored offspring of modernization theory. Thus, modernity in metropole and periphery has engendered social transformations that have been indispensable to feminist and other emancipatory projects, even as it has sometimes strengthened the hands of some of their greatest foes. Given these complexities and problems, many people have argued for jettisoning the project (not to mention the concept!) of modernity altogether. Instead, in the Introduction to *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History and Sociology* (2005), we along with Elisabeth Clemens have argued at length for remaking it.⁵ And as a practical political matter—here we are solidly aligned with Inglehart and Norris—we as feminists find the best hope for gender equality in modernity. Not in any automatic way, however, and not without continuing debate and struggle.

Every day, social actors around the globe invoke modernist bases to advance political projects on behalf of women (e.g., “women’s rights”), or to oppose them as apostles of tradition. Within the terms of modernization theory, ironically, there is no real way to study how, when, and under what conditions people do these things. That brings us to the second problem with Inglehart and Norris’s formulation: that they extrapolate what they take to be a single “culture” from variegated opinion data to a country or “civilization” as a totality. On this basis, we can capture neither the uneven development within and across states and societies, nor the ways that people struggle to link cultural signs and political practices differently within a given social space. As social scientists, and feminist analysts of the present moment in global politics, we need to be able to do these things. How else are we are to understand, for example,

5. Note that the views expressed in the present article are those of the authors only, and should not be attributed to Elisabeth Clemens.

how partisans of fundamentalist religious movements call on reconstructed senses of tradition, fueled by what they perceive to be modern (and therefore threatening), and focused on women as the *ur*-sites of fantasy and enactment? For these actors, “tradition” represents not just what antedates modernity but also what they think it excludes, and what they romanticize but often, by the same token, deride and despise. The signifiers of those reinvented traditions—such as the veil, or women’s bodies themselves (see Fanon 1965; Gole 1996)—are invested with such shifting, ambivalent political meanings. Modernization theory does not equip us (sociologists, political scientists, feminists) to understand these historical formations of signification and emotion, to assess why they resonate for those who propel and are caught within them, or more generally to analyze the nexus of culture and politics.

Inglehart and Norris do a nice job of marking out the boundaries between their account, focused mainly on cultural change, and at least some political-institutional variables (e.g., 2003, 127–46). Young, on the other hand, does not explicitly acknowledge any scope conditions for her claims. We also miss a sensitivity to the actual mechanics of politics and states, including more or less patriarchal politics and states. It is not that we think everyone needs to research everything, doing away with all established academic divisions of labor. But it should not be possible to make assertions about a supposed “security state” on the basis of textual analysis alone, without reference to more grounded cultural and political analysis. One simply cannot, as she does, extrapolate from the tropes employed in George Bush’s speeches to generalizations about how the state works. Some sort of institutional analysis of the mechanics of the American state is necessary—for how else would analysts know whether it has “slid down” an authoritarian slope, as Young claims, or not? Other forms of political science can certainly be helpful here, for they have made these sorts of analysis, including both international relations and the aggregative dynamics of democratic decision making, their stock in trade. And in fact, there are welcome indications of a renewed focus in political science and sociology on the intersection of gender and the workings of governance in contemporary states (e.g., Brush 2003; Chappell 2002), as well as on conversations between feminist theorists and international relations specialists (e.g., Keohane 1998; Marchand 1998; Tickner 1997, 1998).

That institutional analysis should also include the coercive moment of state power. Young seems to assume that well-behaved, appropriate states (states that are not running protection rackets?) can simply do without coercion, whether “dominative power that exploits those it rules

for its own aggrandizement” or the pastoral power that “often appears gentle and benevolent both to its wielders and to those under its sway, but is no less powerful for that reason” (Young 2003, 6). Perhaps Young and many like her cannot conceive of the normative ideal of politics as anything more than deliberative debate or, at most, law enforcement on a global scale. Wielding coercive power, even against terrorists or fascists, is for them simply beyond the pale. But all states face the issue of how to sustain the sinews of power, the extraction of resources—taxes, soldiers—in order to function, against resistance and in competition with other powerful domestic and international actors, whose goals may not coincide with their own. We cannot ignore the insights of Max Weber (1968, 56) and others about the conflictual nature of politics and the bottom-line coercive nature of states. Nor do we believe that even a fully democratic system, national or international, will ever shed its conflictual or agonistic (to use the term favored by Chantal Mouffe) character. We share Young’s aspirations for a genuinely democratic world order, but such an order simply cannot be wished into being. Perhaps we should attend to the bracing warnings of Carl Schmitt (whose insights are interpreted in Kalyvas 1999 and Mouffe 1999), who if nothing else had the virtue of understanding the constitutive role of us-versus-them conflicts, especially in shaping interstate politics. What are the dynamics of interstate relations, the historically specific patterns of alliance and enmity, dependency, and interdependency, that matter in this regard? Such questions are crucial if we want to understand the conflicts between the United States—or “the West” more broadly—and an Islamism that are among the wellsprings of both Islamic jihad and U.S. foreign policy.

One important implication is that coercion, conflict and domination are not, as Young suggests, by definition masculine. In her argument, masculinity is symbolically equated with domination, “masculinist protection,” authoritarianism, violence, and war, while femininity is coupled with peace, victimization, and subordination. This binarizing move assumes that signs and characteristics load in a neatly split fashion onto masculine and feminine. There is no question that this is sometimes how these signs are used in politics, whether from the Right (instance the various forms of fundamentalism mentioned here) or the Left (for example, again, the women’s peace movement of the 1970s–80s). But one of the many potential contributions of feminist analyses of politics is to pinpoint the ways in which state actors and their opponents actively deploy signs of gender in these conflicts, forging these very symbolic links in ser-

vice of coalitions for political and military action. The conjoined signs of father-rule, patriarchy, are often an important one in this regard. But that does not mean that these linkages cannot be disrupted and reorganized. Nor does it mean that, say, the early modern European ruling patrilineages that one of us (Adams 2005) has studied, the reformist elite men of the U.S. Progressive Era who initiated modern social provision for bread-winning men that the other (Orloff 1993) has analyzed, the familiarly related patriarchs that run some contemporary Middle Eastern or Maghreb states (Charrad 2001), and American democratically elected leaders are the same thing and can be reduced to one another as a phenomenon. Young's intervention takes this reductionism to an extreme.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Young's essay paints the United States "as bad as or worse than" any of its supposed foes or Others—even implying that the United States is the sole author of their problems and, in the case of al Qaeda, aggressions.⁶ This inability or refusal to differentiate is also fed by the lack of any grounded analysis of politics, including interstate politics, or of the specific foe in question—rendered as a "marauding gang of outsiders" with no apparent social characteristics, no connection to a movement or states that sheltered that movement. Outsiders, in other words, to what? Young has to rip the attack on the United States out of any larger political frame, which might imply that the "gang" was in that instance an actual, organized threat, sheltered by a state power—in this case, the Taliban regime, which had if not a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, in the classical Weberian sense, then certainly statist access to formidable means of coercion.

If, as we argue, contemporary threats to democracies are not illusory—and certainly not produced by elaborate protection rackets—feminists will have to figure out how to defend as well as advance modernity's incomplete promise of gender emancipation. We want to close with two sets of suggestions—macropolitical and analytic—flowing from our critique of feminist antimodernism. Politically, we might begin by recognizing that this promise is presently institutionalized in democratic if decidedly imperfect states. No kind of national or global security can

6. Young is by no means as extreme in this regard as, for example, Miriam Cooke (2001). But perhaps that critical and political skewing is the reason that Young minimizes the threat of Islamism, and even symptomatically misstates the facts, thereby muting the emotional impact, of the deaths on 9/11, claiming, for instance, that "they died in an instant," a less emotionally trying description of the carnage than one that could come to terms with people's having burned to death or jumped to their deaths from the windows of the World Trade Center.

be achieved anytime soon without also calling on the coercive powers of these states—the states we live in now—rather than, say, a fantasized global law enforcer deputized by all the peoples of the world.⁷ Thus, we find Young's appeal to the women's peace movement of the 1970s–80s entirely unpersuasive in this context, particularly since the core of that movement portrayed the threat posed by the Soviet Union as an illusory fabrication and, in general, showed itself unable to confront the geopolitical realities of the day. Since the fall of communism, all of us now know even better the nature of that threat, as well as the internal deformations of Soviet society. Certainly that movement—and contemporary feminists, in retrospect—were right to question Ronald Reagan's Cold War policies, but their questioning should have extended past the United States to the Soviet Union, whose grounds for opposing the United States were hardly limited to promoting world peace.⁸ We should be willing to admit that however admirable the women's peace movement's aspirations for a world free of conflict, the movement had it wrong on the actual threat posed by the USSR and on the importance of upholding democracy during the Cold War, just as Iris Young has it wrong on Afghanistan and the importance of opposing Islamism and defending modernity today. This stance need not in any way involve handing a blank check to the Bush, Blair, or any other political administration among the world's capitalist democracies. In fact, Young and others are properly skeptical about the goals of the Bush administration. But they seem to lose that necessary modernist skepticism, judgment, and analytical distance when it comes to evaluating the statements of Islamists.

When representatives of Islamic fundamentalist movements—energized by their perceptions of godless Americans and Europeans, condemnation of their putative sexual freedoms, and the presence of

7. Here we might also recommend a better understanding of the affective sources of political support for states qua communities defined in part by exclusions. See Craig Calhoun's (2002) astute questioning of "cosmopolitanism" as a plausible replacement for nationalism in undergirding international political projects. This is not to endorse all forms of nationalism, of course, but to enjoin realism about whether there are alternative modes of sentiment that might sustain the vision of global law enforcement that some feminists recommend. If not, we need to proceed with redoubled caution before assuming that Young's and other "marauding outsiders" can be dealt with apart from invoking the coercive capacities of existing democratic states.

8. Roseneil (1995) offers a more sympathetic reading of the movement—but nonetheless one that we think accords with our basic argument. Of course, many feminists and others on the Left were sometimes critical of what was then called "actually existing socialism"—though only rarely as critical of the USSR as of the United States. The much-needed process of reexamining—including from a feminist perspective—what kind of political formations the actually existing socialisms really were is just beginning. See Verdery (1996).

women in the public sphere—embrace terror as a viable tactic in advancing their aims, is this not a real threat to democracies, and to many of the rights that women and all small-d democrats should hold dear? We think so, and believe that the answer is not to resign ourselves to, much less endorse or applaud, their depredations. To respond defensively, as many on the Left have, that radical Islamists have simply been produced by U.S. aggression or its foreign policy more generally is ludicrous. These arguments typically assume that they had no agency of their own. Ironically, this entails not taking seriously the statements of jihadists about what they are doing and aim to do in the future (see Gould [2005] for a helpful analysis of Islamist appropriations of key elements of Islamic doctrine). If there is a real threat to modernity's promise, as we think there is, feminists should organize against it domestically and internationally, as they have begun to do. The fact that George Bush and his administration might well invoke the promise of "women's rights" tactically and opportunistically at times in what is a multifaceted and internally contradictory struggle against Islamic fundamentalism does not alter these fundamental points.⁹

However much we disagree politically, we are united with Young, Enloe, and others on a key analytical premise: scholars of gender must not relinquish the terrain of the political, and particularly its most symbolically masculine aspects—war, international relations, the administrative apparatus of governing, in short, high politics—to scholars who ignore the gender subtext of political meanings and social relations that organize the practices of war making, state formation, and governance. It is clear enough from the studies we do have that gender is constitutive of politics and that politics is a central moment in the continual reconstruction of gender. Now feminists must push forward the intellectual project of "gendering" all relevant aspects of politics, including

9. That George Bush and Tony Blair make political appeals based on the public's attachment to women's rights strikes us as a marker of feminist accomplishment and cultural change and not merely an example of political opportunism. (Are we surprised that politicians are cynical? No.) Would we prefer that women's rights not be invoked at all? Do we prefer it when women's rights conventions are actively opposed? Obviously few if any feminists would approve of everything the Bush administration is doing! (As we go to press, for example, the U.S. government has just backed off its attempt, on the basis of opposition to any expansion of "rights to abortion," to delay endorsement of a document drawn up for the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women to reaffirm the closing declaration of the group's meeting 10 years ago in Beijing [Hoge 2005].) However, we see the international role of the United States as more mixed than is typically argued in feminist circles, where it is too often taken as axiomatic that anything the Bush administration endorses must be wrong, and therefore, anyone opposing Bush must be a political ally. The enemy of my enemy is sometimes my friend . . . but—as Mao, Napoleon, or Clausewitz might tell us—not always.

the domestic and international activities of states. In *Remaking Modernity*, we and Elisabeth Clemens note that the uneven process of bringing the insights of feminist scholarship to sociology and political science reflects a pervasive gendered division of intellectual labor and symbolic coding of certain subjects as feminine or masculine: “Feminists . . . have conducted a spirited campaign to bring gender into the political and still masculinized core of modernity. The masculine redoubts of the working class (such as welfare states) have been revealed in exemplary historical sociological [or political science] research as sites of gendered contestation and sources of gendering broader social orders, but we have been less successful in entering the corporate headquarters of modernity” (Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005, 55). This state of affairs reflects both intellectual resistance to feminist work and feminist scholars’ own academic choices. Both need to change.

We want first of all to see more serious analytical engagement between gendered and mainstream students of politics, so that gender analysis is not only embedded in but also draws from the political institutional realm in all its dimensions. This will mean learning from—as well as bringing a stronger gender-analytic presence to—the ongoing debates around the clash of civilizations and modernity, postmodernity, and “alternative” modernities. It will involve much more serious engagement with analyses of institutional change and stability (e.g., Streeck and Thelen 2005), politics as process, and the relations between political strategy and culture (Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005, 1–72). It will embrace and expand what are now quite rare analyses of the relationship between gendered representations of war and actual military campaigns and practices (e.g., Hull 2004). We hope that we have made clear that we admire the way that Inglehart and Norris have directly addressed Huntington’s theses, and Young’s effort to distinguish different logics of masculinist politics. If people are successfully interpellated by a logic of masculine protection as well as by a logic of domination—if they are ever to be hailed by a “gender-free” logic of political participation—we will ultimately need to consider that such logics arise out of properly political sources that need to be better understood and incorporated into gender studies.

We like to think that such change would be salutary, not only for feminist scholars within the social sciences but also for gender studies as a larger interdisciplinary academic project. Scholars hailing from the humanities have led the field intellectually for the last 20 years, and we have all learned much from their leadership. So yes, for example, we do

need theories of subjectification to understand the multiple operations that can be characterized (but only as a shorthand!) as “power” (e.g., Butler 1997). But the contours of gendering processes will be shaped by reasons of state as much as by the psychodynamics of mourning and melancholia. The modern subject is likely to be a citizen of a modern state, or at least to be struggling with political expectations and institutions imposed by the modern interstate system. Without the collective help of social scientists, in all their varieties, feminist scholars cannot grapple with the specific intersections of gender and politics in modernity—and we take this task to be particularly important at the present historical moment.

For some women and men, defending modernity will involve practical political interventions; for others, intellectual arguments, drawing on the intellectual and evidentiary resources of multiple disciplines. We do not underestimate either the difficulty of these tasks, even in this preliminary step of urging more analytical clarity, or the debates and struggles involved. Even those who are united against the noxious mix of invented tradition and modern technology exemplified in the Taliban’s embrace of public stoning and surface-to-air missiles, for example, or men’s cleric-sanctioned access to instant cellphone divorces in Iran, will differ with respect to the possible accommodations they see among the emancipatory promises of modernity, invented tradition, and indigenous sociocultural forms. Defending modernity necessarily includes openness to different interpretations of what it involves, of its foundations, varieties, and futures. It implies the necessity for strong public discussions, including arguments over alternative theories and conflicting evidence. And it involves agonistic politics. That is part of the project itself.

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