letter writing; and lastly, by discharging them from confinement by way of trial or as recovered. In his remarks on these several matters he points out also the circumstances which should regulate them, and adds cases in illustration. It is a very good paper, but difficult to make an abstract of. Moreover, there is no novelty in its teachings, for they are such as the management of an asylum will speedily impress upon any physician who undertakes it. At the same time they are worthy the attention of the inexperienced.

M. Bourneville puts the question—was Socrates mad? argues it through fourteen pages, and, in opposition to M. Lelut (who some time since showed an equal concern in the mental condition of the old Greek), comes to the conclusion that he was not a lunatic. Thus do doctors disagree. For our part we are content to abide by the general opinion impressed upon us in our earlier years as the testimony of certain Greek friends of the philosopher, and which was current in our school-books, that Socrates was a wise man and "nae foo." Doubtless he had some odd notions, did some odd things, like all others of mortal mould; held some odd superstitions gathered by him in his nursery, was deficient in the philosophy of the nineteenth century, and did not, to avoid the consequences of its application to himself, always keep before his mental vision the psychological argumentation which, in this enlightened age, is so vigorously worked in analysing the mental condition of every individual who unhappily attains sufficient eminence to attract it towards himself, as a poet, philosopher, thief or murderer. But unless some of our dinner-table medium rappers can call him from the shades, by a writ "De lunatico inquirendo," so that MM. Lelut and Bourneville may satisfactorily examine him, we fear the brief record of his life, as handed down by his contemporaries, will fail in details to permanently settle the question; we would therefore suggest a truce between those disputants, and the desirability of letting the question and its subject rest in peace. R. J. P.

II.—*English Psychological Literature.*

On the Method of the Study of Mind: an Introductory Chapter to a Physiology and Pathology of the Mind. By Henry Maudsley, M.D. Lond. London: John Churchill and Sons, New Burlington Street, 1865, pp. 31.

In this 'Introductory chapter' Dr Maudsley thus asserts the foundation of Mental Science as the objective (inductive) method of investigation:—

"That the subjective method, the method of interrogating self-consciousness, is not adequate to the construction of a true mental science, has now seemingly been sufficiently established. This is not to say that it is worthless; for when not strained beyond its capabilities, its results may, in the hands of competent men, be very useful. D'Alembert compares Locke to Newton, and makes it a special praise to him that he was content to descend within, and after having contemplated himself for a long while, he presented in his 'Essay' the mirror in which he had seen himself; 'in a word, he reduced psychology to that which it should be, the experimental physics of the mind.' But it was not because of this method, but in spite of it, that Locke was greatly successful; it was because he possessed a powerful and well-balanced mind, the direct utterances of which he sincerely expressed, that the results which he obtained, in whatever nomenclature they may be clothed, are and ever will be valuable; they are the self-revelations of an excellently constituted and well-trained mind. The insufficiency of the method used is proved by the fact that others adopting it, but wanting his sound sense, directly contradicted him at the time, and do so still. Furthermore, Locke did not confine himself to the interrogation of his own consciousness; for he introduced the practice—for which Cousin was so angry with him—of referring to savages and children. And we may take leave to suggest that the most valuable part of Locke's psychology, that which has been an enduring addition to knowledge, really was the result of the employment of the inductive or rather objective method. Nay more: if any one will be at the pains to examine into the history of the development of psychology up to its present stage, he may be surprised to find how much the important acquisitions of new truth and the corrections of old errors have been due, not to the interrogation of self-consciousness, but to external observation, though it was not recognised as a systematic method. The past history of psychology—its instinctive progress, so to speak—no less than the consideration of its present state, proves the necessity of admitting the objective method.

"That which a just reflection incontestably teaches, the present state of physiology practically illustrates. Though very imperfect as a science, physiology is still sufficiently advanced to prove that no psychology can endure except it be based upon its investigations. Let it not, moreover, be forgotten, as it is so apt to be, that the divisions in our knowledge are artificial; that they should be accepted, and used rather, as Bacon says, 'for lines to mark or distinguish, than sections to divide and separate; in order that solution of continuity in sciences may always be avoided.' Not the smallest atom that floats in the sunbeam, nor the minutest molecule that vibrates within the microcosm of an organic cell, but is bound as a part of the mysterious whole in an inextricable harmony with the laws by which planets move in their appointed orbits, or the

laws which govern the marvellous creations of godlike genius. Above all things it is now necessary that the absolute and unholy barrier set up between psychical and physical nature be broken down, and that a just conception of mind be formed founded on a faithful recognition of all those phenomena of nature which lead by imperceptible gradations up to this its highest evolution. Happily the beneficial change is being gradually effected, and ignorant prejudice or offended self-love in vain opposes a progress in knowledge which reflects the course of progress in nature: the stars in their courses fight for such truth, and its angry adversary might as well hope to blow out with his pernicious breath the all inspiring light of the sun as to extinguish its ever waxing splendour.

"No one pretends that physiology can for many years to come furnish the complete data of a positive mental science; all that it can at present do is to overthrow the data of a false psychology. It is easy, no doubt, for any one to point to the completeness of our ignorance, and to maintain that physiology never will securely fix the foundations of a mental science, just as it was easy to say, before the invention of the telescope, that the ways of the planets could never be traced and calculated. The confident dogmatist in this matter might well learn caution from the following example of the rash error of a greater man than himself: 'It is the absurdity of these opinions,' said Bacon, 'that has driven men to the diurnal motion of the earth; *which, I am convinced, is most false.*' What should fairly and honestly be weighed is, that mind is the last, the highest, the consummate evolution of nature's development, and that, therefore, it must be the last, the most complex, and most difficult object of human study. There are really no grounds for expecting a positive science of mind at present; for to its establishment the completion of the other sciences is necessary; and, as is well known, it is only lately that the metaphysical spirit has been got rid of in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, and that these sciences, after more than two thousand years of idle and shifting fancies, have attained to certain principles. Still more recently has physiology emerged from the fog, and that for obvious reasons: in the first it is absolutely dependent upon the physical and chemical sciences, and must, therefore, wait for the progress of them; and in the second place, its close relations to psychology have tended to keep it the victim of the metaphysical spirit. That, therefore, which should be in this matter is that which is; and instead of being a cause of despair, is a ground of hope.

"But let it not be forgotten that the physiological method is only one (I) division of the objective method; there are other divisions not less valuable:

"II. The study of the *plan of development* of mind, as exhibited in the animal, the barbarian, and the infant, furnishes results of the

greatest value, and is as essential to a true mental science as the study of its development confessedly is to a full knowledge of the bodily organism. By that means we get at the deep and true relations of phenomena, and are enabled to correct the erroneous inferences of a superficial observation; by examination of the barbarian, for example, we eliminate the hypocrisy which is the result of the social condition, and which is apt to mislead us in the civilised individual.

"III. The study of the *degeneration* of mind, as exhibited in the different forms of idiocy and insanity, is indispensable, as it is invaluable. So we avail ourselves of the experiments provided by nature, and bring our generalisations to a most searching test. Hitherto the phenomena of insanity have been most grievously misinterpreted by the vulgar, because interpreted by the false conclusions of a subjective psychology. Had not the revelations of consciousness in dreams and in delirium been completely ignored by pretended empirical psychologists, truer generalisations must perforce ere this have been formed, and fewer irresponsible lunatics would have been executed as responsible criminals. Why those who put so much faith in the subjective method do reject such a large and important collection of instances as dreams and madmen furnish, they have never thought proper to explain.

"IV. The study of the progress or regress of the human mind, as exhibited in *history,* most difficult as the task is, cannot be neglected by one who wishes to be thoroughly equipped for the arduous work of constructing a positive mental science. The unhappy tendencies which lead to individual error and degeneration are those which on a national scale conduct peoples to destruction; and the *nisus* of an epoch is summed up in the biography of its great man. Freed from the many disturbing conditions which interfere so much with his observation of the individual, the philosopher may perhaps in history discover the laws of human progress in their generality and simplicity, as Newton discovered in the motions of the heavenly bodies the law which he would in vain have looked for had he watched the fall of every apple in Europe.

"May we not then truly say that he only is the true psychologist who, occupied with the observation of the whole of human nature, avails himself not only of every means which science affords for the investigation of the bodily conditions which assuredly underlie every display of function, conscious or unconscious, but also of every help which is furnished by the mental manifestations of animal and of man, whether undeveloped, degenerate, or cultivated? Here, as everywhere else in nature, man must deliberately apply himself to a close communion with the external, must intend his mind to the realities which surround him, and thus by patient internal adjustment to outward relations gradually evolve into conscious develop-

ment those inner truths which are the unavoidable expressions of the harmony between himself and nature. Of old it was the fashion to try to explain nature from a very incomplete knowledge of man; but it is the certain tendency of advancing science to explain man on the basis of a perfecting knowledge of nature."

The Legal Doctrine of Responsibility in relation to Insanity. By S. W. North, M.R.C.S.

A paper bearing the above title was read before the Annual Meeting of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science held at York, September, 1864. Such an occasion presented an excellent opportunity for the introduction and discussion of this most important question. We are glad that a medical man availed himself of it, and are yet more so that this gentleman treated it both soundly and ably. The lawyers so generally have their own way on this subject in public, and are in a position to talk down the unfortunate psychologist in so overbearing (and for the time successful) a manner, that it is something for a doctor to be able to talk himself for half an hour without interruption, and force their unwilling ears to listen to a few truths alike of common sense and sound psychology. Mr. North laid down the only true test of legal responsibility with unmistakable clearness (that which we have so often insisted upon), namely, the *power* to act rightly, and not the knowledge of right and wrong. That this principle will one day be recognised, and the present monstrous *dictum* of the English law be buried in the tomb to which it has unrighteously consigned but too many victims, we have not the least doubt: but this triumph can only be brought about by the persistent efforts of our profession to educate lawyers and legislators in the facts of insanity and the principles of modern cerebral physiology. The intolerable assurance which could induce the Lord Chancellor to assert that it is not necessary "a man should have studied the subject of insanity in order to form a conclusion whether a man is or is not a lunatic," ought to arouse every alienist to maintain the dignity of his profession, and his primary right to form a judgment upon a subject to which he has devoted his life—no less a right than that which we willingly concede to the lawyer in purely legal questions.

Mr. North puts one aspect of the subject of his paper very forcibly when he says: "If the law recognises as a legitimate defence that an act in itself illegal was done under the coercion of *others*, it ought with equal justice not to overlook that coercion, which though arising *within the individual*, and therefore not so patent to our understanding as that from without, does nevertheless, according to the observation and experience of all who have had