

admits works whose author may be contested, multiple, or unknown (the epics of “Homer,” ballads, and biblical books, for example).

I honestly don’t know what Machacek means by “literature.” Philologists and new historians would have it include tracts, travel books, edicts, and speeches. Machacek distinguishes “[a]llusions to earlier authors” from “the relations between literary texts and . . . accounts of the colonial enterprise, medical treatises, and the whole host of other contemporaneous texts” (531). It seems that the latter are not literature, despite the fact that they have authors and that phrases from them appear in plays. Machacek also refers to the distinction between “earlier” and “contemporaneous” texts as one between diachronic and synchronic relations. The example he provides of “diachronic intertextuality” puzzles me (531). He cites Christopher Marlowe’s “Nymph’s Reply to the Shepherd” as a poem written to “answer an earlier literary work” (525). That earlier work was written by Sir Walter Raleigh, in reply to Marlowe’s “The Passionate Shepherd to His Love.” The point is not the confusion about authorship but the fact that the complete versions of both poems first appeared in the same volume, *England’s Helicon* (1600). All references to other texts are of course diachronic, but this example of diachrony in 1600 collapses the distinction between diachrony and synchrony, or earlier and contemporaneous texts.

In concluding his article, Machacek refers to “the species of allusion that I have referred to as phraseological adaptation,” apparently granting that the genus has other species (535). That is a prudent concession, given the fate of all attempts to specify what such terms should mean. Udo J. Hebel’s *Intertextuality, Allusion, and Quotation: An International Bibliography of Critical Studies* (New York: Greenwood, 1989) lists over two thousand works on the subject, and there have been many more in the past nineteen years.

Greek and Roman critics escaped one of our terminological problems because they didn’t have a word for allusion; nevertheless, they were able to provide us with examples of the phenomenon. Their most common words

for connections between authors were *aemulatio* (emulation or rivalry; jealousy, envy) and *philoneikia* (love of strife, rivalry, contentiousness). Machacek and many poststructuralists highlight terminological issues, whereas classical and current critics emphasize contexts—the referential dimension in which people, motives, and historical circumstance play havoc with the notion that if we get the words right, we will have a dependable way to discuss literary realities. The latter part of Machacek’s article introduces such issues into the discussion and can be read with profit even if we are not attending to his strictures about what literary terms should mean. Paul de Man might have characterized this turn in the article as an instance of blindness producing insight. Such changes provide evidence that, just as we can’t stipulate what writers should mean by *world* (which even Wordsworth used in different senses), so literary critics cannot separate their textual terminology from the writers and worlds that texts embody.

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Reply:

This too is text, nor am I out of it.

Wallace Martin rightly characterizes the dilemma that faces would-be lexicographers as they use words to draw boundaries between words, and he tents me to the quick where my definitions do not entirely square with one another or where they defer to other words, themselves inadequately defined. I appreciate his comments. This strife is good for mortals.

Though I thought of my essay as *proposing* potentially useful definitions rather than “stipulating” them, I nevertheless welcome the opportunity to clarify: I do not regard allusion as existing only in poetry (as opposed to “anywhere in literature”) or as pointing only to identifiable authors. But if I were to offer a revised definition—the incorporation into one work of a short phrase reminiscent of a phrase in an earlier work of literature—we might still find the definition inadequate, even assuming the broader meaning

of *literature* that Martin seems to favor. Sometimes an allusion is to a phrase used earlier in a conversation between two people, so unless we were to extend *literature* to such instances, even the revised definition would come up short.

Still, Martin is right to pinpoint *literature* as the term whose meaning I had to leave unquestioned so that I could explore the meanings of *allusion*. However insufficiently defined in the essay, *literature* was far from *impensé* as I wrote. If my attempt to define *allusion* in a thirty-thousand-word essay did not prove entirely satisfactory, I might well tremble to define *literature* within the thousand-word limit of this response. But I do not hesitate to covenant with any knowing reader that for some years yet I may go on trust toward the payment of a work addressing this issue. Cultures generally hold some set of texts worthy of preservation and dissemination (a collection that in Western culture went until recently by the term *literature*, though we may not quite have a word for it now), and allusions are to this body of texts, whatever we might wish to call it.

While it was indeed my premise that if I got the words right we might have a more dependable way to discuss one literary reality, I confess that I honestly cannot understand why Martin defines *context* as intrinsically antithetical to lexicographical initiative. Are there no historical circumstances in which any people are ever motivated to adopt a particular terminology for a particular kind of intellectual work?

But if, after all of Martin's reservations, a blindness early in my article is regarded as having produced insight later on, I shall steer right onward, content though blind. So much the rather thou, celestial light, shine inward.

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Ruskin, Turner, and Modernism

TO THE EDITOR:

While Rachel Teukolsky's "Modernist Ruskin, Victorian Baudelaire: Revisioning

Nineteenth-Century Aesthetics" (122 [2007]: 711–27) may reflect an understanding of Fredric Jameson's "brief" essay and Charles Baudelaire's "anglophilia" or his "love of the elitist dandy," it is uncertain what the article is saying about John Ruskin or about modernism (720). Throughout the essay, there seems to be an insufficient distinction among terms like *modernism*, *modernity*, and the relative *modern*. There is passing recognition, early in the essay, of some of the things that modernism implies ("avant-garde experiments in high-art formalism and abstraction, leading to cubism, abstract expressionism, and more radical adventures in literary form" [712]). But the title "Modernist Ruskin, Victorian Baudelaire," though smart, is not justified by much of what Teukolsky discusses, limited as her article is to volume 5 of Ruskin's *Modern Painters* and an essay by Baudelaire. In fact, she concludes that both of these two texts might be called "eminently" and "very" Victorian (713, 724). It ends up that Jameson is wrong about Baudelaire's anticipation of the postmodernist sensibility (e.g., 717) and that Baudelaire's and Ruskin's judgments suffer from unwitting "confusions" (e.g., 723). Putting such points aside, there are two crucial omissions in the essay.

The most serious gap is its failure to show the relevance of J. M. W. Turner's later style to a major shift in modes of aesthetic representation during the Victorian period. In this context (unless one looks only at Turner's early, "picturesque," style), it is at best inaccurate to describe Turner's paintings as merely "vivid" and his kind of art as something that "faithfully reproduced a divinely ordered natural world . . . [his] painting and landscape [providing] mirrorlike proofs . . ." (712, 718). It is more seriously dismissive of Turner to conclude that "while Ruskin wants to ameliorate conditions for the modern worker, his social vision is fundamentally conservative and upholds social hierarchies and class divisions, *especially* in the elevation of Turner above other spectators" (720; my emphasis). A non sequitur like the following further indicates deprecation or disregard of Turner: "Yet Ruskin