that wish to shirk these responsibilities and avoid the added costs that accompany currency internationalization will actively oppose international use of its currency. Ambivalent or indecisive societies will tend to be passive in their currency statecraft.

One of the many strengths of *Currency Statecraft* is its transferability to the classroom. In specifying the policy choices of states at each stage of the currency lifecycle, Cohen uses alliteration to give the reader a helpful mnemonic device (and the teacher a practical teaching tool). In the "youth" stage (Chapter 4), a state can choose to proactively *promote* currency internationalization (e.g., modern China, Japan in the 1990s), *prevent* currency internationalization (West Germany and pre-1990s Japan), or *permit* the inevitable ascension of a currency to international use (European monetary union). In the "maturity" stage (Chapter 5)—reached when a state's currency attains international status—the policy options available are to *exploit* this power (the United States often), *evade* (the United States on occasion in the 1960s and 1970s), or passively *enjoy* the status (Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and arguably post–Brexit UK). Finally, as the international stature of a state's currency begins to "decline" (Chapter 6), the state can choose to *resist* (Britain pre-1960s), *reinforce* the decline in the hopes of a soft landing (Britain in 1960s), or *relax* and accept its fate (Japan post-2003). Cohen supports the policy decisions in each stage (Chapters 4–6) with succinct accounts of the selected case studies and an analysis of the geopolitical ambitions of the protagonist country.

After six chapters of expert theoretical development on how states deal with the internationalization of their currencies, supported by decades of historical evidence, Cohen addresses the principal question of monetary rivalry: What happens when currency statecrafts collide? Acknowledging that monetary rivalry has been relatively rare in the modern era, Cohen focuses his attention on a potential conflict between the incumbent U.S. greenback and an emerging Chinese "redback." The duel between the two is exceptional, he argues, because "the Chinese seemingly feel no obligation to concede U.S. leadership" (p. 153). China's geopolitical ambitions are strong and its currency statecraft well devised; conversely, the U.S. response in three successive administrations (Bush, Obama, and Trump) has not been "decidedly proactive" but rather "deliberately" *non*-active (p. 160). Cohen explains the nonresponse of the United States as nothing more than complacency: a half-century as the top currency will breed overconfidence that can lead to miscalculations. If China maintains a strong position, it will be well situated to take advantage of any U.S. missteps.

A major strength of this scholarship, as I stated at the outset, is its timeliness. Cohen notes, "Outright interstate contestation over currency power has been relatively rare," but with the emergence of the Chinese yuan and the half-century incumbent U.S. dollar, we have "an exception —a unique and potentially historic confrontation" (p. 149). As this book was headed to press, two more cases arose that challenge the greenback's dominance: the 2018 de-dollarization campaign enacted by the Kremlin and the 2019 European Union alternative to the SWIFT payment system. In the former, the Central Bank of Russia, in response to U.S. sanctions on the Kremlin, decreased its reserve holdings of dollars while increasing its dependence on yuan and euros. In the latter case, EU officials launched a method for bypassing U.S. sanctions on Iran to maintain the nuclear agreement that the EU continues to have with Iran. Both are reactions to U.S. policies that relied on the dollar's dominance. This overconfidence in the use of currency power may be the complacency desired by an ambitious adversary and the misstep that begins the decline of U.S. monetary dominance.

Currency Statecraft's greatest asset is the simplicity of Cohen's theoretical model matched with the thoroughness of his empirical evidence. His treatment of currency statecraft, which has received only limited attention in the literature, fills the gaps in the subject, leaving scholars of monetary relations with a sweeping overview of the literature to date. This book is a necessary read for scholars of international relations and international political economy.

The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK. By Austin Long. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016. 288p. $89.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Chiara Ruffa, *Uppsala University and Swedish Defence University*

As its title suggests, *The Soul of Armies* is a book about the "organizational essence" of military organizations (Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 1974, pp. 28–29). It explores how distinct military cultures emerge and how they shape counterinsurgency doctrines and the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The book argues that military culture is formed in the first "critical formative experience" of a soldier's military service, which Austin Long labels as "the first war" (p. 25). The core of military culture originating from this first operational experience is then transmitted over time through professional military education, thereby affecting how the military functions and operates. The dependent variable encompasses both the doctrine and conduct of operations, mainly operationalized as the size of operations, the level and targeting of firepower, and integration with civilians. The independent variable, military culture, has two main components: one is outward looking ("strategic"), and the other is about internal functioning ("managerial"). Military culture provides both the means to evaluate information (via a logic of consequences) and

forms preferences, values, and identity (via a logic of appropriateness) (p. 17).

Although Long argues that the most meaningful tenets of military culture reside at the service level, subcultures matter too. In his framework, subcultures either resist ("counter") or follow ("orthogonal") the core aspects of the broader service culture (pp. 32–34). Long subsequently identifies two archetypes of culture: a maritime archetype, prone to limited warfare and to cooperating with other organizations and civilians, and a continental archetype, which is about total war and the maximum application of firepower. Four cases illustrate the argument: the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Special Forces, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the British Army. Long studies each of those four organizations' very "first war": the American Civil War in the U.S. army case (1861–65), the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Crimean War and the Sepoy Mutiny (1854–59) in the British case. After their first formative experiences, the cases are followed through their major counterinsurgency fronts: the U.S. cases in Vietnam (1960–71), Iraq (2003–8), and Afghanistan (2003–11); the British Army is studied in Kenya (1952–56), Iraq (2003-8), and Afghanistan (2003–11). The underlying empirical prediction is that military culture should matter more in conditions of high uncertainty, particularly when directives are particularly obscure.

There is so much to like about this book. It is at the same time empirically rich and theoretically sophisticated. It conveys a powerful narrative that makes it highly readable. Although it is not easy to craft scholarship on culture, Long ultimately manages to convince the reader about the stickiness of military culture and how it is transmitted across generations of personnel. The book advances a debate that had reached a stalemate in the early 2000s after the seminal work of scholars addressing military and strategic cultures (e.g., Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War*, 1997, and Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation under Fire*, 1995). Long is the first to theorize about the origins of military cultures and to develop in greater detail a taxonomy of archetypes of military culture. The breadth and depth of the book are its strongest features and at the same time its Achilles' heel. I take issue with four elements of his taxonomy.

First, the dependent variable is somewhat misconceived. It is unclear whether the focus is doctrine or the conduct of operations or both. Although the author acknowledges that "it should be crucially noted that the dependent variable is first and foremost about actual practice in the field" (p. 21), this is not really carried through, and a strong emphasis remains on doctrine. In Chapters 6–8, which deal with the early counterinsurgency campaigns, doctrine is far more in focus than actual practices, although Long does make an attempt to distinguish between doctrine and conduct. The last two

chapters (Chapters 9 and 10), however, are largely about the conduct of operations, and the focus on doctrine is abandoned almost completely. In my view, doctrine should not have been brushed aside as a dependent variable, and at the same time, the interplay between doctrine and actual military behavior could have been problematized more. The book could have systematically used discrepancies between doctrines and conduct of operations as measures of the stickiness of culture; for instance, as the author notes, in relation to the U.S. Army's conduct in Vietnam from 1961–65 (p. 114). It would have been interesting to explore under what conditions a doctrine that does not take into account military culture is subsequently ignored in operations. The other elephant in the room is whether culture increases the likelihood of military effectiveness, which the author alludes to in the conclusion (p. 223). It might look as if the inability of military culture to adapt would make the military less effective, but perhaps surprisingly, this is not what the book finds. Further research should focus much more on the dynamic interplay between doctrine, military behavior, and military effectiveness. Recent scholarship seems to be pushing precisely this line of research (e.g., Cornelius Friesendorf, *How Western Soldiers Fight,* 2018; Chiara Ruffa, *Military Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations*, 2018).

Second, the book falls short of developing a full-fledged new theory about the origins and evolution of culture. Although it makes a much-needed contribution to the ongoing debate on where military culture originates, it could have done more to shed light on how Long selected the first formative experiences. That the American Civil War is the "first war" seems obvious in the U.S. Army case, but it remains unclear why the Spanish-American War would be the "first war" for the U.S. Marine Corps or the Crimean War and the Sepoy Mutiny for the British Army. What are the observables needed to call an operational experience the "first war"? In addition, the book makes a strong assumption about the role of operational experiences in shaping "the soul of armies." This is probably the result of a case-selection bias that stems from the predominance of U.S. cases, which guide the theory development exercise. Yet, the formative moment for a military is not necessarily a war or an operation; it may be something else, such as its disbandment (Germany after World War II) or the reestablishment of civilian control (France, 1962). In addition, I find it difficult to embrace a theory about military culture that does not include theorizing on the role of civilian decision makers who set the constraints and allow culture to evolve in certain directions. For instance, without Kennedy emphasizing the focus on counterinsurgency in Vietnam (1960, p. 106), we might have had different outcomes and a different conduct of operations. Relatedly, the theory of change should also reflect more explicitly on how new operational approaches and experiences, such as those

of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Yom Kippur War, are made sense by the U.S. Army through cultural lenses (p. 171).

Third, the locus of culture is not entirely clear. Although the book argues that service culture is what matters the most, subcultures are important too and may in fact work against the main service's cultural tenets. For example, the U.S. Army Special Forces' subculture developed almost fully independently of broader army cultural traits. In the U.S. Marine Corps case, the persistent tension between the "small wars" and the "amphibious operations" subcultures leaves me wondering what actually constitutes service culture.

Finally, I find the choice to focus solely on formal professionalization processes unwarranted (p. 29). Military sociology suggests that informal processes are at least equally important in shaping military cultures, guiding military behavior at war and at peace (Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia,* 1997; Anthony King, *The Combat Soldier*, 2013). Without the support of informal socialization processes, professionalization would not have been as powerful as a mechanism. Yet, processes of socialization into the military profession are underdeveloped. Indeed, we cannot assume that everyone will be equally socialized into the culture. In addition, levels of socialization may vary across services. For instance, the U.S. Marine Corps has a much less hierarchical structure, which may mean fewer tensions across the officer corps.

In sum, greater analytical care and further theorizing could have made *The Soul of Armies*' argument stronger. Yet, my four points do not undermine the exceptional contribution of this book, which is one of the best pieces of recent scholarship on military culture. I admire the effort to capture in a nuanced and sophisticated way the "essence of culture" and to describe military culture in all its complexity. Through its wealth of empirical material, it shows not only that culture matters but also how. The *Soul of Armies* is a must read for all those interested in where the ongoing debate on military culture, and on culture in general, is heading, and it paves the way for a return to the study of culture and of the stickiness of ideas in international politics.