

parliamentary representation, support from international organizations, decision-making power in city administrations, stakeholder consultations, and grassroots mobilization. For each channel except the last one, she uses a specific case study to illustrate minority presence and empowerment. Space considerations preclude close examination of each chapter, but two stand out for their keen observations on minority inclusion and exclusion in practice. Chapter 4, “The Parliamentary Channel,” would seem to tread a relatively well-worn path with its examination of party politics and lawmaking, particularly concerning minority citizenship access and rights. Cianetti’s application of the presence-polarization dilemma concept to the cases, however, illuminates aspects of majority-minority politics that might otherwise be missed. The concept permits the recognition of a key distinction between process and outcome. On the one hand, she observes, for instance, that “while the policy outcome [of conferring voting rights in local elections in Estonia] was favorable to non-citizens (and, by extension, for the Russian-speaking minority), it was not the result of a compromise but, rather of the majority elite’s ‘magnanimity’” (p. 75). On the other hand, in Latvia, non-citizens’ political rights have remained more circumscribed, but as Cianetti writes, “the ‘worse’ policy outcome for the minority. . . was not the result of a ‘worse’ (in the sense of less inclusive) policymaking process” (p. 77). She concludes that policy content is not an optimal indicator of the democratic inclusivity of the policy process. This assertion is of interest in both the broad discussion of divided democracies and the narrower contrast between ethnic politics in two countries that are commonly discussed with little distinction between them.

Chapter 6, “The City Channel,” offers insight into a little-studied arena of majority-minority politics. As Cianetti points out, city-level analysis is important because minorities often find a smoother path to representation in local politics. Although Latvia, unlike Estonia, does not permit noncitizens to vote in local elections, about 53% of Russian speakers hold citizenship (p. 43), and their significant demographic presence in Riga (about 51%) has given them a strong foothold in the capital city’s political life. Importantly as well, she posits, “Ethnically diverse cities have to deal with the daily management of diversity, which makes their administration potentially more sensitive to pragmatic problem solving than to the symbolic policy framing often prevalent at the state level” (p. 102). In this chapter, Cianetti focuses on debates and policies around minority education, in particular the integration of majority-language courses in minority-serving school curricula. While national-level policy making sets the parameters of policy, ambiguous policies have sometimes opened a space for significant minority representation in practical implementation. The presence-polarization dilemma that Cianetti develops throughout

the book is particularly interesting in this chapter, because it shows city representation as a strong channel for minority empowerment (Latvia) or, alternatively, as a potentially disempowering “trap” (Estonia; p. 127). In the former, a polarizing national debate and active grassroots protest against reform of Russian-language schools created an opportunity for the minority party in city government to engage in compromise that facilitated flexible implementation of language policies, bearing out the hypothesis that local governments are more likely to engage in pragmatic than symbolic politics. In the latter, the non-minority Center Party of former Tallinn mayor and national political figure Edgar Savisaar, which has sought to build a base of minority voters and members, engaged in sharp conflict with national governing parties over the school language issue, eschewing a path of compromise in pursuit of a symbolic victory. Cianetti concludes from the cases that “minority representation through an ethnic party might offer a better avenue to legitimize and empower minority voices than incorporation through a mainstream patron-party” (p. 127), an interesting point considering that urban areas across the democratic West are home to significant minority populations whose representation is largely dependent on majority parties that make space for minority interests.

Thus Cianetti’s book comprises meticulously constructed case studies that use the sharp conceptual tool of the presence-polarization dilemma that she has developed. The substantial case detail will be appreciated by area studies-oriented readers. The book’s contribution, however, is not limited to Baltic studies. The nuanced treatment of the dynamics of majority-minority politics should be of far broader interest. *The Quality of Divided Democracies* is deserving of a wide readership.

Demography and Democracy: Transitions in the Middle East and North Africa. By Elhum Haghighat. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 276p. \$99.99 cloth, \$29.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S153759271900149X

— Güneş Murat Tezcür, *University of Central Florida*

The question of why the Middle East has remained socioeconomically and politically underdeveloped in comparison to the West has been a major preoccupation for scholars across generations. A venerable perspective identifies the causes and remedies of underdevelopment in internal dynamics of the countries in the region. As societies achieve economic growth, they gradually develop characteristics conducive to democratization. Detractors challenge this perspective for ignoring international and intranational power asymmetries and inequalities that perpetuate patterns of underdevelopment.

In *Demography and Democracy*, Elhum Haghighat builds on this modernization perspective and aims to offer a structural explanatory framework to make sense of the

contemporary trajectory of Middle Eastern societies (including 18 sovereign states and Palestine in the Middle East and North Africa but excluding Israel). Her main antagonist is Samuel Huntington's infamous "clash of civilizations" thesis. Like many other scholars before her, Haghghat argues that nothing in Islam makes it inimical to economic and political development. She embraces the notion of "multiple modernities" and argues that religion continues and will continue to remain visible and influential as the Middle East modernizes (in contrast to the experience of some but not all Western countries). She provides a wealth of descriptive statistics to argue that all Middle Eastern countries have been experiencing profound demographic transformations since the late twentieth century. Mortality and fertility rates have declined dramatically, and rich Persian Gulf countries have attracted waves of migrants not only from poorer countries in the region but also increasingly from populous South Asian countries. Furthermore, literacy and access to higher education have increased dramatically even if youth and female unemployment contribute to political instability in most Middle Eastern countries. In addition, some Middle Eastern countries have considerably reduced various aspects of gender inequality, defying the popular image of the region as the bastion of patriarchy.

Haghghat sounds an optimistic tone. Her book suggests that, if we go beyond the headlines with their narrow focus on dramatic events, longer-term demographic and socioeconomic trends in the Middle East appear promising. Yet, her argument has three major shortcomings. First, there is an unresolved tension between the "multiple modernities" approach and the notion of development as articulated in the book. Similarly, the distinction between "modern" and "Western," which is repeated throughout the book, is conceptually shallow. This ambiguity becomes particularly problematic in her discussion of gender issues. Haghghat devotes considerable space to the ranking and scores of the Middle Eastern countries in the Gender Inequality Index (GII) of the UNDP and the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) of the OECD (pp. 117–31). She rightly observes that modernization in the Middle East entails progress according to these internationally accepted metrics. But, then, what "multiple" modernities can we envision in the region if the measures of development are universal? What are the distinctive characteristics of modernity that set the Middle East apart from the West? These questions remain unaddressed.

Next and relatedly, there is a fundamental difference between arguing that religious beliefs and norms are not an obstacle to political development and arguing that the configuration of social practices according to religious precepts does not hinder fundamental rights and liberties. This distinction between secularization as the decline of religion and secularization as the differentiation of life

spheres is the core argument of Jose Casanova's classic work, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994). It is hard to conceive of a democratic system without the latter form of secularization. Yet this distinction is lost in *Demography and Democracy*. Haghghat's detailed discussion of SIGI scores shows that family codes; laws against domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment; societal practices concerning the sex of babies; and access to resources and assets are more progressive (i.e., less discriminatory against women) in Turkey than any other Middle Eastern country. It is then probably not coincidental that Turkey also has the most secular legal system in the region.

Finally, Haghghat completely ignores how geopolitical power struggles highly complicate and often undermine the applicability of the modernization perspective to the Middle East. This one-sided approach is most explicit in her case study of Yemen (the others being Qatar, Tunisia, and Iran, even though no sources in Arabic or Persian are included in the bibliography). Adopting a fatalistic tone, she writes that the current predicament of Yemen is "unsurprising" given its underdevelopment, history of civil wars, and large youth population (pp. 170, 221). However, as Isa Blumi's recent book (*Destroying Yemen*, 2018) argues emphatically, the underdevelopment of Yemen cannot be made sense of without studying its relations with regional and global powers. The civil war that erupted in 2015 has been an enormous human tragedy that has set Yemen back for decades to come. The bombing campaign and embargo pursued by Saudi Arabia and Qatar and supported by the United States is the most salient preventable factor exacerbating this tragedy. Yet, except for a single paragraph (pp. 171–72), this political situation receives no treatment in Haghghat's narrative. Similarly, she duly notes the prevalence of high fertility rates in Yemen, Iraq, and Palestine (p. 83) without pondering the political dynamics affecting demographics in these countries. Nor there is any discussion of the effects of climate change on Middle Eastern societies, despite the centrality of these effects to demographics and development.

There are also a significant number of factual errors in the book. Shiites do not make up 74% of the Syrian population (p. 33). The conflation of Shiites and Zaydis in Yemen (p. 34) is highly problematic given their divergent historical evolution. The MENA region does not hold "the majority of the world's Muslim population" (p. 35): the Muslim population is much larger in South and Southeast Asia. Qatar did not become the host of the 2022 World Cup "through a rigorous selection process" (p. 176): sworn court testimonies reveal that FIFA officials took bribes to support Qatar's bid. Nor did Qatar remain under Ottoman rule until 1951 (p. 174): the Ottoman Empire had ceased to exist by then. Qatar has

a constitution, but that hardly makes it a “constitutional monarchy” (p. 175) with limits to executive power. It is not clear why Qatar would have ranked worse in the Gender Inequality Index (GII) “if Qatari women were heavily employed in blue collar and low-paid employment sectors” (p. 182). After all, an important factor improving a country’s GII score is women’s active participation in the labor force. Homosexuality is not treated as “an illness that can be cured” (p. 138) in Iran: same-sex sexual activity is punishable by death according to Iranian law. If “Iran’s population is projected to grow to close to 100 million by the year 2050” from its 2014 population of 77 million (pp. 152 and 202), how can it also be expected to experience a significant population decline of 41% between 2010 and 2040 (p. 152)?! An Ayatollah is not expected to attain the rank of *marja-e taqlid* first (p. 229), given that the latter is the title of Grand Ayatollahs who achieve the highest level of religious authority in Shiite Islam.

Overall, *Demography and Democracy* provides some useful information about various aspects of demographic changes and patterns of development in the contemporary Middle East.

Readers looking for an insightful analysis of political dynamics shaping these changes and patterns, however, are likely to be disappointed.

The Code of Putinism. By Brian D. Taylor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 264p. \$99.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592719001841

— Joel M. Ostrow, *Benedictine University*

Russia’s politics are once again interesting to the West. Its leader, Vladimir V. Putin, is a dictator nearing his twentieth year in power, and Brian Taylor has crafted easily the strongest, most comprehensive analysis of his rule by spelling out “the code of Putinism.” Many scholars have published analyses of Russia’s political system of late, and most have finally dispensed with any notion of Russia being a democracy, accepting that it has returned to authoritarian rule (a reality I argued with Georgiy A. Satarov and Irina M. Khakamada in *The Consolidation of Dictatorship in Russia*, 2006). Taylor’s book offers a convincing description of the parameters of Putin’s rule and how it shapes Russia’s internal politics, economic performance, and foreign policy; it is a must read for anyone interested in how Russia is ruled or, as Taylor offers in a quip, how it has been “misruled” for the past two decades (p. 131).

Any review of this book must start with the title. There is no “operational code” here, but the use of the word “code” does hearken back to Cold War era terminology. I opened the book wary of the term “code”: Why not just “Putinism” or “Putin’s Rule?” In the end, I found the term useful, if not necessary. Taylor invokes it as “more and less than an ideology ... not just ideas ... [but] not a coherent

and encompassing system of thought” (p. 10). He outlines the “habits, emotions, and ideas” that make Putinism what it is.

These elements are admittedly difficult to categorize in practice. Taylor accurately “decodes” Putinism in the first chapter, describing the “habits” (control, order, loyalty, hypermasculinity), “ideas” (statism, conservatism), and “emotions” (respect, resentment, fear) that, as any observer of Putin’s rule would acknowledge, describe its central tenets (pp. 12–35, 40). In subsequent chapters, he details how Putin and his “Clans and Networks” (Chapter 3) use these elements to emasculate political institutions with a combination of “Leashes and Clubs” (Chapter 2), to direct and control the economy through the use of “Lawyers, Guns and Oil” (Chapter 4), and to provoke and destabilize adversaries abroad by “Punching above Its Weight” (Chapter 6).

What makes Taylor’s the best book on Putin, however, is his measured, dispassionate execution: he paints a devastating picture. Although his language is engaging, his approach is methodical and comprehensive, with meticulous attention to detail. At the same time, this dispassion may frustrate some. In the short section on the media (pp. 63–65), for example, why does he not present the data on the dozens of investigative journalists murdered as a result of this “code,” including the infamous murder of Anna Politkovskaya? Putin has made the job of journalist in Russia among the most dangerous in the world, using “clubs” and “guns” based on his rationalization of maintaining “order” and strengthening the state. Putin’s violent suppression of the press is integral to his attack on information and truth and to his recentralization of power, yet receives scant attention. Similar frustration might arise regarding the plight of opposition politics and attacks against opposition politicians. What of the murders of leaders such as Boris Nemtsov, who receives two brief mentions almost as asides (p. 105 and 155), or Sergei Yushenkov, among the many who have paid the ultimate price for their critical and outspoken political views, as well as the countless others silenced? Yet, these attacks are instrumental to Putin’s destruction of “open politics.”

There are other details, too, that some may quibble with. Taylor spends some time arguing the weakness of Russia’s institutions, detailing how Putin has emasculated the formal institutions in favor of his informal networks and rules that centralize his power vertically. Yet he fumbles when it comes to the relationship between Russia’s superpresidential constitution, institutions, and Putinism (pp. 51–52). The constitution created the institutional environment in which the personal predilections of the individual who happens to be president—indeed, the habits, ideas, and emotions of that individual—determine the nature of politics in the country. The performance of Russia’s institutions depends on the