in providing background on the subject for non-classicists. Chapter 3 ('Democracy: Good or Bad?') surveys opinions of democracy as expressed from the late medieval period to the mid-nineteenth century, ending with Grote, who championed the positive example ancient Athens could present for modern polities. Grote provides a graceful transition to the fourth chapter ('Democracy: Fashions in Scholarship'), which considers views scholars have taken from Grote forward. The sketches in both Chapters 3 and 4 are extremely brief, but this allows for a synoptic view and a quick and easy read over what could otherwise be tedious ground. One wonders at times, however, what R. himself thinks about the material he rather mechanically presents here. Chapter 5, while also ending without a conclusion, appears clearer in purpose: 'Athenian Democracy and Us' focuses, with a disapproving air, on recent, mostly American efforts to connect ancient democracy to modern times. Among other things, R. notes the pressure on presses and academics to make even serious scholarly publications 'accessible' to ill-prepared students, and the frequent scholarly attempts to highlight the utility of studying ancient democratic practices in order to reconsider modern ones.

R. saves the lion's share of opinion for the last chapter, 'How to Study Athenian Democracy'. Here he juxtaposes his own views of how history should be done with those of other scholars. Josiah Ober's stated positions figure prominently: Ober is criticized not for his focus on ancient ideology (which R. rightly considers complementary to M. H. Hansen's and R.'s own institutional approach), but for showing 'wishful thinking' in interpreting the Cleisthenic reforms of 508/7 and for a dubious inclination to draw modern lessons from ancient history. R. also attacks the tendency of some to infer an overly broad rôle for *demokratia* in Athenian drama, religion, and other cultural realms. V. D. Hanson, among others, draws fire for the sometimes simplistic use of classical history to teach moral and political lessons.

The case R. makes overall, when considered with the qualifications he carefully appends along the way, is persuasive. I have long believed, for example, that it is largely irrelevant that one cannot attain absolute historical objectivity; the important thing is for historians to make the effort to remain objective in the face of their circumstances and biases. He also puts it well when he states that 'history is more useful when it does not try too self-consciously to be useful' (p. 90). Less satisfying is a phrase on which R. relies overmuch when criticizing other approaches: we must 'do justice' to the past events and people we study. It sounds reasonable, but what exactly does it mean?

Not all will agree with the theses of R.'s engaging little book, but it is thought-provoking and worthy of every classicist's attention.

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ATHENIAN GREED

R. K. BALOT: *Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens*. Pp. x + 291. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001. Cased, £27.95. ISBN: 0-691-04855-X.

This ambitious, wide-ranging and complex book aims not just at intellectual history but also at the social and political history of greed in Athens (pp. 1, 57). B. examines a range of vocabulary of greed (e.g. *pleonexia*, *koros*, *philochrematia*) that is specifically connected to the notion of injustice and that therefore fits into not only a moral but a political framework. As an umbrella definition, greed is defined as

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'acquisitiveness' or 'an excessive desire to get more' (p. 1) at the expense of others, whether in the *polis* or the international community. Detailed analyses chart the development of attitudes toward greed, with special attention to the differing linkages between greed and other concepts, which in turn reflected the historical context and experiences of writers.

The central thesis of the book is that greed was embedded in the Athenian collective, democratic psyche and shaped its 'national character'. In the heyday of the Athenian empire under Pericles, it created consensus among the classes (B.'s preferred term) because it was directed outward against other Greeks; during and after the Peloponnesian War, greed was unleashed as a destructive force within the *polis* in the hands of demagogues and oligarchs. In turn, Plato and Aristotle were profoundly influenced by the history and embeddedness of greed in democratic Athens in its destructive phase. While Aristotle saw greed as the central problem affecting all political structures in their extreme forms (tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy), his experience of Athenian democracy influenced his formulation of the notion of distributive shares in which the rich justly possess more than the poor. Democracies, for him, were problematic precisely because of the competition between the democratic notion of egalitarian shares and the aristocratic insistence on proportional shares, as well as between demagogues or oligarchs and other élites whose shares could be unjustly taken away. Thus the charge of injustice was then employed as a potent weapon by both sides. Plato, by contrast, constructed a society that would eliminate greed altogether.

While B. states that he is not interested primarily in philosophical, ethical discussions, Aristotle in particular looms large as a foundation. In B.'s stimulating discussion, the philosopher's focus on greed in his critique of democracy and demagogues becomes a critical starting point to address the question of the origins and development of the special link between greed and democracy. Beginning the real focus of the book is a chapter principally on Solon. B. uses the lawgiver's poetry as evidence for the conditioning of Athenians, both *demos* and rich, to connect justice and greed in terms of the notion of proper shares, though he exaggerates the political focus of the fragments. Solon's poetry is held up as 'preeminently responsible for articulating for Athens the internal political benefits of justice and reciprocity' (p. 133).

The core of the book is the chapters on Herodotus and Thucydides, who construct their critiques of democracy through the linkage of greed, democracy, and imperialism. B. argues that Herodotus, in treating post-Cleisthenic Athens, reconfigures greed from being a potentially destructive force within the *polis* to something that now 'glued together elites and demos in a powerful, dangerous military, and now political coalition' (p. 127). Athenians as a whole 'transfer[red] their desires for more outward against Persians, Medizers, and other Greek city-states in general' (p. 127). B. perceptively demonstrates Herodotus' ambivalence toward not only Athenian democracy and imperialism but also the Alcmaeonid clan, which he links to greed and tyranny (through the story of Alcmaeon's visit to Croesus). Thus the brief mention of Pericles, combined with the barbaric behavior of his father Xanthippos after the siege of Sestos in the aftermath of the Persian Wars, can be read as foreshadowing the tyrannical nature of the Athenian empire.

B.'s interpretation of Thucydides allows both Pericles and the Athenian empire to receive a better treatment. The Athenians were united in their greed, but avoided the potential for civil conflict by directing their desire outward in the *arche*, ultimately in the pursuit of glory or honor. In a nice metaphor, B. argues that 'Athenians collectively reinvested the financial dividends of imperialism into a mutual fund of empire that kept expanding and hence kept winning glory. In the pre-war period, Athenian power was commensurate with Athenian desire, by virtue of wise leadership that kept in check the potential excesses of desire' (p. 154). But after Pericles' death, it all changed: Pericles' successors—and the oligarchs of 411 (Chapter 6)—destroyed the moderation that had characterized Athenian greed previously by allowing individual desires to subvert the collective compact.

Interesting, nuanced discussions punctuate the book and the overall argument of a special connection between greed and democracy is thought-provoking and greatly appealing. Ultimately, however, it is compromised by analyses and interpretations that veer from the texts, and by a failure to demonstrate convincingly that the problem of greed and its linkage to injustice in political discourse and in history were peculiar to democracy. Passages are alleged to say things they do not (e.g. Artabanus nowhere speaks of contempt for one's possessions in his speech in Hdt. 7), or not to say things they do (e.g. Cleomenes as unsusceptible to greed, p. 120). It is often confusing whether B. is talking about history or just ideas in authors: the boundary is often unclear (e.g. the statement following the conclusion of a chapter on Solon that 'The history of Athenian greed begins again in earnest with the history of Athens just before and during the Persian Wars' [p. 99] seems to imply that in reality there was not much greed between Solon and 500 B.C.; but how do we know?). Attention to genre, function, performative context (where relevant), and audience, essential for any argument about intertextuality and historical impact, is missing; without it, to take one example concerning the élite's identification with the *polis*, the claim that Solon's poetry was 'mak[ing] a concerted attempt to teach all Athenians, including the elite' (p. 82), and its presumption that in any case he is teaching the 'demos', whom B. sees as an already articulated political class, are unsubstantiated. A final general problem is that, while 'greed' may be elastic, as B. argues, it is so elastic in his discussion as to embrace practically anything. Is the destruction of a banquet service in association with graves necessarily a sign of aristocratic greed (p. 77)? Does the definition of *ophelia* as 'profit' necessarily or always equate to greed (e.g. p. 151)?

While the chapter on Herodotus (B.'s critical starting point for the reconfiguration of greed from within the community to the outside world) has valuable discussions, it shows some sloppy reading and insufficient understanding of Herodotus' aims and approaches. B.'s view that a chief concern of Herodotus 'in documenting the resistance [to Xerxes' invasion] is the degree to which the Greeks could present a unified, Panhellenic front' (p. 108) is odd, in view of the historian's emphasis on disunity and self-serving *polis* behavior. Likewise curious is the statement that Herodotus 'makes no claim about human nature', since an overarching theme in the *Histories* is precisely the inability of humans who possess excessive wealth and power to escape greed, which necessarily activates divine envy and precipitates their downfall. This is precisely why the *Histories* have struck readers as containing a warning to Athens.

A major theme with which B. is concerned is the dichotomy between Athenian and Spartan national character in Herodotus and Thucydides as it relates to greed. B. argues that in these authors and in history, greed was absent in Sparta (until after the Peloponnesian War, at least) and omnipresent in varying degrees in Athens. This is a reflection of a difference not in human nature, but rather of culture. An important example for B. is the story of Aristagoras' visits to Cleomenes and then to the Athenians to try to get help for the Ionian Revolt by promising riches (5.49–54, 97). On B.'s reading, Cleomenes was not susceptible to greed, but 'acquisitive . . . elites' at Athens were (p. 120). Yet Herodotus does present Cleomenes as susceptible to greed and gullibility at first—the historian notes Aristagoras' success until after two days, when only the distance to Susa made him refuse (5.50). Herodotus also implies that he might well have succumbed to a large bribe if little Gorgo had not talked sense into him (5.51). Moreover, unmentioned are other examples that would correspond to B.'s broad definition of greed, such as the reply Herodotus has Gelon of Syracuse make to a request by ambassadors from Greek *poleis* for help against Xerxes, in which Gelon refers to the profits from the *emporia* on Sicily that the cities liked to reap (7.158). The only named ambassador was Spartan (7.153), and one of the words used for 'profit' is *ophelia*, a word B. sees as connoting greed in Thucydides (1.75). Moreover, if Herodotus sees a link between *hybris* and greed, then the Spartan Pausanias should also be guilty of the excessive desire for more, since Herodotus uses the word *hybris* to refer to his behavior against other Greeks (8.2.3). As for Athens, Herodotus makes no mention of any leaders in this story, greedy or otherwise.

B. concedes that after Athens' defeat at the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans themselves exhibited greed, but blames this on particular individuals. Yet, in his discussion of greed and Athenian imperialism he credits individuals with fostering greed and expansion (e.g. p. 120). In any case, it is difficult to make an argument about the uniqueness of greed to democracy given the absence of comparable sources for non-democratic *poleis* like Sparta. If we possessed critical, informed sources for the Spartan conquest of Messenia, they might well have put it in terms of what B. would call greed.

In the case of Thucydides, B. nicely observes that the Athenians in their speech at Sparta say that they were 'conquered' by fear, honor, and *ophelia*, translated as 'profit' and equated with greed, thus implying that their 'hunger for more is an unrestrained appetite that acts as the directing principle of their hyperdisciplined fighting power' (p. 152). Yet B. also argues that the Athenians' greed to expand their *arche* before the Peloponnesian War was 'properly restrained by the moderation (*sophrosune*) of Pericles and others and was christened by Pericles as a way to bring Athens glory' (p. 153). Moreover, for B., Thucydides' personal views can be extracted: 'His *History* is in some sense a memorial to the glorious edifice whose foundations were Athenian greed' (p. 176), and the historian 'admires the Athenians for organizing greed out of domestic politics' (p. 177).

Perhaps, however, the portrait of the Athenian *arche* and of Pericles in Thucydides is considerably more complex than B. allows in his rather sanitized presentation. Pericles exhibits strength in holding in check the unruly, irrational masses; but he is also made to say that Athens' *arche* was like an immoral tyranny (2.62.3)—by nature excessive and unrestrained in Greek thought—and the reader knows that Pericles was instrumental in making it so. Moreover, Pericles' injunction to the Athenians in the Funeral Oration (2.42.3) to become *erastai* of the city (or its *dunamis*, an ambiguity in the grammar unnoted by B.) is hardly a restraining comment. One of B.'s supports for Thucydides' admiration is the absence of greed in the Pentekontaetia; but on his elastic view of greed it is there, even without the explicit terminology under scrutiny. Thucydides saw the rapacity of the Athenians in their empire for what it was all along, if one thinks, for example, of the brutal war with Thasos to seize its resources (1.100), and the extortion of money that led to increased power—not glory (1.99). It is not clear that these, not to mention the unjust enslavement of Naxos, elicit Thucydides' admiration. He may rather reinforce, not contest, Herodotus' critical, if implicit, judgement of the *arche*.

There is no doubt that the excessive desire for more was a divisive force in Athenian democracy, or, alternatively, a cohesive one. The idea of a consensus about greed complements Finley's influential discussion of the benefits of *arche* to Athenians from rich to poor. However, the larger linear argument of a development from a period of moderated greed directed outward to divisive greed within the *polis* that B. sees in the texts of Herodotus and Thucydides is too pat, and takes on an increasingly artificial feel, as many of the important supports evaporate upon scrutiny and subtleties are lost. If the history is drawn from the texts, then it becomes problematic as well. B. poses important and intriguing questions and his book should be read; but a more careful treatment is required to answer them fully.

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SPARTA: 'A MODERN WOMAN IMAGINES'

S. B. POMEROY: *Spartan Women*. Pp. xvii + 198, ills. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Paper. ISBN: 0-19-513067-7 (0-19-513066-9 hbk).

Spartan women have proved exciting down the millennia. Sometimes they are all too exciting, as moralists have inflated the virgins and mothers of the Lakonian villages into monsters or exemplars, bold sluts or moral karyatids. A generation ago, Sarah Pomeroy, with her unopinionated textbook *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves*, did more than anyone to establish the study of Greek women generally as an open, non-partisan discipline. But Sparta here has worked its traditional magic. P.'s new book is excited and personal. Taken at face value, it will be widely influential and elaborately misleading. Behind the Spartan women reconstructed by P. stands an unacknowledged template, of an ideal of womanhood altogether better known.

A mark of sophisticated commentary on Sparta has been, from the first, learned doubt. Thucydides once confessed himself obstructed by the secrecy of the Spartan constitution (5.68.2); Plutarch opened his *Lykourgos* by observing the pervasive discord among his sources. In recent scholarship, the question of *le mirage spartiate* has been central, as, for example, in the difference between Cartledge and Kennell on whether late information about the *agoge* can be read back to the Classical period. Serious doubt is now cast even on whether Spartan austerity predated the fifth century. P. is not at home in these waters.

P.'s remark, presented parenthetically, that 'the written evidence [*sc.* on Spartan women] . . . is not without problems' (p. 163) as an understatement would be hard to beat. Her approach to sources may appear, if undiscriminating, at least systematically inclusive, as on p. 69, where she seems to give equal weight to Aristotle and to the (apocryphal) *Sayings of Spartan Women.* But in reality, important material is neglected. Episodes here underplayed say much about the author's (ir)rationale. From Theopompos (at Athen. 609b) we hear of fourth-century Sparta executing some of its prominent citizen women for political reasons—a rarity in Greek history, suggesting an exceptionally high influence for Spartan women. From Xenophon and Aristotle there is evidence of Spartan women panicking in the face of an enemy invasion (of 370/69)—again, exceptional material since concerned with behaviour in mass and in public.The third-century revolutions at Sparta generated remarkably extensive surviving testimony on Spartan women's action—from Phylarkhos via Plutarch (in the Lives of Agis and Kleomenes): detailed and idealizing material which again involves political executions of leading women. These episodes, which require careful treatment in any work on Spartan women, are passed over rapidly in P.'s book. Why? Perhaps, as

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