

## Book Reviews

*At Cross Purposes: US–Taiwan Relations Since 1942.* By RICHARD C. BUSH. [Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. xii + 287 pp. \$27.95. ISBN 0-7656-1372-7.]

*Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US–China Relations, 1989–2000.* By ROBERT L. SUETTINGER. [Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003. xii + 556 pp. £29.95, \$39.95. ISBN 0-8157-8206-3.]

These are two very fine books written by individuals who were deeply involved in the making of American policy towards China in the 1990s. From 1997 to 2002, Richard C. Bush served as chairman and managing director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the semi-official body created in 1979 by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to manage relations with the island in the wake of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1994, Robert Suettinger, a career intelligence officer, joined the staff of the National Security Council at the White House as director of Asian Affairs; a position that he held until he moved to the National Intelligence Council in 1997 (coincidentally, as Richard Bush's replacement).

Neither volume is, strictly speaking, a memoir. Bush does draw on his personal experience as a congressional aide during the 1980s and early 1990s and much less so on his years with the AIT. However, the bulk of his study constitutes superbly researched discussions of what he considers to be "relatively unstudied issues" related to the historical evolution of relations between the United States, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Suettinger, on the other hand, provides a memoir-like narrative of the years he was in the White House, but relies largely on research, interviews with major participants in the policy process, and his own insights for the remainder of the book. However, although neither author adopts a strictly participant-observer approach, both are clearly drawing on the knowledge acquired during extensive government service to make judgments on the complex issues they address, and it is this wisdom which makes these books essential reading.

In *At Cross Purposes: US–Taiwan Relations Since 1942*, Richard C. Bush explores a potpourri of issues, including a discussion of Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to return Taiwan to China after the Second World War; an analysis of American efforts to qualify that decision during the 1950s and 1960s; a careful examination of the language and logic of the "sacred texts" (the three joint communiqués and the TRA); an examination of American responses to Kuomintang (KMT) authoritarian rule in the periods before and after the initiation of democratization; and, finally, an overview of American policy-making on the Taiwan issue since 1989. A conclusion briefly updates this overview to the eve of the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan and highlights some themes of the book as well as their resonances in present policy.

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These are by no means new questions. Many have been treated extensively by other commentators. Yet Bush consistently succeeds either in enriching the prevailing wisdom or providing new insights. For example, the section on the background to the decision at the Cairo Conference to return Taiwan to China provides a vivid picture of the pivotal role played by President Roosevelt, emphasizing both the impact of his vision of China's role in the post-war world as well as his casual indifference to the various options being developed in other parts of the government. Similarly, the analysis of the evolution of post-war American policy towards the status of Taiwan and its ruling government (a distinction which, itself, helps Bush to deconstruct and clarify a complicated picture) not only adds greater nuance to our understanding, but also qualifies the commonly accepted notion that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles pursued a "two China policy."

To my mind, the most valuable chapter in the book is Bush's careful analysis of the essential Chinese and American statements on the Taiwan issue. He analyses the joint communiqués (1972, 1978 and 1982) from several perspectives: the wording of the texts themselves, the negotiating records and the accompanying statements made by the US and the PRC. By providing this rich context and carefully deconstructing the language (English and Chinese) used by each side, he provides essential insights into the nature of the joint communiqués; the frequent discrepancies that exist between public and private statements on the American side; the judgment, based on careful textual analysis, that the American side made concessions to the Chinese; and the fact that the poorly or vaguely drafted statements allowed each side to sustain its own self-serving interpretation of the statements.

These are useful conclusions. In the first place, they suggest that the Chinese insistence that American actions contradicted earlier statements is based not simply on a negotiating strategy that proceeds from an assumption of China as an aggrieved party, but on their analysis of the texts and on private statements made by the negotiators (most dramatically, Richard Nixon's comment that he could do more than he could say in public). Equally important, they imply that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait has been sustained by each side's respective (sometimes even contradictory) readings of ambiguous documents intended to fudge difficult issues. Recent developments in relations between the United States, Taiwan and China suggest the declining usefulness of such an approach.

Presumably, Bush's analysis of these statements (as well as of the TRA) is based on his own deliberations during the period when he was deeply involved in the management of US-Taiwan relations – again, indicative of how his government service provides a unique perspective on what, basically, are historical questions. However, it also demonstrates what is lost in our understanding of these documents by Bush's general reticence to reflect on his experience heading AIT from its Washington headquarters.

As noted above, the AIT is technically an "unofficial" body charged

with managing relations with Taiwan. In fact, it works closely with the State Department and many of its personnel are seconded from there. Presumably, the TRA and the three communiqués figured heavily in Bush's discussions with officials on Taiwan, colleagues in the executive branch, as well as congressional members and staff. It would have been useful to know how these complex documents were interpreted by these very different constituencies as well as how the various ambiguities and nuances, which he skilfully identifies, actually played out in intra-governmental relations and negotiations with interlocutors abroad.

Similarly, the final chapter on Washington's Taiwan policy since 1989 is largely an historical narrative of the policy output, with very little focus on the process in general or, more specifically, on the role of Bush or the AIT during the late 1990s and the first years of the 21st century. For the most part, his insights into the *making* of American policy are found in the chapters on attempts to influence domestic politics during periods of KMT authoritarian rule (chapter three) and democratization (chapter six). In the former case, the emphasis is on the executive branch; in the latter, Bush focuses on the efforts of Congress and, in particular, his mentor, Steve Solarz.

With the exception of what he presents as the unique case of human rights policy in the 1980s, he emphasizes the inability (and frequent unwillingness) of the US government in general – and Congress in particular – to shape the direction of politics in Taiwan. Overall, Bush seems to minimize the role of Congress in shaping policy, especially in respect to what is considered by many to be its most potent tool for exercising influence – the Taiwan Relations Act. Yet, I wonder if this is really the case. For example, if one looks at the conflict over policy towards China and Taiwan during the Clinton administration, the simple existence of the TRA – more than its specific provisions – provided a strong legal pretext for congressional intervention by threatening additional legislation and joining with pro-Taiwan groups inside as well as outside the administration to influence policy, especially in regard to arms sales.

Here, once again, Bush's reticence to share his own experiences narrows the scope of the discussion. He feels free to draw on his reminiscences as a member of Solarz's staff when discussing the congressional role in regard to human rights. However, when it comes to the domestic political battles of the late 1990s, for which he had a front-row seat and in which he likely played an important role, he provides few real insights into the dynamics of policy-making in Washington.

A similar opportunity is missed in the discussion of American efforts to draw up policy in regard to the domestic political situation in Taiwan. A major theme of the book is how, until the recent democratization of the island, the United States was able to make agreements and statements focused on its own interests there without reference to the wishes of the people on the island. Since then, Bush argues, Taiwan's citizens have "gained a voice on national policy, including policy toward the mainland," thus complicating American policy-making.

How has it been complicated? How has the United States tried to shape its policy to these new realities of domestic politics? These are questions that are central to any understanding of Washington's involvement in cross-strait relations from the mid-1990s to the recent furore over Taiwan's constitutional referendum. Bush was at the centre of many of the early attempts to deal with the delicate issues that touched on Taiwan's domestic politics. Thus, it would have been valuable if he had used that experience to provide, from a practitioner's perspective, insights into how this issue affected the management of relations with Taiwan and the range of options available to Washington.

This is, of course, asking too much of one book. Richard C. Bush sets out to re-examine questions that are largely historical and he is enormously successful in this effort. Those who study US–Taiwan relations can only hope that, in his next book, he will provide us with equally insightful glimpses into how many of these issues played out in the actual management of relations with Taiwan during the late 1990s.

Robert Suettinger cannot be charged with reticence in making judgments about the policy process in Washington or in drawing on his own experiences during extraordinarily difficult times in relations between Taiwan, China and the United States. Yet, once again, this is more than a memoir. As is the case with the Bush volume, the author takes a topic that has been the subject of many excellent recent studies and adds not simply fresh information, but also some unique and extremely valuable perspectives.

Suettinger argues that the fall of the Soviet Union and the events at Tiananmen had a decisive and debilitating impact on Sino-American relations. Bereft of a strategic rationale and poisoned by the impact of the 4 June 1989 tragedy, the relationship, the author believes, lurched from crisis to crisis during the Bush and Clinton administrations and remains today on an unsteady footing. The “current state of U.S.–China relations,” he argues, “cannot be understood without reference to Tiananmen” (p. 13).

His principal analytical – and explanatory – tool draws on two-level game theory: an approach that highlights the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy. Foreign policy in each country is not the result of clear-headed strategic thinking based on a vision of national interests. Rather, decision-makers on both sides of the Pacific working with unwieldy bureaucracies, seeking to preserve their own political power and labouring under the influence of prevailing stereotypes, have produced policies shaped as much by domestic factors as by the international challenges. Although Suettinger never rigorously applies or develops the two-level game paradigm *per se*, his study contains much evidence for those who would seek to do so.

As one might expect, given the available information and Suettinger's actual experience, the discussion of the American side is much richer in detail than that of the Chinese side. In looking at the policy process in Washington, the author pulls no punches. He harshly criticizes the FBI for its leaks during the campaign finance scandals and for its management

of the Wen Ho Lee case. Congress appears as an obstacle to making effective policy in part because of the salience of party politics and its self-perception as the upholder of a “values based foreign policy” (concern for human rights, etc.) in contrast to the more “realist” foreign policy orientation Suettinger apparently sees prevailing in the executive branch (p. 426). However, even within the latter, divisions and conflicts abound: especially the all-too-familiar conflict between the State Department and the National Security Council (curiously, the Pentagon, which was deeply involved in bureaucratic politics surrounding China/Taiwan policy in the late 1990s, receives little attention). In this conflict there seems to be little doubt where Suettinger’s loyalties lie. In the Clinton administration, he makes clear, China policy got on track only when it came under the supervision of National Security Advisers, Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger. Indeed, the book ends with the assertion that “there is no substitute for leadership by the National Security Council on China policy” (p. 426).

Not surprisingly, Suettinger’s description of the still-opaque Chinese decision-making process is less detailed. The focus is on elite actors, and although he tries to depict the context in Beijing in categories parallel to those used in analysing the United States (bureaucracies, interest groups, press, etc.), the description remains at a very high level of generality, with one exception: the role of the military. In this case, the author cites numerous incidences – especially during Jiang Zemin’s consolidation of power – when dependence on military support strengthened the voice of the military in the policy process and “limited his policy flexibility” (p. 208).

The author’s analysis of the twists and turns in Sino-American relations from 1989 to 2000 is masterful. Maintaining his focus on domestic developments in each country, Suettinger draws on a wide variety of sources – his own experiences, interviews, newspaper articles, memoirs, other studies – to present an historical narrative of the major events of these years. Even those who believe they are well-versed in these events will gain new insights from this excellent example of diplomatic history. Of course, the discussion of those events in which Suettinger was directly involved is the strongest, with the examination of the 1995–1996 Taiwan crisis especially rich and well done.

However, there are other ways, more subtle than personal recollections, in which a reader can benefit from the author’s government experience. One is the exceptional access to a wide range of former officials, many of whom are former colleagues. Another is reflected in the manner in which he uses the sources at his disposal. Abjuring the use of classified or formerly classified documents from either the United States or China, he relies very heavily on press reports from Taiwan and Hong Kong despite his acknowledgment that, although they “are often very good, they are also sometimes ill-informed, biased, inaccurate, and speculative.” In a curious disclaimer, he notes that use of such materials “should not be construed as validation based on my experience as an intelligence

analyst,” but “... on my own personal appraisal, not that of the U.S. government” (p. 11).

Other than being a somewhat convoluted way of making the usual qualification that his analysis does not reflect government views, this is a difference without a distinction. Clearly the author cannot erase the analytical skills and knowledge that he has gained in government. His judicious and informed use of these materials is an important element that sets this book apart. And those specialists who have struggled with the temptations of using materials of doubtful provenance will be rewarded by flipping back and forth to the footnotes to see the judgments Suettinger has made. This is especially the case with his heavy reliance on *The Tiananmen Papers*, a set of documents that Suettinger himself consistently notes “supposedly [came] from central Communist Party archives.” (p. 410)

The author’s long experience in viewing China and Sino-American relations as a government official is also a mixed blessing. It seems natural that Suettinger’s experience as a day-to-day observer of dealings with Beijing on sensitive political and security issues would result in the gloomy picture that he paints. However, like the view of the sky by the frog in the well, there is more to the relationship than that gleaned from observing government dealings. As he notes, since Tiananmen, the United States and China have developed a complex web of economic and social relationships. Although certainly not without problems, these elements – often ignored when focusing on the volatile official relationship – provide additional stability and strength to the relationship.

Finally, it seems to me that the emphasis on Tiananmen as marking a juncture “when the relationship between the United States and China went instantly from amity and strategic cooperation to hostility, distrust, and misunderstanding” is overemphasized. As others have noted, the Sino-American relationship was difficult in the 18 years following Kissinger’s trip in July 1971, despite the “strategic co-operation” in regard to the Soviet Union (even Suettinger, at one point, refers to the basis for co-operation as “tattered,” p. 415) and, even before the spring of 1989, it was showing signs of strain over many of the issues that came to the fore after Tiananmen.

Indeed, if one looks at Sino-American relations both from a long historic perspective as well as from a structural analysis of the relative positions of each side in the global system, Tiananmen appears to be just another issue that has aggravated a historically difficult relationship rather than a decisive turning point. As Richard C. Bush suggests in his book, relations with revolutionary China, whether led by the KMT or the Communist Party, have never been smooth. And, as Harold Isaacs has noted, stereotypes and ambivalence have dominated the relationship almost from the beginning. They were not created by the events in Tiananmen Square. The drive to achieve national dignity and international status has been a part of the Chinese Revolution since the early 20th century, and the competing objectives of the US and China in the Pacific area have compounded the difficulties bequeathed by history.

These historic and structural factors not only suggest the need for a greater perspective on the decisive role of Tiananmen, they also caution that the “good news” of a “government in transition” (p. 441) that Suettinger alludes to (but does not define at all clearly) at the end of the book should not be exaggerated. Sino-American relations seem destined to be difficult regardless of the political system that rules China. In the final paragraph of the book, he sums it up wisely: “Maintaining balanced, beneficial and constructive relations between the United States and China will never be easy.”

STEVEN M. GOLDSTEIN

*Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior.* Edited by SUISHENG ZHAO. [Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 319 pp. \$26.95. ISBN 0-7656-1285-2.]

Suisheng Zhao has assembled this volume from articles recently published in the *Journal of Contemporary China*, which he edits. Its chapters cover recognizable terrain for political scientists: whether China, as a rising power, will seek to maximize its relative or absolute gains; the likelihood its increasing power will tend towards status-quo or belligerent lines; and the degree of Chinese ‘exceptionalism’ when compared with other countries. As the subtitle might suggest, the contributions present China in a favourable light, stressing how China’s leaders have spurned ideological purism for the pragmatic weighing of national interests, with only nationalism to serve as a double-edged sword by conferring legitimacy on the government, but potentially also taking it away.

The assertion that strategic calculations govern Chinese foreign policy contrasts with other interpretations, such as those of David Lampton in *Same Bed, Different Dreams*, who assigns a large role to domestic politics, or Peter Gries in *Understanding Chinese Nationalism*, who highlights the constraining role of nationalist ideology on the ability of China’s leaders to de-escalate crises with other countries. Zhao’s contribution lies less in defending the assertion of pragmatism against those competing perspectives and more in drawing upon it in offering fresh material.

Zhao, himself, offers chapters on the variants of Chinese nationalism (nativist, anti-traditionalist and pragmatic), adjustments in post-Tiananmen foreign policy, and China’s Asia–Pacific relationships. These are among the volume’s strongest offerings. The most ambitious chapter is by Rex Li, who notes the insufficiencies of realism and liberalism and instead offers a theory in which considerations of likely returns from increased trade impel Chinese leaders to pursue more pacific or belligerent policies towards the West. His attempted reconciliation is interesting, but does not fit the timing or participants’ observations either in Mao’s détente with President Nixon or in the more recent warming of Sino-



American ties between 1995 and 1999. During the latter, the possibility of expanded trade ties was not raised until the signing of the US–China WTO Agreement in November 1999, but Beijing’s decision to moderate its stance towards America following the Straits crisis occurred in August 1995, before a meeting between Warren Christopher and the Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, in Brunei. Like the earlier warming of 1971–72, it appears to have been a decision made largely on security grounds. While many in Beijing continued to believe the US was attempting strategic encirclement and dovish voices had been discredited by the American extension of a visa to Lee Teng-hui, Jiang Zemin believed improved ties would permit China to further its interests in a world where his nation needed America more than America needed China.

Other chapters worth noting are Lowell Dittmer’s beautifully written history of the Sino-Russian relationship, and Lau Siu-kai’s preference for historical research over broad generalization in demonstrating that, at least in the case of Hong Kong, pragmatism pre-dated Deng. Andrew Scobell presents a summary of his published research on Chinese strategic culture. From his finding that some high-level members of the People’s Liberation Army were reluctant to go to war in Korea, we may infer the existence of a strategic culture that holds constant decades later; but Scobell has not demonstrated that, and to his credit he is rightly modest in his conclusions. Jing-dong Yuan analyses the motivations driving Chinese nuclear proliferation, which provides a way to expand influence in the Middle East and Pakistan, and to bargain or retaliate against the West. However, Yuan sees an adoption of international standards in China’s move from Maoist calls for anti-imperialist proliferation towards supporting an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Other selections would have benefited from greater fleshing out. Wu Xinbo’s chapter on antinomies within Chinese foreign policy is given short treatment, and it would have been intriguing to connect them with policy outcomes. Zi Zhongyun’s chapter on ideology and the Sino-American relationship regurgitates Michael Hunt, with a questionable fixation upon the role of race in the making of China policy in Washington. Zhang Junbo and Yao Yunzhu’s piece on differences between Chinese and Western strategic cultures is captivating as a depiction of Chinese perception, but is less convincing as historical analysis. The authors contrast Chinese concern with the concept of *dao*, moral rectitude and stratagem, with Western preoccupation with ‘material’ rather than ‘human’ factors in war. Zhang and Yao’s reading of Western strategic history does not seem to have included Machiavellian *virtù*, the traditions of just war and *ius ad bellum* – or more to the point, the Trojan horse.

The assertion that China is a great power occurs repeatedly in the volume, but only Zhao, in chapter eight, comes close to putting forward a justification or definition for the claim: his suggestion is that China’s great power status was contingent upon Cold War bipolarity. Also, given Zhao’s allowance that Chinese pragmatism collapses under foreign demands triggering historical sensitivities, is this true pragmatism? This is



especially the case as the more important security or human-rights issues for both China and the West are ones involving precisely such historical sensitivities – Taiwan, Tibet and the treatment of Chinese dissidents.

It in no way detracts from Zhao's achievement to note that the more extensive use of an English-language proof-reader might have spared readers such eclecticism as “neo-conservatism” and “prudential foreign policy.” Other readers might find themselves distracted by the volume's use of “1989 events” instead of Tiananmen Square, as well as the quotation marks surrounding, for example, “human rights.” Nonetheless, Zhao has assembled an impressive collection of contributions, especially on Chinese nationalism, regional relationships and prospects for adopting the norms of international society. This volume will provide a useful supplement to other edited work built on similar terrain, such as Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh's *Chinese Foreign Policy*.

PATRICK BELTON

*The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China.* By MA JISEN.  
[Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2004. 466 pp. Hard cover \$39.00, ISBN 962-996-149-0; paperback \$25.00, ISBN 962-996-202-0.]

This superb history of the Cultural Revolution inside China's foreign ministry is a carefully documented account by a participant whose overriding concern is with the factual record and with setting it straight. Ma Jisen, who worked in the West European Department between 1952 and 1969, asserts that on a number of crucial points popular understanding of Mao's assault on revisionism remains shaped by what are really little more than “dramatically oversimplified... [and] brazenly distorted... cartoonized rumour accounts” (pp. 403–404). In support of this assertion, she adduces much new and powerful evidence, especially from the first years of the Cultural Revolution. The end result is a book that may well prompt many readers to seriously reconsider much of our accepted knowledge about what happened – and why – in those tumultuous years when the British Mission in Beijing was set ablaze, Chinese students waving the Little Red Book were roughed up by the KGB in Red Square, and Mao turned from obsessing about American imperialist paper tigers to describing (in conversation with Edgar Snow in December 1970) that country's Republican president, Richard M. Nixon, as “a good person (*haoren*), the number one good person in the world!”

The author is not out to replace old myths with new ones. She finds no simple answers and, in fact, does not even seem to seek them. Much of the value of her work lies in the subtle way it brings to the fore the *absurdity* of the Cultural Revolution. On occasion, her raw data, her carefully selected illustrations from contemporary texts, speak only too

well for themselves: “If you want peace, the revisionists will not let you have peace,” she quotes Foreign Minister Chen Yi as saying in June 1966 – then, a few lines later, she has him denouncing, in the very same speech, the revisionist fallacy of seeking peaceful co-existence (pp. 13–14).

While the greater and best part of her book focuses on the second half of the 1960s, she also deals with the early 1970s and the “repairing of foreign relations” symbolized by the PRC’s admission to the United Nations and the country’s long overdue normalization of relations with a host of Western “capitalist countries.” Though she refuses “to generalize ... in a few simple terms” about the enigmatic Zhou Enlai, she manages in all of this to draw a fascinating portrait of the premier who “led the implementation of Mao’s revolutionary line in foreign affairs, and then worked to change this line ...” (p. 353).

An important story, told here for the first time in some detail, is that of the crack-down on so-called “May 16 elements.” After 1967, 56 per cent of the Foreign Ministry’s 3,000 staff were “apprehended on suspicion of being” members of a “May 16” conspiracy (p. 267). At first, Mao and Zhou Enlai had argued that the only thing they knew for certain was that these were bad people. Exceptional interrogations, however, conducted by PLA representatives in a make-shift prison in the Foreign Ministry basement quickly allowed them to secure intelligence showing that the “May 16 elements” in fact constituted a nation-wide network of ultra-leftist ideological extremists determined to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat! As the author points out, the crack-down in the ministry “was [run] under Zhou’s direction and became an example for the whole country” (p. 268). Over six pages, under the heading “Various ways to extort a confession,” she helps the reader understand, in painful detail, what that “example for the whole country” was all about (e.g. “[Point] 5: Threats with inducement taking advantage of family feelings... [Point] 8: Nowhere to appeal ...”).

*The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China* comes with an English–Chinese list of names and terms, bibliography and index. Meticulous attention has been paid to translation and editorial detail: errors in the 2003 Chinese language-edition (ISBN 962-996-067-2) have been corrected and an appendix providing “a brief glimpse of what happened to some of the leading cadres [in the ministry] in their later years” (p. 396) has been expanded. An essential book for China historians, all serious students of PRC foreign relations and, last but not least, the greater and lesser Sir Percy Cradocks of this world.

MICHAEL SCHOENHALS

*China Against the Tides: Restructuring through Revolution, Radicalism and Reform* (second edition). By MARC BLECHER. [London and New York: Continuum, 2003. xv + 246 pp. £19.99. ISBN 0-8264-6422-X.]

Marc Blecher's magisterial text on China's political economy was first published in 1996. The tale of China's unfolding political economy after the 1949 Revolution has often been told, but Blecher did full justice to the subject, telling his story with aplomb, verve and no little eloquence. By focusing on politics and economics, he sensibly restricted the scope of his book, and by combining three narrative chapters with more analytical chapters on the state, inequality, as well as economics and politics, Blecher's reach extended well beyond that of any mere descriptive account.

This book, the second edition, retains the essential structure of its predecessor, but updates the story to 2002. In addition, a significant body of new material has been included. For example, the Society chapter includes an up-to-date and apposite discussion of gender inequality, whilst that on political economy discusses the implications of WTO entry. And, in recognition of the increased blurring of the distinction between rural and urban China, the separate chapters on the rural and urban economics of the first edition have been amalgamated. A little more up-dating would have improved the text still further; for example, the chapter on pre-1949 China takes into account little by way of recent scholarship. That, however, is only a minor quibble.

In its essentials, this is a textbook, and that is reflected in the balanced and judicious tone that permeates its pages. Nevertheless, Blecher's stands as a text apart. For one thing, it does proper justice to the complexities of Chinese political economy and (in a truly excellent discussion) its administrative system. Doubtless, some will complain that it is too sophisticated for its audience, but it is hard to condemn an author for refusing to pander to the mediocre. Secondly, this book is richly informed by Blecher's own research on the local Chinese state and economy, particularly that on Shulu county (Xinji city) in Hebei, conducted with Vivienne Shue. It is, therefore, the work of a practitioner, not an onlooker. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it focuses on the fundamentals of development, class, inequality and growth, and in so doing avoids fashionable ephemera. In a sense, its flavour is rather traditional. For example, the term "social formation" is used without either apology or irony, and the 1949 Revolution retains its (rightful) place as the fundamental climacteric in 20th-century Chinese history. Not all will share Blecher's approach to these matters. However, it is hard to see how one can understand an explicitly Marxist state armed only with a knowledge of missionaries and modernization theory, or a messianic faith in the capability of the multinational to render harmonious a fractured social landscape. If we are to comprehend post-1949 China, we need to understand its political and economic structures, as well as the forces and ideals which animated its leaders. Marc Blecher's book is the place to start.

CHRIS BRAMALL

*The Power of Tiananmen: State–Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement.* By DINGXIN ZHAO. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 433 pp. ISBN 0-226-98260-2.]

The ghost of Tiananmen stubbornly refuses to leave the mansion of Chinese politics. Since Deng Xiaoping mobilized the PLA against the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Chinese government has refused to review the event or its suppression. A brief flurry of publications and public gestures affirmed the correctness of the decision in the months after 4 June until all official acknowledgments of the incident were withdrawn from circulation in November 1989: Tiananmen was best forgotten. The 15th-year anniversary in June 2004 might have been an appropriate moment to lay the ghost to rest. Jiang Yanyong, the PLA doctor who publicized China's failure to deal with SARS in 2003, attempted to puncture the silence by calling for an official re-evaluation, but he achieved little beyond being made to disappear for seven weeks. The power of silence is strong, but so too is the power of memory. Tiananmen will remain an unexploded mine on the battlefield of Chinese politics until it is properly defused.

Dingxin Zhao's study of the sociology of knowledge and action during the democracy movement provides a rich and persuasive portrait of how this power came into being. The core of his argument is that the democracy movement arose at a particular moment of alienation – a naively idealistic but disillusioned intelligentsia facing a post-ideological regime of dwindling legitimacy – within a particular ecology of social interaction – a poorly organized society facing a state that could penetrate from above but not inspire investment from social actors below. By astutely blending structural and contingent factors, Zhao is able to show how student activists and state representatives produced effects or forced reactions that neither could anticipate or control. This interplay generated emotional expectations and disappointments that each side consistently misread, thereby pushing the terms of debate onto a moral ground from which there could be no retreat.

Zhao's analysis refreshingly conceives the movement as a dialogic interaction between state and society rather than as a steady stream of righteous demands on one side and an equally steady stream of refusals on the other. His attempt to read both sides helps to restore contingency to the events that led to violence. In the absence of substantial evidence regarding decision-making within the government, however, the state remains something of a black surface in his analysis, mirroring the initiatives of the students without seeming to take any of its own. Assigning the state a reactive role minimizes its capacity to have chosen to act differently, and may neglect to acknowledge the power of state institutions to resist transformation from below. Zhao is most persuasive in showing how the failure of Chinese society to develop intermediate organizations produced a movement that was spontaneous, unidirectional and driven by "emotions, rumors, and traditional cultural elements" (p. 355) rather than by strategy or even tactics. Unlike the May Fourth

and December Ninth movements, which were “strategy-driven,” the democracy movement was “emotion-ridden due to the absence of organized forces to fill in the political vacuum created by the movement itself” (p. 296). Though Zhao bases his findings on well-constructed survey data, the book is as much a history of emotions as a sociology of mass politics: a history not so much of what people felt, though his interviewees provide him with much material on that score, but of how the escalation of affront and offence on both sides drove the movement to its tragic end.

The wave of global marketization since the 1990s has handed the Chinese state legitimacy windfalls that have closed off further calls for genuine political reform. Zhao nonetheless warns that an undemocratic, performance-based regime remains intrinsically unstable. The government’s ongoing refusal to reconsider 4 June, and its inability to respond to the now annual moral challenge to re-open the case with anything other than incarceration and thought reform, are evidence of that instability. So long as Chinese state and society are unwilling or unable to revise their relationship or imagine the desirability of pairing prosperity with justice, the power of Tiananmen is unlikely to fade.

TIMOTHY BROOK

*State Collaboration and Development Strategies in China: The Case of the China–Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (1992–2002)*. By ALEXIUS A. PEREIRA. [London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 189 pp. ISBN 0-415-30277-3.]

Take a drive through the Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) and you will see what appears to be a model industrial estate: cleanly laid out roads interspersed with green parks and endless rows of factories humming with activity. There is none of the chaotic, thrown-together feel of so many Chinese industrial parks; the atmosphere is almost serene. Talk to the managers of these factories and you will hear nothing but praise for the managers of the park. Even the biggest problems – the rapidly rising cost of land, the shortage of workers – are indications of success. Surprisingly, and despite these outward appearances, the SIP was, until recently, viewed by many as a grave disappointment.

The SIP was not supposed to be just another industrial park in China: it was a grand experiment. The idea was to transplant the strengths of the Singaporean model – effective bureaucratic management, world-class infrastructure and a stable business environment – to China through government co-operation. The park was a joint venture between a foreign consortium directed by the Singaporean government and a Chinese consortium consisting of local governments and centrally-controlled, state-owned enterprises. From the perspective of the Chinese government, the hope was that the SIP would provide a model of effective governance

for the rest of the country at the same time as it served as an engine of growth in the Jiangsu region. From the perspective of the Singaporean government, the SIP was partly an attempt to capitalize upon its strength in management in a location with far lower costs, and partly an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the Singaporean “model” in a Chinese context. The stakes were high for both parties.

Alexius A. Pereira provides an excellent account of the evolution of this project. His book does a fine job of taking the reader through each phase of the project: the initial motivations of the partners, the selection of a site, the construction of the park and its evolution over the better part of a decade. It is a straightforward account and the author’s voice is often distinctly in the background: long passages, in fact, consist of direct quotes from interviews. This approach makes the book useful as a source of information on this important project, and it is certainly the most comprehensive account to date.

The book is less satisfying in its explanation of the ups and downs of the SIP. The most important of these twists involved the economic difficulties of the park between 1997 and 1999 (a chapter entitled “Crisis”), the competition from the neighbouring Suzhou New District (SND), and the subsequent decision of the Singaporean partner to reduce its stake in the project (a chapter entitled “Disengagement”). The SND is a locally controlled, rival zone in Suzhou, and although it was created before the Singaporean project, it was not supposed to be a direct competitor – or at least this was what the Singaporeans were told by their high-level contacts in Beijing. It was with dismay that they learned that local politics in China can be every bit as important as central level politics. Local Suzhou officials, put off by what was perceived to be an arrogant Singaporean attitude, aggressively promoted the locally controlled zone. As the SIP struggled in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the SND grew rapidly.

The lack of a comparative framework makes it difficult to assess the success of the SIP project. In particular, it is difficult to judge the extent to which the transfer of the Singaporean software gave the development zone a comparative advantage. Why was a local zone more successful than the Singaporean-controlled zone? Was it because the local officials were able to imitate the Singaporean software so adroitly? Or was it perhaps because this software was actually not that important to investors after all? Similarly, once the Singaporeans reduced their stake in the SIP, it quickly became successful. This might have been a result of the Singaporean management finally reaping dividends, but it might also have been the result of greater support from local officials or simply a consequence of a general investment upswing in China. Although Pereira touches upon these questions, the book does not provide full answers.

ERIC THUN



*Catch-Up and Competitiveness in China: The Case of Large Firms in the Oil Industry.* By JIN ZHANG. [London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. xx + 230 pp. \$114.95. ISBN 0-415-33321-0.]

Jin Zhang's study of the oil industry examines the challenges China faces in its efforts to create indigenous firms capable of competing with the world's leading companies. The task of catching up with the international oil giants is daunting for China's oil firms not only because the global oil business is one with a high cost of entry in terms of experience (the top companies have been around the longest), but also because, as Zhang observes, they are chasing a moving target. The international oil industry of today is fundamentally different from that of the 1980s and early 1990s when the Chinese government embarked on its tortuous path to reform China's oil sector. The mergers that occurred between the world's major oil companies in the late 1990s created a smaller group of much larger companies at the apex of the international oil industry, greatly expanding the gap between these companies and China's aspiring giants. Furthermore, many state-owned firms have disappeared from the ranks of the world's leading oil companies, a development that runs counter to China's strategy of catapulting its "national champions" into this peer group.

Zhang illustrates the magnitude of these challenges facing China's aspiring oil giants through her systematic comparison of BP and Shell with PetroChina and Sinopec, the partially-privatized subsidiaries of the state-owned China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Group Company (CNPC) and Sinopec Group respectively, on a number of key business and organizational criteria. At first glance, the lead these "super majors" have over the Chinese companies in terms of business capabilities such as financial performance, technological prowess and the quality of their reserve portfolios, is more striking than the advantage the super majors have in organizational capabilities such as structure and leadership. Indeed, the organizational structures of PetroChina and Sinopec resemble those of BP and Shell. Zhang notes, however, that beneath these superficial similarities lie two critical differences between the Chinese companies and the super majors, differences that arguably constitute the greatest obstacle to the Chinese oil companies "catching up" with the super majors.

First, unlike BP and Shell, PetroChina and Sinopec do not have strong, unified corporate cultures and identities. They are struggling to integrate powerful subsidiaries that, as a result of the enterprise reforms launched in the mid-1980s, developed considerable autonomy and their own corporate ambitions. In one of the most fascinating sections of her book, Zhang describes the unsuccessful quest of Daqing Petroleum Administration Bureau, China's largest oil producer, to gain independence from CNPC and transform itself into a competitive multinational company by merging with other strong Chinese oil and petrochemical enterprises, an ambition resolutely crushed by CNPC.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, while the corporate head-

quarters of BP and Shell are located within BP and Shell, it is unclear, as Zhang observes throughout her book, whether the headquarters of PetroChina and Sinopec are to be found within PetroChina and Sinopec or within their respective state-owned parent companies. While the relationship between subsidiary and parent company is ambiguous, two facts about the ties that bind them together indicate that the parent company's influence looms large. First, in both cases, the parent company is the largest shareholder (CNPC controls a 90 per cent interest in PetroChina, while Sinopec Group has a 56 per cent stake in Sinopec). Secondly, several of the directors on the boards of PetroChina and Sinopec concurrently hold top positions within CNPC and Sinopec Group, positions for which the Chinese Communist Party has the power of appointment and removal.

Zhang's study raises, but does not explicitly answer, the question of whether PetroChina and Sinopec can join the ranks of BP and Shell if they remain under the control of their state-owned parent companies. As Donald Clarke observed in the third quarter 2003 issue of the *China Economic Quarterly*, the goals of state control and wealth maximization are fundamentally incompatible because the state has objectives other than maximizing financial returns. *Catch-up and Competitiveness in China* suggests that the Chinese government might value its control of PetroChina and Sinopec more as a means to maintain high employment levels than as a means to maximize revenue. CNPC and Sinopec Group, which employ 800,000 and 600,000 people respectively in their largely unprofitable non-core businesses and social services, depend on PetroChina and Sinopec for the bulk of their income. Consequently, as Zhang speculates, the parent companies may pressure their child companies for larger dividend payments. Furthermore, both PetroChina and Sinopec have workforces four to five times larger than those of the super majors. Thus, high employment trumps the efficient use of capital.

*Catch-up and Competitiveness in China* should appeal to students of China's quest to transform its state-owned enterprises into firms that can compete on the global playing field. It is not only one of the most comprehensive histories of institutional change in the Chinese oil sector to date, but it also illustrates the height of the hurdles the Chinese oil companies must clear in order to join the ranks of the super majors. This book also generates questions for future research: can Beijing reconcile state control with wealth maximization? If not, will Beijing continue to choose control over profits, settling for companies that do not rank among the very best in the world? What is the price of the failure, however defined, of Beijing's national champion strategy?

ERICA S. DOWNS

*Only Hope: Coming of Age under China's One-Child Policy.* By VANESSA L. FONG. [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 242 pp. £29.95. ISBN 0-8047-4961-2.]

This is an ethnographic study, conducted in Dalian between June 1997

and 2002, of a sample of singleton urban youths and their families. The author interviewed high school boys and girls and their families about their hopes for college and the elite jobs expected upon graduation. Given that Fong (now an assistant professor in the Harvard School of Education) was then a graduate student at Harvard, home of some of the most respected anthropology and sociology faculty whose careers began with survey projects such as this, there are understandingly high hopes for this book (the revised product of her dissertation). Although the footprint of the dissertation (in style and, to some extent, in theory) remains to distract the China specialist occasionally, the book is fascinating and, as book editors often say, “a good read.”

Over the last 20 years, there have been a number of studies by Chinese and foreign scholars on the establishment, provision, effectiveness and consequences of the so-called single child family (SCF) policy. This controversial policy, subject to different interpretations and more effective in urban China than in rural areas, seems well established. The generation of young people now coming of age includes the so-called singletons. Fong has contributed to our understanding of their situation by her use of the term “only hope,” by which she means these children are the only hope for a growing number of aging, city-dwelling parents, who are without jobs or welfare protection, and thus facing a bleak future.

The book commences with a lengthy introduction that summarizes aspects of the SCF policy development in the light of the Wallerstein theory of capitalist world development. The author has adopted this theory as an explanation for the conflicts and difficulties faced by the singletons as a generation. The five chapters in the book are interspersed with charts comparing singletons with youngsters who have a sibling, and Chinese youth with its American counterpart. There is an abundance of notes (some very valuable) and an extensive bibliography, together with a list of all those interviewed (though their identities are protected). Each chapter looks closely at the responses of the young people (and quite often their parents) on specific topics. From a broader perspective, Fong’s analysis of the youths may be characterized as an effort by them to move from a Third World setting (often the appropriate backdrop for their parents’ views) to a First World setting of interesting and remunerative jobs. Moreover, in the course of their passage to adulthood, the young men and women come to desire First World goods and benefits possessed by wealthier classmates and viewed on television and other media.

Fong energetically sought out participants for her project by volunteering to coach students preparing for examinations. Money was not exchanged; there were occasional meals offered and Fong was often invited to special events. Though the singletons themselves are the central focus, Fong interacted with the parents as well. She appears to have a keen ear for interchange among family members. During the course of her stay in China, many of the youths took examinations and learned the results. The author observed excitement and joy as well as disappointment and occasional heartbreak.

There is a desperate quality to the book's title, "Only Hope," and Fong illustrates the alternative outcomes that may lie ahead. This is particularly clear when the titles and chapters are considered. There is, for example, ample evidence of parental discipline and students' self-discipline in their work to achieve their goals. The stratification of the educational system is well known, and it and examination strategy are discussed by the author. A chapter is devoted to discussing traditional filial piety together with realism on the part of parents aware of their own situation in an aging society. Examples of the young person's resentment and guilt endemic to the situation are quite powerful. The bursts of anger at the demands of some parents are contrasted with the reality of dashed hopes when results become known. The overall dilemma is quite clearly set down in the final substantive survey chapter entitled "Spoiled."

Fong addresses, implicitly and explicitly, the ongoing contradiction of a First World youth's enhanced expectations, fuelled by doting parents (also anxious for a successful outcome) willing to make many sacrifices for their singleton to proceed along a path the parents barely know. Fong concludes that the road to good jobs and a First World life may not be broad enough for all the young women and men who are joining the march. A second volume following the outcomes of this first generation of singletons would be most welcome.

JOYCE K. KALLGREN

*Changing China: A Geographic Appraisal.* Edited by CHIAO-MIN HSIEH and MAX LU. [Oxford and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003. 512 pp. \$48.00. ISBN 0-8133-3474-8.]

One of the greatest challenges to those researching and lecturing on China today is the country's rapid rate of change. To date, there have been only a handful of timely general texts for use in English-language geography and other social science courses. These have included single-authored efforts, such as Christopher Smith's *China: People and Places in the Land of One Billion* (1991), Frank Leeming's *The Changing Geography of China* (1993) and Songqiao Zhao's *Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population and Development* (1994); and edited collections such as Terry Cannon and Alan Jenkins' *The Geography of Contemporary China: The Impact of Deng Xiaoping's Decade* (1990), Gregory Veeck's *The Uneven Landscape: Geographic Studies in Post-Reform China* (1991), and Robert Gamer's *Understanding Contemporary China* (2003). Although each of these books remains an important and valuable contribution to the literature and to the teaching of courses on

China, the remarkable pace of change in China has rendered them out of date in less than a decade.

In this context, it is good to see a new contribution. Using China's rapid post-1978 change as a theme, geographers Chiao-min Hsieh and Max Lu have assembled *Changing China: A Geographic Appraisal*, an edited collection of 26 chapters, in 500 pages. These chapters, largely written by geographers, are organized into three sections entitled "Economic changes," "Social changes" and "Changes along China's periphery." The primary strength of the book is its breadth. Although it addresses neither physical geography nor China's environmental issues, it does speak to a wide range of human geographic questions, from land use and agricultural development to population and economy. The majority of the chapters, with a few exceptions, are well grounded within the authors' own research foci and expertise. The most notable weakness of the book is one shared by many edited collections: that it lacks integration and a sense of dialogue between the chapters. This weakness might have been overcome through a face to face meeting of the authors, through an exchange of chapter drafts, through editorial guidance, or through more extensive section introductions and summaries by the editors. This type of integration is, of course, rare.

The presentation of the book is concise and appropriate to keeping the cost down for course use. A list of figures would have been a helpful guide to the many black-and-white maps, line drawings and tables in the text. There is wide variation in the style and quality of the maps and other illustrative materials. Nonetheless, these illustrative materials provide a substantial enhancement to the text.

The 26 chapters vary considerably in their level of detail and analysis, from general overviews, such as Chiao-min Hsieh's "Changes in the Chinese population: demography, distribution, and policy" and Robert McColl's "The geography and political economics of Inner Mongolia beyond 2000," to quite specific analyses, such as Yixing Zhou and Fahui Wang's "Suburbanization in Beijing." The choice of detail for the chapters seems to have been left to the authors. For example, while the chapters by McColl on Inner Mongolia and Toops on Xinjiang provide nice introductions to the geography of those regions, similar discussions are lacking for most of the rest of China. While this uneven approach makes a cover-to-cover read of the volume a bit disjointed, it does mean that instructors can pick and choose articles appropriate to the background of their students. However, it also means that the book would not be sufficient as a stand-alone text as it does not provide a systematic overview of China's basic geographic characteristics.

In summary, this book has the potential to make a substantive contribution to geography and social science courses focused on China. Given that the alternative might be to require students to purchase several other edited collections in order to cover similar ground, it serves as a welcome, timely and cost-effective addition to the resources available.

PIPER GAUBATZ

*Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticization.* By LAM WAI-MAN. [Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. xi + 291 pp. \$72.95. ISBN: 0-7656-1313-1.]

Buttressed by local scholarship, the conventional understanding of Hong Kong's political culture has long dwelt on the notions of apathy and indifference. *Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong* advances an interesting and provocative thesis to refute the conventional claim by taking readers through a historical journey of Hong Kong's major conflict events between 1949 and 1979. The author ambitiously seeks to engage in a critical evaluation of the conventional theses, especially that by Siu-kai Lau in the 1980s. Lau's idea of utilitarian familism, which is much cited in Hong Kong studies, provides an explanation of political apathy that locates the causes in the wider culture as well as in weak state-society relations. Questioning Lau's thesis on strong methodological, conceptual and empirical grounds, the author aims to present an alternative reading of Hong Kong politics, which she captures well in the subtitle: the paradox of activism and depoliticization.

Contrary to Lau, the author argues that political participation was neither minimal nor simply utilitarian. She broadens the conception of political participation to include political acts targeted at the local government, the Chinese government and private institutions; discursive activities through the press; and politically relevant activities via social organizations and social movements. Using a multiple-case interpretive approach, she draws on 13 events as case studies and analyses them in terms of their scale, intensity, publicity, significance and ideological claims. The author maintains that all of the events were "impressive" and were "part of larger movements that persisted over a number of decades and that were sustained by the particular nature of society and politics at that time" (p. 229). These testify to the existence of significant levels of political activism. Adding a twist to her argument, the author further maintains that a culture of depoliticization existed side by side with political activism, which functioned to check left-wing activism in the context of Cold War and Chinese politics.

The book presents by far the most thorough critique of the conventional thesis of Hong Kong culture, as epitomized by Lau's theory. The author devises an innovative methodological approach to political culture by inviting readers to make sense of political activism in both qualitative and simple quantitative terms whilst also taking into account a culture of depoliticization in society at large. This is a due corrective to much survey research that draws an over-generalized picture of local culture without delving into internal variations among different sites and different groups. The 13 case studies, drawing on multiple sources, offer substantial and interesting accounts of selected events over the three decades, and bring to light a renewed understanding of the mobilizational power of civil society. The paradox of the culture of depoliticization is particularly interesting and original. The culture, which is itself a re-



sponse to the political environment of activism, in turn facilitated alternative forms of politics in the social domain – acutely political activities disguised as social activities. For the most part, the major arguments presented in the book are persuasive and powerful.

However, the notion of culture used by the author contains some conceptual ambiguities. The culture of depoliticization consists of such constituent discourses as stability and prosperity, the identification of actors as troublemakers, denial of political realities, and so on. Was the culture a set of strategies, discourses, ideologies or activities, or did it include all of them? Although the government's role is discussed in separate sections, the author often refers to “the society,” “the public,” “some people,” and even “the culture of depoliticization” as agents behind the cultural phenomenon. Yet who were the specific agents involved in such developments and how did such processes come about? Was the culture of depoliticization more a discursive or ideological strategy by the ruling bloc that was found in specific sites? How and why did it create a general self-perception among the people? Given the concern of the book, some conceptual clarification and discussion about the notion of culture would seem necessary.

On the whole, the book shows serious scholarship and makes a very significant contribution to Hong Kong studies as well as the study of political culture. It is highly recommended to colleagues and students interested in the field.

AGNES S. KU

*In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation.*

Edited by CHRISTIAN HENRIOT and WEN-HSIN YEH. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xii + 392 pp. £50.00. ISBN 0-521-82221-1.]

Henriot and Yeh have produced a rich and highly readable volume on Shanghai during the 1937–1945 Japanese occupation period. Many of the path-breaking essays are based on primary sources from newly accessible Shanghai archives.

The volume is divided into three sections, broadly on economic, political and cultural history. In the first section, Christian Henriot and Parks Coble both demonstrate that the Shanghai capitalists left in the city were caught in a tight situation: they had little choice but to co-operate with the Japanese, who wanted to make Shanghai into another economic powerhouse in their Co-Prosperity Sphere but who were also exploitative and driven by military rather than commercial needs. On the other hand, the exiled Nationalists considered Chinese businessmen who co-operated with Japan to be collaborators, rendering them vulnerable to assassination during the war and condemnation after it. Frederic Wakeman explores the way in which smuggling became part of the economic and cultural

landscape in supplying wartime Shanghai, and Sherman Cochran looks at a “fixer,” Xu Guanqun, who played for high stakes selling medicines across enemy lines, demonstrating that the neutral “island” of the foreign concessions in Shanghai from 1937 to 1941 was hardly an impermeable one. Allison Rottmann completes this section by rethinking the rural narrative of Communist Revolution, showing that Shanghai helped to supply and shape the politics of the central China base area.

The second part looks at issues in governance. Tim Brook examines the Great Way government, a short-lived Japanese client administration which operated in Shanghai in from 1937 to 1938. It exploited a “hack Confucian ideology” (p. 185) to endear itself to the locals, but met with little enthusiasm. Disinterestedness also describes the city’s working class in Alain Roux’s analysis, which argues that while there were no mass protests against Wang Jingwei’s collaborationist regime, workers also failed to join Wang’s trade union organization, seeing it as unpatriotic or irrelevant. Also ambiguous was the role of the Shanghai United Committee (SUC) headed by gangster boss, Du Yuesheng: Brian Martin shows that the SUC moved from being a vehicle of anti-Japanese resistance to a back-channel for economic contacts between the regimes of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. Another highly significant change in governance was the end of Western empire in the city. Robert Bickers shows how “Shanghailand,” the settler-dominated International Settlement, disappeared under the impact of Japanese occupation and British diplomatic unwillingness to support it. Similarly, as Christine Cornet demonstrates, occupation, post-war Chinese nationalism and a lack of interest in Paris led to the end of the French Concession in 1946.

In the third section, Carlton Benson illustrates the way in which, perhaps surprisingly, Shanghai radio was politicized only for a short time in the period from 1937 to 1941, and that its supposed frivolity in returning to commercial themes aroused Nationalist anger. Women’s wartime roles are also addressed: Nicole Huang argues that for writers such as Eileen Chang, the war enabled a previously confined discourse of domesticity to become public; and Susan Glosser argues that the heroic struggle to maintain an “ordinary” life can be interpreted as women’s resistance. Finally, Paul Pickowicz looks back at the 1946 film, *Women Side by Side*, which explores the dilemmas of “people in the grey areas in the middle... forced to devise... painful survival strategies” in the wartime city (p. 359).

Unusually for a conference volume, the essays fit together as a whole and the reader is left with one overwhelming theme in mind at the end: ambivalence. Wartime Shanghai was not a place of simple heroes and villains, and ordinary citizens were reluctant for the most part either to sacrifice their lives or to co-operate with the enemy. How could one not be ambivalent when a gangster boss was prominent in the resistance, or when the most famous collaborator was a former Nationalist hero who desperately believed that he was doing the right thing by working with the Japanese? Even supposed neutrality was not absolute: the “island” of the foreign concessions was neither wholly at peace or war between 1937

and 1941, and was inextricably tied to the wider conflict destroying China. It is a pity that there are no maps provided to make the chapters dealing with fast-moving events in the city easier to follow. But, overall, this important book raises many questions about how the Sino-Japanese war shaped Chinese culture and politics, and will be necessary reading for scholars and students dealing with 20th-century Chinese history.

RANA MITTER

*Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: The Politics of Chinese Cinemas.* By POSHEK FU. [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. 288 pp. £14.95. ISBN 0804745188.]

Despite its short length (152 pages excluding reference matters), this pioneering study in English of “the Shanghai–Hong Kong nexus” in Chinese cinema succeeds in placing wartime Shanghai and Hong Kong cinemas in specific (albeit not always “proper” as Poshek Fu claims (p. xvi)) institutional and industrial contexts, bringing to light the “humanity” of the filmmakers, the “multiplicity of the historical situations,” and the “complexity of the cultural politics” of filmmaking and film criticism (p. xv). Most impressive of all is Fu’s dedication to primary research, reading hard-to-find print materials as well as conducting interviews and watching rare films. The book’s incredibly rich information (e.g. studio assets, production costs, ticket prices) will certainly interest scholars of modern Chinese history and culture, and Fu’s accessible stories should attract general readers as well.

After a preface outlining Fu’s aims, chapter one, “Mapping Shanghai cinema under semi-occupation,” traces the rise of Zhang Shankun’s Xinhua Company in Shanghai and reveals the ambiguities, contradictions and ironies of “Solitary Island cinema” between 1937 and 1941 – a cinema that defied political boundaries and thrived against odds. Chapter two, “Between nationalism and colonialism,” based on Fu’s similarly-titled previous study (in *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity*, edited by Fu and David Desser (2000)), discusses Hong Kong’s “double marginality” between “Sinocentric” nationalism and British colonialism, and critiques the “Central Plains syndrome” in Shanghai filmmakers stranded in Hong Kong in the late 1930s. Against the Chinese syndrome, Fu asserts, Cantonese films like *Southern Sisters* (1940) articulated “a both/and hybridity” constitutive of a new “local consciousness” or emergent identity (p. 87). Chapter three, “The struggle to entertain,” derives from Fu’s previous article (“The ambiguity of entertainment: Chinese cinema in Japanese-occupied Shanghai, 1942 to 1945,” *Cinema Journal*, 37.1 (Fall 1997)) and argues against a binary view of either/or (e.g. resistance/collaboration, patriots/traitors). Fu depicts “occupation cinema” as a space of entertainment for the colonized to “escape from Japanese propaganda” (p. xiv), although the both/and logic also compels

him to note the paradox that occupation cinema ultimately “helped normalize and naturalize the everyday violence of the occupation” (p. 131). In an epilogue, “Filming Shanghai in Hong Kong,” Fu goes through the changing political–economic situations in post-war Shanghai and Hong Kong.

This book brings attention to a largely ignored area in film scholarship and adds to a growing list of Shanghai studies. Fu’s criticism of the entrenched binarism in Chinese cultural politics is generally appropriate, although sometimes he appears to err on the other side of essentialism by regarding leftist filmmakers as possessed by the Central Plains syndrome. As filmmakers like Cai Chusheng and Situ Huimin were originally from Guangdong, Fu would be more persuasive had he analysed the necessarily complex ways they negotiated their identities (Shanghaiense, which differs from the Central Plains, as well as their native Cantonese) on and off-screen. While Fu’s use of primary sources is impressive, his reliance on sympathetic accounts of Kawakita Nagamasa and Zhang Shankun (e.g. by Tong Yuejuan, Zhang’s wife) raises the issue of the reliability, if not objectivity, of Fu’s reconstruction. Indeed, a more “proper” historical context should include a comparison of similar criticisms by Shanghai elites of all examples of “vulgar” commercial filmmaking in Shanghai (the late 1920s and the late 1930s) and Hong Kong (the late 1930s). In other words, Fu succumbs to the same “either/or” logic he criticizes when he places prewar Cantonese entertainment cinema “in contrast to the mainland cinema” (pp. 70–71), for the latter is equally marked by complexity and multiplicity (hence, Shanghai occupation cinema). Finally, although Fu is commended for his close readings of film narrative (e.g. *Mulan Joins the Army* (1939) and *Eternity* (1943)), it is puzzling to read such judgments as “*Marches of the Guerrillas* [1939] shows skillful camera control, but its melodramatic narrative lacks a realistic appreciation of the Japanese enemy” (p. 172). Personal judgments of this kind testify that merely advocating “both/and” pluralism does not solve the question of intellectual positioning, and how to interpret wartime Chinese cinemas (Shanghai, Hong Kong, Chongqing) still remains a daunting challenge to film scholars and historians alike.

YINGJIN ZHANG

*Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local Politics, 1870–1930.* By DI WANG. [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 376 pp. £48.50. ISBN 0-8047-4778-4.]

The last 15 years have witnessed a small flood of books on the physical, political, social and cultural transformation of the modern Chinese city covering paved streets and sewers, rickshaws and streetcars, public parks and meeting halls, monuments and museums, theatres and markets, police and gangsters, municipal government and public hygiene, bankers and

businessmen, factories and publishing houses, newspapers and movies, law suits and protests, workers, students and prostitutes. Most of this literature has focused on the coastal cities (especially Shanghai), and the approach has usually been top–down: how the state and urban elites have constructed a new Chinese version of modernity.

Wang's book stands out as a careful historical ethnography of a provincial capital in the Chinese interior, Chengdu, at the turn of the 20th century. In contrast to previous top–down studies of urban elites and the rise of urban governance and police, this provides a bottom–up view from the street, and the richness of street culture pervades the entire book. Superbly researched and aided by a wonderful collection of illustrations, the book shows us peddlers and artisans patrolling the neighbourhoods, beggars and hooligans harassing residents, religious rituals and entertainment, and, above all, the vibrant life of the teahouse. In a similar book on coastal Shanghai, Lu Hanchao (*Beyond the Neon Lights*) unforgettably describes the housing projects known as Stone Portals (*shikumen*) as a locus for the daily life of Shanghai urbanites. In this book, the Chengdu teahouse repeatedly appears as a critical venue of social interaction, popular entertainment, dispute mediation, political discussion and police surveillance.

A critical question in studies of urban modernity is how the transformation of public space has affected social relationships and political behaviour. Wang argues for a process in which the new municipal authorities and police first sought to control the newly created public space of paved and widened streets by licensing rickshaws, driving off children, hawkers and entertainers, and preventing craftsmen from using the roadside for production. The state took over such functions as street-sweeping and fire-fighting while household and neighbourhood responsibilities were reduced. The expansion of state interventions, especially when they targeted customs and rituals deemed to be “superstitious,” inevitably provoked resistance from the populace and a degree of alienation from the newly empowered state.

In the last decade of the Qing, new elites sought to politicize some of this discontent in street demonstrations and through the use of new media – both print and theatre. Wang describes this as a transformation of “street culture into street politics” (p. 248). A chapter devoted largely to the popular movement against railway nationalization (using foreign loans) provides a vivid illustration of this process. This Sichuan railway recovery movement was a critical prelude to the 1911 Revolution and of great importance to modern Chinese history. Wang's account provides a telling illustration of the links between the new culture and the new politics of the street, with public lectures, parades and protests. But he is not entirely convincing that the politicization of street life was a continuous process lasting into the Republican era.

The relatively brief discussion of Chengdu street life in the Republican era is cause for some disappointment. Here, the police and the state seem much less dominant. Soldiers were clearly more important, but they were just as likely to be the unruly detritus of defeated warlord armies as

agents of a militarized state. By the 1920s, women were aggressively claiming the right to appear in public. Most intriguingly, the Gowned Brothers (*paoge*) secret society assumed an enormously important role in Republican-era Chengdu, mediating disputes, arranging deals and dominating the teahouses. Their growth in power, of course, brings to mind that of Du Yuesheng and the Green Gang in Shanghai. However, the account here is far too brief to assess their social composition and role, or their relationship to “legitimate” political institutions.

This carefully researched study is a fine example of the kind of fine-grained social history being produced by the new generation of young Chinese historians. Here, ordinary people claim their rightful place on the historical stage. How their lives related to the grand narratives of modern China is a story still being told, but this book provides a number of thoughtful and important suggestions.

JOSEPH W. ESHERICK

*Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China.* By LAURENCE SCHNEIDER. [Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003. xi + 305 pp. ISBN 0-7425-2696-8.]

Readers who expect a comprehensive analysis of biological science in modern China, as the blurb on the jacket promises, may be disappointed: this book specifically contrasts the small community of followers of T. H. Morgan in Republican China with the state-sponsored rise of Lysenkoism after 1949. The first part follows the development of genetics and evolutionary theory in three universities in China, namely National Central University in Nanjing; the missionary school of Yanjing University in Beijing, linked to the Rockefeller Foundation’s Peking Union Medical College; and Nanjing University, an American missionary school closely tied to Cornell. The author shows that training in biology and genetics developed in these three schools, thanks to substantial philanthropic involvement from the United States, as a “transfer” of knowledge took place between Chinese life scientists and major American institutions.

While the author presents valuable biographies of a small number of scientists such as Chen Zhen, Tan Jiazhen and Tang Peisong, and succeeds in recreating the political and institutional context within which these three geneticists operated, his work is insufficiently grounded in primary sources. The literature produced by biologists in Republican China is never invoked in any systematic way, the first chapter being largely based on Chen Zhen’s biology textbook to create the impression of a neat “transfer” of knowledge from the United States. However, incompatible theories in biology were often invoked, contradictory ideas about evolution were bandied around, and vague phrases on “struggle for survival” were widespread in dozens of biology textbooks, many far more



popular than Chen Zhen's work: neo-Lamarckism and Mendel-Morganism were never tidily organized into two "schools," and they could even overlap, as very different writers from complex backgrounds struggled to make sense of an ever-growing global repertoire of biological theories. In Europe and the United States too, biologists disagreed over the relative importance of nurture versus nature, and China was no exception: diversity, elided by the author in favour of a fairly simplistic notion of an American success in Republican China before the failure of Lysenkoism under Soviet influence, is precisely what makes pre-1949 biology such a fascinating field.

The second part is more convincing, as the author provides the first detailed account of the rise of Lysenkoism, tracing its institutional and organizational bases and elucidating its effects on research in biology and genetics. Dogmatic belief that organisms were entirely shaped by the environment, rather than by internal factors like genes and chromosomes, was allowed to hold sway over biological research, as genetics was banned as bourgeois science. The transformist tradition, which harked back to Lamarck, believed that acquired characteristics could be passed on to the next generation, leading to a vision of control over nature and the pace of evolution. Schneider closely follows the fortunes of the genetics community and the political ramifications of those who supported Lysenkoist biology. It is unfortunate that he does not use Jasper Becker's award-winning book on the Great Leap Forward (New York, 1998), which would have helped him to transcend the narrow confines of political figures, debates and institutions to show how Mao Zedong's efforts to control scientific research had disastrous consequences for millions of ordinary people: one of the tragedies of the greatest famine in the 20th century, after all, was that Lysenkoist theories displaced the proven methods and accumulated knowledge of farmers who had tilled the same fields for generations.

The last chapter of this book abandons all pretence at critical scholarship, praising instead the "phoenix-like" rise of genetics in apparent ignorance of the fact that a global outcry, led by international associations of geneticists, condemned the passage of a eugenics law in 1995, while widespread concern has been expressed about the political uses of genomics and new reproductive technologies in a one-party state. The four central chapters on Lysenkoism are the real focus of the book, providing invaluable information and detailed analyses of the role of biology in a period of revolutionary upheaval.

FRANK DIKÖTTER

*British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter.* By FA-TI FAN. [Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004. ix + 238 pp. £32.95. ISBN 0-674-01143-0.]

For those who have conducted research on the fauna and flora of China

and who have been curious about the “Reeves” in *Muntiacus reevesi* (the Chinese muntjac) or the “Cunningham” in *Cunninghamia lanceolata* (the Chinese fir), this book is a great revelation. Many wild plants and animals from China bear scientific names honouring Western naturalists, and this book is the first historical analysis of how Westerners conducted natural history research in China from the mid-18th to the early 20th century. By focusing on British naturalists during a period of dramatic change in the relationship between China and the West, the author has developed a richly textured account of the encounter between vastly different systems of knowledge and representation of the natural world. As such, this work is sure to be of great interest for scholars of the social sciences, cultural studies and the social construction of nature.

Drawing on a vast and diverse array of scientific journals, personal correspondence, memoirs and administrative records from the period, the author convincingly ties British natural history research to larger imperial demands for useful information on natural resources in a vast area that was scarcely known by outsiders before the Opium War (1839–1842). The connection between commerce and natural history is exemplified by the English East India Company’s interest in botanical, biogeographic and horticultural information on tea trees. Of greater significance still, according to the author, was the way in which knowledge of the natural world was produced through an elaborate network of relationships between British naturalists and Chinese people of all walks of life. The latter included not only the bureaucrats who monitored the already highly circumscribed lives of British expatriates in Canton [Guangzhou] at the beginning of the 19th century, but also collectors, who often made long trips into the interior in search of specimens, and painters, who had to learn an entirely new repertoire in order to provide scientific drawings to British patrons from the factories of Guangzhou to Kew Gardens. Indeed, one of the primary goals of the book is to “explain the formation of scientific practice and knowledge in cultural borderlands during a critical period of Sino-Western relations.” The author sets himself a difficult task: to reconstruct the economic and cultural lineaments of “scientific imperialism” without ignoring “the indigenous people, their motivations, and their actions.” Not only does the book succeed in this effort, it avoids facile demonization of the main Western actors in this drama. Instead, we see a compelling set of portraits of British men of widely differing backgrounds and interests who often made great sacrifices in their quests for scientific knowledge. Generally, these men were keenly aware of the degree to which they relied on local Chinese experts and indigenous knowledge for the success of their own endeavours.

In a chapter called “Sinology and natural history,” the author shows that “Western scientific knowledge” about Chinese nature was not only produced through the labours of multiple Chinese and European actors, but that it also quickly became subsumed within the discursive formations of both Sinology and biology. Western naturalists capable of conducting textual research using classical Chinese sources were few and far between

until the second half of the 19th century, when data from China and its ancient texts were finding their way into the works of scientific luminaries such as Candolle and Darwin. The author provides numerous examples of how such knowledge was a hybrid creation resulting from generations of indigenous Chinese practices and records on the natural world merged with years of British research in Chinese gardens, markets, mountains and manuscripts that would have proved fruitless without Chinese “guides.” The book’s archaeology of this knowledge is a useful complement to recent works on the social construction of fieldwork and scientific knowledge, such as Raffles’s *In Amazonia: A Natural History* (2002).

This cultural interplay is illustrated by the British efforts to obtain accurate scientific drawings of Chinese plants and animals. Plant specimens were difficult to keep alive on the long return trip to England, and dried specimens did not adequately show the shape and colour of flowers. To provide data on the ever-growing number of “new species” from China, the naturalist John Reeves (1774–1856) (a tea inspector for the Guangzhou factory of the East India Company in his “day job”), employed at least four artists to paint plants, birds, shells, reptiles and mammals. This was no simple matter for the naturalist or the artists. Even artists who had been trained for the export market were not accustomed to working exclusively from actual models. In conventional paintings, “[a] butterfly might be a hybrid of the features of two or three different species or be an entirely fanciful invention.” Under Reeves’ tutelage, however, the artists were soon able to produce paintings that “resembled the plates in multi-volume natural history books in their emphasis on the general appearance rather than the anatomical details of the subjects, though some of them included close-ups of body parts (such as the mouth and feet, or the foot).” And yet, in their details of line, colour, shading and sometimes form, the paintings reveal their Chinese origins. This is especially obvious in depictions of biota that had long inhabited the Chinese ecological imagination – and the author uses cranes and plum trees as examples. Among the book’s 16 figures (and gracing its cover), there is a red-crowned crane from the Reeves paintings, and the author states that, “the gesture of the [crane] – standing upright with one leg hidden beneath the body, its neck gracefully curved, its eyes gazing peacefully ahead – comes straight out of the Chinese tradition.” This image is a fitting representation of the “borderlands” region of cultural production that the author describes so well. Not until the 20th century, with the rise of modern academic specialization, did Chinese biologists replace their earlier Western counterparts in the exploration and description of the country’s vast biotic resources. The author wisely states that this “merits a volume of its own.” As someone who has enjoyed poring through modern Chinese guides to the “medicinal animals” of China to find information on the life histories of species seldom described in recent Western sources, I am keenly interested to learn more about the historical development of Chinese natural history in the 20th century, and this is a topic of investigation for which the author seems uniquely qualified.

CHRIS COGGINS

*Framing the Bride: Globalizing Beauty and Romance in Taiwan's Bridal Industry.* By BONNIE ADRIAN. [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. xiii + 297 pp. Hard cover £36.95; \$55.00, ISBN 0-520-23833-8; paperback £14.95; \$21.95, ISBN 0-520-23834-6.]

In this engaging study of weddings in contemporary Taiwan, anthropologist Bonnie Adrian documents a rite of passage recognizable across the world from its major visual representation: the wedding photograph. Photographs prompted her early questions and provided her with the point of departure for her research. Why do couples have so many wedding photos? Why do they wear so many different costumes in the photos? Where are the photos of family members? What precisely is the cultural content of such photos, overtly Western – the bride usually in white dress and veil, the groom in morning or evening suit – yet puzzlingly different?

Answers to these questions are suggested in the course of many small journeys through the strange, theatrical world of the Taipei wedding: the bridal salons, which rent out the clothes and take the photographs; the wedding rites and wedding banquet, where the bride changes from one gown to another; the marital home, where the massive photo album is kept, to be drawn out for the admiration of guests or, in later years, for a woman to recall her youth and beauty at the moment she passed from single to married life. The typical photo session is described in fascinating detail. The session occurs before the wedding, and usually takes a whole day. At the wedding banquet guests can look at the photos, which typically contain an astonishing range of images of bride and groom in a variety of poses, places and costumes. Thousands might be spent on a good collection of wedding photos, none of which record the actual wedding.

Adrian sees the wedding photo as very much the young couple's domain, the space they – and especially the bride – appropriate for themselves in face of the effective ownership of the wedding itself, and to some extent even of the marriage, claimed by the senior members of the family. This analysis is grounded in her understanding of the particular tensions surrounding marriage in contemporary Taiwan, where – as elsewhere in East Asia, not to mention the West – the number of single women is rising. As young women in Taiwan increasingly gain financial independence, they have developed a critical perspective on a family system that they see as imprisoning them in the home and reducing them to the role of bearers and rearers of the next generation.

This phenomenon, like the white wedding and the wedding photo, might be seen as a case of the “Westernization” of life in Taiwan, a concept Adrian tackles early. “The ways in which the photos are Western,” she writes, “are complex and full of Taiwanese agency” (p. 12). But “the West” itself, as she further points out, needs to be understood as something other than an imagined place. Her analysis presses towards defining “Westernization” as a signifier for “globalization,” but she refrains from jettisoning “the West” as a term of analysis. It is, after all,

a reminder that “the transnational flows of goods, people, and ideas that we call globalization are not conducted in a balanced and egalitarian fashion” (p. 15). As her study shows, none of the power wielded by “the West” in this process can take from the dynamism of the local culture. In Taiwan, familiar technologies and imagery are deployed in a way “far more particular and complex” (p. 16) than the explanation of “Westernization” would suggest.

The study as a whole begs questions about changes over time as well as differences across cultures. With respect both to the popularity of white weddings and to the significance of photography in contemporary Taiwan, Adrian tends to underplay longer-term historical developments. On both these points, the photographic record from the 1930s gives food for thought. Taiwanese wedding photos from before the period of “imperialization” (1937–1945) usually show the bride in white gown and tulle veil, or even in a white or pink *qipao*, which became a popular style of wedding dress in mainland China in the 1930s. In the post-war years then, were not Taiwanese women picking up the broken threads of their own fashion history when they donned the white dress?

As for the wedding photo itself, this became a prescribed element in wedding rituals in China in the 1920s or just before. A comparable development had no doubt taken place in Japan, as well as in Taiwan. Even if the extraordinary focus on wedding photos at the other end of the century was shaped by circumstances specific to that time, it may be that a historically-rooted valorization of the photo has informed contemporary practices more profoundly than has been suggested in these pages.

Tracing the history of these cultural phenomena was not Adrian’s main task. In touching on the past, however, she usefully reminds us how little has been written on the impact of general historical change on ritual life in Chinese communities. Her own richly interpretative and eminently readable study has done for late 20th-century Taiwan what awaits research for earlier times.

ANTONIA FINNANE