

Inclusion and Incarnation: a response to Bayne

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Abstract: I suggest that Tim Bayne's use of the term 'inclusion' to describe the model of the Incarnation found in Morris and Swinburne may have misled him. The experiences of the Word do not include those of Jesus in the way that mine include my experiences as a teenager; but He is aware, in the case of Jesus, that 'these experiences are mine', which is not true of His awareness of the experiences of other people. Again, Bayne rejects the idea that what differentiates the experiences of Jesus from those of the Word is that they differ in kind, on the grounds that they are integrated so as to be co-conscious in the divine consciousness; but this is only true if we think in terms of 'inclusion'. Nor are any false beliefs held by Jesus part of the beliefs of the Word. Furthermore (although this is not related to 'inclusion') while a single soul may be sufficient to unite experiences, it need not be necessary; some other factor may (and I think does) unite the human and divine experiences of Christ.

In his article 'The inclusion model of the Incarnation: problems and prospects',¹ Tim Bayne criticizes the views of (specifically) Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne, to which he gives, not the name Morris and Swinburne themselves preferred, the 'two-minds model', but his own name, the 'inclusion model'. I appreciate his difficulty over the former name, that 'mind' is too wide a term; but I think that 'inclusion', though doubtless warranted by some expressions in Morris and Swinburne, is also misleading, though in a different way. Possibly the phrase 'two-consciousnesses model' (TCM) would do?

The first problem with the TCM which Bayne regards as serious is over the 'non-perspectival thesis'. It appears at first glance that 'for any two token experiences P and Q, P and Q are either co-conscious or they are not'.² Advocates of the TCM are committed to denying this; for if P is a human experience of Jesus, and Q a divine experience of the Word,³ they are co-conscious relative to the divine consciousness but not relative to the human. And this seems extremely odd (though Bayne thinks it might not be fatal).

This is one place where I think the use of the word 'inclusion' has misled Bayne. The human experiences of Jesus are not (I should hold) included in the divine

experiences of the Word in the way that (say) my experiences as a teenager are included in my experiences as a human being. If I may adapt what I have said on this matter elsewhere,⁴ the experiences of the Word include Q but not P. The Word, being omniscient, is of course aware of Jesus' experiences, as He is of those of (say) Tim Bayne. (Jesus, of course, is not normally aware of any of the experiences of the Word.) But, in addition, the Word is aware, in the case of Jesus, that 'these experiences are mine', which is not true of His awareness of the experiences of Bayne. This would not, I think, normally be called 'inclusion'.

Bayne goes on to ask 'in virtue of what do Christ's two consciousnesses belong to the same subject, viz. Christ?'⁵ I think his rejection of Morris at this point is possibly too brusque. Morris says that there is in Christ only 'one center of causal and cognitive powers'. This is ambiguous. If Morris meant 'one centre which contains causal and cognitive powers', Bayne's criticism is fully justified. But if Morris meant (and his use of the phrase 'two minds' suggests he did) 'one central self to which causal and cognitive powers belong', he is closer to Swinburne than might appear at first sight, and escapes the force of Bayne's argument.

Swinburne himself accepts the idea of a soul as the factor uniting consciousness over time and at a time; and (for what it is worth) I should agree (though I should prefer 'self' to 'soul' for theological reasons). This too Bayne rejects on the grounds that 'one cannot give an account of the unity of consciousness in terms of souls if, as the inclusion theorist holds, it is possible that a single soul might possess multiple streams of consciousness at a time'.⁶ But I think he has here confused two propositions which are similar but not identical. One is 'These experiences form a single stream of consciousness *only if* they are had by one soul', and the other is 'These experiences form a single stream of consciousness *whenever* they are had by one soul'. The first is true (or so Swinburne holds, and I agree), but does not support Bayne's criticism. The experiences of Jesus would not form a single stream of consciousness if they had not been had by a single soul or self. Nor would the experiences of the Word. The second proposition would support Bayne, but is false. (An analogy might help. Somebody might say 'The United Kingdom forms a single nation *only if* it has a single sovereign'; and this might be true. But if he or she went on to say 'The United Kingdom and Canada have a single sovereign, and therefore form a single nation', that would not be true at all.)

On this particular point the appropriateness of 'inclusion' language does not, I think, arise. On Bayne's next three points it does. He raises, firstly, the question of how Christ's two consciousnesses are to be individuated, and gives reasons for rejecting the suggestion by Swinburne that this is to be done by invoking the physical correlate of his mental states. I think he may be right there. But he is, possibly as a result of thinking in terms of 'inclusion', too ready to dismiss the obvious suggestion that divine and human experiences are different in kind. This is surely true (especially if, as I should myself hold, divine experiences are timeless). Bayne rejects it as a possible differentiating factor on the grounds that the two

must be integrated in such a way as to be co-conscious in the divine consciousness. But if we do not let ourselves be misled by the word 'inclusion', there seems to be no need for this. It suggests that the human experiences of Jesus are in some way among the divine experiences of the Word; and adherents of the TCM need not hold any such thing.

Similarly with the question of Christ's self-consciousness. If we believe in a substantial self, then the 'I' thoughts of Jesus and of the Word refer to the same self. But neither is a subset of the other. Bayne argues⁷ that all the 'I' thoughts tokened within Jesus' consciousness are also tokened within that of the Word. But this again is based on 'inclusion' language, and loses force if we set that aside. As I said above, I should say that the Word is (to take an example of Bayne's) aware of Jesus' feelings if he gets lost in the market, and is aware also that these are his own; but they are not themselves part of the divine consciousness in the way that these two awarenesses are.

And lastly, the same applies to the argument from infallibility. 'All of Christ's beliefs are properly attributable to God', Bayne claims, including those which were false. They are certainly attributable to a person who was God; but they do not form part of the contents of the divine mind. The obvious analogy is the dispute over the title 'Mother of God', *Theotokos*, applied to the Virgin Mary. It has seemed absurd, even blasphemous, to some; God has no mother, and can have none. And this is true. But it is equally true that the Virgin did bear a son who was God, and the title has rightly been accepted. One who was God could and did have a mother. Similarly with any false beliefs held by Jesus. They are not 'included' among the divine beliefs (if there are such things). God has no false beliefs, and can have none; but false beliefs could be and doubtless were held by someone who was in fact divine. Bayne cites the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* (which, he points out, is accepted by Swinburne and Morris) to support his case. But this holds only that predicates properly ascribed to the Word may be used of Jesus and vice versa; the same person, said St Leo, wept over Lazarus as man and raised him as God.⁸ It does not (except in an extreme form which Swinburne explicitly, and rightly, rejects⁹) hold to 'total interpenetration'. It is a doctrine about language rather than metaphysics.

I conclude that Bayne has not made his case; and I suggest that he has been unfortunately misled by his own renaming of the position held by (among others) Morris and Swinburne.

Notes

1. Tim Bayne 'The inclusion model of the Incarnation: problems and prospects', *Religious Studies*, 37 (2001), 125–141.
2. *Ibid.*, 130.
3. For convenience, I use 'the Word' to refer to God the Son and 'Jesus' to refer to the son of Mary; to use 'Christ' of both can be a little confusing or lead to awkward qualifications.

4. Richard Sturch *The Word and the Christ: An Essay in Analytic Christology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 131–133.
5. Bayne ‘Inclusion model of the Incarnation’, 133.
6. *Ibid.*, 134.
7. *Ibid.*, 136.
8. I am not altogether happy with this particular example (see Sturch *The Word and the Christ*, 133–134), but the point it makes is sound enough.
9. Richard Swinburne *The Christian God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 211.