

demagoguery win the masses, but the visible reality and power of ‘living organization’” (*The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 1966, p. 361). This is what “real socialism,” dubbed by some “posttotalitarianism,” tried to capitalize on by blending dictatorship and consumer society and aspiring to *demoralize* the populace through inculcation of “utilitarian motivations” in them (see Václav Havel’s *The Power of the Powerless*, 1985, pp. 30, 38, 45). This strategy did not fail—apathy and cynicism had been very real and widespread phenomena. But its very success backfired—the once 19 million–strong CPSU could mobilize barely a handful of its members to defend it when a “moment of truth” arrived.

How did it come about? Scott describes such “moments of truth” as a breach of the frontier between the “hidden and the public transcripts,” as the former’s “public declaration” that enunciates the overturn of the existent structures of power (*Domination and the Art of Resistance*, Chapter 8). The greatness of Aron’s “troubadours” consists in making such a declaration uncompromisingly and vocally. It is not that “truth telling” produced an eye-opening effect, nor that everything they said was “true,” nor that all “hidden transcripts” of the oppressed were publicly articulated by them (in fact, most of the socio-economic grievances, as distinguished from the legal-political ones, were not), and this is something very typical of the ideological struggles accompanying all “exits from communism.” But, recalling Likhachev’s adage, the “silence” was broken: At least something of what had always been “seen” became publicly voiced. And this brought about a hugely liberating effect.

The arrival of the moment of truth, however, was made possible by certain *structural* phenomena, by the deepening of the cracks in the system, greatly though inadvertently enhanced by Mikhail Gorbachev’s “reforms. No “strains” and “dysfunctions” in the system can explain why the system becomes politically “unsupportable.” But those cracks, or “displacements,” *may* make people behave in ways they never before considered, *may* induce them to experiment with their environment, which has ceased to be “familiar.” They *may* acquire, in the course of all that, a sense that “*habitus* is not destiny” (according to Pierre Bourdieu) and that an alternative may be possible. This is how agency may arise in a nondeterministic fashion. Ideas are indispensable for shaping agency’s “sense of meaning and purpose.” It may be true that “what matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives” (Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transitions to Democracy,” in G. O’Donnell et al., eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 1986, III: 51–52). But it is equally true that no agency capable of transformative action can arise without a sense of its legitimacy.

That legitimacy’s formation is always a much more “agonistic” and a much less continual and “logical” process

than it appears in the retrospective accounts of historians such as Aron’s theoretical mentor, Bernard Bailyn, or by Aron himself: “Leaving aside the arguments of perestroika’s and glasnost’s opponents, both on the left and on the right” (p. 5), is not an ideologically innocuous and purely “technical” arrangement serving to limit the scope of the book. This arrangement suppresses the actual struggles for *hegemony* that took place during perestroika and that largely determined its outcomes, as well as the evolution of the troubadours’ liberal credos. This analytic move establishes the liberal credos’ *monopoly* on perestroika, misrepresenting *their* opponents as the opponents of perestroika *as such* instead of showing them as the proponents of some *alternative* versions of perestroika. We already have some profound attempts to deconstruct the liberal ideological monopoly on the American Revolution (e.g., Terry Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 2007; Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution*, 2005). It is to be hoped that similar attempts in relation to the “recent Russian revolution” are forthcoming. But the theme of “taming” the anticommunist revolutions and of suppressing their more radical aspirations and potentialities has already been introduced into political-theoretical discourse (see, e.g., Jeffrey C. Isaac, “The Meaning of 1989,” in *Democracy in Dark Times*, 1998; Gideon Baker, “The Taming of the Idea of Civil Society,” *Democratization* 6 [no. 3, 1999]: 1–29).

The aforesaid certainly does not either diminish the importance of Aron’s book or belittle the contribution of the “troubadours of glasnost” to the dismantling of communism in Russia. It is necessary, however, to place their contribution in a more sober perspective and to open it up to serious questioning from a standpoint of political theory.

Reorganizing Popular Politics: Participation and the New Interest Regime in Latin America. Edited by Ruth Berins Collier and Samuel Handlin. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010. 408p. \$65.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592712003337

— Daniel H. Levine, *University of Michigan*

This important book provides a systematic and genuinely comparative effort to describe and explain the origins, operations, and impact of changing patterns of interest representation in contemporary Latin America. The editors and authors draw on a set of surveys administered in 2002 and 2003 in the metropolitan areas of the capital cities of Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. They use the data from these surveys effectively to map the evolution of associational life and representation, and to explore the difference that new patterns make to the quality of individual and group participation and representation.

The argument of *Reorganizing Popular Politics* hinges on the transition from a pattern of group formation and linkage geared to political party–trade union ties (“UP-Hub”) to one characterized by multiple associations that

are tied together in networks with differing degrees of structure and scope (“A-Net”). The dynamics of this transition are conditioned everywhere by the timing and circumstances of economic crisis, which undermines the ability of established political parties, party systems, and affiliated organizations to maintain themselves and sustain their ties with organized groups.

Working off this main story, the authors give particular stress to four issues: 1) variation in the scope and intensity of participation; 2) the ways in which new associations manage, if at all, the business of “scaling up,” that is, organizing a chain of linkages and impacts that move interest representation from smaller to larger stages with some hope of effectiveness; 3) state–associational ties and the limits to associational autonomy; and 4) sources of representational distortion, which are mostly attributed to inequalities of class and education.

The contrast among national cases is striking, if not very surprising. The collapse of party systems of the UP-Hub genre is associated with the emergence and expansion of associational networks as an alternative. This is most notable in Peru and least visible in Venezuela, where although the old party system did collapse, all organizations came under severe pressure, pressure that has only been magnified with the efforts of the Chávez regime to reconstruct organizations through state sponsored and controlled networks of groups. Argentina presents what the authors call a *Statal Web*, with associations tied to interactions with the state and closely linked to Peronista networks. Chile is described as a *Liberal Net*, with less state dependence and weaker links, a heritage of the Pinochet-era attacks on preexisting groups and networks.

Although the book’s title speaks of “popular politics” (basically equivalent to the politics and action repertoires of poorer and less educated citizens), and the theme is repeated throughout, what the analysis and data show is that middle- and upper-class citizens fare better in the new A-Net patterns, where their specific advantages of education, money, time, and connections are felt more effectively.

The book is organized thematically. Three chapters on “Interest Politics and the Popular Sectors” introduce the surveys, provide context on the cases and on broad regional trends, and outline key elements of the contrasting UP-Hub and A-Net patterns. Subsequent chapters address evolving patterns of individual participation, with attention to the choice between direct-action protest and group-mediated participation (Chapters 4 and 5), group structure, linkages across levels, and action repertoires (Chapters 6, 7, and 8). A general conclusion draws these themes together around the central motif of the transition from UP-Hub to A-Net.

Reorganizing Popular Politics is unduly difficult to read and occasionally frustrating. The editors and authors indulge a predilection for classification, typologies, acronyms, and coined terms that sometimes substitute for clear explanation. Frustration arises because the editors and

authors are very cautious about drawing conclusions and implications, limiting themselves instead to mapping the patterns they find (p. 328). This sometimes leads to findings that are, to say the least, not surprising. Thus, for example, “better linked associations are far more likely than atomized associations to engage in a range of state-targeted strategies” (p. 229). The more general point worth taking from the analysis of state-association ties is that notions of organizational autonomy that are central to much of the new social movement literature are not very accurate. Most associations seek and compete for ties with the state. Those with more resources and better connections manage the process better.

The book continues themes advanced in Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier’s *Shaping the Political Arena* (1991) and marries them to concerns arising from a very different literature on new social movements. Although the fit is sometimes difficult, the overall result is a valuable book that rewards the effort required to read it, with rich and useful insights about the evolution of associational life and representation, as well as the likely shape of future patterns. The authors demonstrate that despite widespread belief that civil society is fragmented and weak in Latin America, participation remains high and groups are continually exploring new ways of coordinating with one another in a search for more effective representation and links with the state. These efforts often do not succeed, or if they succeed, they do not endure for very long, a result that can be traced to long-term class and institutional rigidities.

Politics, Identity, and Mexico’s Indigenous Rights

Movement. By Todd A. Eisenstadt. New York: Cambridge University

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Based on interviews with indigenous and non-indigenous respondents in Mexico, this book shows that indigenous people do not universally endorse collective over individual rights, and argues that it is social and economic history, and not only ethnic identity, that shapes attitudes toward rights. This finding challenges the claims of many indigenous rights activists and scholars who believe that there is a more or less singular indigenous worldview, which centers on a communitarian conception of identity. The research here, however, draws indigenous people into the fold of political subjects whose attitudes may vary, may change, and are shaped by institutions beyond culture alone. It is a valuable and timely contribution to indigenous scholarship and politics.

Politics, Identity, and Mexico’s Indigenous Rights Movement is built around a puzzle that emerges from a comparison between the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas and a widespread social protest in Oaxaca in 2006. While the Zapatista uprising famously included an indigenous