opaque regarding philosophy of science.) In any case, Chernoff performs a service by carefully extracting such criteria from the texts themselves. Some of the authors explicitly or implicitly stress empirical adequacy, others falsifiability, others predictive power, others simplicity, others the explication of causal mechanisms, others the elimination of alternative explanations, and the list goes on. What scholars present as theoretical or empirical debates, then, are to some extent philosophical debates.

Chernoff takes care to follow a sound research design himself. His three cases vary along the dependent variable: He finds more consensus in the literature on alliance formation, and finds near-convergence in the democratic peace literature. That is, Chernoff asserts that most scholars accept the proposition that liberal democracies do not fight one another. He acknowledges that no such consensus exists regarding the causes of the democratic peace, and for many scholars that means that the most important question is still contentious. Chernoff's cases are too few for statistical significance, but the results are suggestive: The more scholarly consensus on an empirical question, the more scholars agree on philosophy of science. The point is made clear in the concluding chapter, which presents some simple quantitative analysis of his data from the three literatures.

Still more interesting, scholars who favor one kind of answer to a puzzle tend to employ similar criteria for what makes an explanation adequate. The nuclear proliferation debate is bedeviled by a wide divergence of criteria. Those who favor realist arguments strongly tend to favor explanations that locate "true causes" and apply to a broad range of cases. Those who favor non-realist arguments favor instead "deep causes" and falsifiable hypotheses. Such a divergence is far less evident in the democratic peace literature: There, realists and liberals alike claim to seek empirical adequacy, "true causes," falsifiability, and so on.

No book can do everything, and Chernoff's analysis raises some questions that it does not answer. First, Chernoff's precise question—why no scholarly consensus on puzzle x?—turns on one particular notion of scientific progress, namely what Chernoff calls "approach to consensus" or the withering away of disagreement over how to explain phenomena of interest to the scholarly community. As he notes, however, some philosophers say instead that science progresses when it is able to explain more facts, make better predictions, or give people greater control over the world. Chernoff's canvassing of leading positions among philosophers of science on progress—Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, van Fraassen, et al.—is a tour de force, but he does not give enough reasons why we should favor his own "approach to consensus" view over the alternatives. As Galileo, Newton, and Einstein knew, consensus does not always mean progress.

Nor does Chernoff show that security studies is any more divided as regards empirical puzzles than economics, psychology, or the natural sciences. Consider the heated debate in evolutionary biology between E. O. Wilson, who argues that selection happens at the multiple levels, including groups of organisms, and Richard Dawkins, who counters that selection takes place only at the genetic level. Or consider the interminable (and highly policy-relevant) debates among economists over how best to pull an economy out of recession. Even if these sciences do enjoy more consensus than these cherry-picked examples suggest, one is left wondering if their practitioners agree more than security scholars do as to what makes for a good explanation.

But these are questions that emerge from an ambitious and well-executed study. They do not damage Chernoff's claims, but rather are evidence that his is an original book pursuing a fruitful line of inquiry. The chief lesson is that, insofar as security scholars want to close the book on persistent empirical puzzles, we should have a sustained collective conversation, not so much about methodology, but about the assumptions that ground our methods.

Generations and Collective Memory. By Amy Corning and Howard Schuman. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015. 272p. $90.00 cloth, $30.00 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592716003352

— Félix Krawatzek, *University of Oxford*

The question of how the social sciences should approach collective memory has challenged researchers for some time. Henri Bergson and Maurice Halbwachs, along with the nowadays neglected contributions of Richard Semon, Théodule Ribot, and Ewald Hering, discussed the relationship between individual and collective memory, its dynamic or stagnant character, and the tension between its enabling or constraining forces. Corning and Schuman inherit this conceptual pedigree and focus moreover on studying generational formations.

Generations and Collective Memory is an ambitious attempt to connect two concepts that are intrinsically difficult to define and even harder to research in a systematic and comparative way. The first part deals with collective memory by focusing on three mnemonic signifiers (Christopher Columbus, the relationship between Sally Hemings and Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln) and their changes over time. The second part explores the importance of a generational effect on memory by drawing on a set of comparative cases. The third part goes beyond the "critical year effect" to address wider concerns in the study of collective memory.

The first part of the book offers an intriguing analysis of how memories of three important American signifiers changed over time. The sections on Columbus and Hemmings/Jefferson draw ably on a fascinating combination of sources from across time. The authors explore memories within different social groups by bringing

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together novels, films, textbooks, news media, scientific debates, and survey data. Through this wide variety of material the polyphony of memory at different points in time becomes clear. For example, despite revisionist thinking about Columbus in academia during the 1980s, traditional images about the "courageous discoverer of America" (p. 40) remained prevalent among the public. Given the inertia of memory and the time involved in translating academic turns into changes in the school curriculum, it was only in the 2000s that Columbus became a widely divisive figure. Drawing on surveys conducted in 1998 and 2014, the authors show that glorifying images have diminished and that critical memories have grown. Notably the Columbus and the Hemings/Jefferson chapters illustrate how memory evolves over time with new actors being audible or new historical evidence being unearthed.

The second part constitutes the conceptual core of the book. Based on various surveys conducted between 1985 and 2010, the authors show that respondents were most likely to mention an event as having been decisive if it occurred when they were between 10 and 30—the generational effect. The first big event experienced by an individual is expected to have an exceptionally strong impact on memory. They rightly underline the difference between witnesses and descendants as being decisive in the way an event is framed. However, it is surprising that the authors do not discuss the role of media or politicians in shaping what is publically perceived as having been a significant event. What an individual recalls as decisive in a survey depends strongly on whether the wider public still considers a particular event to have been decisive. The importance attributed to an event changes over time, and it would have been intriguing to combine the survey data with a wider investigation into the meaning of the events mentioned by respondents.

The third part further develops the concept of collective memory. In particular the chapter about generational experiences of war is noteworthy for its crossing of different mnemonic narratives and inverting of perspectives. The authors explore how memories of World War II and the Vietnam War influenced memories of the Gulf War (1990–1991) and the Iraq War (2003–2011). Every new experience is in need of interpretive anchorage and it is through historical analogies that particular interpretations of current events become coherent. On one side, George H.W. Bush compared Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait with Nazi conquests of neighboring countries prior to World War II. On the other side, Democrats like Senator Bob Kerry drew on the Vietnam experience to warn about U.S. military interventions (p. 150). The authors illustrate a decisive shift towards the Hitler analogy during the Gulf War, highlighting how the unfolding of events also alters collective memories.

How does *Generations and Collective Memory* fit with the most recent theoretical advances in the field of memory studies? The book's conceptual discussion is eclectic; clearly, the term "memory" has multiple meanings. The authors want to explore "how ordinary people participate in collective memory" (p. 13). Within the framework offered, however, this is a problematic assertion. There is no development of how this participation might shape collective memory, or inversely, how different mnemonic narratives influence individuals or how this participation leads to changes in collective memories. It is striking that the literature of the third wave in memory studies is completely absent in the book, despite the usefulness of concepts like "multidirectional memory," "travelling memory," or "entangled memory" for providing a more stringent conceptualization.

Thinking about collective memory alongside more recent theoretical innovations changes how one would use survey data. Memory, as operationalized in the book's second part, is primarily located on the level of the individual. Corning and Schuman suggest that they can measure memory by aggregating responses to survey questions, proposing that memory is meaningfully recalled and can thus be studied on the level of the individual. Moving beyond the early debates between Halbwachs and Bergson, however, memory studies increasingly emphasize that collective memory is not the sum of individual memories but is instead shaped by the communicative situation and an individual's social embeddedness. With this theoretical perspective, isolated individuals alone are not the level at which collective memories are located.

Despite a crossnational comparative dimension, the research stays enclosed in its methodological nationalism. Collective memories about Columbus, Hemings, or Lincoln neglect any transnational or global memory regime which might have influenced those national narratives. The authors stress, for instance, that Columbus memories have tarnished since the 1980s—but this disintegration of heroic national narratives is neither unique to Columbus nor to the United States. It is precisely this observation which drove Pierre Nora to his study of French *lieux de mémoire*. It would have been enriching to consider how non-national dynamics affected collective memories on the national level. As the multidirectionality, traveling, or entangled approaches underline, memories have never been exclusively enclosed in national containers.

An important question concerns a possible distinction between memory and knowledge. The authors aim to capture memory by asking respondents what events "seem to you to have been *especially* important" (p. 83), and assess knowledge by asking "Have you heard of . . . ?" and then following up with "What does . . . refer to?" The line drawn here seems debatable. Is the distinction between memory and knowledge analytically productive?

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The distinction implicitly suggests an underlying dichotomy between a true interpretation of an event—knowledge—and later distortions through memory. However, every perspective on an event is an interpretation and therefore even the earliest interpretations of any event rely on existing interpretive strands, for instance memories of similar events. Therefore knowledge is itself a product of memory and the distinction between the two is blurred, as the authors explore when they study those responses that were initially coded as "false" and later indicate interesting mnemonic patterns (p. 185).

Despite these lingering questions, this book is also of interest to a general audience. It is well written, careful in its interpretations of the data used, and draws on a very rich set of sources. It opens new avenues for further research that have the potential to bring the more interpretive part of the social sciences into dialogue with the most recent work undertaken in the humanities.

Constructing Cause in International Relations. By Richard Ned Lebow. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 208p. $113.00 cloth, $30.99 paper.
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— J. Samuel Barkin, *University of Massachusetts Boston*

Claims about causality are a key feature of much of the scholarship in political science generally, and international relations specifically. The identification of cause is what separates description from explanation. And yet, for all the claims made about causal relationships across both the social and natural sciences, the concept of causality itself remains both poorly understood and highly contested. What do we mean when we say *x* causes *y*, and how do we know that the relationship between the two is in fact causal? Such questions have generated an increasing literature in international relations over the past decade, and it is into this literature that Ned Lebow's book *Constructing Cause in International Relations* fits.

Lebow begins the book with a review of how causation has been understood in the philosophy of science. He argues that there is no consensus on this question in the practice of the contemporary natural sciences; different specific subfields within the sciences approach cause in fundamentally incompatible ways. For example, some subdisciplines of physics follow Hume in understanding cause as correlation. Other subdisciplines create intellectual constructs that cannot be empirically identified directly, but to which they impute causal powers—an approach to causality that philosophers of science call scientific realism. Yet others, such as some areas of quantum theory, eschew causality altogether. If physics, the hardest of the hard sciences, cannot agree on a concept of causality, Lebow argues, it should be no surprise that social scientists contest the concept among themselves as well.

The historical review begins with Aristotle, who identifies four kinds of causes, one of which—efficient causation (the proximate source of an outcome)—is what scientists, both natural and social, most often mean when talking about cause. David Hume attempted to specify the idea of efficient causation by associating it with what he called "constant conjunctions," or observed regularities in relationships among entities (p. 25). It is this Humean understanding of causality that Lebow is principally arguing against (although he also distances himself from various other understandings of cause, including scientific realism). His answer to Hume, and the positivist social science tradition that builds on Humean logic, is what he calls inefficient causation, a play on Aristotle's efficient causation.

The idea of inefficient causation builds on a Weberian epistemology, in which the analytical categories through which we construct data are intellectual impositions on the empirical world rather than inherent features of that world. It also builds on a constructivist approach to international relations, which sees the political world as socially constructed rather than materially given, and as contingent on social context that cannot be reduced to generalized assumptions about behavior such as rational choice. The combination of two starting points yields an understanding of causation that is singular rather than generalizable; Lebow argues that we should study the causes of single events rather than looking for the cause of a general category of event. For Lebow "cause makes sense of the social world in a manner consistent with evidence in a way that has some social value beyond its internal structure" (p. 6). Attribution of cause in this understanding helps us to understand the world rather than being intrinsic to the world, and should be judged on the extent to which it succeeds in doing so.

Lebow devotes two chapters to developing a methodology for the study of inefficient causation. He begins with the idea of cognitive frames and potential causal links between frames and individual behavior. He then discusses the aggregation of behaviors into outcomes as a separate set of mechanisms and processes, often yielding outcomes very different from what individuals intended to achieve through their behavior. At each of these levels, causal relationships can be traced forward (from cause, looking for effect) or backward (from effect, looking for cause). Inefficient causation allows for multiple causes, at various levels of inquiry and degrees of remove from effects; it "is a multi-step process that involves searching for connections between and among causes" (p. 65).

The final substantive chapter of *Constructing Cause* is devoted to a case study that illustrates Lebow's methodology for addressing inefficient causation. It focuses on visual frames, particularly the transition, beginning in the late medieval and early renaissance eras, to linear visual frames that emphasize perspective and an individual

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