

Promising Parties: Can Parties in Government still Deliver?

MARK M. GRAY

Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, Georgetown University,
2300 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20007, USA.
E-mail: mmg34@georgetown.edu

The ability of political parties in advanced industrial democracies to maintain the traditional linkage between voters and their governments by making and attempting to fulfill policy promises is potentially being challenged by emerging social, political, and economic forces of the 21st century. Parties may become less meaningful to the electorate as they deal with the cross-pressures created by the forces of Europeanization, globalization, localism, and the increasing independence of central banks. These factors have the potential to make parties in government, at the national-level, marginally less able to fulfill the promises they make to voters. The review of literature presented here regarding these challenges indicates that although the risks to parties are very real, the effects of these emerging forces have yet to substantially diminish the primary roles and functioning of national parties in government. Those most at risk of being affected in the future are parties who rely strongly on economic appeals and promises.

‘A party is neither a social unity nor an economic unity. It is based upon its program.’ (Robert Michels, *Political Parties*¹)

In democracies, political parties have traditionally linked citizens to government through offering policy alternatives in manifestos and party programs at election time. By making promises to constituents, potential voters see value in participating in the political process and can make meaningful choices. Parties gain long-term support by making good on these promises in government, or – if they are in opposition – by preventing the parties in government from fulfilling promises that may harm their core constituencies.^{2–5} As Katz notes, this idea of ‘Party government’ is the dominant legitimizing myth of the representative mass democracies’ and to some degree all modern democracies have some varying level of the ‘party-ness of government’.⁴

As the 21st century began, some questioned the continued ability of parties in post-industrial democracies to make policy promises that were distinguishable from other parties or to keep those promises once they entered into government.⁶ Theoretically, in this new age, parties may have become increasingly constrained by many forces, including: globalization, localism, regional political and economic union, the rise in independence of central banks, and in the growing fiscal demands of modern tax and welfare states.

This article focuses on literature published in the last decade, for the most part in peer-reviewed political science journals, regarding possible changes in the ability of parties in Europe to produce responsible government outcomes. It addresses recent research on the ability of parties in government to organize the policy making process and implement policy decisions that reflect the promises made to voters in manifestos and other election campaign media.

Emerging challenges to party government

Even as they strike a pessimistic tone about the future of parties in advanced industrial democracies, Dalton and Wattenberg note, 'it has become a reoccurring fashion in political science research to proclaim that parties are in decline'.⁶ In an earlier era, Katz noted a similar tendency for political scientists to make dire predictions about the future of party democracy while indicating, 'the problems to which they pointed usually were real enough'.⁴

Although no predictions of crisis are made here, the challenges facing 21st century parties in government seem as real and universal as ever.⁷ In recent decades, the political geography of democracy has shifted. National governments and national parties must now deal with increasingly influential global political, social, and economic forces as well as the continuing development of regional institutions and, in some cases, the establishment of new institutions of local government. From inside and out, the ability of national parties to manipulate and control the socio-economic realities of the nation state have eroded. Under the strain of greater economic interconnectedness through the processes of regionalization and globalization, national party governments may be increasingly constrained in their ability to steer domestic policy, and thus less able to deliver collective goods to their traditional constituencies. Where this has occurred, choices on ballots become less meaningful to voters, with fewer benefits perceived for one party being in power over another. What were once predictable differences between parties in government in many post-industrial democracies may now have become more difficult to discern and the traditional party government model may lose relevance.

Substantial changes in democratic electorates have occurred as well. The original partisan theory, advanced by Hibbs⁸ and others, rests on a particular

conception of the relationship between citizens and the political system, where clearly demarcated social classes identify with certain parties. In this type of system, parties would pursue economic policies that benefit their core constituencies. Modern economic realities may have undermined the most fundamental assumptions of this partisan theory. The pressures of globalization, immigration, the growth of the service sector and a rising middle class in industrialized nations has altered the traditional class structure. The linkages between labor unions and labor and socialist parties has weakened in nearly all industrial democracies, relative to what it was in the immediate post-war decades.^{9–12} Since the 1970s, both class-based voting and cleavage politics declined across advanced industrial democracies.^{13–16} The deep-rooted divisions in society that traditionally structured political conflict may be fading, making it more difficult for parties to differentiate and target their programmatic promises.

Additionally, systemic changes in the economic system and long-standing policy commitments of states may be increasingly restricting the potential of parties to control public policy. Key economic outputs such as inflation, growth, and unemployment are often more heavily influenced by events occurring outside of the domestic economy. With the growth in international trade and the globalization of production and finance, national governments have also lost some of the control they once had over economic policy. New pressures to conform to the ‘lowest common policy denominator’ have emerged as the need to compete with the economies of other countries has created pressures for fewer socio-economic benefits and less regulation.^{17,18} Consequently, parties in government may feel pressure to opt for policies that do not reflect their ideological traditions. For example, Labor and Socialist parties may feel the need to move to the center and reinvent themselves in the ‘Third Way’ (e.g. New Labour in Britain) in order to embrace programs that lack many of the core policy promises their party had made in the past. In addition, the growth of non-discretionary budget items and changing demographics, namely aging and sometimes shrinking populations, may also contribute to a decline in the amount of control parties in government have had in national budget commitments, limiting their flexibility to adapt to these and other new realities.

Empirical research has come to varying conclusions over the question of whether the party composition of government makes a real difference in public policy and economic performance. Some studies have concluded that ‘party control matters’. For example, both Castles¹⁹ and Hicks and Swank²⁰ find party control of government matters for welfare expenditure, Budge and Keman²¹ find the same effect on total expenditures, and Hibbs^{8,22} research reveals an impact on unemployment and inflation. Iversen²³ shows that even where the overall level of welfare expenditures may fall, differences between the parties may remain. In more recent research, Allan and Scruggs²⁴ show that traditional

partisanship exerts strong influences over welfare state entitlements, even as the overall trends reveal retrenchment. Specifically, before 1980, parties of the Left were associated with increases in income replacement rates, and after 1980 parties of the Right have become associated with larger cuts in these same entitlements.

A different set of studies points toward less influence for parties or even an ‘end of partisanship’. Garrett and Mitchell show that increasing trade and international financial openness in recent decades is associated with lower levels of government spending.²⁵ Others point toward a trend of declining party control over policies as diverse as fiscal and monetary, to transfer and consumption expenditures, since the 1970s.^{19,26–32} Caul and Gray find that parties have had only modest influence on economic outputs and spending. Reflecting the pressures of globalization, the average performance of all other long-term industrial democracies is often the best predictor of economic outputs and spending in any one country.³³

Regardless of the effectiveness of parties in government, there is evidence that parties still rely heavily on the traditional party government model. A recent study by McDonald *et al.*³⁴ including 71 parties in 16 countries in post-Second World War elections shows that parties are consistent in the promises they make – so much so that they are unlikely to alter their course in order to be more responsive to changing electoral environments. McDonald *et al.* note, ‘The mainspring of policy flexibility over time comes from electorates switching votes between parties and alternatives, rather than parties adapting to electors’ wishes.’³⁴

This article does not attempt to bring some new answer to the question ‘do parties matter?’ Instead, it seeks to understand recent developments in research that may tell us if parties are beginning to matter *less* or *more* in the new realities of the 21st century. In understanding this we may better understand if the ‘party-ness of government’ remains robust in post-industrial democracies and whether the future is promising for parties that continue to rely on making promises.

State of the 21st century party

Mair *et al.* note that for most modern political parties, success in government may no longer be a primary aim; survival often comes first.³⁵ Some of the challenges noted below may affect a party’s potential to survive in the electoral marketplace. However, more so, these emergent forces have and will challenge the ability of parties in government to claim success to a degree that is meaningful to the electorates that will determine their future fate. All the challenges to the party government model noted below can diminish ‘party-ness’ to one degree or another. The focus is on four of the most commonly noted, Europeanization, globalization, localism, and the rising independence of central banks.

Europeanization

The 21st century political party exists within a new era of blurred borders and boundaries. Nowhere is this more evident than in the development of the European Union (EU) and the potential for the emergence of forces of 'Europeanization' that can render national parties and policy less able to act independently *within* their own borders. As Mair summarizes, 'European integration increasingly operates to constrain the freedom of movement of national governments, and hence encourages a hollowing out of competition among those parties with a governing aspiration. As such, it promotes a degree of consensus across the mainstream and an inevitable reduction in the range of policy alternatives available to voters.'³⁶ The broad loss of political power associated with the process of Europeanization and globalization more broadly has been described as 'deparliamentarization'.³⁷

Ladrech³⁸ expects parties will seek greater influence at the supranational level but that the success of this process will be country-specific and dependent on institutional interactions with some being better able to adapt than others. He is pessimistic of this approach noting,

Political parties ... have the incentive and motivation to 'come to terms' with the changes in their environment as it impacts on their fortunes, but ... they are constrained in a number of ways. The most basic dilemma, though perhaps not so obvious, is that there is little if anything in the way of resources that the EU possesses that can be translated into a positive gain for a political party³⁸.

Instead, national parties may be more likely to use the EU as a rallying point by either supporting its continued development and expansion or by campaigning against it, as has occurred in Britain, France, and Germany.^{38,39}

Although national governments may still have considerable autonomy and power within the decision-making process of the EU,⁴⁰ further adaptations by national parties participating in the Council of the European Union or the European Parliament may only further dilute the importance and identity of the national parties within their individual states. Yet Marks and Wilson show that 'Political parties have significantly more in common with parties in the same party family that they do with other parties in the same country.'⁴¹ But this similarity has not always led to the development of coherent policy promises as Brzinski notes, 'A common task of party federations in European elections is drafting a common election manifesto. One problem faced by European parties is the absence of agreement among national parties on major issues. The result is often vacuous programs.'⁴²

Potential expansions of the EU will likely introduce additional complications. Those national parties that participate in party federations or Europarties will experience the introduction of new actors from similar party families and face new opportunities for even greater fractionalization. Some of these new actors

will likely be from post-Communist states where parties are still developing and developing from very different traditions than the longstanding EU members. Both Bartolini and Mair⁷ and van Biezen⁴³ indicate that parties in post-Communist and emerging European democracies will not develop similarly to how parties evolved in long-term European democracies. The same evolution should not be expected to occur twice. This creates the potential for complications within party families. For example, will representatives of Labor or Socialist parties from long-term democracies, former Communist states, and emerging democracies be able to work toward a common agenda within EU institutions together given their divergent pasts and the varying cleavage structures that existed at the time of their early development? How might this occur for European parties of the Center which may have even less in common than those on the Left? To use a metaphor for party labels, in the future of the EU a rose may not always be a rose.

Delsoldato holds out the possibility that the convergence of this party diversity may 'in fact revive old cleavages and produce new sources of conflict,' which could in turn reinvigorate party systems.⁴⁴ However, it remains to be seen whether this revival would trickle down to national-level parties. Within parties, Poguntke *et al.* point to the problem of 'executive bias' in EU decision making and the potential for national parties to come under strain as rank and file members are distanced from leaders and specialists in policy areas important to the EU.⁴⁵

Globalization

Broader technological, economic, and political changes that have made it easier to travel across borders and exchange information, goods, services, and media were among the most discussed cultural phenomena of the late 20th century and continue today. Few would argue that globalization has not mattered but there is disagreement about how much it has mattered. In this debate, Drezner notes the general acceptance of the notion that 'globalization leads to convergence of traditional national policies governing environmental regulation, consumer health and safety, the regulation of labor, and the ability to tax capital'.⁴⁶ These are all key policy dimensions that voters expect parties in government to influence.

Convergence implies that governments and firms will seek out policies that make them most competitive in the global market and that the pressure to do this means seeking to emulate policies of deregulation, lower taxation, and fewer benefits to limit the costs of production and keep the economic environment as attractive as possible. This is an oversimplified model and it does not account for the fact that political gains can be made by encouraging or voicing support for protectionist policies. Indeed, Kriesi *et al.* show that the forces of globalization

have led to the creation of a new and important political cleavage in European countries.⁴⁷ Bohere and Tan demonstrate that parties of the Left have had an early advantage in this political environment.⁴⁸

Yet, empirical evidence counters the expectation of any strong movement toward policy convergence. Drezner's review of empirical studies shows that there is little evidence of downward pressure on wages or labor standards or toward deregulation toward a lowest common denominator.⁴⁶ Alternatively, the EU has engineered institutions and standards that would make it difficult for a member state to make such dramatic changes. To some degree, Europeanization is acting as a check against the broader convergence pressures of globalization.

Genschel concludes that 'Globalization is neither fatal nor irrelevant for the nation state; it is one important factor in its continuous transformation.'⁴⁹ His review of the effects of globalization tax policy indicates that global forces have not affected change as much as they have prevented it. Obinger *et al.* note similar findings in their comparative study of welfare state policies in that, 'The welfare state is still a bastion of the nation state.'⁵⁰ However, their research also indicates that parties within national systems seem to have less influence and ability to make changes that they once did. To the degree that globalization constrains policy change, parties may be less effective at steering policies that they once commanded rather easily.

Convergence is not the only threat of globalization. Zürn argues that globalization is leading to political denationalization where segments of government that were once the responsibility of national governments are now the domain of other supranational governments and regimes.⁵¹ To the degree to which some policies fall out of the national government portfolio, parties will lose additional levers that are the basis of the policy promises they can make. Adaptation may imply that parties become veto players seeking to maintain some control in areas where they have traditionally been used to being the primary influence.

Yet most conclude that, together, the forces of globalization and convergence are still more concept and caution than a stark reality. Clark *et al.* say that 'broad statements about the effects of increased capital mobility on the political control of industrial economies and the sovereignty of nationstates should be critically viewed and carefully qualified'.⁵² Mosely concludes that 'Despite financial globalization, the motivations for many government policies remain rooted in domestic politics and institutions.'⁵³

Localism

Parties may also be increasingly challenged at the other end of the geographic spectrum with fractionalization pressures from local governments. Dalton and Gray note an emergence or re-emergence since 1970 of regional governments in

Belgium, Italy, France and Britain, as well as some notable locally elected offices such as the Mayor of London and the Mayor of Paris.⁵⁴ Further, globalization and Europeanization has created both local economic ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ depending on the availability of attractive local industries, labor structures, and public policies. These local economic successes have bolstered the tax income for some while those who have failed to attract investment or seen capital leave their area have seen their fortunes diminish.

Growing political and economic decentralization could potentially have several negative effects on national parties as local issues strain the process of creating a coherent national party identity and platform. Thorlakson finds that within federal systems, parties in more decentralized states become less congruent.⁵⁵ Local political pressures lead to differences between the local political environment and the national party agenda. As Thorlakson notes, ‘When state elections are more important contests, state-level parties will have little incentive to maintain similar policies to those of the federal party if this risks electoral disadvantage in the state arena.’⁵⁵

Relative to the degree to which local governments are more empowered in the future, the greater the threat of a loss of identity will be to national parties. A party unable to create a coherent platform or identity may struggle to win votes where electorates are looking for clear clues about the potential future performance of a party in government. In a system with these local and regional pressures, parties representing the interests of specific geographies may be more likely to emerge rather than those that represent more traditional and national socio-demographic, ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages.

In many democracies, local governments have gained power and responsibilities in recent decades and in some cases have taken over roles that were once the domain of branches of the national or regional government or in some cases even the local party organizations. The danger in this expansion for national parties is in voters recognizing that local governments are providing many more of their essential services and public goods than the national government. In such a system, the local party representatives in government, especially where these representatives are elected rather than appointed, may gain increased autonomy that could threaten the national identity of the party.

In systems where local governments have gained this additional power and autonomy, the risk of poor outcomes, inefficiency, or even scandal at the local level of the party can further endanger the prospect of the national party. More so, in a competitive system, to the degree to which one party is associated with poor governing outcomes on the local level, relative to parties in local governments elsewhere, voters may choose to punish the poorer performing party at *all* levels of government and, at worst, those living in areas under the control of the poorer performing party may choose to move, thereby eroding the local tax bases and

diminishing the local economic outlook, resulting in unpopular cuts in local government spending and services.

The blame game can run in the opposite direction as well. Local council members have much to fear when their national party becomes unpopular.⁵⁶ When the national party in government loses favor, party members elected to local governments may choose to vocalize their dissatisfaction with the national party and/or distance themselves from unpopular national policies if they are secure enough in their local standing.

The rising independence of central banks

At a macroeconomic level, one of the key levers available to party governments is no longer as widely available as it once was with the rise of independent central banks, which limit party influence over monetary policy.^{57,58} Independence, broadly defined, encompasses the degree to which a government can influence a central bank in terms of its appointments, length of terms, dismissals; its budget; policy; and access to the levers that can manipulate monetary policies. The development of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the increasing independence many national central banks have gained in recent decades have eroded the power of European parties to make and enact policies aimed at affecting interest rates, growth, and price inflation. As Strøm notes, ‘during the 1990s the “partyiness” of central banks clearly declined in many advanced industrial democracies’.⁵⁸ This has occurred most often in federalist systems⁵⁹ where parties may have already been challenged by the pressures of localism noted above.

However, the growing influence and independence of central banks on national economic output has been, and can continue to be, a positive development for both voters and parties in governments – even to the point of saving some parties in government from their own mistakes. More so, Bernhard notes that more independent central banks can help ease tensions in multi-party governments and between a governing party’s frontbench and backbench by providing regular and third-party releases of information and indicators of economic performance that can be trusted by all parties.⁵⁹ Elsewhere, Bernhard and Leblang show that the loss of control over economic policies has helped some parties remain in government.⁶⁰

The growing importance of central banks will likely continue to insulate party governments from blame during poor economic times. Yet, it is not clear that voters conduct such mental calculus and the loss of power may not be worth some marginal loss in blame for poor outcomes, not to mention the potential that a party in government may not be given credit for managing a good economy. However, even where central bank policy works well, as intended, and where there is a more stable and positively performing economy over the long-term, the

fact remains that parties will be less able to make the argument that voters would be better off economically if they were in power rather than an opposition party. Instead, the economy may be perceived as being in the hands of the professional economist and the political discourse may shift to other policy areas. Many of Europe's oldest party traditions are rooted in economic and class cleavages. Even greater erosions of these may weaken their success and perhaps even endanger their survival and relevance in the coming decades.

Yet, more often than not, the record of success of central banks in managing economies has not met the ideals of economic theory and evidence has emerged of interaction effects that are related to strong unions and nations with Left party governments.⁶¹ Thus, partisan effects have remained visible and others argue that central banks and even the broader forces of globalization have not rendered parties in government less able to influence monetary and fiscal policies. Oatley⁶² demonstrates that from 1970 to 1994 governments with parties of the Left in control were still more likely to run deficits and those where parties of the Right were in power they were more likely to reduce interest rates. Oatley concludes, 'the latitude necessary to pursue distinct partisan macroeconomic strategies does exist, even in an open economy'.⁶² However, his study does not include the period in which central banks have become increasingly powerful. It remains to be seen if these tendencies for partisan influence have continued and will continue in the future.

Conclusion

Parties may be marginally less able to fulfill promises because of the emerging challenges noted here. However, that does not mean parties will cease to make promises. Under current conditions, party government does not necessarily need to be as effective as it was in the 1960s to be important. The *perception* that parties matter in voter's minds is still paramount. In short, any urgent predictions of a crisis in party government are unwarranted. As Strøm notes, 'we should avoid the assumption that political parties are merely passive victims of large scale changes in their environment. ... The leaders of parties, like those of other organizations, adapt to changes.'⁵⁸

The emerging challenges noted here are real but none are likely to contest the centrality of national parties in the minds of voters in the near future. In that vein, one important measure of the health of national party democracy in Europe is voter turnout. The elections that bring out the most people to vote are the focal points for the workings of 21st century democracy. If citizens become more likely to vote in EU, regional, or local elections than in their national elections, the importance of national parties in government will have been truly eclipsed. Until then, if ever, predictions of the demise of party government are premature.

With turnout in EU elections declining over time, the real crisis of party representation may be in the EU Parliament rather than in any national government.

As the challenges outlined here develop further, they will likely represent the key forces that will trigger new adaptations in how parties seek and perform in national government. This process will have its winners and losers and perhaps those most at risk are the parties that have traditionally relied on economic promises. All of the challenges outlined here show the potential to limit severely the abilities of parties to manipulate macroeconomic policies and outcomes as they once did. Parties that are able to adapt and make promises that matter to voters outside of the increasingly constrained economic policy realm may have the most promising futures.

References

1. R. Michels (1968) *Political Parties* (New York: Free Press).
2. R. Dahl (1966) *Political Opposition in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University).
3. G. B. Powell (1982) *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
4. R. Katz (1986) Party government and its alternatives. In: R. Katz (ed.) *Party Governments: European and American Experiences*, Vol. 2 (Berlin: De Gruyter).
5. H.-D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs (eds) (1995) *Citizens and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
6. R. J. Dalton and M. P. Wattenberg (eds) (2000) *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
7. S. Bartolini and P. Mair (2001) Challenges to contemporary political parties. In: L. Diamond and R. Gunther (eds) *Political Parties and Democracy* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press).
8. D. A. Hibbs (1987) *The Political Economy of Industrialized Democracies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
9. A. J. Taylor (1993) Trade unions and the politics of social democratic renewal. *West European Politics*, **16**(1), 133–156.
10. J. Pierre and A. Widfeldt (1992) Sweden. In: R. Katz and P. Mair (eds) *Party Organizations* (London: Sage).
11. P. Selle (1997) Parties and voluntary organizations: strong or weak ties? In: K. Strom and L. Svansand (eds) *Challenges to Political Parties: The Case of Norway* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press).
12. C. Thomas (ed.) (2001) *Political Parties and Interest Groups: Shaping Democratic Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher).
13. M. Franklin (1985) *The Decline of Class Voting in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
14. M. N. Franklin, T. T. Mackie and H. Valen (1992) *Electoral Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
15. R. J. Dalton, S. Flanagan and P. A. Beck (1984) *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

16. I. Crewe and D. Denver (1985) *Electoral Change in Western Democracies* (London: Croom Helm).
17. S. Berger and R. Dore (eds) (1996) *National Diversity and Global Capitalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
18. R. Keohane and H. Milner (1996) *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
19. F. G. Castles (1998) *Comparative Public Policy: Patterns of Postwar Transformation* (Cheltenham: Edward Elger).
20. A. Hicks and D. H. Swank (1992) Politics, institutions, and welfare spending in industrialized democracies, 1960–82. *American Political Science Review*, **86**(3), 658–674.
21. I. Budge and H. Keman (1990) *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in 20 States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
22. D. A. Hibbs (1977) Political parties and macroeconomic policy. *American Political Science Review*, **71**, 1467–1487.
23. T. Iversen (2001) The dynamics of welfare state expansion: trade openness, de-industrialization, and partisan politics. In: P. Pierson (ed.) *The New Politics of the Welfare State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
24. J. P. Allen and L. Scruggs (2004) Political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial societies. *American Journal of Political Science*, **48**(3), 496–512.
25. G. Garrett and D. Mitchell (2001) Globalization, government spending and taxation in the OECD. *European Journal of Political Research*, **39**, 145–177.
26. C. Boix (1998) Partisan governments and macroeconomic policies in OECD economies. Working Paper. Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.
27. T. R. Cusack (1999) Partisan politics and fiscal policy. *Comparative Political Studies*, **32**(4), 464–486.
28. G. Garrett and P. Lange (1991) Political responses to interdependence: what's 'left' for the left?. *International Organization*, **45**, 539–564.
29. R. Hofferbert and D. Cingranelli (1996) Public policy and administration: comparative policy analysis. In: R. Goodin and H.-D. Klingeman (eds) *The New Handbook of Political Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
30. E. Huber and J. Stephens (2001) *Development and Crisis of the Welfare States: Parties and Politics in Global Markets* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
31. H. Keman (1984) Politics, policies, and consequences: a cross-national analysis of public policy formation in advanced capitalist democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, **12**, 147–170.
32. M. G. Schmidt (1982) The role of the parties in shaping macroeconomic policy. In: F. G. Castles (ed.) *The Impact of Parties* (London: Sage).
33. M. Caul and M. Gray (2000) From platform declarations to policy outcomes: changing party profiles and partisan influence over policy. In: R. J. Dalton and M. P. Wattenberg (eds) *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

34. B. D. McDonald, I. Budge and P. Pennings (2004) Choice versus sensitivity: party reactions to public concerns. *European Journal of Political Research*, **43**, 845–868.
35. P. Mair, W. Müller and F. Plasser (2004) Conclusion: political parties in changing electoral markets. In: P. Mair, W. Müller and F. Plasser (eds) *Political Parties and Electoral Change* (London: Sage Publications).
36. P. Mair (2000) The limited impact of Europe on national party systems. *West European Politics*, **23**, 27–51.
37. A. Hurrelmann, Z. Krell-Laluhova, R. Lhotta, F. Nullmeier and S. Schneider (year?) The democratic nation state: erosion, or transformation, of legitimacy: is there a legitimization crisis of the nationstate? *European Review*, **13**(1), 119–137.
38. R. Ladrech (2002) Europeanization and political parties: towards a framework for analysis. *Party Politics*, **8**(4), 389–403.
39. L. Ray (2003) When parties matter: the conditional influence of party positions on voter opinions about European integration. *The Journal of Politics*, **65**(4), 978–994.
40. T. König (2007) Divergence or convergence? From ever-growing to ever-slowing European legislative decision making. *European Journal of Political Research*, **46**, 417–444.
41. G. Marks and C. J. Wilson (2000) The past in the present: a cleavage theory of party response to European integration. *British Journal of Political Science*, **30**(3), 433–459.
42. J. B. Brzinski (1999) Changing forms of federalism and party electoral strategies: Belgium and the European Union. *Publius*, **29**(1), 45–70.
43. I. van Biezen (2003) *Political Parties in New Democracies: Party organization in Southern and East-Central Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
44. G. Delsoldato (2002) Eastward enlargement by the European Union and transnational parties. *International Political Science Review*, **23**(3), 269–289.
45. T. Poguntke, N. Aylott, R. Ladrech and K. R. Luther (2007) The Europeanisation of national party organisations: a conceptual analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*, **46**, 747–771.
46. D. W. Drezner (2001) Globalization and policy convergence. *International Studies Review*, **3**(1), 53–78.
47. H. Kriesi, E. Grande, R. Lachat, M. Dolezal, S. Bornschieer and T. Frey (2006) Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, **45**, 921–956.
48. R. E. Bohrer II and A. C. Tan (2000) Left turn in Europe? Reactions to austerity and the EMU. *Political Research Quarterly*, **53**(3), 575–595.
49. P. Genschel (2005) Globalization and the transformation of the tax state. *European Review*, **13**(1), 53–71.
50. H. Obinger, S. Leibfried, C. Bogedan, E. Gindulis, J. Moser and P. Starke (2005) The intervention state: the shifting welfare component. *European Review*, **13**(1), 161–185.

51. M. Zürn (2003) Globalization and global governance: from societal to political denationalization. *European Review*, **11**(3), 341–364.
52. W. R. Clark, U. N. Reichert, S. L. Lomas and K. L. Parker (1998) International and domestic constraints on political business cycles in OECD economies. *International Organization*, **52**(1), 87–120.
53. L. Mosley (2000) Room to move: international financial markets and national welfare states. *International Organization*, **54**(4), 737–773.
54. R. J. Dalton and M. M. Gray (2003) Expanding the electoral marketplace. In: B. E. Cain, R. J. Dalton and S. E. Scarrow (eds) *Democracy Transformed?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
55. L. Thorlakson (2007) An institutional explanation of party system congruence: evidence from six federations. *European Journal of Political Research*, **46**, 69–95.
56. G. Boyne (1998) Party competition and local spending decisions. *British Journal of Political Science*, **28**(1), 210–222.
57. A. Lijphart (1999) *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
58. K. Strøm (2000) Parties at the core of government. In: R. J. Dalton and M. P. Wattenberg (eds) *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
59. W. Bernhard (1998) A political explanation of variations in central bank independence. *American Political Science Review*, **92**(1), 311–327.
60. W. Bernhard and D. Leblang (2002) Political parties and monetary commitments. *International Organization*, **56**(4), 803–830.
61. T. Sakamoto (2005) Economic performance of ‘weak’ governments and their interaction with central banks and labour: deficits, economic growth, unemployment and inflation, 1961–1998. *European Journal of Political Research*, **44**, 801–836.
62. T. Oatley (1999) How constraining is capital mobility? The partisan hypothesis in an open economy. *American Journal of Political Science*, **43**(4), 1003–1027.

About the Author

Mark M. Gray is a Research Assistant Professor at Georgetown University at the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA) in Washington DC. He has published research on political parties, voter turnout, and the effects of international integration in articles for *International Organization* and *Comparative Political Studies* as well as in chapters in the Oxford University Press edited volumes, *Democracy Transformed?: Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (2003) and *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (2000).