Cavell's discussion of consent focuses on human community, on the conditions of and obstacles to articulating our common humanity, and, in doing so, elides the specific features of political community in a way that leaves it in no place to address the question of political obligation acutely raised by those subject to state violence. Whereas political realism is in the game of justification but fails to reconcile this with its simultaneous commitment to taking history and ideology seriously, Cavell's approach never really enters the justificatory game. Although there is much that political realists and Cavellians may dissent from in Arnold's readings, they are clearly and intelligently laid-out interpretations— and in this respect do the job of indicating why he thinks that these approaches are unlikely to succeed in overcoming the analytic–continental divide and thereby open up the space for his own preferred aporetic approach to cross-tradition theorizing. This argument is presented as an education in limitations that aims to deepen our understanding of what Arnold refers to as the "density" of our political concepts. By this he means something like the complexity that they have acquired over the histories of their use or, to use terms Arnold does not, the multi-aspectival character of these concepts considered as historical institutions.

The first two case studies intended to recommend this approach focus on Philip Pettit and Hannah Arendt in reference to "freedom *as such*" in chapter 3 and to political freedom in chapter 4. Arnold's basic claim is that Pettit is committed to an account of freedom theorized as "discursive control," which makes sense of our intuitions concerning the relationship of freedom and responsibility; however, this picture of freedom cannot be reconciled with Arendt's account conceived in terms of non-sovereign agency and theorized in terms of "natality" that makes intuitive sense of cases of "spontaneous, improvised, but nonetheless intelligible, free activity" (p. 98). In chapter 4 Arnold focuses on Pettit on freedom as non-domination in relation to Arendt on freedom as isonomy. The problem for Pettit is that his attempt to distinguish himself from the problems he identifies in the Rousseauvian republican cannot be sustained, whereas the problem for Arendt is that freedom as isonomy is not compatible with institutionalized structures of rule. The moral to draw from these chapters is that, for Arnold, "freedom is a dense phenomenon" (p. 135) and that an aporetic approach illustrates the insights and limitations of both traditions. It is notable that this reading of Arendt requires upholding the view that her reflections are structured by the opposition of rule and freedom, a position challenged most prominently in the work of Patchen Markell, which Arnold references but does not seriously engage (p. 193, fn23).

The final case study is that of Rawls and Derrida in which Arnold argues that both engage in a turn to history to articulate their "post-metaphysical" conceptions of justice—Rawls to underpin the justification of liberal-democratic political society and Derrida to underpin the normative validity of law—but in neither case can this turn provide the resources required for their projects. This is an original and engaging argument, but it also raises an obvious question: there is another major contemporary theorist who famously also proposes a "post-metaphysical" view of justice and explicitly engages with the role of history in the emergence of such a view, namely, Jurgen Habermas. Yet, despite referencing Habermas's sympathetic criticisms of Rawls, Arnold writes as if the kind of synthetic cross-tradition theorizing that Habermas represents (and if anyone is a synthetic cross-tradition theorizer, then Habermas surely is!) is simply absent from the field of reflection. This does, it seems to me, fairly severely limit the scope of the argument being advanced. It also raises a final set of questions that are motivated by my sense that much of the most original and interesting political philosophy of the past 50 years has emerged from people drawing from work across traditions—Habermas is one example as is, from the same generation, Charles Taylor, while Iris Marion Young and James Tully may be mentioned as others. So, why do we need to treat "analytic" and "continental" political philosophy as if they are silos sealed off from one another that necessarily stand in an aporetic relationship?

Yet although I remain skeptical concerning the scope of the thesis advanced by Arnold, *Across the Great Divide* is an original and provocative book. Arnold's writing is always clear and intelligent; his studies are sufficiently detailed for serious argument to engage. Further, the perspective of aporetic cross-tradition theorizing offers a standpoint that may be helpful in revealing features of how we theorize political concepts that are otherwise elided and in disclosing unnoticed assumptions and limitations in particular theoretical orientations. This work deserves to be widely read both for its general claims and its case studies, which should be addressed in more detail than I can offer in this short review.

Capitalism on Edge: How Fighting Precarity Can Achieve Radical Change Without Crisis or Utopia. By Albena Azmanova. New York: Columbia University Press, 2020. 272p. $90.00 cloth, $30.00 paper.
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Capitalism on Edge investigates the most pressing socio-economic and ecological challenges facing the United States and Europe in a period that a growing number of left-leaning political theorists view as mired in economic and political crisis. Albena Azmanova challenges the prevailing assessment on the Left that capitalism is no longer

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secure and is facing collapse. Pointing particularly to the rejuvenation of the world economy in the wake of the 2008 Great Recession, Azmanova contends "that capitalism as an engine of prosperity is doing well" (p. 2).

Azmanova views "precarity capitalism" as the latest variant of capitalism, one that produces economic insecurity and ecological disaster. Although she argues that the capitalist system is healthy overall, precarity capitalism, which emerged in the 2010s, has nevertheless replaced "neoliberal capitalism" and produced attendant joblessness and economic insecurity. Even as capitalism prospers, therefore, Azmanova takes solace in the rise of protests critical of it in the last decade (p. 190). In contrast to left, right, and centrist prescriptions, however, Azmanova suggests that such radical protests point to a new form of capitalism that is not fully defined yet, aside from overcoming "precarious capitalism" through protest politics.

In Azmanova's construct, the emergence of precarious capitalism actually reveals the resilience of the capitalist system that, simultaneously, casts a majority of Americans and Europeans into economic instability. But precarious capitalism does not produce a systemic capitalist crisis. Despite popular dissatisfaction with capitalism's failure to provide universal prosperity, Western economies are supported by all constituencies. Counter-hegemonic movements are therefore not against capitalism, but are instead seeking economic prosperity within the system, revealing the capitalist system's vibrancy. The challenge then, is to address popular discontent against precarity capitalism that has produced what Azmanova designates "a crisis of the crisis of capitalism," defined as an economic system that is trapped in unending crisis management. Azmanova argues that this "chronic inflammation" contributes to the potential emancipation and "radical overcoming" of precarious capitalism (pp. 2, 15, 152, 190). Today's political movements are far less threatening to the system, she maintains: "Over the past hundred years, the energies of protest have been gradually deflating from *revolution* to *reform*, *resistance*, and now *resilience*" (p. 20). Yet, she goes on to argue that, in the last decade, protests to reclaim economic, political, cultural, and employment security are growing (p. 69).

Azmanova contends that the major challenges to society are "poverty, inequality, crime, and environmental degradation" (p. 48). The major shortcoming under precarity is its failure to produce abundant jobs. *Capitalism on Edge* points to the rise of protests for economic and physical security as of signal importance. Yet even protests on the Left demonstrate support for capitalism, she argues. Azmanova notes the Spanish Indignados proclamation: "We are for the system: the system is against us" (p. 21). But these movements on the Left are juxtaposed against the rise of right-wing electoral mobilization, including Brexit and Donald Trump's election as president of the United States, as signs of antiestablishment protests—whether of the Right, Left, or center.

What is Azmanova's solution to the discontent manifested in protests against precarity capitalism? The "millennial generation" or the "new generation" has embraced a vague democratic socialism and will augur in the transformation. In the United States, these are the same currents that elected "a maverick presidential candidate" willing to challenge existing technocratic policies. Azmanova pointedly asserts, "Trump's presidency signals that the technocratic politics of no alternatives (the TINA policy logic) that had paralyzed Western democracies for the previous three decades is over" (p. 198).

Azmanova correctly observes that the response to precarity capitalism has run the gamut from leftist opposition to capitalism to far-right demands against migration and that its shortcomings can be addressed by social reform and redistribution aimed at reducing economic uncertainty for the majority through "stabilizing production, employment, and income" (p. 193) and building a more humane capitalism. However, for Azmanova, saving capitalism will occur through "overcoming" it via social reform and poverty reduction, rather than through ending inequality. She concludes that capitalist inequality is, in fact, supported by popular majorities (pp. 172, 178, 193–94). Yet statistical evidence over the past 50 years consistently demonstrates that inequality, not poverty, is expanding significantly in the West.

The book's conclusion points to her remedy: Azmanova sees social protests and radical electoral politics as the path to overcoming precarity capitalism. Pointing to Occupy, Indignados, and other social protest movements as crucial sources for change, she suggests that the solution to the problem seems to have come with the rise of right-wing working-class protest.

The parties of the Left have disappeared, and examples of new parties, such as the Democratic Socialists of America, led by the educated white middle class, seem incapable of building an institutional solution to the crisis. The solution, one might argue, would seem be to return to the legacy of postwar socialism in Europe and learn from its mistakes. However, Azmanova does not examine the possibilities of the state ending poverty, redistributing income, and appealing to class solidarity. Instead, she rejects all socialist models as replacements for the increasingly authoritarian contemporary capitalist model, even if they provide insight into an institutional system that guarantees basic protections.

Azmanova intentionally rejects critiques foregrounding the danger of populism, stating, "I have proposed that we abstain from using the term 'populism' altogether" (p. 9). However, the rise of populism evokes the threat of fascism, defeated 75 years ago, and replaced by nominally communist systems. By deflecting an analytic understanding of populism and, by extension, fascism, Azmanova loses sight

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of a familiar history. The communist and Eastern Bloc governments that Azmanova vilifies with rhetorical flourish throughout the book were established by partisan socialists who defeated fascists in Europe. The rise in populism and appeals to nationalism today are deliberately left unexamined. As such, *Capitalism on Edge* does not consider the rise or resurgence of racism, white supremacy, and xenophobia. Although Azmanova correctly identifies the proliferation of protest politics, in the absence of an elaboration of potential institutional solutions, she leaves the potential dangers of populism unexplored.

Finally, *Capitalism on Edge* unfortunately adopts and applies a Eurocentric perspective that ignores the world outside the West. Azmanova disregards the fact that overcoming precarious capitalism may simultaneously require even further subjugation and exploitation of the Global South, where the majority of people live in even greater precarity and instability. Overcoming capitalism through reform may require further pillage of the 85% of the world beyond the United States and Europe. That would be a tragedy.

Vanguardism: Ideology and Organization in Totalitarian Politics. By Phillip W. Gray. New York: Routledge, 2020. 210p. $124.00 cloth, $31.96 paper.
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Vanguardism as a distinctive form of radical politics is evidence that the left–right spectrum is not actually a straight line but is shaped more like a horseshoe. Measured in one way, the extremes are far apart, but the ends also begin to converge and often exhibit a great deal of similarity. Whether they are advocates of more equality or its enemies, vanguardist cadres have articulated ideologies and forged political movements that are eerily similar to one another. A comparative study of this brand of extremist politics that accounts for its convergence is definitely needed.

Phillip Gray's systematic analysis is a good first cut at this ambitious task: he has synthesized a vast range of material into a readable comparison of the vanguardist movements that have formed since the end of the nineteenth century. Such movements always have totalitarian aspirations, Gray argues (pp. 3–4), but many never succeed in capturing power or building totalitarian states. The focus of this study is the movement itself as the vanguard of leaders and ideologists conceive of it. Gray shows that there is a common vanguardist syndrome operating within a disparate array of revolutionary movements that have emerged since the rise of mass politics.

Gray argues that vanguardism as an ideal-type consists of six interdependent elements (p. 9). The key one is what he calls "category-based epistemology," according to which some distinctive social group or fraction of the whole population is said to be so positioned that it can discern "the actual dynamics influencing, shaping, and (in a sense) determining the direction of History, society, and human development" (p. 12). The self-appointed vanguard of this fraction sees more clearly than the rank and file the path forward to a beneficial reconstruction of society, because this advance guard has discovered the inner workings of historical change (the second element in the syndrome) through its development of a science of seeing (the third element), making it possible to bring about a total reconstruction of social life (the fourth element) after the enemy that prevents this emancipation (the fifth element) has been vanquished by the movement that the vanguard party leads (the sixth element). Vanguardist movements vary depending on which type of disadvantaged social grouping is thought to be "epistemologically privileged": class, nation, race, faith, or (more generically) the subaltern of the oppressed. A chapter is devoted to the analysis of each of these variations, with Leninism, Fascism, and Nazism constituting the classical forms of vanguardism that have given way in the course of time to a welter of hybrids and new species.

The book could serve as a useful undergraduate text in a course about political ideologies, but the author's understandable hostility toward vanguardism prevents him from fully entering into the mindset of the leadership cadres that direct these movements. Each version is dissolved mechanistically into the same six elements, but that method inevitably robs these ideological families of the life force that would have made them plausible to their adherents.

To orient the reader, it might have been helpful to situate vanguardism more precisely within the larger galaxy of authoritarian ideology, past and present. A contrast is drawn with technocracy (p. 35), and vanguardism is clearly different from the divine right of kings or classical forms of paternalism and guardianship. Across its many variants, vanguardism can be described as modern, illiberal, populist, and revolutionary. It has adapted certain kinds of democratic ideas to its hierarchical purposes, but it is fundamentally hostile to pluralism and always exhibits a will to monopoly. It does not accept the philosophical legitimacy of competition.

Vanguardism, we could say, is the toxic form of identity politics. Its aspirations are always supremacist. Some part thinks (or is told) that it ought to be treated as if it were the whole. Gray describes this part as the "epistemologically privileged population," but that seems inexact to me. In Leninist theory, for example, it is not the case that proletarians as a class can know what nobody else can know. On the contrary, Leninism (like every other form of vanguardism) is predicated on the assumption that the bulk of the identity group in whose name the vanguard claims to speak does *not* know what the vanguard knows,

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