postulates that all early brain activity was "unconscious" but evolved as a dynamic process on the basis of gradual self-awareness, biologically purposive and directed towards drawing attention to clash, contrast, conflict, pain or danger with a view to diminishing these by modifying environmental or personal activity. Where this modification is successful, self-awareness thus becomes self-eliminating. The function of consciousness can be seen therefore as catalysing processes which tend to remove its cause in each situation. Only to aesthetic awareness in which there is no struggle between self and environment does this not apply.

The importance of the hierarchical organization of mental processes in which traces are so organized as to guide present or future thought and behaviour is stressed. These mental processes, however, are not seen as static, i.e. remaining in the categories of unconscious, pre-conscious, conscious, etc., but are regarded as of changing structure and dynamic in their development. Only certain transitory aspects are accessible to immediate conscious attention. In all this considerable implications for mental disorder can be seen. For example, schizophrenic states could well be construed as a disruption of the hierarchical organization of mind.

There are also implications for psychotherapy, for in terms of our current conception of the conscious/unconscious antithesis, it is pointed out that no self-improving psychological methods of treatment for curing the severer mental conditions have been developed. While partial understanding of the mind in the form of a dramatized allegory has been gained (the Freudian doctrine and its variants), the situation remains confused. Whyte believes that existing concepts will only be satisfactorily replaced when exact science has established a valid theory of biological organization. Further than this, the commonly held idea that the effectiveness of psychotherapy depends in part in rendering what is unconscious, leading to a better degree of personality integration, may well prove to be quite erroneous. This is in line with Whitehead's conception of the advance of civilization depending upon the number of important operations that can be performed without conscious effort, which, of course, applies to individuals also.

While the demand for a static dichotomous concept of mind continues, the persistence of Cartesian dualism is inescapable. But Whyte's theories allow the development of monism—a unity in which "material" and "mental", "conscious" and "unconscious" are derivable as related aspects of one primary system of ideas.

It is not often that philosophy offers such a

potentially profound contribution to the advance of psychology and psychiatry. This book is a considerable achievement and can be highly commended.

W. H. TRETHOWAN.

Schmerz und Schmerzhaftigkeit (Pain and Tenderness). By A. P. AEURSPERG. Springer-Verlag. 1963. Pp. 76. DM12.80.

Although no experimental or clinical work is actually presented, the author states that his essay is based on his experiences in the Luftwaffe Hospital in Vienna during World War II. After the war he continued his observations first in Sao Paulo, where he received hospitality at the Surgical Clinic, Vasconselos, and later in 1949, in Concepcion, Chile, at the Psychiatric Clinic which he has built up and which he directs.

The monograph is a critical review of the literature on the physiology and psychology of pain. The first chapter discusses the classical theories on the physiology of pain and tenderness. The second chapter explains the difference between "pain sensation" and "pain feeling"—the two aspects of pain. Sensation is an element of perception; feeling, on the other hand, is a mode of experience, which is characterized by the psychic state of the individual, and this will determine his entire attitude towards and response to the stimulus. The author contends that sensation predominates in exteroceptive pain, feeling in visceral pain. The chapter culminates in the proposition that the "biological meaning" of exteroceptive pain is to force attention to a danger for the purpose of arresting it, whereas that of interoceptive pain is to immobilize the individual; thus making him an easy prey to the forces of elimination—eliminating the spent and diseased life. The third chapter discusses the functional substrate of pain and tenderness due to illness. As regards transferred pain, the author appears to agree very largely with Weddell, diverging from his views only in a number of subsidiary points. According to the author both superficial and deep pain depend on one and the same substrate, which includes the autonomic nervous system.

At the end of the book there is a lengthy postscript about the dependence of pain on the total condition of the organism, and on its relationship to the environment. One feels that this part of the book is really closest to the author's heart, giving his views on the anthropological significance and function of pain. The argument is sweeping and ranges over philosophy, art, anthropology, psychology, cybernetics, etc. An attempt is made to evolve a formula to describe the complexities, from which one can then generalize. He does this as follows: provocation of pain only acts in the context of the organism's total relationship to its environment. This relationship is realized through the autonomic nervous system and reactions to pain derive their intentionality only from the context of this regulated relationship. In the course of his general discussion the author equates physical pain and mental anguish. He writes "In the language of dualism, the meaningfully motivated pain of mental anguish is contrasted with the physical pain caused by illness. From the phenomenological point of view, however, mental anguish is just as physical as bodily pain due to illness. Anguish has the methodological advantage of being directly understandable in terms of meaning. But physical pain too, as indeed all suffering due to illness, can only be described adequately in the context of an individual's psychic state, together with any changes in the latter and how it is related to the environment."

The essay is clearly argued and the author is thoroughly familiar with the literature on his subject. The last section of the book may perhaps not convince everyone, but it will certainly bore no one, not least because of the charmingly told story in it about the hunting dog called "Stoffel".

J. HOENIG.

Learning and Instinct in Animals. By W. H. THORPE. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. 1963. Pp. 558. Price 63s.

Man is unique in the preponderance that learning plays in his behaviour. Yet he is but one among a host of animals. The very word "instinct" had become unfashionable among psychologists for 30 years. Its inevitable return is owed to ethologists. Here is a book, the second edition of one already recognized as authoritative, in which the author is not afraid to write of "instinct", and of the build-up of something from within-an urge to behave according to a certain in-built pattern, an urge so powerful that the behaviour may even break-out (as "vacuum activity") in the absence of the usual releasing stimulus. Puppies and calves evidently have an instinctive urge to suck and, if fed so that they do little sucking, there will be an "overflow", with sucking of, for instance, the ears and navels of companions (cf. thumb-sucking).

The book begins with an extensive theoretical survey of such concepts as drive, instinct, insight, habituation, and learning. Then Dr. Thorpe summarizes a great deal of work on lower animals, finally reaching the mammals. The space devoted reflects the author's interests: birds get 107 pages

Pickford Projective Pictures

R. W. PICKFORD

A short text accompanied by line drawings on cards, which show children in relationships with other children and with adults and sometimes alone. These pictures are intended to be used for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes in Child Guidance Clinics and for counselling and remedial teaching.

Text and picture material 50s net Text 30s Picture material 25s

Probation and Mental Treatment

MAX GRÜNHUT

This study discusses probation as a method of treatment from a legal and a criminological point of view. The author follows up a sample of cases occurring within one year, through the successive stage of their treatment by psychiatrists and probation officers, and makes a critical assessment of the experience gained during their medical treatment, during their probationary service and afterwards.

Library of Criminology

15s net

A Study of Children's Thinking

MARGARET DONALDSON

A contribution to theories of the development of intelligence and of test construction based on findings from an analysis of the errors made by children in solving problems.

35s net

Alcoholic Addiction

A Psycho-Social Approach to Abnormal Drinking HOWARD JONES

'Dr. Jones concludes a fascinating study with suggestions for the treatment of alcoholics which seem sound and practical. The subject is rarely discussed with such objectivity and insight, and he deserves a wide reading.' D. L. HOWARD. Daily Telegraph

30s net



TAVISTOCK PUBLICATIONS