

This brings us to my final point of criticism. As its subtitle suggests, the book claims to go beyond the World Bank's strategy and to offer a multi-dimensional policy framework for rural and agricultural development in Turkey. Yet, neither the emphasis that the book puts on concerns such as environmental sustainability, technological progress and the viability of small farmers, nor the neo-institutionalist position it takes in order to realize these goals can be said to surpass the policy agenda of the World Bank.⁵ Thus, apart from a few truly critical chapters, *Rethinking Structural Reform in Turkish Agriculture* is unable to go beyond the new neo-liberal orthodoxy, although it endeavors to complement economic goals with social and environmental concerns, and decries an excessive belief in the so-called self-regulating market mechanism.

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Kerem Öktem. *Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989*. London: Zed Books, 2011

When Mao was asked in the 1950s what the lessons of the French Revolution were, he responded that "it was far too early to tell." Mao's exaggerated answer indicates the difficulty of studying recent history. The on-going historical process makes it rather difficult for social scientists to comprehend the what is social. Kerem Öktem tries to overcome this difficulty with his comprehensive book *Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989*. In this study, he examines Turkey's recent history in terms of its current political developments.

Öktem asserts that there have been three key historic moments in Turkish history since 1980, which are all intertwined with global historical transformations. The first moment is the military coup of 1980; the second is the year 1989 when the election of Turgut Özal as civil president coincided with the collapse of the Eastern block; and the third is 9/11, which created a discursive polarization between Islam

5 The growing interest by the mainstream development thinking in the importance of institutions for the effective functioning of markets and in new development goals can be observed, for instance, in World Bank, "World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997); World Bank, "World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001); World Bank, "World Development Report 2003: Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002); World Bank, "World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007).

and the West within the process of Turkey's application to European Union membership. Öktem uses the concept of "angry nation" in order to interpret this historical process. He finds the reasons for the nation's anger in the founding ideology of the republic—namely, the relation between religion and society, the ethnic definition of citizenship, and the incomplete separation of powers between elected governments and non-elected actors such as the military, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary (pp. 2-6).

In the first chapter, Öktem evaluates the historical background of Turkish political culture. This chapter consists of a general summary of the literature on the history of modernizing Turkey. The author asserts that several features of Turkey's politics—such as the ambivalent relation with Europe which is perceived both as enemy intent on destroying the Ottoman Empire and the foremost space to emulate; the fear of the liberalization of minority rights, which allegedly may destroy Turkey's territorial unity; and the special role of the army in the policy-making process—are inherited from the Ottoman past (p. 21). Turkey not only inherited its key contradictions from the Ottoman Empire, but also created new contradictions—such as the conflicts between the modernizing elites and religious conservatism in the provinces, between the Turkish-dominated state and the Kurdish population, and between the hegemonic state bloc and the new classes. According to Öktem, under the pressure of these contradictions, the Kemalist one-party state appeared as an amalgam of nationalism, statism, and authoritarian modernizing policies (p. 39). After the transition to the multi-party system, the conflict between the non-elected bureaucracy (called "the guardians of the state") and the elected governments has determined the basic parameters of Turkish politics between 1950 and 1980.

Following this historical background, Öktem examines Turkey's politics from the 1980s to the present. He examines the Özal period in the second chapter within the framework of the conflict between the elected governments and the guardians of the state. He draws parallels between the *Demokrat Parti* (DP, Democrat Party), the *Anavatan Partisi* (ANAP, Motherland Party), and the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP, Justice and Development Party) (p. 58). The author states that Turkey experienced economic growth under a more stable economic structure when compared to the 1970s, thanks to Özal's liberalist policies. Moreover, Özal's liberalism created a new class of industrial capitalists in the Anatolian cities and new economic areas such as tourism (pp. 69-70). Turkey re-engaged with the world through Özal's international policies, which were shaped by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Özal's vi-

sion for a Turkey that is proudly Muslim and European nurtured an active foreign policy that aimed to raise Turkey as a regional power (pp. 76-77). Although Öktem criticizes his authoritarian policies and his political ethics leading to corruption and cronyism, the author's position towards Özal is by and large positive, mostly due to Özal's "struggle" against the military and the bureaucracy.

The third chapter investigates the 1990s under the heading the "lost decade." Öktem asserts that Turkey's normalization after the military coup of 1980 under Özal was interrupted by the cautious atmosphere of the 1990s. The civil war in the eastern regions of Turkey, the economic crises, and the weak coalition governments nurtured a crisis of the system; however, the most important dynamics of the 1990s appeared to be the political resurrection of the guardians of the state (p. 84).

In the fourth chapter, the author deals with the AKP within the context of the antagonism between the Islamic Calvinists and the guardians of the state. The AKP has maintained the IMF program of Kemal Derviş, and these economic policies have led to the growth of new classes that have been labeled as Islamic Calvinist or "green capital." The AKP has also continued the pro-European reform of İsmail Cem, pushing Turkey to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria and to become ready for the accession negotiation (p. 123). However, the full membership process has halted owing to Turkey's refusal to extend the Additional Protocol to Cyprus and due to the European governments' indecisive position towards Turkey's membership. Öktem claims that the European years of the AKP government have witnessed a more critical examination of the past. On the one hand, the taboos of Turkish history (such as the 1915 Armenian Massacre, the September 6-7 Events, the National Struggle, and the Kurdish Question) have begun to be critically debated. Yet, simultaneously, a new type of nationalism has developed, as demonstrated by bestseller books such as *Şu Çılgın Türkler* (These Mad Turks) or television series such as *Kurtlar Vadisi* (Valley of the Wolves). This nationalist hysteria has also manifested itself in traumatic events such as the murder of the journalist Hrant Dink. Öktem chronologically itemizes this process and perceives this rise of nationalist hysteria as the return of the guardians aiming to overthrow the AKP government (pp. 144-155).

In the fifth chapter, Öktem deals with the second term of the AKP government and claims that the clash between the AKP and the guardians of the state has moved to the courts through the Ergenekon trials. According to Öktem, the trials have exposed the guardians whose hegemony has been challenged by the elected government (pp. 159-161). Furthermore, this chapter deals with "the Kurdish opening" and the new

Turkish foreign policy. In terms of foreign policy, Turkey has become a culturally, economically, and politically regional power in the former Ottoman territories, including the Balkans and the Middle East (pp. 170-181).

One of the most intriguing parts of Öktem's study is the final section of Chapter 5, which contains predictions about Turkey's future. He asserts that the hegemony of the Kemalist bloc in Turkey's politics has ended and that the future of Turkey will be established according to the answer of the following question: What kind of bloc will replace the Kemalist republican one? It may be a conservative bloc nurtured by the Islamic brotherhood and religious network, which will refer to a new tutelage regime. The second scenario is the emergence of a liberal regime which cannot be realized without an affiliation with the European Union. The third scenario is the resurgence of a new guardian state regime, which will lead to the emergence of a civil war between Turks and Kurds. Öktem states that a number of factors will determine which combination of scenarios will be realized, including the political positions of the EU, the USA, Iran, Iraq, and Iraqi Kurdistan. The author predicts a mixed scenario of the liberal state and neo-Islamic tutelage (pp. 187-189).

Returning to the title of the book, the question still remains: What is the reason for the nation's anger? Öktem claims that the anger stems from the nation's own experiences of exclusion and discrimination. Moreover, anger has also been provoked by the guardians of the state. And who is the guardian of the state? According to Öktem, it is the coalition of military commanders, the high judiciary, and the bureaucracy, which together have aimed at saving the republic first from the communists, then from the Islamic conquest (p. 185). *Angry Nation* is reading the history of Turkey on the basis of the dichotomy between the guardians of the state and the elected governments. The guardians of the state are depicted as omnipotent evil shaping Turkey's history during the multi-party era. They appear as the cause of all political crises, such as the Kurdish question or the Alevi massacres. Therefore, it can be asserted that the analysis of *Angry Nation* is based on a Manichean dichotomy between the elected representatives and the guardians of the state.¹ Other social actors and historical processes are neglected in Öktem's story of Turkey and reduced to impotent puppets in the service

1 Manichaeism is a dualistic religious system, its basic doctrine being that of a conflict between light and dark, matter being regarded as dark and evil. In this regard, the Manichean dichotomy refers to the existence of a binary opposition between different parts which symbolize the absolute evil and good.

of the guardians of the state in their power struggle against the elected governments.²

This neglect of other social actors and processes can be observed in many parts of this study. For example, the author claims that the student movements of 1968 resulted from the provocation of the non-elected guardians of the state trying to provide a basis for a military intervention. He asks: “[W]ere socialists, fascists, Islamist and the communists fighting their own battles, when they attacked each other in the 1960s and 1970s, or had they become puppets in a cynical game staged to maintain control over a society that was spiraling out of control?” (p. 15) Reading history on the basis of the dichotomy between the guardians and the governments hinders comprehending the inner dynamics of the student movements and reduces the activists to mere puppets of the pro-coup mindset. However, the 1968 movements cannot be socially analyzed without the urbanization process that Turkey experienced in the 1960s, the drastic increase in the number of university students, the cultural atmosphere in Turkey in the 1960s, and the new social movements around the world.

Öktem’s assessment of the Sivas Massacre is another example of his problematic historical analysis. He claims that the Sivas Massacre was a scenario created by the guardians of the state, which aimed to govern by turning neighbors into enemies. In this way, the Alevi became involved in the guardians’ fight against the Islamists (p. 98). This is the current/Orthodox assessment of the Sivas Massacre, which can be followed through daily newspapers. However, this assessment misses the conservative reaction to the Alevi, which has shown itself in daily life and justifies those people who burned Alevi to death in Sivas or killed Alevi in Maraş as the victims of the diabolical scenario of the guardians of the state. Whether the “deep state” played a role in the Sivas Massacre or not, the motivation of those who burned the Alevi poets in Madımak cannot be reduced to the provocation of the guardians of the state.

This dichotomic analysis not only reduces the multi-dimensionality of historical events to a single variable, but also misses the sophisticated

2 This neglect of social actors and processes not only creates a problematic historical approach, but also leads to an occasional confusion of empirical data. For example, Öktem dramatically confuses the pro-Kurdish *Demokratik Toplum Partisi* (DTP, Democratic Society Party) with the center-right *Demokratik Türkiye Partisi* (DTP, Democratic Party of Turkey), which separated from the *Doğru Yol Partisi* (DYP, True Path Party) during the 28 February process. He incorrectly writes that the DTP, Democratic Society Party (not the DTP, Democratic Party of Turkey) formed a coalition government with the ANAP and the *Demokratik Sol Parti* (DSP, Democratic Left Party [p. 110]). Claiming that a pro-Kurdish party joined a governmental coalition in the 1990s is not only a historical mistake, but also contradicts Öktem’s portrait of the 1990s.

relation between the civil and the military within the framework of democracy theory. More importantly, the assessment of politics on the basis of the clash between the civil and the military contributes to the composition of a distorted conceptualization of democracy which is equated with the non-military. As a result of the equation of the non-military with the democratic, Özal in *Angry Nation* appears as civilian/democratic politician fighting against the hegemony of the military. However, the "civilian" Özal was vice prime minister of the military government following the coup, between 1980 and 1982. Moreover, the January 24 Decisions which were prepared by Özal were enforced under military rule. Öktem, who is also aware of these facts, states that "Özal did benefit from suspension of trade union activities and the destruction of the left after the 1980 coup and the restrictive measures of the 1982 constitution" (p. 68). Under these circumstances, is being elected by the people sufficient to make Özal a civilian-democrat? The neo-liberal transformation of society and the military coups went hand in hand in Turkey, as they did in Latin American countries. Thus, can Özal's neo-liberal policies, which Öktem assesses as successful, be disassociated from the military coup of 1980? The author's dichotomic assessment depicts a political arena in which civilian and military bureaucracy and elected politicians are mutually exclusive; however, a comprehensive analysis of Turkey's politics clearly indicates that the relation between the elected governments and the military is much more sophisticated.

In *Angry Nation*, Öktem claims that Turkey has experienced a radical transformation, from an agrarian economy and isolated country to an economically developed regional power, in the three decades since 1989. However, institutional weakness, political crises, and ethnic conflicts have overshadowed this economic and international success. The study attempts to explore the inconsistency between the economic success and the political instability within the framework of the antagonism between the guardians of the state and the elected representatives. Therefore, the author indirectly believes that demilitarization will quintessentially bring political democracy to Turkey, in parallel with economic modernization. This circuitous assumption prompts him to reconsider the current political development of Turkey. Do the Ergenekon trials mean the elimination of the "deep state," or the substitution of the older cell of the "deep state" with a new one? Does challenging the hegemony of the military render authoritarian policies excusable? What are the criteria of economic success? Can economic success be assessed on the basis of economic growth, without considering the unequal income distribution or unemployment rates? Is becoming a regional power with an imperial vi-

sion commendable? All these questions have been brought to the agenda thanks to Öktem's study. Despite its problematic analytic framework, *Angry Nation* provides the readers with the opportunity to engage with these questions.

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Sarah D. Shields. *Fezzes in the River: Identity Politics and European Diplomacy in the Middle East on the Eve of World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, xi + 306 pages.

In Turkish historiography, the Hatay issue has always been emphasized as a glorious success of Turkish foreign policy in the interwar period. Although the Europeans' role in its resolution in favor of Turkey based on the changing balances within Europe on the eve of World War II has been debated and explained in the relevant historiography, how the identity politics of France, Turkey, and the League of Nations shaped and changed life in the region is virtually unexplored. Sarah D. Shield's book examines in detail this latter, not-yet-told part of the story.

Shields demonstrates that the historiography on the *sancak* of Alexandretta has not benefited, as previous studies have claimed, from an extensive use of both published sources and archival materials. The League of Nations Archives in Geneva, the *Archives des Affaires Etrangères* in France, the National Archives in the United Kingdom, and the Prime Ministry General Directorate of State Archives in Turkey are the major archives that the author uses in order to reach a multi-dimensional and objective historical narrative. Through this archival material, specifically on the basis of reports, Shields analyzes the background of the Hatay issue which previously has been studied mostly from a diplomatic perspective.

The first chapter problematizes the identity politics implemented in the region after 1936—in other words, after the date when the decolonization of Syria became a real possibility. Afterwards, the fate of the *sancak's* people, as Shields successfully shows, was tied to the so-called "freedom of choice" in terms of registering for only one identity in order to determine the ethnic majority in the region. The problem was, however, the multi-lingual and multi-ethnic character of the people, rendered choosing a single identity for registration very difficult, even