As she explains, the Christian Right has many built-in advantages when it comes to organization. Whether the various groups that share the "secular" label can ever match the mobilization of the Right remains an open question. Hansen has rendered a service by providing a clear description of that question and the context within which it will be addressed. In the process, she has made a valuable contribution to the literature.

Despite their dissimilarities, the books considered here underline three important lessons that academics must all periodically relearn, beginning with a recognition of the wisdom of the old adage that where we stand depends upon where we sit. All scholars bring a "lens," or worldview, to efforts at analysis; our first task is to be fully aware of them, to examine our premises, and be willing to alter them when the data requires such alteration. Our second task is to define our terms with clarity and precision and our third is to situate our research both within the relevant literature, broadly defined, and historically. Despite their merits, both *Faith Based* and *Reinventing Civil Society* would have benefited had their authors revisited those elementary principles.

Competitive Interests: Competition and Compromise in American Interest Group Politics. By Thomas T. Holyoke. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011. 208p. $32.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592713000522

— Matt Grossmann, *Michigan State University*

In the crowded Washington interest group community, lobbyists have to compete with one another to influence policy in their areas of concern. Thomas Holyoke demonstrates that this competition can sometimes produce compromise, depending on the ideological alignment of groups and legislators and the flexibility that members give group leaders. By cleverly assembling data from 83 interviews and close analysis of six policy debates, he investigates the conditions under which lobbyists and legislators reach consensus on policy proposals rather than maintain polarized positions.

Holyoke compiles the positions that lobbyists and legislators advocate on arctic oil drilling, bankruptcy reform, bioengineered food, wildlife conservation, dairy pricing, and money laundering from 1999 to 2002 in the US Congress. His innovation is to rank the proposed options in each issue area from most liberal to most conservative. By asking the lobbyists to identify their ideal resolution as well as any other proposals that they support along each continuum, he can estimate how far interest groups are willing to compromise and whether their choices affect a bill's chance to become law.

The results indicate that lobbyists are more willing to support compromise positions if their membership is flexible, their opponents are numerous and resourceful, and their target legislators support proposals further from their preferred option. Lobbyists are also most likely to cooperate on the proposals advocated by their more resourceful and committed competitors, but also by those who more closely share their preferences. Public interest groups and organizations with larger lobbying forces are less likely to support compromise positions in each case. Compromises among legislators are only sometimes associated with interest-group cooperation. Nonetheless, bills with support from moderate legislators are more likely to reduce ideological conflict among interest groups; in turn, more compromise among interest groups is associated with more bills becoming law.

The results come from four different data sets, each with its own unit of analysis but much of the same data. The first study assesses whether each group supports each compromise proposal (at the group-proposal level of analysis), the second whether each pair of groups cooperates in support of the same proposal (at the dyad level), the third whether the average divisions between groups atrophy as proposals move through committees (at the issue level), and the fourth whether group divisions lead to less advancement of legislation (at the bill level). This mixture of analyses is a virtue of the book because it provides the reader several lenses through which to see the same underlying process.

The problem is that the most important patterns may happen at the issue level of analysis, where only six cases are available. The first analysis assumes that one can independently observe each group's decision on each proposal and the second that each dyad independently decides whether or not to cooperate. Yet no lobbyist decision is independent of issue-level dynamics or the decisions of all the others. In one issue area, hundreds of lobbyists reach agreement; in others, there is little movement. Twice as many wildlife conservation lobbyists, for example, adopt compromise positions as those in any other issue area. Money-laundering reform lobbyists remain equally divided in their ideal and advocated positions, whereas all of the other issue areas feature some compromise. There are no bills enacted to address bankruptcy reform or arctic drilling but quite a few in the other four areas.

Holyoke explores several issue-level mechanisms for these differences; he assesses distinct dynamics due to issue salience and type, as well as party and committee polarization. He theorizes about possible cascading bandwagons of support and the role of networking among lobbyists and legislators. Without enough issue areas to observe, however, the reader is left wondering why compromise seems so much more obtainable in some issue areas than in others. Interest groups may have little to do with the potential to compromise in some areas. Alternatively, their divisions may be symptomatic of the same precursors that lead legislators to deal on some issues and fight it out on others. Holyoke gathers evidence that interest groups play

a role, but their decisions are constrained by the availability of reasonable, moderate proposals that legislators advocate. Much of the art of politics is finding a proposal that satisfies as many people as possible. The context of each issue area determines the difficulty of that task. Interest groups may be primary or secondary participants in the process of finding acceptable compromises.

Holyoke models interest-group strategy as an outcome of competition in ideological space. He effectively dispenses with older views of interest groups as partners in cozy subgovernments or seekers of niches without any opponents. To get what they want, most lobbyists need to convince legislators to accept their views and disregard those of other groups. The author proposes that the primary challenge of a lobbyist is trying to satisfy his or her members, as well as legislators. Some lobbyists have more leeway from members and some have stronger competition; either can promote compromise. Lobbyists often need to move toward the proposals of legislators rather than visa versa. A lobbyist's decision to join a coalition, previously seen mostly as a resource-sharing arrangement, is seen here as a choice of endorsing a potential compromise. In Holyoke's view, all of this leaves open more potential for groups to deliberate with their members and with other groups—to reach consensus, not aid gridlock.

The empirical work points to a few limitations of this theoretical view. First, lobbyists support proposals different from their ideal position in only about one-third of the cases (and less than one-fifth in most issue areas); there is quite a bit of sincere lobbying that may not be very strategic. Second, the analysis happens to include mostly membership organizations; memberless advocacy groups, corporate policy offices, and other institutions may operate more opportunistically. Third, it is difficult to separate empirically the desire to satisfy members from personal intransigence or ideological commitment. Likewise, a lobbyist may move toward legislators to influence a bill's passage or to maintain access; we only observe the movement. Fourth, not all issues may be best understood as a unidimensional ideological battle with several intermediary positions, even if these six can be viewed that way. Fifth, although the analysis admirably attempts to sort out whether legislator or interest-group compromises come first, the results show issue-specific feedback loops where neither is the definitive first mover.

This book is an impressive addition to the contemporary interest-group literature. It is well worth reading by the broader audience interested in American lawmaking and policy dynamics. It is also a marker of the successful evolution of interest-group research, from a concern with those who mobilize and those who dominate to coverage of the specific choices that lobbyists make as actors interdependent with one another and with policymakers. The book illustrates how competitive pressures are inseparable from the policies that groups advocate and their potential for influence. Interest groups can mirror the broader political system, either in reaching consensus on compromise proposals or in polarizing and thus enabling gridlock. *Competitive Interests* shows that they do both, illustrating some of the mechanisms driving each process.

Progress for the Poor. By Lane Kenworthy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 168p. $75.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592713000534

— Joe Soss, *University of Minnesota*

Desperate poverty amid great affluence remains a defining feature of American life. It also remains one of the most striking blind spots in American political science. In 2011, more than 46 million Americans lived below the poverty line. Almost 1.5 million households weathered the grinding effects of "extreme poverty," living on an income of two dollars or less per person, per day. To find a discernibly higher poverty rate, one must look all the way back to the mid-1960s at the dawn of the War on Poverty. Yet while poverty is a central fact of life for millions of Americans today, it is a peripheral concern at best in the professional study of U.S. politics. In recent years, economic inequality has moved to the field's center stage. As growing numbers of political scientists have asked how the super-rich came to hold so much material wealth and political influence, however, they have largely ignored the opposite end of the income distribution.

Lane Kenworthy's important new book, *Progress for the Poor,* arrives as a welcome invitation to change this state of affairs. In a slim and tightly framed monograph, Kenworthy pursues a series of empirical analyses designed to shed light on a single question: What kinds of public policies are most effective at raising living standards for the poor? Readers should not look to this book for an analysis concerning how the poor are positioned in class relations, how poverty relates to inequality, or what life conditions are like for the poor themselves. The value of the work lies in its careful dissection of cross-national evidence to 1) demonstrate that material advances for the poor depend on the choices we make among policy alternatives and 2) specify the policy choices that are most effective for achieving this goal.

Drawing on data from 20 affluent democracies, Kenworthy presents empirically grounded arguments that challenge conventional wisdom on both the left and right. He begins by considering the claim that policy interventions to help the poor should follow a simple principle: aim to achieve economic growth. The author does not dismiss this view entirely. On balance, economic growth is better for the poor than stagnation. But economic growth alone is not sufficient because its benefits do not inevitably "trickle