

richer and more profound history but also forces us to see the seemingly secular political reformers of our own tradition, such as Locke, in a vastly different light. These facts alone make the book worth the effort.

In the hands of these authors, federalism becomes something of a normative imperative and a theoretical codification for a well-ordered state. By pushing the reader to pick up what are today often neglected thinkers from the early modern period—such as Heinrich Bullinger, Johannes Althusius, and Johannes Cocceius—or to revisit the place of John Knox in the historical scheme, Elazar and company do a great service to the history of political thought and Reformation theology as well. By demonstrating its extension over time to the colonial shores and later American political thought, they force us to reconsider the genealogy of American political discourse and allow us to explore what is at least a complimentary if not an alternative conceptualization of the American political “soul.” Properly used, the reorientation intended here and developed in much greater detail in later work provides a receptive reader with new tools for addressing the continuing problems of the modern liberal state concerning pluralism, tolerance, the relationship between liberty and equality, the relationship between parts and wholes, and, perhaps most important, the fundamental nature and meaning of citizenship itself. Despite the fact that much of this gets done better later by these same writers, this is no mean feat.

Globalizing Democracy: Power, Legitimacy, and the Interpretation of Democratic Ideas. By Katherine Fierlbeck. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998. 216p. \$69.95.

Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism. By Charles Jones. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 249p. \$65.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Nomos XLI: Global Justice. Edited by Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer. New York: New York University Press, 1999. 222p. \$50.00.

Charles R. Beitz, *Princeton University*

The monograph by Charles Jones is both less and more than its title suggests. It is less because his book is devoted almost exclusively to global distributive justice, a topic of great contemporary importance but one that hardly exhausts the subject of global justice. (Global political justice is a distinct topic, about which we have, if anything, even less clarity). It is more in that Jones's ambitions go beyond the defense of cosmopolitanism promised in the subtitle. Hand in hand with the presentation of his own version of cosmopolitanism he offers a *tour d'horizon* of contemporary thought about international distributive justice—indeed, his book is probably the most philosophically sophisticated such account in print. This combination of advocacy and critical survey results in a work that should interest not only scholars of the subject but also those seeking an intelligent introduction to it.

Global Justice is organized around a distinction between cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches to international distributive justice. The first several chapters consist of critical discussions of three different cosmopolitan theories—those based on utilitarianism, human rights, and the form of global Kantianism defended by Onora O'Neill in *Faces of Hunger* (1986) and in portions of *Towards Justice and Virtue* (1996). Jones's own view is a form of human-rights-based cosmopolitanism. Its central idea will be familiar to readers of Henry Shue's *Basic Rights* (rev. ed. 1996). Like Shue, Jones argues that human rights are protections of important human

interests, and among these rights, none is more important than the right to subsistence. Accepting for the moment Jones's conception of a human right, his argument that there are subsistence rights and that they are morally basic seems to me persuasive.

It is one thing, however, to say why basic rights should matter to those whose rights they are and another to explain why those who have duties to contribute to their satisfaction should be moved to do so. This is because the considerations that serve to ground claims of right are typically recipient oriented: They have to do with the interests of the rights holder. It is frequently not obvious why anyone else should care about these considerations—at least to the extent necessary to motivate affirmative action to satisfy their demands. Jones replies to this question indirectly. He describes an allocation of both positive and negative duties associated with human rights, and he identifies and refutes several reasons someone who is subject to these duties might resist complying. The argument is plausible as far as it goes, but some readers may think it does not go far enough. Skepticism that human rights can generate duties to act often arises from a denial that the duty holder stands in the kind of relationship to the rights holder that can explain why the duty holder should be moved by an appreciation of the rights holder's situation. Jones's defense of cosmopolitanism would be more powerful if it included an account of the moral importance of subsistence duties that connects more perspicuously with the perspective of the holders of these duties.

Jones does address a variety of other doubts about cosmopolitan theories that have been expressed in the recent literature. These include views emphasizing the special claims of compatriots, the ethical significance of nationalism, the constraints resulting from recognition of cultural differences, and the (allegedly) nonderivative moral importance of the state. The typology of antic cosmopolitan positions is illuminating, and within it Jones finds a place for virtually all the leading antic cosmopolitan writers of the last decade or so. Throughout, the critical discussion is thoughtful and penetrating. Indeed, Jones's formulation of views with which he disagrees is sometimes clearer than the original.

Nomos XLI contains eight contributions, some of which originated as papers or comments presented at the August 1996 annual meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. It is a mixed bag. The contributions by Brian Barry, Samuel Scheffler, Charles Jones, and Hillel Steiner are free-standing essays devoted to one or another aspect of the subject of global justice. (Jones's is essentially the same as chapter 5 of his book.) Three are commentaries (two, by John Kane and Liam Murphy, respond to the Scheffler article, and the third, by Debra Satz, apparently originated as a commentary on Barry but now ranges much more broadly). The eighth item—an essay on political realism by Lea Brilmayer, a coeditor of the volume—is primarily metatheoretical: It includes a provocative comparison of the domestic and international realms but does not engage the normative problems taken up in the other articles.

The contributions by Barry and Scheffler are the most substantial of the lot. Both consider the conflict between local loyalties and the demands of global justice, but they approach the subject from different directions. Barry is interested in reliance on nationalism (sometimes, as he points out, mistakenly identified with statism) to justify resistance to requirements of global justice, particularly those involving humanitarian intervention and international redistribution. He distinguishes two varieties of nationalism: the “blood and soil” nationalism found in much of the real world and the “academic” nationalism of such writers as Michael Walzer

and David Miller. These views are more different than many people recognize (including some proponents of academic nationalism), but Barry holds that neither is compatible with cosmopolitan principles. Because we have strong reasons to accept these principles, whereas we have little reason to regard the nation as an object of independent value, he argues that both kinds of nationalism must be rejected.

At the end of the essay, Barry turns to a different kind of nationalism—"cosmopolitan" (or "civic") nationalism, which he says is "essential to the operation of a liberal democratic polity" (p. 53) because it helps to motivate social cooperation. Unlike the blood and soil and academic varieties, civic nationalism cannot come into conflict with cosmopolitan principles because it is constrained by them from the outset. It is not clear that Barry really has in mind a form of nationalism at all. It seems more like liberal patriotism: a shared allegiance to a particular society—but not necessarily a national society—based on a principled approval of the society's basic political values and an appreciation of the distinctive features of its social life that constitute its identity. Whatever we call it, this form of group loyalty is plainly important for the success of liberal polities; equally plainly, it is the only form that a cosmopolitan should accept. The arguments, both critical and constructive, are characteristically clear and sharp and exhibit great good sense.

Scheffler has a different interest. He notes that the conflict of global and sectional obligations often presents itself as a conflict between "general" responsibilities (those owed to everyone) and "special" responsibilities (those arising out of membership in various kinds of groups). When special responsibilities require us to subordinate general responsibilities, this does not seem like selfishness but, rather, a recognition of the importance of the special relationships that constitute the group. Against this, Scheffler considers an objection ("the distributive objection") that might be pressed by cosmopolitans. It holds that special responsibilities confer unwarranted advantages on those to whom they are owed. These persons have already benefited in some way from participation in the special relationship, and it is not right for them to benefit again, and at the expense of nonmembers who are needier, when others who are parties to the relationship honor their special responsibilities. To recognize special responsibilities, that is, is to acquiesce in a distinctive kind of unfairness.

Having framed the objection, Scheffler considers several rejoinders to it. He believes that these rejoinders are frequently overreaching, but he concludes that we cannot dismiss altogether the idea that there are such things as special responsibilities and that those may take priority over global or general ones. He argues that this possibility of conflict between the global and the sectional is inherent in the plurality of our ethical commitments. At the same time he believes, although strictly speaking he does not argue, that the sectional has too often been allowed to eclipse the global—that the tendency has been to honor special responsibilities at the expense of global ones, even when there is no credible defense for doing so.

It is not a criticism to observe that this analysis takes us only so far. As Scheffler points out, we need a better understanding of the constraints that special and general responsibilities can plausibly be allowed to impose on each other, but he does not propose such an understanding here. Accordingly, on the strength of this analysis, it is not possible to say with precision how much and in what ways the special responsibilities that we have reason to accept should constrain the global responsibilities that cosmopolitan consider-

ations require us to recognize. It remains as a challenge for the future to see how far this task can be carried out.

Katherine Fierlbeck states that her book is about "the consequences of the globalization of democratic norms" (p. 7). Each chapter addresses a different area of controversy in the recent literatures of democratic theory and comparative political development. These involve the meaning and justification of democracy, its relationship to liberal constitutionalism (on the one hand) and the aspirations of ethnic and cultural minorities (on the other), the relationship between democracy and the economy, and the significance of civil society for democratic stability. The reference to "globalization" in the title might therefore mislead. This is not a book about either globalization as a social process or the extension of democratic ideas to the global level; rather, it examines some normative and analytical issues that arise in the context of the spread of ostensibly democratic political forms beyond the Western industrial democracies.

With the exception of the chapter that criticizes the multiculturalists and the conclusion, the book is mainly composed of critical, synthetic reviews of the relevant literatures. As far as I can judge, these discussions are reasonably complete in their coverage. For the most part, Fierlbeck's own positions are plausible enough, particularly her criticism of the political temptation to stretch the definition of democracy beyond the point where it can serve any moral purpose. But the critical discussions are not very detailed—perhaps inevitably, as they range over large and diverse literatures—and readers who are strongly attracted to positions that the author rejects may not find their minds changed. Moreover, these discussions are not, except inferentially, elements in the progressive development of a single, unifying theory. This is too bad, because Fierlbeck's insistence that we should hold to a well-defined and ethically significant conception of democracy for purposes of foreign and international policy is timely and well founded. One wishes that the contours of such a conception had been more clearly etched and its normative foundations more straightforwardly defended.

Lives of the Psychics: The Shared Worlds of Science and Mysticism. By Fred M. Frohock. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 281p. \$27.50.

Millennial Visions: Essays on Twentieth-Century Millenarianism. Edited by Martha F. Lee. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 214p. \$65.00.

Jodi Dean, *Hobart and William Smith Colleges*

Mainstream political science, particularly in its rationalist and pluralist modes, has relied on a narrative prominent in social thought at least since the work of Max Weber. This narrative reads modernity as a process of disenchantment. The process involves a division of the world into differing value spheres in the wake of the retreat of transcendental ideas as well as a demystification that sets out procedures and probabilities that determine both what is worth knowing and the conditions of certainty. One oddity of this narrative of disenchantment is its radical disconnection from the practices and beliefs that continue to enchant the world, a point Jane Bennett persuasively argues (*The Enchantments of Contemporary Life: Crossings, Energetics, and Ethics*, 2001). Not only do religious and magical worldviews continue to provide many people in ostensibly disenchanted societies with orientation and meaning, not only are there multiple knowledge communities, but also discourses that claim objective, scientific status themselves rely on magical, spectral, and incantatory supplements. *Lives of the Psychics and Millennial Visions*