authors conclude that "we need to be cautious about exaggerating the consequences of cosmopolitan communications, for good or ill, because a series of firewalls persist that preserve the imprint of distinctive national cultures" (p. 309). This is sure to annoy or disappoint those on the left and on the right looking for a clash of civilizations, or for a jihad fought with a McWorld involving progressive cultural commodification of our lives.

Despite the many merits of this book, it is also surprisingly remiss in giving insufficient attention to many political and historical factors. The missing politics are of two sorts. First, one has to ask, what kind of cultural politics do we find in the societies, such as Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway, that the authors uphold as exemplars of cosmopolitan places? How should we reconcile the force of the authors' data with the July 2011 shootings and bombings in Oslo, the 2009 Swiss ban on minarets affirmed by a 57% voting majority in a referendum, or the Jyllands-Posten newspaper controversy in Denmark following the publication of Prophet Muhammad cartoons in September 2005? In these cases, there was overreaction from the right-wing and religious fringes (about which Norris and Inglehart have written elsewhere), but there was also a widespread agreement about the alleged dangers of Islamic extremism, even in a moderate society such as Switzerland where the majority of its Muslims, mostly Bosniak, are secular and cosmopolitan. Switzerland, until quite recently, also allowed direct voting on pictures of potential immigrants for citizenship, a practice that was denounced as xenophobic and racist. My general point is that given racism and xenophobia in the so-called cosmopolitan societies, often affirmed in surveys, are we overestimating their tolerance?

Second, there is a narcissism of small differences in the colorful international politics shaping the flows of cultural products in the so-called cosmopolitan societies themselves that the authors do not describe. The Uruguay Round of trade talks (1986–94) almost fell apart over audiovisual exports from the United States to the European Union (interestingly, the authors use the term "audiovisual" popular at the World Trade Organization but resented in UNESCO). France and Canada then led the dramatic movement toward the 2005 UNESCO Convention (incorrectly confused in the book with a 2001 declaration on cultural diversity). This is not just a tempest in a teacup where cosmopolitan societies that are otherwise tolerant of each other fell apart over a minor issue, but a war of cultural images that consumed considerable political space. Moreover, if these cosmopolitans can barely stand the cultural imports from like-minded societies, one can understand how their cosmopolitanism decreases further when confronting "others."

There are also historical reservations on the estimates of the communication gap, and on the presence or lack of cosmopolitanism in rich versus poor societies, respectively. First, Orientalism as a historical fact, as argued previously, is ignored in positing the values of cosmopolitanism. Second, openness among developing countries is defined in ahistorical and partial ways. Anthropologists such as James Ferguson and Jane Guyer have demonstrated through detailed ethnographies the complex connections between remote and "developed" societies throughout history, and unraveled both the patterns of cultural hybridity and political domination. Arjun Appadurai speaks of "scapes" and imaginaries" that tie the developing world with the other worlds. Furthermore, polls such as Gallup and World Public Opinion surveys from the Program on International Policy Attitudes often show better rates of acceptance of globalization among the developing worlds than in the "cosmopolitan" ones. Depending on the measurement tool, the communication gap or cosmopolitanism in poor societies might yield different results.

Although *Cosmopolitan Communications* overestimates the openness and tolerance in its cosmopolitan societies and underestimates it for poor ones, while remaining faithful to its data sets, its moderated claims are compelling. This excellent book deserves great recognition and, more importantly, attention from critical followers who will debate its findings while deepening and expanding its research agenda.

South Asia's Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament. Edited by T. V. Paul. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010. 352p. $70.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592711003331

— John D. Ciorciari, *University of Michigan*

South Asia is no stranger to insecurity. Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan are convulsing under pressure from the Taliban. Killings continue in Kashmir as two of the world's largest armies glare at each other across the Indo-Pakistani divide. Suicide bombings, interreligious feuds, and Naxalite revolts tug at the seams of India's quilted population. Fragile peace prevails in Nepal and Bangladesh, while Sri Lankans try to pick up the pieces after the brutal end to a 27-year civil war. Alongside the violence, other threats to human security abound—most dramatically in the form of immense floods, earthquakes, and other natural disasters.

This timely book helps explain why South Asia suffers from such high levels of domestic and regional insecurity. Editor T. V. Paul sets the stage by arguing that these security woes stem largely from two sources: weak state capacity and an anemic regime of interstate norms. As the title suggests, its contributors—who include experts on international security and the region—focus primarily on the first point. They generally agree on the relative frailty of South Asian states, ranging from "strong-weak" India (p. 15) to the fragile governments in Kathmandu and Kabul. They also concur with Paul's assessment that states lacking material capabilities, institutional capacity, and legitimacy are prone to added insecurity. Nevertheless, the

authors offer diverse perspectives on the specific causes of state frailty and its consequences.

The book's first major endeavor is to identify the causes of state weakness in South Asia. At one end of the spectrum are arguments focused on policy choices and leadership failures. At the other end are explanations rooted in longer-term structural factors. The book does not present an explicit agent-structure debate but usefully juxtaposes examples of these arguments at the outset. Robert Rotberg argues that states' relative failure or success is "largely man-made" (p. 43) and that institutional and structural weaknesses stem from poor executive decisions. Matthew Lange follows by highlighting constraints imposed by geography, economic resources, ethnic diversity, and the legacy of colonial rule and institutions. Indeed, South Asia's leaders face serious obstacles to state consolidation as they seek to govern dauntingly diverse populations across colonial borders, rugged mountain ranges, and jungles. Extra-regional actors also impose constraints, often contributing to ideological divides and infusing local rivalries with external arms and ammunition.

Unsurprisingly, no general theory emerges about the relative importance of agency and structure. Both clearly matter, and at times South Asia's weak states appear overdetermined, as governments are saddled with structural impediments and the path-dependent consequences of their own poor decisions. For example, Baldev Raj Nayar contends that both structural factors—such as colonial legacies and ethnic cleavages—and policy missteps explain why South Asian states have generally been slow to plug into the global economy and reap the "mostly positive" effects for state capacity (p. 119). Mustapha Kamal Pasha argues that both historically shaped identities and actions by jealous leaders have thwarted the emergence of a strong autonomous civil society that could otherwise supplement South Asian state institutions and hold them accountable.

Importantly, the book's six country-focused chapters suggest significant causal variation across states. Lawrence Ziring argues that Pakistan was created during the process of British decolonization without even the territorial or institutional "rudiments" of a strong functional state, and that "weakness only begot further infirmity" (p. 172). Rasul Baksh Rais also accords considerable weight to structural factors when discussing Afghanistan's weakness, focusing on its geographic and political character as a remote "frontier state" (p. 196). As they argue, those two troubled states were born with severe structural handicaps, which even effective leaders would be hard-pressed to overcome.

By contrast, Sankaran Krishna contends that Sri Lanka seemed "uniquely poised among developing countries to be a success story" (p. 222), and he attributes much of the state's weakness to failures by Sinhalese leaders, who sought support through ethnic allegiances rather than civic nationalism. India was also not predestined to be weak. David Malone and Rohan Mukherjee stress that social and regional divisions have constrained Indian policy but also note the country's "rapid and positive response to liberalization" (p. 163). Nehru's decision to pursue economic autarky was not foreordained; India could have strengthened earlier than it did. Leadership decisions are crucial in the process of punctuated political evolution, and the structural burdens imposed by South Asia's history and geography are not insurmountable.

In addition to examining causes of state weakness, the contributors discuss its consequences for regional security. They generally avoid the tautological trap of defining weak states as insecure ones by emphasizing that state strength is a function of much more than security services. Paul argues that leaders of weak states tend to face "complex, multidimensional security challenges" (p. 7) and lack the institutional capacity to address them. To meet immediate threats, leaders frequently resort to repression, stoke cross-border conflict to mobilize nationalist support, and seek external sponsors. In the longer term, those actions often exacerbate local and regional tensions. Benjamin Miller argues convincingly that much of modern South Asian conflict stems from a "state-to-nation imbalance" (p. 74). When states lack strong capabilities and civic loyalty, and when boundaries cut across ethnic lines, secessionism, irredentism, terrorism, and other security challenges flourish.

Variation across countries is again evident. India appears best situated to meet security threats. Its neighbors enjoy less democratic or performance legitimacy and less capacity to deliver basic services, contributing to the rise of violent Islamist groups in Bangladesh, risks of renewed ethnic and ideological strife in Sri Lanka and Nepal, and myriad problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many contributors rightly allude to the chicken-and-egg relationship between security and state capacity and the paradox that short-term efforts to consolidate state power often provoke countermeasures by the state's challengers, prolonging insecurity.

A few themes could be better elaborated in the volume. In general, the contributors do a better job identifying structural causes for state weakness than pinpointing key policy missteps or missed opportunities. How close were some of South Asia's frail states to developing along stronger lines? The role of the regional order could also be further developed. Paul notes that the noninterference principle has helped the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) achieve interstate peace even amid continuing internal violence. Rotberg argues that a more proactive international approach to failing states is needed, citing the "Responsibility to Protect" (p. 46). This opens space for an important debate: Is South Asian security plagued more by excess intrusiveness or by the lack of decisive leadership, most likely by India? This could be the basis for a future study.

Overall, *South Asia's Weak States* makes an admirable contribution. It diagnoses South Asia's problems through

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a strong set of conceptual and historical studies. The conclusion by Paul and Theodore McLauchlin identifies the key question as scholars and policymakers seek a cure: How can vicious cycles of state weakness and insecurity be reversed into virtuous ones? There is no silver bullet, but arming oneself with a better understanding of the sources of South Asian insecurity will certainly help.

Immigration and the Constraints of Justice: Between Open Borders and Absolute Sovereignty. By Ryan Pevnick. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 210p. $82.00.
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— Kamal Sadiq, *University of California, Irvine*

This book is a carefully crafted and innovative attempt to trace the ethical underpinnings of immigration policy. Ryan Pevnick boldly asserts the primacy of citizens' ownership rights over national institutions and territorial boundaries (pp. 11, 44, 54–60). He argues that citizens have a special claim over and above foreigners on the goods and institutions they produce through their labor, taxation, cooperation, and coordination (p. 11). At the same time, ownership claims via self-determination are not absolute, and minority rights must be protected as a matter of justice (p. 63–66). Equally, self-determination is not an unlimited justification for ownership claims, though it provides sufficient reason for considerable exclusions of many would-be immigrants. This perspective, which Pevnick calls "the associative ownership view," rejects the views of both open-border advocates calling for unrestricted mobility across national boundaries and policies asserting absolute state sovereignty (statism through immigration controls in an effort to protect national interest). In both accounts, the moral and legal rights of "foreigners" come up against state sovereignty and self-determination.

According to Pevnick, statists give little consideration "to the interests of foreigners," all the while emphasizing the right of citizens to select an immigration policy that is best for themselves (p. 8). Citizens determine the national interest, and therefore, they will choose any new members of the political community. He argues that statism mistakenly justifies a state's right to exclude foreigners based on an inadequate understanding of sovereignty. He asserts that sovereignty alone cannot explain self-determination in which the claims of others impose no restriction on the citizenry. To Pevnick, foreigners "are neither beyond the scope of justice nor trumped by considerations of sovereignty" (pp. 20–21). Sovereignty is bound by norms of justice in which all individuals possess "an equal moral status" (p. 21). But having an equal moral status does not necessitate a right to free movement.

Pevnick denies "the right to free movement" by distinguishing between moral rights (basic conditions for human well-being) and legal rights (conditions "protected by law") (p. 81). Instead, he proposes that the legal right to movement is in fact based on the instrumental need to protect individuals' moral right to subsistence (p. 87). He stops short of accepting open borders as an inherent right, despite sharing similar concerns with proponents of open borders. Stressing the right of individuals to enjoy a basic threshold of subsistence—and therefore the right to move to obtain such a minimum standard (pp. 87, 90–94), Pevnick both makes an exception for refugees and immigrants from extremely impoverished countries and defends the right to exit. He believes that clarifying the right to free movement not as a basic moral right but as a means of protecting other such rights allows us to better judge appropriate immigration policy (p. 100).

Subsistence becomes a categorical limitation on free movement in Pevnick's formulation, since individuals above a certain threshold do not qualify (pp. 95–96). Unequal distribution of wealth in the world requires that those in persistent poverty be allowed international mobility to gain access to wealth (pp. 91–92). But not all inequalities in opportunity are unjust; rather, a commitment to self-determination recognizes that there are some instances (Pevnick discusses four) when inequality is in fact a form of injustice (pp. 117–30). He can oppose inequalities that contravene norms of justice "without embracing an unbounded commitment to equality of opportunity" (p. 117).

The author objects to those who wish to exclude foreigners due to concerns about national identity because they fail to "explain why members of the cultural majority are entitled in the first place to make decisions about the future cultural composition of the country" (p. 135). Claims about the cultural nation mistake the relationship between state institutions and citizens as one of shared identity when it is actually about their entitlements and ownership (p. 15).

Pevnick's associative ownership view speaks well to the need to find middle ground on debates surrounding the ethics of immigration. It powerfully captures the nuanced relationship between moral rights and instrumental public policy. In the process, the author contends with rival ethical constraints on immigration policy, forcefully defending the efficacy of his "ownership"-based claims on territory and membership. While some of Pevnick's examples are contrived, and he could have done much more to draw on actual immigrant testimonies, life stories, and experiences, his vigorous defense of his "associative ownership" thesis and its expansion to newer terrains is an impressive contribution to the current literature on the ethics of immigration policy. Indeed, it will initiate an important new debate on immigration ethics. Let me begin that discussion now.

First, Pevnick opposes "integrationist" scholars who advocate the regularization of long-term resident illegal immigrants (pp. 163–70). He claims this move will violate the political community's right to ownership, self-determination,