

reward their members for procuring federal spending; since most liberal voters are represented by Democrats, this results in higher vote shares for Democratic members. As for Republicans, on the one hand, conservative voters do not reward their Congress members for the spending they bring home; indeed, some Republican members actually pay an electoral penalty for procuring federal spending. On the other hand, Republican members are rewarded electorally for procuring contingent liabilities for their districts, and those programs are less likely to help Democrats.

A consideration that Sidman adds, and the theoretical concept that is most original to the book, is that these ideological cues produce more consistent electoral effects when political polarization is high. When polarization is low, the existence of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans attenuates the partisan effect that pork barrel spending has on elections: some part of the Democratic electorate prefers low spending, and some part of the Republican electorate prefers high spending. Thus, the ideological nature of pork barrel spending is somewhat obscured. However, during times of high polarization, conservative voters are more or less all Republicans, and liberals are more or less all Democrats. This means the ideological cues voters respond to—including cues coming from government spending projects—map almost perfectly onto party, which gives these cues their maximum impact on electoral outcomes.

Sidman tests this theory with a variety of data, starting with dividing pork barrel spending into ideologically significant categories. He begins with three categories: public works projects, such as spending on road and bridges (the prototypical, historically original, pork barrel spending), contingent liabilities, and military spending. An initial examination confirms that members' pursuit of each type of project is conditional on party, ideology, and polarization in the ways suggested by the earlier discussion: Democratic members are more likely to pursue public works spending, and Republican members are more likely to pursue contingent liabilities. The ideology of military spending is less clear than the other two categories, so throughout the rest of the book Sidman focuses on contingent liabilities and public works spending. A separate individual-level examination of voter attitudes also confirms that conservative voters are less receptive to spending than are liberal voters, and they also are more likely to hold this view when they live in a district with high levels of distributive spending.

The bulk of the empirical examination focuses on public works projects' and contingent liabilities' separate effects on a wide variety of electorally related outcomes. These outcomes include Congress members' election returns, individual-level vote choice, likelihood of drawing opponents in primary elections and quality challengers in general elections, and campaign fundraising. As with all

wide-ranging empirical investigations, results are messy, and not all hypotheses are supported by the data. But in general the results are consistent: high levels of traditional distributive spending (i.e., public works spending) are associated with liberal voters being more likely to vote for their incumbent representative and Democratic members doing well when seeking reelection. Conversely, high levels of spending are associated with conservative voters being slightly less likely to vote for their incumbent member than when spending is lower; as a result, Republican members do not receive the same benefit from distributive spending. Indeed, such spending can actually hurt Republicans; for example, in chapter 5 Sidman finds that high pork barrel Republicans are more likely to draw a primary election challenger. Conversely, over the course of Sidman's investigations, he finds that contingent liabilities tend not to affect Democrats' reelection prospects but do significantly help Republicans by increasing their levels of campaign spending (chapter 6). And all of these trends are accentuated when polarization is high.

All told, this book is a significant addition to the study of pork barrel politics. Many of the theoretical concepts that Sidman discusses originate elsewhere in the literature, but the book brings them all together in one place for the first time and adds the novel insight that polarization conditions the partisan response to pork barrel spending. As well, this book provides by far the broadest empirical examination of pork barrel spending's influence on electoral outcomes to date. This empirical work both confirms previous findings and provides us with new insights into the role that pork barrel spending plays in congressional elections. Thus, the book is an important new resource for all who wish to understand how pork barrel spending works.

After Reagan: Bush, Dukakis, and the 1988 Election.

By John J. Pitney, Jr. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2019. 272p. \$37.50 cloth.

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I was in my senior year of college as the presidential election heated up in the summer and fall of 1988. I watched the primaries, the conventions, and the general election with great interest as I prepared to cast only my second vote in a presidential contest, and I vividly recall how presidential politics, never for the soft-hearted, seemed to be particularly negative. Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis, the Democratic nominee, had to fend off the accusations in the Willie Horton ad that he was soft on crime, as well as the unflattering film of him riding a tank against the backdrop that he was soft on defense—at the same time that then-vice president and

Republican nominee George H. W. Bush was fighting the image of being a “wimp” and his connection to the Iran-Contra affair late in Reagan’s second term. The 1988 campaign seemed particularly unpleasant—or so we thought. That election seems tame by the standards of today, but it contained glimpses of what was to come, including changes to the electoral map, parties, partisans and even to how campaigns themselves are waged.

John J. Pitney, Jr.’s *After Reagan: Bush, Dukakis, and the 1988 Election*, is a treat. Part history, part political science, this well-written and engaging survey of the 1988 election highlights what we could not know then: it was the last election in which the Cold War and Soviet threat were pressing issues, the first to have truly negative ads (arguably featuring the most negative political ad since 1964’s “Daisy”), and one of the last in which the internet was a nonfactor. This book reminds us how presidential electoral politics used to be the process of building a political resume that was attractive and strong enough to run at the national level. It also reintroduces us to names that once dominated American politics (Babbitt, Jackson, Clinton, Gore, Hart, Biden, Bentsen, and Gephardt on the Democratic side, and Republicans Baker, Dole, Robertson, Quayle, and, of course, Reagan), as well as political consultants whose names we knew or would come to know in the intervening decades (Atwater, Stone, Manafort, Black). Even Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders appear several times throughout. *After Reagan* analyzes how politics and parties were fashioned in the last decade of the twentieth century and how partisan identities were shaped across several previous decades. Anyone who reads this book cannot possibly do so without connecting dots from the past to the present: the book shows both how those days differed from and how much they have in common with today.

Pitney begins by painting a political portrait from the 1950s to the late 1980s. The biographies of Bush and Dukakis, though different, reflect the narrative of how presidential candidates were once made. Bush was a son of privilege, though many of his initial moves in political life were made consciously without the help of his connections. From his time as a member of the House of Representatives, to a failed Senate run, to a defeat at the hands of Lloyd Bentsen (who would later be tapped as Dukakis’s running mate), to becoming ambassador to the United Nations, chairman of the Republican National Committee, liaison to China, and director of the CIA, and his experience as a failed presidential candidate in 1980, as well as his vice presidency, George H. W. Bush was one of the most well-prepared presidents in history. Even with these credentials, he stumbled out of the gate in 1988 by losing Iowa. Dukakis, in contrast, had been governor of Massachusetts, lost a bid for reelection, and then came roaring back to regain the Governor’s Mansion. His status as an intellectual (he taught at the Kennedy School of

Government at Harvard) helped him win reelection and placed him in good stead for the Democratic nomination in 1988, but his highbrow ways would hurt him in his self-presentation on the campaign trail and in debates.

Pitney provides fair-minded and deeply insightful accounts of each party’s primary. The role of money, endorsements, media, personal backgrounds, and how the nominations were not as front-loaded as today provide us much to think about in relation to current politics. Of particular interest is Pitney’s careful analysis of Super Tuesday, which began as a way for regions (in this case, the South) to amplify their influence. No fewer than 20 states went to the polls on March 8, 1988.

The general election is covered in one chapter and reinforces current scholarship that, although campaigns matter, they matter at the margins, and those margins matter. But the key issues are the fundamentals: presidential approval and especially the economy. Because of the great importance of the state of the economy to the election outcome, some (much?) of the blame leveled at losing candidates is misplaced. In relation to 1988, Dukakis was pilloried because of how he appeared in an ad featuring him in a military tank; his low-key, cerebral reaction to the death penalty question; and the fact that his campaign squandered a 17-point lead after the Democratic convention. Pitney takes all of these factors into account, analyzes their impact on elite and voter perception, and acknowledges that they certainly did not help Dukakis, but argues that the fundamentals were simply too strong in Bush’s favor. In a short concluding chapter, Pitney makes the same argument that the fundamentals largely doomed the Bush reelection bid, in spite of the success of Desert Storm, which translated into record approval ratings. More than anything, a sluggish economy—coupled with the fact that even in the best of circumstances it is difficult to elect the same party’s candidate more than three times—helped put Bill Clinton in the White House in 1992.

There are at least two great analytic strengths of *After Reagan*. First, as noted, Pitney does not simply claim that fundamentals loomed large in the general election, nor does he claim that they completely swamped the campaigns. Rather, he painstakingly but accessibly traces the two, analyzes their interaction, and persuasively argues how and why these campaigns ended the way they did. His analysis bolsters the argument that all the blame-game, Monday-morning-quarterbacking postmortems that follow elections, which usually place culpability on the candidate and her or his campaign, are often misplaced.

This leads to the second great strength, which is the through line from the late 1980s to present-day politics and the careful analysis of the primaries, underscoring the seeds in each party that would blossom in 1988 itself or take hold and flourish in the present day. For example, Pitney traces how California and Texas, both of which

went for Bush, were about to become reliably Democratic (California) and Republican (Texas); how the Hispanic vote, which was not a high-turnout demographic, has become key for Democrats since Hispanic turnout has increased dramatically; and the cementing of the influence of the Evangelical wing of the Republican Party. All of these trends were present in 1988 but were poised to take off in the intervening years. Pitney also considers the roots of cable television and right-wing talk radio, dramatic differences in messaging and fundraising that were not as prevalent in 1988 as in the internet age, and how 1988 was among the last campaigns to distinguish between campaigning and governing.

In sum, *After Reagan* is highly recommended. A few typos aside, it is highly readable, engaging, and extremely interesting. It would fit well in whole or in part in undergraduate or graduate classes on campaigns and elections, or the presidency itself. Though it is about the 1988 election, the book succeeds in illuminating almost as much about our current politics.

Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion. By Paul Frymer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. 312p. \$35.00 cloth. \$24.95 paper.

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How did the supposedly “weak” American state create a vast settler empire? With a few notable exceptions, scholarship in American political development (APD) has had surprisingly little to say about this question. Most of our theories about American state development are drawn from research on the social welfare state and the development of federal bureaucracies. The arrival of Paul Frymer’s *Building an American Empire*, then, is a welcome addition to the literature. With the publication of this book, APD now has a clear and persuasive account of US territorial expansion.

In this masterful study, Frymer highlights how federal land policies were used strategically to manufacture white majorities and push indigenous people off their lands. Homesteading laws that provided free or subsidized land to white Americans and European immigrants allowed the state to expand its dominion with little coercive power. It did this, Frymer writes, not through military power but by facilitating settlements on the frontier to avoid “being stretched too thin while maintaining strength through compactness” (p. 36).

Frymer covers a lot of ground in this book, but he does so skillfully, detailing the expansion of the United States from 13 to 48 states and the annexation of Hawai‘i. He moves through the history of US expansion geographically and chronologically, beginning with expansion east of the

Mississippi, and, later, the Louisiana Purchase and lands in the Southwest acquired from Mexico. The history of black colonization, a chapter of US history that is far too often neglected, is covered in great detail.

Much more than a work of synthesis, Frymer gathers evidence from congressional debates and roll-call votes, which he supplements by examining territorial records, periodicals, and some archival sources. This allows him to pay careful attention to shifts in partisan control, sectional tensions, changes in the capacity of the American state, and indigenous resistance. His incorporation of pioneering scholarship in Native American and cross-border history is particularly welcome (e.g., Richard White, *The Middle Ground*, 1991; Andrew J. Torget, *Seeds of Empire*, 2015).

As one might expect, Frymer begins by considering the incorporation of territory east of the Mississippi. Rather than permitting settlers to move across the continent on their own, US officials carefully laid out townships that allowed the state to “secure contested frontiers by being ‘full on this side’ before forging farther into vast geographic spaces” (p. 10). This strategy was born out of the state’s inability to overpower Native American resistance through military power. White settlers, Frymer argues, were used to establish a frontier that was easy to protect. What is more, settlers remained tied to American metropolitan centers that assured their security and fidelity to the United States. The low visibility of government power likely contributed to a still-common view that the American West was a largely stateless space.

Although the low-capacity American state used land purchases and exploitive treaties as its primary tools of dispossession, coercive force played a role as well. Under Andrew Jackson’s direction, the infamous Removal Act of 1830 forced Native Americans to settle west of the Mississippi. Not only did mass resistance from indigenous people deplete the government’s resources but Frymer also argues that the sheer horror of this policy—one that led to the death of roughly one-fourth of the Cherokee nation—led to political opposition among northern activists.

In a detailed section on Louisiana, Frymer explains how the territory’s mixed-race population initially led some to oppose its incorporation into the union, an episode that reveals the tension between the American state’s twin goals of expansion and racial homogeneity. The “solution,” which was implemented by Louisiana’s legislature in 1806, was to establish Black Codes to place whites above free and mixed-race people of color.

Territories with diverse populations, Frymer argues, could be incorporated only if strict racial hierarchies were enforced. Although the North and South differed over slavery, there was overwhelming support for the United States as an exclusively white settler nation. In this way, Frymer demonstrates the importance of looking beyond the traditional divide between the North and South to uncover how westward expansion also shaped US racial attitudes.