

creates the conditions for its restoration” (p. 79). The author calls these alternative discourses “anti-structure,” and the struggle of the dominant structure versus anti-structure defines the meaning of political self-sacrifice. Anti-structure has power by translating the experience of humiliation into a form of power in which the sacrificed body represents the community and its potential restoration.

Four case studies effectively illustrate these arguments. The first is the Northern Ireland hunger strikes in the early 1980s. Jailed Republican prisoners used hunger strikes to protest their treatment as common criminals. They created an anti-structure narrative: They were prisoners of war, not common criminals; they were in a concentration camp, not a prison; they were martyrs, and Margaret Thatcher was the criminal. They situated their resistance within Christian metaphors (Jesus was also a prisoner of conscience) and the history of republican struggle. The Thatcher government was unwilling to bend—until one of the hunger strikers won a seat in Parliament, and the hunger strikes became worldwide news. When that member died, there were protests across Europe and the United States. To avoid “losing” the discursive warden’s dilemma, the UK eventually recognized Sinn Fein as a nonmilitary, political wing of the Irish Republican Army and began negotiations.

The second case is the assassination of Father Jerzy Popieluszko during the Polish Solidarity movement. The Polish government considered Popieluszko its biggest threat, and security forces kidnapped and killed the priest. This act catalyzed an anti-structure informed by Polish nationalism and Christian symbolism. Solidarity remained nonviolent due to this anti-structure framing (Christian) suffering as part of (Polish) resistance. Pope John Paul II explicitly provided the theological infrastructure: Death through martyrdom was a living victory, like that of Christ. Polish suffering and the martyrdom of Popieluszko not only would lead to the resurrection of an independent Poland but would also have redemptive value for the whole world. The martyr narrative was instantly powerful, and the Polish regime publicly put the security officers on trial—a rare event within the Soviet bloc. The event created the political space for a strengthened Solidarity movement that helped facilitate the end of communist rule in Poland.

The third case is the self-immolation by Buddhist monks to protest the Vietnam War. Self-immolation in the face of foreign invasion has a long history within Buddhism and is not considered suicide if it is an offering and sacrifice to Buddha. In these cases, the monks were an offering on behalf of the Vietnamese people. Buddhism was an important part of the political culture as most felt repressed by the Catholic regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. The first self-immolation occurred in June 1964, and the photo of Thich Quang Duc quickly became an iconic image of the war. As other monks (and nine

Americans) followed suit, massive demonstrations broke out in Saigon, and the United States pressured Diem to compromise with the Buddhists. He instead raided a Saigon temple that was at the heart of the Buddhist movement and arrested 400 people. The United States then conspired to remove Diem and—ironically for the Buddhist movement—increased its involvement in Vietnam with the regime that followed.

These examples effectively illustrated the argument so well that the final case study chapter—on suicide terrorism and the self-immolation in Tunisia that triggered the Arab Spring—seemed anticlimactic. The obvious common theme throughout the cases was the role of religion in constituting “martyrdom,” and the importance of this work stems from illustrating the common discursive dynamics across the cases.

I was left wondering whether these dynamics are generalizable beyond such extreme cases of self-sacrifice within religious frameworks. Would we find similar patterns in discourse regarding less intentional self-sacrifice in more secular contexts—whistleblowers, protesters, dissidents, and so on? Does the warden’s dilemma apply to many other situations? Or is the emotive shock of dead and dying bodies a relatively unique path to the construction of powerful alternative discourses? Either way, this is an excellent example of a thoroughly interpretive approach that can offer valuable insights into world politics.

Global Shell Games: Experiments in Transnational Relations, Crime, and Terrorism. By Michael G. Findley,

Daniel L. Nielson, and J. C. Sharman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 276p. \$90.00 cloth, \$34.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S153759271500420X

— Asif Efrat, *Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya*

It is rare for a book to set out a goal as ambitious as establishing a new research program. In *Global Shell Games*, authors Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson, and J. C. Sharman aim to do just that. The book is based on the first field experiment conducted on a global scale, and it launches a program that the authors label Experimental TR: the experimental science of transnational relations.

This program has a dual premise. First, contemporary international relations scholarship focuses largely on formal relations among governments that, the authors claim, represent only a small proportion of the actual international dealings that take place in global society. Therefore, they call for an empirical refocusing of IR scholarship on the private actors that carry out most international activity. More specifically, Experimental TR seeks to identify the causes of the international behavior of individuals and private organizations and the effects that private actors—alongside state influence—have on international politics. In this approach, states may play

a leading role, but such role is not assumed; state influence is treated as a variable (p. 17). As the authors readily acknowledge, they are hardly the first to call for a greater examination of transnational relations. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye did so more than four decades ago. But it is the second pillar of the authors' approach that contains the real innovation: employing field experiments as a tool for studying transnational relations. Contrary to what many scholars believe, they argue, field experiments in IR are feasible—logistically, financially, and ethically—and can be fruitfully employed for identifying causal effects.

The book is largely an exercise aimed at demonstrating this second point: the promise of field experiments in IR and their potential as a solution to scholarly and policy problems. On this front, it clearly succeeds. The authors focus on corporate service providers (CSPs): firms whose business it is to establish, sell, and maintain shell companies. While shell companies may have legitimate uses, they might also be abused in order to disguise criminal schemes. Global corporate transparency standards aim to curb such abuse by requiring CSPs to demand notarized identification documents from their clients. But do CSPs actually comply with this requirement? In the experimental design probing this question, 7,456 emails—under alias identities—were sent to 3,771 firms in 181 countries. All emails asked for confidential incorporation, but the authors randomly assigned treatments to learn if targets' behavior changes in response to different conditions, such as being informed about international legal requirements, being told about possible legal penalties, being prompted to behave appropriately, or receiving a request from a citizen of a country associated with corruption or terrorism. The various experimental conditions were compared to a "Placebo" condition whereby the requester purports to come from a minor-power, low-corruption wealthy country.

The authors deserve praise for meticulously crafting and executing a research design that is innovative, creative, and ambitious—even audacious. Posing as individuals who seek to establish a shell company under a cloak of secrecy does require guts. The careful attention to detail—from minimizing detection risks to the coding of outcomes—is evident throughout the book, including a lengthy appendix that explains the experiment. And this great effort paid off, yielding a range of interesting findings that often defy conventional wisdom. Importantly, these findings clearly demonstrate the gap between rules on the books and actual behavior on the ground. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an international body that combats money laundering, including through the regulation of shell companies—is widely considered to be influential and effective; yet the experiment reveals a significant degree of noncompliance with the prohibition on untraceable shell companies, which is a key tenet of the anti-money-laundering (AML) regime. This is a cautionary note for IR scholars who typically focus on the formal aspects of

international agreements—such as their ratification—and neglect their on-the-ground operation and impact. Another surprising finding is that tax havens—typically seen as lawless jurisdictions—demonstrated the highest levels of compliance, followed by poor countries, with rich countries at the bottom. Some of the treatments also produced counterintuitive results. For example, a reference to the FATF's international standards did not elicit greater compliance; referencing appropriate behavior also failed to increase compliance and may even have lowered it.

While the empirical findings are valuable, their interpretation is sometimes wanting. This is especially the case with the heterogeneous effects that many treatments produced. For example, the Corruption treatment raised the nonresponse rate (suggesting that some subjects may seek to avoid shady dealings by ignoring the inquiries altogether), while at the same time reducing compliance rates (p. 106). The IR literature on compliance typically seeks to explain why compliance varies across states; that is, it aims to identify attributes of states that account for their tendency to violate or comply with international norms. *Global Shell Games*, however, does not attempt to explain variation in compliance among CSPs, postponing such an analysis to future work (p. 172). Explaining the variance in behavior is not possible partly because CSPs—the book's central actors—are left untheorized. The book could have benefited from a theoretical discussion of these actors, their motivations and concerns, as well as distinctions among types of CSPs. Such a theory could have strengthened the empirical analysis; it would also have helped the reader to assess whether the findings are generalizable.

While the book teaches us much about CSPs, it is not clear whether this knowledge applies to other participants in the AML regime—notably, banks—and to other actors in the global economy. Furthermore, the book tests observable implications from various IR theories that are introduced piecemeal, and the logic for selecting them is unspecified. A more coherent, focused discussion up front would have given the book a stronger theoretical backbone.

Notwithstanding these concerns, this book is an empirical feat that demonstrates the value of field experiments for IR research, sets a model for such experiments, and provides much helpful practical guidance. It also calls into question some widely held views about international law and reminds us to look beyond the intergovernmental domain into the realm of transnational relations. These are all important contributions.

The Politics of Leverage in International Relations:

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Does soft power matter in global politics? Even in an era of a rising China and a resurgent Russia, all but perhaps