possible value to the religious problem. The subject may be approached both from the point of view of the scientist or philosopher who surveys the exterior phenomena of religion, and also from the standpoint of the believer to whom religion is a matter of inner conviction and faith. From the first point of view there is no doubt that the religious sciences find in the psychic sciences a wide field for the advance of their peculiar researches. Thus a knowledge of hypnotism and the neuropathic temperament make the various episodes described in the biographies of the saints much more believable. In such histories almost all psychic phenomena, clothed in religious form, are to be found, but preserving under this form evident analogies to those described at the present day under the categories of hypnotism, dissociated consciousness, animal magnetism, and spiritualism. When, however, the religious question is considered from its essential basis the psychic sciences can furnish no great light. The religious sentiments, the religious idea, seem quite independent of all these more or less abnormal psychic phenomena. Religion has its deep and probably indestructible roots in the highest moral aspirations of human nature. Two interpretations are given to spiritualistic phenomena—one which explains them as the subconscious experiences of the medium, and the other which explains them as the manifestation of intelligence, exterior to this world. The first hypothesis is the only one in accord with scientific postulates, and even if the latter were clearly demonstrated, in so far as religion is not solely a matter of belief in a future life, such certitude would have but little value from a religious point of view. The writer concludes that religious experience is independent of objective verification, and, whatever may be the future progress of psychic science, religion will always be a matter of faith and intuition. H. DEVINE.

The Opposition to the Doctrine of Association of Ideas. [*L'Anti-associationnisme.*] (*Revue Philosophique, May*, 1916.) *Dugas, L.*

By the exaggeration of the scope of the law of association of ideas a reaction has been provoked which questions not only its scope, but its sense and value. If, says the author of this article, there is a law which seems established in psychology, it is that of association. All the philosophers from Plato to Spencer have recognised it. But the use that English empiricists have made of it has given umbrage to the rationalists of our day, and they pretend and charge themselves with proving that association of ideas, as they understand the doctrine, cannot, and in fact does not, exist.

Brochard, in his article on the "Law of Similarity," which appeared in the *Revue Philosophique* in 1880, opened the anti-associationist campaign. He did not wish to destroy all the laws of association, but only one—the most important by the way—the law of association by resemblance. "Ideas of the past," he says, "being presented at the same time as those of the present, we can observe whether they are like or unlike. But one sees that the perception of the resemblance or contrast only occurs after the appearance of the ideas. It is not the cause but the consequence of association. The ideas are already associated by contiguity at the moment when we notice that they are alike, and their

resemblance would escape us if the law of contiguity had not already done its work."

Association then by similarity comes only in consequence of association by contiguity, or, to put it in another way, there is no association by resemblance, but only a judgment of resemblance passed on associated ideas in virtue of the only law of association which exists, namely, that of contiguity. The association of similar ideas is only apparent; the mind has not the power of grouping such ideas, of searching for them, or of discovering them; it can only wait for them.

But if similar ideas cannot associate together, cannot evoke each other, cannot recall each other, if they associate only by contiguity, it may be asked: (1) How is it that contiguity so often causes the meeting of similarities? One would say that it searched for them, that it aimed at causing the encounter, which ought to be, by hypothesis, accidental, exceptional, and rare. (2) How does the mind take cognizance of a resemblance which it cannot discover at once, at which it does not aim beforehand, which it is not disposed to notice, and which it does not look for?

Brochard's idea of association is a law of reproduction of past phenomena in their order of succession. The more the reproduction of the past is perfect, without change, integral, literal, the more it approaches a pure mechanism, the more it is an automatic unrolling of images and of acts, which no thought directs, the better it realises the idea of association which Brochard has conceived.

Others, however, do not take the word in such a rigorous sense. Plato, for example, remarks that association constitutes a discovery, a progress of thought, that is to say the passage from an idea present to the senses to one which has escaped from the senses. "Recollection," says Plato, "is perceiving a thing in such a manner by the senses or otherwise as to think of another thing which one does not perceive, and which one does not recognise in the same manner as the first; thus, seeing a musical instrument, one thinks of the person who plays it." Reminiscence then enters into the association of ideas, which Plato does not name, but which he designs in a very clear fashion, and of which he expresses the law in these terms: "Reminiscence is caused sometimes by similar things, and sometimes by dissimilar things."

The writer proceeds to examine in detail the theory of association by contiguity—the theory of mechanism, as he terms it—and to point out its fallacies. In the course of his arguments he remarks that the only real law of association is the law of interest, and that this law is applied to memory, considered either as a conservation or as an evocation of the past. For example, I retain from the past only the facts which I had an interest in considering at the moment; I evoke from the past only the facts which I am interested in remembering now.

Although throughout the whole of his article it is evident that the writer leans to the doctrine of association by resemblance, yet he arrives at the conclusion that one cannot put forward association of ideas as a universal and unique law which will be in psychology what the law of attraction is in astronomy and physics. There is not one but several laws of association. They are heterogeneous and irreducible, and they

express the relations between ideas—not necessary relations, but only possible—in such a way that the true psychological problem is to define and class these "possible modes of association."

These laws of association, then, are simple frames (*cadres*) of thought, frames not rigid, into which thought *may*, not *must*, enter; or, making use of another metaphor, they are different ways, which open before the thought, and which it is *invited*, not *compelled*, to follow.

These laws are only different manners, forms, or methods of thinking. But these methods, which command and direct the course of thought, are themselves imposed on each mind by its own nature, by its own mental idiosyncrasy. Association explains itself by idiosyncrasy of temperament. Besides, this is expressed in common language; a man is characterised by his turn of mind, his form of thought, or, to put it in another way, by the nature or kind of his association of ideas, and one understands by that that if it be his associations which define his mind, it is his mind which determines the course and form of his associations. Still it is necessary to add that each mind has several aspects, several manners or forms of thought; or, to express it in another way, one can engage one's self in different ways of association, and one does not fail to do so. The laws of association, then, can be considered as different and successive points of view of the same mind.

This may be explained by examples:

(1) Association by contiguity characterises minds which are fond of the temporal and spacial order of things, which depend on this order for recovering their recollections, and which do not take the trouble of assembling, grouping, or comparing their ideas. This is also the point of view of minds which are resting themselves, taking a holiday as it were, and which give themselves up to the accidental associations which circumstances bring.

(2) Association by resemblance is characteristic of minds which are occupied and preoccupied by a dominating idea, which bring everything to this idea, discover it everywhere, and strive to seize or to procure comparisons with it. It is also a point of view which certain minds may momentarily take without it being natural or proper to them. Finally, one may see among those in whom this form of association dominates a tendency to gather everything to one's self, to shut one's self up in an habitual circle of ideas; in short, an egoistic and conservative turn of mind.

(3) Association by contrast characterises the minds which receive every new idea badly, and which, to get away from it, and to defend themselves from it, throw themselves at first into the arms of the opposite notion. This form of mental contradiction is common and natural, for it is not always and only from vanity and jealousy that one contradicts. One may do so from an instinct of legitimate mental defence, not defiance, but of simple prudence with regard to the ideas which present themselves. One wishes to take time to get used to these new ideas, so one resists and examines them before surrendering. Association by contrast is also the mark of minds which love extreme fluctuations and oscillations of thought.

J. BARFIELD ADAMS.