(e.g., see Phil Klinkner and Rogers Smith, *The Unsteady March,* 1999). The focus of *Locked Out* is on felon disenfranchisement and not racial politics at large, but the findings suggest that felon disenfranchisement might operate within a larger historical arch of race and institutions, especially political parties.

Locked Out also tackles the complicated task of estimating the political impact of felon disenfranchisement. Manza and Uggen combine estimates of the size and location of the disenfranchised population with their prospective vote choice and turnout, which are estimated by matching sociodemographic characteristics of the felon and ex-felon population with data from the Current Population Survey. Felon disenfranchisement gives "a small but clear advantage to Republican candidates," but even these small benefits have made a difference in close presidential elections and in a handful of Senate elections (Manza and Uggen, p. 191). In the 2000 presidential election, for example, the authors estimate that Al Gore's popular vote margin would have increased from 500,000 votes to one million votes. If Florida's disenfranchised felons had been permitted to vote, with a mere 28% turnout but a 70% Democratic preference, then Gore would have won Florida by more than 80,000 votes.

Each of these three books offers a different account of how the carceral state was built, but they converge on the idea that the American penal system has become vast enough to reshape political opportunities and social inequality. Gottschalk shows that even liberal interest groups and social movements are interlinked with and sometimes exploited by usually conservative law-and-order interests; Western reveals how the prison boom distorts our measures of inequality and permanently undercuts the opportunities for already marginalized groups; and Manza and Uggen demonstrate how felon disenfranchisement changed not just the electorate but also election outcomes. These are significant contributions to our understanding of the carceral state.

As is usually the case with innovative work about understudied issues, however, these books set a research agenda by highlighting as many questions as they answer. We know little, for example, about how crime policy and the carceral state interact with other policy areas involving surveillance and detention, such as immigration policy and the "war on terror." Extensive historical and comparative analysis has explained why the U.S. welfare state is an international "laggard," and we need similar investigation as to why the U.S. carceral state is an international "leader." Further still, studies of the carceral state should pursue a more synthesized theory of the interplay among institutions, race, and policymaking, as there is too much of a bifurcation between studying the causes of crime policy, on the one hand, and the consequences for blacks and Latinos, on the other. Taken together, these three books suggest that the modern prison boom has altered the American political landscape, and this important insight should only further encourage political science to investigate unanswered questions about the carceral state.

Changing White Attitudes Toward Black Political Leadership. By Zoltan L. Hajnal. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. 230p. $65.00 cloth, $22.99 paper.

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— Andra Gillespie, *Emory University*

In his book, Zoltan Hajnal probes the reason for increased white support of black candidates at the local level. In doing so, he makes an important contribution to the literature on race and voting behavior. Contrary to previous work that claims that white vote choice in elections featuring black candidates is a function of white prejudice or backlash, Hajnal proffers a more nuanced information model of vote choice. When white voters first face the prospect of black elected leadership, they resist and organize against black candidates because of racial stereotypes, fears that the quality of life in the city will deteriorate, and fears that black elected leaders will initiate policy changes that will benefit blacks at the expense of whites. However, when these fears do not materialize, whites sharply lower their resistance and even begin to support black candidates in greater numbers.

To test his theory, Hajnal employs a quantitative analysis of mayoral elections in 26 medium- to large-size American cities from 1967 to 1999. These cities all elected their first black mayors during this time period, and in the subsequent election, the new black incumbent faced a white challenger. As expected, white voters strongly opposed black candidates in many of those first elections. This opposition was racially motivated, as conventional explanations for white support of black candidates had little bearing on white vote choice. Candidate quality, for instance, is statistically insignificant, while the size of the black population is significantly and negatively correlated with white support for black candidates.

The second election—that is, the black incumbent's first reelection campaign—is markedly different from the first race. White support for the black candidate increases in the second election, and voter turnout decreases, suggesting less racial mobilization. Additionally, conventional political factors such as candidate quality and newspaper endorsements, which were not significant predictors of vote choice in the first election, now reemerge as significant factors in predicting white support for the black incumbent.

Furthermore, Hajnal finds, using National Election Study data, that living under black leadership tempers white racial resentment. Respondents in cities that had experienced black leadership were less likely to profess racial resentment and antiblack affect and were less likely

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to believe that blacks were pushing too hard and too fast for equality.

Perhaps Hajnal's most fascinating finding is the parabolic relationship between demographics and white support of black candidates. In those first black incumbent reelections, whites in cities with clear black and white majorities increased their support for the black incumbent. However, in cities where the white and black populations were roughly equal, contestation remained. On average, black candidates in racially balanced cities garnered fewer white votes as incumbents than they did as challengers. Hajnal argues that white residents of racially imbalanced cities have greater opportunities to learn about black leadership than residents of racially balanced cities, and this learning is reflected in the different election outcomes.

Two case studies help illustrate this finding. First, Hajnal looks at Tom Bradley's tenure as mayor of Los Angeles, a minority black city. Using polling data and newspaper archival analysis, the author contends that white voters were initially apprehensive of Bradley. However, as Bradley demonstrated competent governance, he won the support of an increasing number of white voters.

In contrast, Harold Washington's 1983 and 1987 mayoral victories in Chicago were marked by increasing racial polarization. Hajnal argues that this is likely due to the fact that Washington's election and first term did not necessarily send the same information signals to white voters because of the parity in black and white population in Chicago. Thus, Washington never had the opportunity to implement any policies that would signal reconciliation to white voters and convince them that black political leadership was nothing to fear.

In general, Hajnal asks the right questions in this book, and I believe that his interpretive intuition heads in the right direction. However, issues of power should play a more central and explicit role in the narrative. It is possible that whites who oppose black incumbents in racially balanced cities learn just as much as whites in racially imbalanced cities because they are learning about power first and foremost. Whites in cities with small black populations surely learn tolerance, but they also learn that having a black mayor will not upset the balance of power. Even Hajnal concedes that this realization makes them less afraid to elect a black mayor. Moreover, while residents in majority-black cities may learn that having a black mayor will not lead to deteriorating conditions and redistributive policies that unfairly benefit blacks, they could also perceive that black leadership is inevitable given the size of the black population. Thus, white support of blacks and black leadership could be a strategic move to join the winning coalition and reap influence.

By a similar logic, whites in racially balanced cities also learn a great deal. They still have resources to at least attempt to defend their interests without compromise. So while this political maneuvering may prevent white residents from challenging their prejudices, they do learn important lessons about bare knuckle politics, and that learning should not be diminished in the analysis.

It was also surprising that Hajnal never controlled for legislative alliances in his statistical models. Does white support for black incumbents increase or decrease when the city council is majority black or clearly aligned with the mayor? Given the small sample size, it should be relatively easy to gather this information from city council minutes, newspaper coverage, and even elite interviews with local politics insiders, journalists assigned to city hall, or even the principal actors themselves.

Despite Hajnal's minimal discussion of power, *Changing White Attitudes Toward Black Political Leadership* makes an important contribution to our understanding of the dynamic nature of racially polarized voting. Like all good works, this book raises new questions, but I interpret that as a strength of the work. The book makes important strides in our understanding of racial polarization in voting, and it should open new lines of research—quantitative, qualitative, and experimental—on the relationship among race relations, public opinion, and political behavior.

The Averaged America: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public. By Sarah E. Igo. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. 408p. $35.00.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071812

— David E. Campbell, *University of Notre Dame*

If I told you that this book is about the history of survey research in America, would you read it? If I told you that much of the book deals with Alfred Kinsey's reports on human sexuality, would that pique your interest?

Perhaps only a political scientist could say that the Kinsey chapters are not actually the best part of the book. Or, at least, other parts should be of greater interest since they better inform us about modern survey research. The ongoing fascination with Kinsey, however, speaks to an important theme in *The Averaged American*—how surveys can shape the public's perception, or misperception, of itself.

In her book, Sarah Igo tells Kinsey's tale alongside those of Robert and Helen Lynd, authors of the Middletown studies, and the first wave of brand-name pollsters—George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald Crossley. Igo explains how they were all in pursuit of the average, or representative, American, though each used a different methodology. Gallup and his contemporaries relied on the new, and seemingly magical, science of representative sampling. The Lynds chose the residents—or most of the residents anyway—of a single city (Muncie, Indiana) to stand in for all of America. Kinsey purported to lay bare, as it were, the sexual practices of the population by interviewing a large but decidedly nonrepresentative sample of Americans. Having spent his career studying the insect

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