ians. Somehow the Dixiecrats (and plantation owners) of the early twentieth century represent a continuity of interests with the black and white Populists, whom the southern ruling class brutally crushed, lynched, and disenfranchised. Here and there are inklings of these class differences and what they might have meant for the national, radical, farmers movement as a whole, but they are never analytically confronted.

The most striking omission is with respect to race. There are hundreds of examples of the racist actions of agrarians, as well as the American Federation of Labor and other trade unionists, but these never figure into the analysis. William Jennings Bryan is the unsung hero of the book, but his virulent racism (Sanders fails to mention he was a supporter of the Ku Klux Klan) is seen as a wart rather than a problem for the movement. It can be plausibly argued that workers and farmers, at their most radical and effective, were antiracist, and that acceptance of racism destroyed the vitality of farmers, not just trade unions. Dozens of instances can be gleaned from reading the small print in the book. Of special importance is the pivotal 1924 farmer-labor presidential campaign of Wisconsin's Robert LaFollette, who had wide support in the Midwest and West but little in the supposedly agrarian radical South, in good part due to LaFollette's advocacy of civil rights for blacks. In the South, of course, that was a direct threat to the white supremacist control of black labor by southern cotton planters but not much of a threat to the interests of poor white farmers. It was not merely the failures of labor but the weaknesses of agrarian radicalism, particularly in the South around issues of race, that foreshadowed the ultimate failure of the movement. A deeper probing of these issues would have dramatically affected the underlying analysis.

This all said, the book is rich, provocative, and informative, and it is a must read for students of American politics.

American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy. By Mark A. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 245p. $39.00 cloth, $16.00 paper.

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The question of who holds meaningful political power in democratic societies motivated some of the most important works in American political science in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. Scholars such as Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom explored the power structure of America and noted the constraints imposed upon representative democracy by a capitalist system. These types of examination seem to have fallen out of favor over the last several decades, probably because of problems surrounding the measurement of a concept such as power and the general feeling that such questions can never be answered with any high degree of certainty. This has been a regrettable development for the discipline. Despite its difficulty, the question of who holds political power and how it is exercised remains among the most important to be asked about politics and government.

The exploration of political power in America—specifically, the ability of business to control political outcomes—has made an ambitious and triumphant return in Mark A. Smith's *American Business and Political Power*. Smith starts by reviewing the literature on the power of business in the United States, and he wisely casts his view beyond mainstream political science literature to take in the work of C. Wright Mills, G. William Domhoff, and Ralph Miliband, among others. Smith concludes that the pluralists, elitists, and class theorists may differ in their perspectives on the extent of business power, but they all share the assumption that a unified business front in the political arena will result in business being able to control political outcomes. Yet, Smith's findings refute this assumption: "Unity does not increase the direct influence of business and reduce democratic control by the citizenry. Instead, unity coincides with the opposite results.... Policies match the collective desires of business only when citizens, through their policy preferences and voting choices, embrace ideas and candidates supportive of what business wants" (p. 8).

Key to Smith's contention is the idea that not all political issues will result in a unified business front. Specifically, issues of interest to business are characterized as being "particularistic," "conflictual," or "unifying." Essentially, unifying issues are those in which the entire business community has an interest; they involve governmental decisions that have the potential to affect all businesses, not just particular corporations or industries. Smith uncovers these unifying issues in an exhaustive search of the positions on national issues taken by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce from 1953 to 1996. He finds that although these issues are fairly rare, they are also the most ideological, partisan, and salient.

Smith creates a scale to measure the degree of business success on these issues and shows that this scale is highly associated with certain measures of citizen preferences, such as public opinion, public attitudes toward corporations, and the partisan composition of Congress. This relationship holds in the face of what Smith terms "overt" sources of business power and political mobilization, such as spending by corporate political action committees and business lobbying capacity. Smith also refutes the implication that business holds more subtle, "structural" power that forces elected officials to enact policies favored by business, particularly during times of economic hardship. He determines that the real power of business lies in its ability, particularly over the last several decades, to influence public opinion through the support of policy think tanks that hold favorable views on business. The mechanism through which this occurs is the news media visibility of researchers from conservative think tanks.

Smith's analysis is ambitious, and it is developed in a logical, thoughtful, and sophisticated manner that remains accessible throughout. It is also a reminder that many of the most important questions about politics are not answered with readily available data. Some may quibble with Smith's choice of U.S. Chamber of Commerce positions to construct the dependent variable. Smith notes that this organization represents both small businesses and large corporations and is therefore a good proxy for the views of the entire business community. The potential problem is that when it comes to exerting political influence, small businesses are quite likely to be in a different league from large corporations. In fact, the real question of business power may be the extent to which large corporations can influence governmental policies. Smith demonstrates that the positions of the U.S. Chamber are nearly identical to those adopted by the Business Roundtable, which represents mostly large corporations, but this still does not address the question of the independent influence that might be exerted by large corporations. Such influence may come as a result of the increasing use of soft money contributions to the political parties, an issue Smith does not examine.

It is a very significant finding that disagreements between the business community and the public on unifying issues are typically resolved in favor of the latter. Yet, Smith admits that on particularistic issues that do not receive much attention and affect only a few firms or industries, business interests are much more successful, the increased openness of the legislative process notwithstanding. These types of issues are much more prevalent than the unifying ones Smith examines, but despite the public's seeming apathy toward them, the fact that business tends to be very successful in this arena erodes the democratic ideal perhaps more than Smith would like to admit, as not all particularistic interests are created equal. If political power is about who gets what and how, it has long been clear that business interests are more successful at securing benefits from the government than, for example, welfare mothers.

Despite these criticisms, Smith's study will certainly lead scholars to question the ability of business to exert political power at the national level in the absence of public support. And Smith raises some very important questions. His findings indicate little evidence of structural business power at the national level, but he notes that state and local governments are probably much more susceptible to the pressures of enacting favorable business policies. This is an especially important point in view of the drive over the last two decades to allow states more policymaking power. If Smith's logic is correct, than the devolution of policy responsibilities to the states is something that business as a whole should welcome, given the potential benefits. It also should be noted that the end of the Cold War has allowed for a much more globalized system of capitalism, one in which increasing competition among nations could lead to greater structural power for business.

Some may argue that public opinion favors more governmental power for the states, but as Smith shows, the greatest power of the business community may lie in its ability to influence public opinion. Smith's findings indicate that business seems to have made a concerted effort at politically socializing the public in favor of probusiness positions since the business failures of the 1960s and early 1970s. Because a dim view of government is likely to work in favor of business, this effort has probably benefited from declining public confidence in governmental institutions in the wake of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. But Smith shows that it is important to explore whether declining public confidence has been exacerbated by unflattering media portrayals of governmental behavior, not only in news broadcasts but also in television shows, movies, and so on.

Like all significant and able scholarship, Smith's book raises a number of important questions. It is gratifying to see an examination of such a fundamental and enduring political question addressed again by a mainstream political scientist. The book would be an excellent addition to graduate courses on political behavior and even upper level undergraduate courses on public opinion, elections, and democratic theory.

The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and Managing Compliance. By Malcolm K. Sparrow. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 346p. $20.95 paper.

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Regulation has never been popular in the public mind; like death and taxes, it is regarded—at best—as an unpleasant inevitability. Calls for deregulation hearken back at least to the Nixon administration, and the theme of reducing the alleged burdens of regulation have become a kind of bipartisan mantra, advanced by every American president in the latter third of the twentieth century. Scholars have not been appreciably kinder. Criticism oscillates between the charge of regulatory capture and the accompanying danger of pliant regulators falling into the clutches of their clientele, and the more recent—and virtually opposite—concern with regulatory unreasonableness and the tendency of governmental agencies to enforce regulations in a mechanistic and irrationally aggressive manner.

In this pervasive environment of what my students would term "dissing" regulation, *Regulatory Craft* seems an extraordinary anomaly. Malcolm Sparrow presents a positive, almost affectionate, portrayal of regulation and the beleaguered administrators charged with its implementation. He entertains no doubts about the continuing need for command and control forms of social policy, and he does not apologize for its coercive elements or its assumption that bad guys will always be with us. The raging debate over the need for less coercive, market-based alternatives to regulation is conspicuous by its absence in these pages.

The author directs his attention to the administrators who implement regulatory programs. Scholars are notably absent from Sparrow's description of his intended audience. Yet, academic students of regulation and public policy will find much to like in this book. It is a refreshing antidote to recent "pop" public administration, especially the more extreme manifestations of the reinventing government movement, which applied customer satisfaction as a standard of governmental excellence, willy-nilly, to a range of activities for which it was inappropriate at best. (My favorite example of this pathology is Sparrow's discussion of the effort to "reinvent" the customs service, which included a wrenching and debilitating debate over whether smugglers should be considered among the agency's "customers.")

The central argument is deceptively simple: Sparrow urges regulators to "pick important problems and fix them" (p. xvi). He first discusses why this approach is both novel and necessary, setting the argument in the context of a highly useful analysis of the basic theoretical and pragmatic problems of regulatory practice. Regulators, he argues, are always short of resources and unable to enforce all their mandates. Thus, the exercise of administrative discretion in allocating scarce resources is inevitable. Although these determinations necessarily result in an implicit ranking of the various risks the agency is responsible for addressing, political (and, increasingly, legal) reality presses administrators to deny the existence of such discretion. As a result, hazards are addressed more or less randomly, based on the cases that come in the door as well as the organizational structure and professional orientation of the agency's staff. The simple admonition to pick important problems, then, is not politically, legally, or bureaucratically easy.

Once important problems have been selected, they need to be "fixed." Sparrow provides an extended discussion of problem-solving techniques, risk assessment and control, and administrative and organizational structures. The central sections of the book are a virtual manual for practitioners. According to Sparrow, the essence of craft, and the missing ingredient in most operating regulatory programs, is choosing the right tool for the job. His diagnosis of this most basic problem of regulation is not new: Robert Kagan, Eugene Bardach, John Braithwaite, and others have written extensively on the propensity of regulators to fall victim to what my colleague, Robert Nakamura, calls the "hammer and nail pathology": When the only tool you know how to use is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. But Sparrow lays out the problem in an intelligent and comprehensive way, and he goes where few academic observers have ventured: He proposes concrete policies and administrative structures and procedures that have been shown to overcome it. I found that the sections dealing with problem-solving infrastructure and "finding resources and making space" presented a bit more