There is one more circumstance in Griesinger's life which it would be unjust to pass over without mention even in this brief notice. He abolished the use of mechanical restraint in the treatment of the insane in the Charité. While many of his countrymen were defending with passionate prejudice the system of mechanical restraint, and rudely condemning a system of which they had no practical knowledge, he visited the best English asylums, studied the non-restraint system in practical operation, recognised its success, and forthwith set himself earnestly to work to carry it into effect. The circumstance affords an illustration of his large and candid mind, ever open to receive and fairly examine new views, and capable of rising above the trammels of habits and systems of thought. In the same spirit of candid enquiry he personally studied the family treatment of the insane at Gheel; and his latest labours were given to the zealous advocacy of a larger measure of freedom for the insane than they have under the system of indiscriminate sequestration which is now in vogue. His last words are a noble testimony to the generous and enthusiastic spirit of an earnest reformer.

But we must bring to an end this short memoir, deeply conscious how lamely it exhibits the great merits of him whose loss we mourn. One comfort we have, that death which has robbed us of him, and of so much that he might, had he been spared but a little while, have done, cannot rob us of the good work which he has done; of this nothing can bereave us. The seed which he has sown will surely spring up and bear fruit a hundredfold, and he, being dead, will yet speak. He has put off mortality and has put on immortality: the mortal we have lost, but the immortal abides with us. Justly then may our mourning be turned into joy—joy that the true work of a good life never dies, that though death is great, life is still greater, "seeing that we die in a world of life and of creation without end."

Mental Philosophy in Germany and France.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature in the present state of mental philosophy is the rapid spread of materialism in Germany, which has attracted considerable attention in France, and has been noticed this year at the two scientific gatherings at Norwich and Oxford. There seems to be a general tendency to attribute this revival of materialism exclusively to the teaching of physiologists, which is natural,

but far from correct. For the last twenty years it has been obvious that the Critical Idealism of Kant and his school had completed its circular course, and it had become more and more estranged from the general intellectual activity of the country, although retaining a nominal supremacy. The moment had therefore come for its fall, just as the schoolmen were displaced by Descartes, the Cartesians by Locke, and the sensualist school by Kant; and various signs indicated that the next philosophical movement would be to the opposite extreme.

The first tendency to materialism appeared in the school of Herbart, which, although despised by the Hegelians, has long been gaining ground among thoughtful men in Germany; and some of the strongest psychological arguments anywhere to be found against the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul are due to Waitz and Drobisch, two of Herbart's disciples.

But the impulse to its present rapid increase among scientific men is due to their general acceptance of Comte's philosophy, whence some Positivists have deduced materialism by a process which their high-priest, M. Littré, does not disavow.

The results are probably best known to English readers by Dr. Büchner's book, on "Force and Matter;" but many others have shown equal boldness in pushing materialism to its furthest consequences. Thus Vogt asserts that the brain secretes thought as the liver does bile, or the kidneys urine; while Moleschott speaks of thought as "a phosphorescence of the brain;" and Meyer of laws of thought as innate functions of the same organ.

Virchow, who has been claimed as one of the chief supporters of these opinions, does not seem to go so far; he would appear rather to remain in that state of ακαταληψία or suspension of judgment, which is a fundamental article of the true Positivist creed; indeed, he goes farther, and asserts that the fact of self-consciousness is inexplicable on the materialist hypothesis.

It is unfortunate that this movement shares, to a very great extent, in the contemptuous neglect of the system it seeks to displace, which is the immediate strength, and ultimate weakness, of every philosophical innovation. The arguments employed by its upholders are (as M. Caro says) "d'une désespèrante monotonie," being almost exclusively derived from the disagreements of metaphysicians, and from the

natural sciences; indeed, the only philosophical difficulty which appears to have seriously embarrassed them, is the difference in kind between thought and the phenomena of the external world. This they ordinarily answer by suggesting analogies; as Vogt's, that the other secretions of the body differ in kind from the glands which form them; or as Büchner's, that the movement produced by a steam-engine differs from the engine itself.

Moleschott urges, with much more subtlety and ingenuity, that the law of transmutation of force supplies the solution of the difficulty; if heat can be transformed into light or movement, movement into electricity, and so forth, any of these may be again transformed into nerve-force, and nerve-force into thought. As this is not a professed treatise on the subject, it may be sufficient to remark, that the real objection to materialism is not based upon the mere difference in kind between thought and any phenomena apprehended by the senses, but on that difference being so utterly radical as to lead us to suppose they can have no substratum in common; and to this the analogies proposed are no answer whatever. The law, again, of transmutation of force evidently depends upon all the forces of nature being only various modes of the local motion of matter (at any rate such is the conclusion now almost established by modern physicists); which it is only begging the question to extend to the phenomena of mind. But Moleschott has deserved well of philosophy by bringing forward (into more prominence even than Mr. Herbert Spencer) such a suggestive topic, yet one which appears more likely to injure than to benefit his own cause. Curiously enough, he and some of his disciples have been led by the exigencies of controversy, to personify vaguely this law, and thus to revive the Neo-Platonist idea of an "anima mundi," while, even more recently,* it has been employed in the same way, but on totally opposite grounds, to establish a system of "naturalistic Pantheism," if I may be allowed to coin a new adjective in describing an alliance which is among the probabilities of the future.

Whatever may be the fortunes of this materialist movement, one good result is already discernible: it will put an end to the separation which at present unfortunately exists between philosophy and natural science. On the one hand,

* By M. Emile Burnouf, "La Science des Religions." *Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct.* 1, 1868.

https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.14.68.528 Published online by Cambridge University Press

men of science who profess materialism and atheism *are* philosophers, though they may not know it; they are deciding upon some of the weightiest questions of philosophy, and are forming a system for themselves, although without the help of previous speculation to guide them.

On the other hand, metaphysicians are at last condescending to study biology and the other physical sciences, which, since the time of Descartes, have been generally considered beneath the dignity of a philosopher. The principal opponents of this new movement are convinced that it is principally owing to the neglect of science by philosophers, and we thus have M. Janet, one of the French "spiritualist" school, writing a book on "Le Cerveau et la Pensée," which testifies to considerable study of the physiology of the nervous system, and M. Caro giving a most interesting and excellent account of the relation of materialism to positivism and to the experimental sciences. Such a change from their master's teaching, among the disciples of Victor Cousin, must be for the better.

There is even great reason to hope that the general principles of the natural sciences may be included in the text-books of philosophy used abroad. For instance, Professor Dellacella, of Parma, works into his admirable little manual of "Antropologia Empirica," the opinions as to functions of the different parts of the encephalon held by Schiff, Lussana, and De Renzi; and in a Compendium of Philosophy, just published by Professor Stoeckl, of Münster, the physiology of the nervous system, the phenomena of dreams, somnambulism and insanity, the principles of geology and biology, Serre's and Darwin's theories of the origin of species are briefly, but adequately stated, and their bearing on general questions of metaphysics is fairly estimated. If it is desirable that philosophy should have any influence at the present day, when the experimental sciences are advancing so rapidly, this is the only way to produce such a result; but there is still much to be done to close the gulf which has been formed by three centuries of mutual estrangement and neglect.

R. W. G.

Dr. Rumsey on the Public Health.

Dr. Rumsey's "Address on Health," delivered as President of the "Public Health Section," at the Social Science Congress, held at Birmingham, in October, 1868, contains a masterly summary of the whole subject. It was published in