The most important contribution of the book is that through its vast collection of data, it helps us better understand the contours of representation for gays and lesbians. It is hard to understate the effort required to identify the sexual orientation of state legislators from 50 states over a 15-year period and then to create data sets needed to evaluate the competing hypotheses explaining both electoral and legislative behavior. As a result, this work promises to provide a foundation for research for years to come.

Future research might build on this impressive work by accounting for agenda effects as well as trends in public opinion at the state level over time. Public opinion toward gay rights has become significantly more favorable over time. It is possible that as the public increasingly comes to support gay rights, the influence of descriptive representation may decrease. Indeed, in his analysis of backlash, Haider-Markel observes large differences in the effect of LGBT legislators on bill passage in different periods.

A second important consideration is that the pattern of advances in gay rights across states has a distinctly partisan flavor to it that goes beyond the notion of party competition included in most of the models presented. To take just one example, legislation advancing gay rights is almost never even considered in legislatures in which the Republican Party holds a majority. What congressional scholars refer to as "negative agenda control" thus provides gay rights opponents an easy way to prevent the passage of such bills. It is hard to tell, however, how much the results reported herein might be subject to such agenda-setting effects.

Out and Running provides important insights in helping to answer one of the most pressing questions political science faces today: How can marginalized minorities gain political representation? Haider-Markel shows that the descriptive representation of gays and lesbians has important substantive benefits. Of course, to the extent that one values political equality as an important democratic principle, the descriptive representation of marginalized groups has value regardless of its substantive effects. Showing that those benefits outweigh their potential costs adds weight to the argument. By helping us to better understand how gays and lesbians gain and exercise power, and the role that descriptive representation plays in fostering substantive representation, the author provides an important and timely contribution to the study of contemporary politics.

Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion. By Donald R. Kinder and Cindy D. Kam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. 368p. $86.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.
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— Michael G. Hagen, *Temple University*

In their book, Donald Kinder and Cindy Kam reinvigorate the concept of ethnocentrism, a concept first applied to social scientific questions more than a century ago but in recent years rarely considered as a source of Americans' political preferences. Kinder and Kam define ethnocentrism as "a predisposition to divide the human world into in-groups and out-groups" (p. 8).

As a means of reintroducing and redeveloping the concept theoretically, and grounding their work in what has gone before, the authors offer in Chapter 1 a brief and readable intellectual history of the proposition that humans naturally view the world ethnocentrically. Their review yields, in Chapter 2, a theory of ethnocentrism. While ethnocentrism may be widespread, the theory holds, it is not a constant: Individuals differ in their inclination toward an ethnocentric outlook—in part due to genetic variation and in part due to variation in the conditions that shape social learning. Differences in outlook, hardened with age, will be manifest in adulthood in opinions about public policy. But the weight that ethnocentrism exerts on opinion will vary, too, with the character and framing of the policy issue and with an individual's capacity and motivation to see connections between his or her orientations and government action.

In Chapter 3, the authors give operational life to their central concept. Those with an ethnocentric view of the world, Kinder and Kam argue, typically subscribe to negative stereotypes of social groups. Using data from the American National Election Studies and the General Social Survey, then, they gauge ethnocentrism from responses to a battery of questions, devised by Lawrence Bobo, about the qualities of whites, blacks, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans. Respondents rated each group on three scales—one anchored by "hardworking" and "lazy," one by "intelligent" and "unintelligent," and one by "trustworthy" and "untrustworthy." This chapter—supplemented by one appendix in the book and another on the publisher's Website—provides an uncommonly thorough explanation of why and how these items, plus the demographic items that characterize each respondent's own race and ethnicity, were combined to yield an omnibus measure of ethnocentrism. The authors also employ, as an alternative measure, a parallel assessment based on "feeling thermometers" that solicit evaluations of the same groups. Measured in these ways, ethnocentrism in the extreme is not the norm in the United States. Few Americans hold uniformly positive views of their own group and negative views of others. Most do, however, hold more positive views of their own group than of others. Most Americans, the authors conclude, maintain "a sense of perceptible but subtle superiority" (p. 57).

Kinder and Kam are careful to distinguish ethnocentrism, theoretically and empirically, from related and overlapping constructs. From their perspective, ethnocentrism differs from prejudice, for instance, in focus and scope. "Prejudice" refers to hostility toward a particular social group; "ethnocentrism" is a belief in the superiority of

one's own group over others. Ethnocentrism springs in part from authoritarianism, but only in small part; the two are only weakly correlated. Nor do the measures employed here merely repackage other fundamental political orientations: Ethnocentrism is virtually uncorrelated with party identification, ideological identification, social trust, and opinions about whether American government is bigger than it should be, and it is only weakly correlated with egalitarianism.

The remainder of *Us Against Them* demonstrates that ethnocentrism substantially shapes Americans' opinions about a wide variety of policies, above and beyond the elements typically used to explain Americans' policy preferences. Once again, both the analysis and the presentation are meticulous and expansive. Americans with an ethnocentric point of view are more likely to support increased federal spending on homeland security and border security, on national defense in general and on the war on terrorism in particular. They also were more likely to support the war in Iraq and to evaluate the presidency of George W. Bush favorably. The ethnocentric are less likely to support US assistance to other nations in general or to particular nations or foreign groups in need, and they are less favorably disposed toward immigrants to the United States.

Ethnocentrism's influence on Americans' opinions is not limited to the non-American or new Americans, however. The ethnocentric are less likely to support the rights of gay and lesbian Americans to marry, adopt, and serve in the military. They are less likely to approve of government spending on welfare and food stamps and more likely to approve of adding restrictions to programs designed to help poor Americans. And the ethnocentric are less likely to support government programs that help other racial and ethnic groups. As an indication of the magnitude of these effects, the authors report that the impact of ethnocentrism in general rivals—and often exceeds—the impact of partisanship.

While making a persuasive case for the influence of ethnocentrism on policy opinions, Kinder and Kam are also clear about the limits of that influence. They recount at length their search for effects on issues of special concern to women, finding very little. And they frequently note that a variety of other factors remain as influences on policy preferences, even after the impact of ethnocentrism has been taken into account. However, it might be easy to come away from the book with an exaggerated sense of the contribution of ethnocentrism to aggregate levels of support for particular government policies in the United States. Ethnocentrism promotes support for an aggressive approach to terrorism, for example, but the analysis here confirms that the *least* ethnocentric also tend to support more government spending on homeland security and border security, on national defense and the war on terror. Ethnocentrism promotes whites' opposition to welfare, but the least ethnocentric white Americans also typically oppose increases in government spending on welfare and food stamps, oppose increases to welfare benefits to women who have additional children, and support limits on the length of time an individual can receive welfare. The least ethnocentric also tend to disapprove of gay sex, teen sex, and extramarital sex, just as the most ethnocentric do.

Moreover, while the individual-level effects of ethnocentrism may often approach or exceed those of partisanship, the distribution of ethnocentrism differs considerably from the distribution of partisanship. Kinder and Kam find that a majority of Americans are neutral or very nearly so with regard to ethnocentrism; strong Democrats and Republicans are much more numerous than Americans at either extreme of the measures of ethnocentrism employed here. In the aggregate, then, the potential for ethnocentrism to divide Americans' policy preferences—and, to the extent that their preferences matter, government policy—may be somewhat limited.

Whatever the impact on policy, *Us Against Them* makes a powerful case for regarding ethnocentrism as an important source of Americans' preferences on a remarkable range of policy options. Its argument and evidence will require the attention of scholars interested in the roots of Americans' policy preferences (and its applicability outside the United States is sure to be an area for future research). The book will make a valuable addition to graduate and advanced undergraduate courses on public opinion and political psychology, not only as a source of knowledge about the fundamentals of American politics but also as a model of sophisticated analysis and lucid and lively presentation of first-rate social science.

Nationalization of American Political Parties, 1880–1896. By Daniel Klinghard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 280p. $95.00.

Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don't Kill the U.S. Constitutional System. By David R. Mayhew. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 240p. $29.95.
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— Robin Kolodny, *Temple University*

As "unintended" institutions, political parties present an analytical conundrum for political scientists, especially those concerned with American politics. While some recently authored constitutions of strong democracies acknowledge the role of political parties as a means for linkage between the polity and the state, the US Constitution is silent on the topic of political parties. Indeed, as we are frequently told, political parties were reviled by the Founding Fathers, relegated to the status of "factions" that inevitably cause "mischief." We are also quite familiar with the story of party emergence despite the best efforts of constitutional engineers to guarantee otherwise.