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*Consciousness as a Truth-organ considered, or, Contributions to Logical Psychology ; by the Rev. W. G. DAVIES, Chaplain of County Asylum, Abergavenny.*

## INTRODUCTION.

*Nature of these contributions.* What characterizes these contributions is that they are mainly of a logical nature. Placing ourselves on logic as a stand-point, we have endeavoured to take a comprehensive view of the domain around ; and have not rested satisfied with merely examining mental processes in their results, but from logic have penetrated wherever we could into the psychology of logic. The consequence has been that the logic and the psychology have not always harmonized. We have had occasion indeed in several cases to reject the ordinary doctrines of logical science, and modify them in such a manner as our psychological researches seemed to us to direct ; and we cannot conceive, though the contrary opinion is held by high authorities, that the laws of thought can be fully determined otherwise than by following the method we have here observed, that is, tracing every mental process to its source by a searching and exhaustive analysis. How far we have succeeded in carrying out this undertaking it is not for us to decide. All we dare hope is that we have done enough to justify our plan of inquiry ; and that we have contributed in however trifling a degree towards the advancement of that noblest of sciences—the science of mind, and especially that noblest portion of it which affords an answer to the long asked question :—What is Truth ?

*Necessity for such a Science.* Philosophers have rarely

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discussed high and difficult problems without eventually being forced back upon the fundamental question so clearly stated by Locke:—What is the human mind capable of knowing, and what not? We may as mystics arrogantly assume that the higher faculties have no limit to their capacity, and stand in need of no external aids—that in their lofty flights they leave psychological and logical laws in the clouds far beneath: we may form an exaggerated estimate of the deductive method with Descartes and the German philosophers, and assume that human reason is not dependent for its data on observation and experiment; and when such courses have brought us into a dreamy region of contradiction and unnaturalness, draw back dismayed, and flee into the contrary extreme of cloistral gloom and credulity, and preach the theory of human incompetency; or sceptically secure ourselves in the confined and dreary stronghold of pure sensationalism, and deny to the human mind half its powers, and those its best. But it is evident we must look for something better than this extremely digressive procedure, for in proportion as we deviate from the straight road of progress, in that proportion we are not advancing, though we may be undergoing the preparation necessary for it. And alas! there are too many, with whom the wish is the father of the thought, who are ready to urge from having to witness so much diversity—such bold advances followed by such humiliating retreats—that the true and the false, the good and the evil, are after all very much matters of taste—that there is indeed no absolute truth, no fixed standard of morality.

Now we have been led to believe from a long-continued examination of the matter, that these constant surgings from over confident to over fearful and credulous, or to over contracted and sceptical tendencies, are only possible so long as a true system of logical psychology is yet undiscovered or unrecognized, and that whatever contributes to this end, contributes also to the settlement of all those great questions, now so diversely viewed, entirely because the capacities of the human mind on which their settlement depends are not yet fully and clearly determined, and because those helps are not provided, without which, experience clearly testifies that we may in vain endeavour to find egress from darkness and confusion, to light, beauty, and order.

Some men regard a knowledge of logical science as of mere secondary importance, because, as they think, it can only describe mental processes which take place spontaneously

without requiring to be known ; and maintain that constant practice in reasoning is far preferable for strengthening the mind, to the most careful study of the theory of reasoning. Now there is just about the same amount of truth in this opinion as there would be in that of a savage who pleaded against cultivating the ground, because it produced spontaneously all the sustenance that he required of it. If on every subject men think aright spontaneously—without the external aid of rules or models—why all the perplexity and error which we have indicated in the preceding paragraphs? If they think erroneously on many subjects, and those the most important, why defend such a procedure? The truth is, as we shall have to shew more fully in another place, men reason correctly in a spontaneous manner in the elementary sciences, such as the mathematical only, and in the ordinary affairs of life. When they approach higher and more complicated questions, they require all the help they can obtain from a reflective knowledge of the mind's powers and laws.

The objection therefore, to the utility of this science, founded on the analogy, say, between the possibility of attaining excellence in dancing without the least acquaintance with the anatomy of the limbs, and the possibility of becoming a fine reasoner without being put to the disagreeableness of undergoing a course of Aldrich, presupposes that the two cases are precisely analogous: but are they analogous throughout—that is the question? The eagle and the lark may soar in company as far as the clouds, but there the eagle leaves the lark, and has to proceed on his sunward course all alone in his glory. Reasoning is analogous to dancing, in the point mentioned, as far as it develops itself *spontaneously*, but beyond this point the analogy ceases. Granted that Terpsichore has no occasion for being versed in bones, muscles and ligaments, is it equally true that those who are disputing about the method of acquiring the higher truths—according to Mr. Morell, Positivists, Individualists, and Traditionalists—have no need of a further instalment towards the solution of Locke's great question, but will spontaneously crawl along into the light somehow, never doubt?\*

*The physiological method.* Since the introduction of phrenology, great stress has been laid by physiologists on the opinion that no method of investigating mental phenomena

\* As to the objection that minds differ so widely, and that consequently no two minds view the same thing in the same light—if it be true, then there is an end of all science, that of the mind included, and we may at once endorse the lines of our Poet Laureate :—

is calculated to be successful but theirs. We believe the truth to be that no method is likely to succeed which does not acknowledge the physiological to be a necessary and important half. Indeed physiology appears to us to throw great light upon the science of mind; and such a science in its integrity it will be impossible to obtain without the co-operation of those who devote themselves to the study of the nervous system. But we must be careful to distinguish between what nervous physiology does for us, and what it does not. Its office, it is superfluous to state, is to assign to every mental function its organ, to describe each organ, and the laws which affect it; and how mental and cerebral states act upon each other &c.; but it cannot afford us a science of the functions. The function of the stomach, for example, stands in a very different category from that of any cerebral function. The *stomach* is not endowed with consciousness: the *mind* while conscious of other objects is self-conscious—is the observer, or is competent at least by a reflex process, to be the observer, of its own operations. This is the fact on which mental philosophers lay such emphasis when they declare that mental phenomena are not to be sought in the same manner as physical phenomena. In the one case the mind examines itself, which is a reflective process: in the other case it examines something else, and this last is its procedure when following the physiological method.

As to the method of observation on the actions of mankind for the ascertainment of mental functions, it is highly useful as far as it goes, but is not by itself sufficiently searching for the purpose of constructing a science of functions. Actions declare that such and such thoughts are in the mind of the actor. What thoughts? The thoughts that

Much less this dreamer, deaf and blind,  
 Named man, may hope some truth to find  
 That bears relation to the mind.  
 For every worm beneath the moon  
 Draws *different* threads, and late and soon  
 Spins, toiling out his own cocoon.

No one will deny that minds differ widely from each other, but then they resemble each other widely too, and that—which is the all important point—in the most necessary and fundamental attributes. The more necessary and fundamental an attribute of mind, (indeed of anything: it is a law of nature) the more extensively it is possessed, and the more permanent it is; but the less necessary and fundamental an attribute of mind the more uncertain is its possession, and the more changeable its nature. To contend that because minds differ there can be no mental science is on a par with maintaining that because no two blades of variegated grass can be found to resemble each other perfectly, they have not the least resemblance. This objection then we cannot but deem frivolous and unreasonable.

are in your own mind. Of what character are they? Consult the actions; they are as unintelligible as a book to an infant unless you possess the clue to them in yourself. Well you do possess it. Of what character then are the thoughts? Of such and such a character. But be more minute, give an exhaustive analysis—disclose the science of them: you cannot; you find that external observation cannot aid you, and that if you would know the innermost structure of thought you must examine long and searchingly the only specimen of which you possess a direct knowledge, and that is your own consciousness, for other men's thoughts you know indirectly only. In short you know nothing of another man's consciousness, except what you know of it, through the medium of your own.

But here it becomes necessary to concede that by the method of observation exclusively, it is possible to discover that a man has certain mental phenomena in excess of your own, or in a less degree than your own, or forming combinations different from those which yours usually do, and facts of that character. And such a method is indispensable when your object is, by the comparison of various minds, to ascertain how far they agree with, and differ from each other; and how men are most likely to act in certain circumstances; and the man proficient in such knowledge is said to be well versed in human nature; but it is evident that the *basis* of mental science must be laid by a purely psychological method, to which the method of observation bears about the same relation as history does to the philosophy of history, or sociology.\*

*The psychological method.* In the endeavour to obtain a scientific analysis of consciousness—to acquire a knowledge of those points which are common to all minds—external observation would distract rather than help. The psychologist's aim must be to discover the necessary and universal

\*By external observation we come to know the uniformities of human conduct: by reflection on our own consciousness, and by the study of psychology proper we become able to account for those uniformities, or become possessed of a knowledge of those laws from which we could deduce how men in certain circumstances would be most likely to act, and indeed how men in every circumstance ought to act. External observation can gather from past uniformities only what uniformities are *likely to occur* in future; but psychology can deduce from the laws of the mind how the coming generation can improve on the observances of the past one—can in short *anticipate* the approaching destiny of our race. The mere observer is apt to maintain that nothing *is*, or *is to come*, but that which *has been*: the psychologist cannot avoid inferring that the past and present experience of mankind, in relation to future experience, is but the boy who is to be the father of the man.

truths of the mental world, or the particular instances in which such truths pass from theory into reality. Well—universal truths—you exclaim—these demand for their establishment the very widest induction, consequently if you limit your observation to your own thoughts you cannot possibly procure the results for which you are seeking.

Now whether such truths can be established by a reflective examination of a single mind, or whether they involve a minute inspection of all history, and a wide observation of living characters, this is the question: its answer forms the cardinal principle of inductive logic. Can we then from reflection on our own mental phenomena—with the aid, of course, of the light afforded by the researches of philosophers in the same field †—get possession of those universal truths which constitute a science of the mind's operations? As an attempt to answer this all-important question, a question relating to scientific truth to whatever subject pertaining, we offer the following contributions, which will thus be seen to be an analysis of the intellectual faculties with a view of determining the true method of scientific inquiry.

We may now state another potent reason in favour of cultivating the psychological branch of mental science which is this:—The physiologist cannot assign an organ to a function, unless he knows sufficiently for the purpose what the function is. To possess this adequate acquaintance with the operations of the mind involves, as we think the sequel will prove, a much closer intimacy with the composition of consciousness than it is possible to acquire by mere outward observation. It is quite possible, for instance, for the empirical observer to consider a compound mental process as simple, and consequently to be incapable of establishing a correct system of organology.

The study of mental functions therefore by a reflective examination of them, this is the task we are endeavouring to accomplish. And we feel convinced that a thorough separation of the two cognate departments—the physiological and the psychological, is absolutely demanded in the cultivation of a science in which all we can hope to see accomplished by a mind short of superexcellent, is that it should succeed in shedding some degree of light on one only of those

† We here gratefully acknowledge our obligations to the labours of others in the field of psychology, more especially to the writings of the late Sir Wm. Hamilton, and those of Mr. J. S. Mill, writings of a very opposite character it is true, but on that account more edifying; but our deepest obligations are due, we must maintain, to our own consciousness.

departments. In the course of these investigations, then, we shall carefully abstain from trespassing on a department in which all our knowledge is superficial, and necessarily taken on trust. But while thus confining ourselves to our own field of inquiry, we beg leave to intimate, in deference to the valuable labours of our fellow-workers in the other field, that we have carefully sought from their discoveries as much light as we could obtain from them in the way of suggestion, and of checking our conclusions in our strictly psychological search.

*Vagueness of psychological descriptions.* There are many who regard the teachings of mental philosophers as extremely vague. Intellectual processes, as usually described, seem to the mind long trained in the school of physical philosophy to be almost unknowable. There can be no doubt that there are some men whose mental constitution is of so concrete a character, who by their peculiar habits of investigation find considerable difficulty in realizing as facts those which the internal world of mind exhibits to persons of a more reflective and abstract turn. And we are inclined to concede to the concrete philosophers that psychological doctrines have been exhibited to them in the most general terms—in a manner very dissimilar to what they have been accustomed in their respective sciences—and thus have come to them, even where there was little diversity of view among such doctrines to obstruct the acceptance of them, in a very airy and spectral shape. And we feel convinced that had mental philosophers been able to divide their general views into more particular and comprehensive parts, many points of disagreement would have been cleared up in the process, and many be found to accept their teaching who now will not comprehend it, or doubt its truth. Now whatever system of mental science the future has in store for us, we believe it must be one which will enumerate and describe each distinct faculty contained under the general terms hitherto rested in by psychologists. For instance, besides a general description of perception we must have analyzed for us minutely and fully the various perceptive faculties which such a term denotes. The same with all parts of the mind intellectual and emotional, an effort must be made to descend from the generals so much in vogue, to the particulars contained in them.

Since we have lamented the necessity which compelled mental philosophers to rest in the cloudy region of general description, we must expect to be asked what we

have done to redeem our observations from liability to be similarly regarded, especially since we have emphatically declined assigning to every function its organ, which would be giving it a local habitation, as well as a name, and would render it, some may think, a more appreciable fact to minds of a concrete conformation. But it is not at all likely that this result would follow surely and extensively, for it happens that between thought and its organic condition there is nothing in common which would help you to understand the one through the medium of the other. The mind can know itself only by contemplating itself *in action*. It may ponder over the structure of the brain and nerves, but it discovers in them nothing approaching to the nature of consciousness: it beholds merely its organic accompaniment, which is no more like mind than pain is like the point of the needle which inflicts it. We then study consciousness, as it only admits of being studied, in itself; and are, we believe, enabled to give it a distinct and specific character by exhibiting it in the *forms* in which it expresses itself in articulate language. Intellectual processes, when their spiritual essence is embodied in the forms in which they find their legitimate expression, will be found to be far more distinctive facts than they have hitherto seemed to those whose minds demand a material symbol to enable them to arise from the engrossing world of sense to a clear apprehension of the abstract, the ideal, and the remote.

#### PART I. SECTION I.

*What is consciousness?* Consciousness comprehends every cognitive act, it being that in which all intellectual operations resemble each other. It is the *summum genus* by which all cognitive acts are denoted.

Among such acts there are three which may be called originating acts, because all knowledge takes its commencement from one or the other of them. They are Perception, Conception, and Reason. Other operations, *such as* Memory, Association, Abstraction, Imagination, and Belief, presuppose these, and originate no ideas.

Reflection is the name of no separate Faculty, but merely expresses the act by which the originating powers become cognizant of mental phenomena. In their direct operation these faculties are the origin of all knowledge of objects\*: in their reflex operation they are the origin of all knowledge of the mind's direct or transitive agencies.

\* Whatever the mind is conscious of.



This being an inquiry into the structure of the mind from the logical point of view is concerned chiefly with the originating faculties. The remaining mental operations will be considered only so far as the main object of this inquiry renders such a step absolutely necessary. We shall proceed then in the first place to enumerate:—

*The conditions essential to the originating acts in common with other acts of consciousness.*

I. *A subject or ego.* In a cognitive operation we are not merely conscious of an object, but that the subject or *ego* is conscious of the object. We are constantly realizing our own individuality in every manifestation of consciousness, and without this constant possession of our subjectivity, our thoughts—if it were possible in such a case to have any—would be as much isolated from each other, as if each of them belonged to a separate person. We shall have to discuss this point again at greater length.

II. *Time.* Consciousness when once awakened must have some degree of permanence. Thought is so inconceivably rapid that it can only be realized in connexion with the track that it leaves behind it. This permanence of consciousness after its first flash into existence is memory.

A cognitive act, therefore, without memory to retain it would, from its velocity, be scarcely perceptible—a most rapid succession of most minute disconnected points, instead of an abiding breadth of surface.

But consciousness has no past; its time is a perpetual *now*. The past is thought of by means of a rapid and unbroken flow of ever present consciousness. The future has no existence, but in imagination, which out of past experience invents a time to come.

III. *Attention.* An act of thought, although it may exist in a rudimentary or *passive state* is not consummated until the cognitive power is concentrated on as much of an object as the mind can well embrace at one time. To what extent this power is possessed will have to be determined when we come to treat of the proposition. This concentration of the mental power upon an object by an act of the will, or perhaps some strong impulse, is attention.

We may observe by way of elucidating this point, that it is said that we sometimes have a sensation without being aware of it, as when a clock strikes in a room in which we are sitting, without our observing that it has struck. Now a sensation, in the sense in which we understand the word, must be either painful or pleasant, but

for us to have such a feeling without being conscious of it is what we cannot comprehend. But then *our* consciousness asserts that sound is not a sensation\*—a pleasing or painful feeling—but an unemotional phenomenon. All we can understand therefore in the instance of the clock striking without our being aware of it is this:—The usual effect is caused by the vibrating medium upon the organ of hearing, but it fails to awaken consciousness, because that has its force so much concentrated in a different quarter, that it leaves the organ of hearing in a state analogous to sleep.

But there is another explanation. The mind is capable of various degrees of exertion: it may regard an object carefully and minutely, or it may scarcely notice it at all.

In the first instance the mind concentrates the cognitive power on each point of the object in turn: in the second instance, though conscious of the existence of the object, it does not attend to any part of it in particular. There is then a marked distinction between consciousness when exerted, and when not exerted—between the *attentive* and the *inattentive* mood of mind. We dwell upon this obvious fact in order to prepare the way for stating that these two states of mind co-exist. While we can only well *attend* to one part or one quality of an object at a time, we are nevertheless *inattentively* conscious of its remaining parts or qualities. Or take what we may call the field of thought—although we can only attend to a limited portion of it at once, does it not seem that we are not wholly unconscious of the contiguous points; and that when we attend to them in their turn, it is because we were previously dimly cognizant of them? Every thought has other thoughts linked to it: when we bend the attention therefore to a particular idea, we may have at the same time a faint consciousness of those with which it is associated; and the ease and rapidity with which we pass from one thought to another is perhaps sufficiently

\* We are here anticipating a distinction which we shall be compelled to discuss rather fully as we proceed. We assert that sound is not a sensation, but we are well aware how ambiguous and misleading the term sensation is, and that some persons will insist that the reports of the senses are sensations. But they will insist also that pain and pleasure are sensations, that the disgust attending some tastes and scents, and the pleasure attending others are sensations, so that in fact they make the term sensation perform a variety of offices. Sometimes it has to stand for perception, sometimes for a phenomenon that has no emotion or feeling in its nature, sometimes for a phenomenon which is exclusively of that character. The reader will not be surprized then if we declare that we have almost as great a horror of the word sensation as Reid had of the word idea.

accounted for by saying, that we naturally pass from that portion of the field of thought to which the attention at any one moment is limited, to some other portion of it of which we were previously dimly cognizant.\* It is in sight that this fact is so clearly manifest, in which we only attend to what is in the axis of eye, but see more or less imperfectly the whole field of vision.

Although various faculties of the mind act simultaneously they do not usually attend to their respective objects at the same moment. We may be so engrossed with one deep thought, that we may be scarcely alive to the world around us. While the eye is attracted by fine colours and forms, the ear perhaps may be all but deaf to sounds. While the hand may be delighted with the smoothness of the mole's skin, the eye perhaps may be gazing vacantly into space. Thus it may be when we hear the clock striking, while that event fails to attract attention from something else in which the mind is lost, we may hear it, but only passively or in an indiscriminating manner. We hope we have now elucidated our meaning when we asserted, that an act of consciousness although it may exist in a rudimentary or passive state is not consummated till it becomes an act of attention.

IV. *An asserting force.* Intuitive consciousness when apprehending an object asserts, proclaims, or avers, its existence as possessed of such and such attributes, and that in such a manner that it cannot avoid doing so. Reason however raises questions as to the real nature of the *non ego*, namely as to whether it is in reality what it must invariably appear to be. Thus the rainbow appears to be external to us, and can only be realized in a *positive* sense as it thus appears. But it is *inferred* nevertheless to be a phenomenon of a subjective character. Here the intuitive assurance and the inference do not harmonize, and cannot be brought to do so. Intuitive consciousness or perception *must* continue to aver, after the inference is obtained, as it did before that event, that the rainbow is a distant object much greater in circumference than that of the retina multiplied, who shall say how many times? Reason on the other hand *must* as confidently pronounce that the rainbow, as we know it has, independently of us, no existence.

But in this want of harmony between intuition and reason,

\* Thoughts certainly crowd upon the mind at times faster than we can find the power to attend to them. The practiced speaker while his attention is engaged with the thought he is on the point of uttering, has nevertheless before his mind the thoughts which are immediately to follow

or the impossibility of either abating the asserting force of the other, we see nothing to deplore, but much to admire. Suppose for instance—while we take it for granted that we could not be made aware of the existence of extended objects at a distance but by means of some such mechanism as the eye—that before we had acquired any scientific knowledge of vision we felt confident that a visible object was external, but that after we had done so our assurance vanished, and intuition from that moment regarded what we saw as having no further connexion with the external world? Or that reason yielded to the asserting force of our intuitive assurance, and might as well be non-existent? Can you conceive a state of things to which the poet's words would apply with greater force and truth:—"Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise"? To be possessed of an organ which secures for us a fellowship with the world without, through the medium of a world within, which cannot be *positively* realized as internal, appears to us indeed to be a contrivance admirable in the extreme, and exhibiting the wisdom of the Creator as much as any thing within this cosmical sphere.

V. *Form*. Every cognitive act has a special form in which it expresses itself in speech. Form is that attribute of expressed thought which remains when the matter of a proposition is wholly abstracted, and symbols substituted for it. As we shall have to devote the whole of the second part of this inquiry to the examination of the forms of Perception and Conception, and a great portion of the third part to an examination of the forms of Reason, we shall here conclude our remarks on this head, and proceed to notice a very important condition peculiar to Perception, and that which renders it most strikingly distinct from every other kind of consciousness.

We must beg leave to call this condition—*biunity*, that being the term which most forcibly expresses the attribute which has now to engage your attention.

*Biunity a differential attribute of perception*. A perception is composed of two distinct elements, namely consciousness and an object—C+O. Abstract the object and the perception is destroyed as effectually as if you had abstracted the consciousness. The O element is indispensable to the biune fact C+O.

We use the term object in the most extensive sense, as equivalent to whatever we can be conscious of. We are conscious of two main classes of objects, namely, subjective—that which belongs to *self*; and objective, that which does

not belong to *self*. Subjective or self objects comprise sensibilities or emotions, and muscular actions.\* Objective or not-self objects are divisible into objective, and *quasi-objective*, or that which *is* † external and that which *seems* to be external.

But we derive another large and highly important class of objects from the reflex activity of the mind. And it seems, which is a fact demanding great attention, that before the mind has by a reflective procedure scrutinized its own processes, it knows nothing whatever of those processes more than is obtrusively patent in their results. Sir William Hamilton insists that there are "acts and affections of mind which, manifesting their existence in their effects, are themselves out of consciousness or *apperception*. The fact of such latent mental modifications is now established beyond all rational doubt, and on the supposition of their reality, we are able to solve various psychological phenomena otherwise inexplicable."‡ And, though philosophers for ages have assiduously sought to discover what it is that really takes place in spontaneous thought, the secret is yet but partly stolen from the mind.

It is in the presence of the object in the perception, and its absence from every other act of consciousness, that we behold the wide difference which there is between it and them; and that on which the universal assurance is grounded that what we perceive is different from what we remember or imagine.

The distinction between perception and memory, for example, if the above be a true description, is easily explained. Memory is the persistence of the C element after

\* We fail to discover in our own consciousness, that muscular action is made known to us as a sensation or emotion. We are cognizant of it as an unemotional object, *sui generis*, which cannot be expressed in simpler terms than muscular action or exertion, because not resolvable into anything else.

The fact that bodily exertion is delightful when muscular energy is in a state of high pressure, but painful when the same energy has become very weak, does not constitute it an object of the sensitive kind, more than the zest and eagerness with which the intellectual faculties work when fresh, and the difficulty and reluctance with which they work when jaded, places them in the category of the mental emotions or sentiments.

† Of course the sensationalists will object to this division, and maintain that for us nothing is external, but only appears to be. We shall endeavour to shew by and bye, that what appears to *intuitive consciousness* to be external, but is pronounced by *reason* to be internal, must be called *quasi-objective*; but that what appears to *intuitive consciousness* to be external, and is pronounced by *reason* to be in reality what it is apparently, must be called—if we are to distinguish in language what is clearly distinct in fact—objective or external.

‡ Sir W. Hamilton, Edition of Reid's *Works*, p. 551.

the O element has disappeared. Every recollected object is simply C: in no instance have we been able by any amount of effort to make a recollection or an imagination seem a perception or C + O.\*

Yet it is much easier to call up vivid thoughts of some objects than others. Visible objects it has been said possess this aptitude in a high degree. But to us by far the easiest objects to realize in thought are spoken words. Corresponding to the actual utterance of words, there is simply an ideal utterance of them. It is only the merest novice in reading who has to whisper his words when he does not desire to read audibly: almost every educated person peruses a page by a mental articulation of the words. And thus it is that all men, deaf mutes excepted, carry on a train of thought—they mentally speak their thoughts. Now even these objects, though more easily thought of than any others, are far from being in their mental what they are in their actual character. Who will say that a word spoken in thought is a faint attempt at speaking it in reality? this we are positive of—there is no audible sound, and no vibration of the articulating organs to cause such sound. The fact is the audible word is a *biune* fact: the other is not.

The objects most readily and vividly thought of are the unemotional—the objective, *quasi*-objective, and muscular actions (*e. g.* the muscular actions of the articulating organs.) The objects least apt to be realized in thought are the emotional. The reason for this seems to be that when the object of the perception is not a feeling, there is a larger endowment of the cognitive power, and that power has fuller scope for discriminating activity; but when the object is a feeling, there is a smaller amount of cognitive power, and the feeling is so engrossing that consciousness is in a mere passive condition, and does not re-act upon the feeling, and analyze it; and the stronger the feeling, the more unlikely is the mind to do this. But we are again anticipating a principle which can only be clearly discussed in its proper place.

*The two elements in sensible perception are quite distinct.* It is important to observe that in sensible or external perception the cognitive element is not a part of the object, nor that a part of the cognitive element. The cognition is not C + O, and the object especially is not a mere modification of C, or a combination of C with O. The cognitive element knows itself,

\* See Lewes' *Biographical History*, Library Edition, p. 449, and Bain on the *Senses and the Intellect*, p. 337.

as well as the object, and consequently is fully competent to declare which is which; it therefore confidently asserts that the fact of *knowing* the object does not constitute it either in whole or in part, *i. e.* the object is not a modification of consciousness, nor is it a combination of consciousness and something else; but a really distinct, second, element, essential to the very existence of the perception. This is, beyond doubt, what consciousness most emphatically avers. Compare an act of outward perception with an act of memory or imagination, and in the difference which you detect between them, how can you possibly avoid being made aware of the fact here insisted upon? Consciousness declares then that there is a *real*, and not an *apparent* distinction between the C and the O elements in the perception.\*

*Observations.* The object in the perception is known immediately in itself as a present object, and is the only object which exists as present to us.

Being known immediately the object is known as it *is*; but if you say it is not known as it *is*, but as it *is not*, then the *only* object for us is that which you know as something that the first *is not*; which is therefore for us no object at all.

Every object must in the first place be known immediately. If we know an object mediately, it must be through the resemblance which it bears to something which is already known. Thus according to the "ideal" or, as Sir Wm. Hamilton has named it, the Representationist theory of external perception, the mind possesses an *immediate* knowledge of the "idea" only, but can have no knowledge whatever of the external object except in so far as the "idea" is a copy of it, a fact which we have no possible means of ascertaining, as the sceptical philosophers have most triumphantly proved. But fortunately we do not know an external object through the medium of any thing representing it: we know it *immediately in itself as a present object, and as of a nature perfectly separate from the consciousness which apprehends its existence.*

*Relation of the object to the cognitive element of the perception.* It is to be noticed that the cognitive element reveals the existence of the object; *for us* therefore the object presupposes the cognition—Being presupposes knowing. Consciousness is therefore the *cause* of the existence of objects *ad nos*. Or to state the fact still more definitely

\* In some internal perceptions, we shall have to shew further on, that the object and cognition are confused.

—An object exists *for us*, as present, in the biune fact C + O only, and then exclusively through the intervention of the C element, or in any sense, only so far as it is known or thought of. Thus if we contemplate the world as existing independently of us, we are all the while regarding our own thoughts, which of course cannot exist out of the mind which conceives them. Being *for us* is either invariably linked to knowing, or is knowing simply. In the perception it is being + knowing: in memory, imagination, &c., it is simply knowing. Now the question naturally suggested by this doctrine is:—whether consciousness is competent to declare the independent reality of external objects. 1st, Is the object *really* non-egotistical in the perception; 2ndly, Can it exist out of the perception, or as O minus C?

But we think that if the question be put at all it ought to be more broadly stated. Instead of demanding whether external phenomena have a real and independent existence, it should be enquired whether *any* thing which consciousness reveals to us has any reality. We know that *subjective* phenomena have been pronounced far above the reach of scepticism; and that consequently the question as we put it will be deemed preposterously wide; whether it is so or not, perhaps, the following criticism will decide. But we strongly suspect that this is the only complete way of stating it; and thus expressed it carries with it *its own negative*; and the reason why this fact has escaped detection must be because the question has not been proposed in its full proportions.

All Being, including subjective Being, yea, and even that of consciousness itself, only exists *for us* in so far as consciousness, when asserting its existence, asserts truly. Push your inquiries to the very furthest point to which they can go, and you come to an asserting power, as the basis of all existence *ad nos*—yea, as the basis of its own existence.

Now if this asserting power is mendacious, a dark forbidding nihilism is the fearful result; if as is usually taught objectively mendacious, but not subjectively, a scarcely less forbidding idealism. But if this ultimate principle is veracious objectively as well as subjectively, the result is what the common sense of mankind, has, with certain admirable exceptions, led us to expect. Is consciousness veracious? We hope to be able to demonstrate in the proper place (after we have explored the province of Reason) that it is; but this is the dilemma: either it is *objectively* veracious, or we are altogether “the dupes of a perfidious Creator.”



Nihilism, or Realism—choose between them: you have no other choice. For convict the asserting principle of objective falsehood, then its character for subjective truthfulness is also lost. Absolute scepticism triumphs, and proclaims,

“ A life of nothings nothing worth.”

But we must guard also in another way against the abuses of this doctrine, and that is by proceeding to discuss the counter doctrine, which forms the natural antidote to its extravagant over-statements.

*Relation of the cognitive element in the perception to the object.* In the perception C+O, if O cannot be *known* to exist without C: on the other hand, C cannot *exist* without O, there could be no consciousness of a given object without that object to awaken it. But as two things cannot presuppose each other in the same sense, for the same thing cannot be the antecedent of another thing, and also its consequent, we must understand that being presupposes knowing in the order of knowledge, but that knowing presupposes being in the order of existence. From the first order springs idealism, from the second realism; which two doctrines are thus perceived to be quite compatible; halves in fact of the same grand system in which the idealistic half proclaims, that the realistic half must be accepted as its counterpoise. But this difficult subject demands all the light which our subsequent investigations may throw upon it, so we shall proceed to shew, that although the object only exists *for us* when *known*, that it must exist, if we are not aware of the contrary, when *unknown*.

We annex the above limitation because there are two classes of objects which differ widely in respect to what we are now inquiring about. Some objects as thoughts, emotions, muscular actions of a certain character, &c., only exist, while we are conscious of them. We know by the most conclusive evidence that these do *not* exist, but when they are perceived. There are other objects, however, which we feel assured have an existence, to which the fact of being known is not in the least essential. Reason cannot avoid concluding from what we perceive of *external* objects, that they have an existence perfectly out of relation to the *contingency* of being perceived by us. For example, first, being and (being+knowing) are distinct facts; for of the first, knowing is no necessary part, of the second it is for eliminate knowing, and you destroy the synthesis (being+knowing), the only being which there is *for us, but not the only being*. Secondly, if being for us pre-

supposes knowing, knowing presupposes being, if the object cannot be *known* to exist without consciousness; on the other hand consciousness cannot *exist*\* without the object: the object, consequently, except when we know the contrary *must* exist independently of us, seeing it *must be prior* in time to the consciousness which it awakens. In the bowels of yonder mountain may be hidden an immense store of iron and coal. If such be the case, it is not lying there unknown. And what about the gems which the "dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear," and the rose that blushes *unseen*, "and wastes its sweetness in the desert air?" Are they mere fictions of the poet? There is nothing in the nature of the external object that would lead us to infer that it cannot exist out of the perception, or apart from us, for it is strictly an *external* object in the perception. Consciousness exists apart from the object which aroused it—why cannot the object exist apart from the consciousness which *it aroused*? Remember, that which exists as a matter of fact, may not exist as a matter of necessity. Of course nothing exists without being open to the eyes of Him with whom we have to do—the Omniscient, but we must conclude that being almighty, He has the power to withdraw his mind from a given object, and that then that object would still exist, though absolutely unknown. The question to be decided is *not* whether any object *does* exist in an unknown condition, but whether it *is possible* for it so to exist? Reason concludes that it is possible, and that the world existed *ages* before man first trod on its surface and realized to himself its varied and wondrous existence. We infer then that we know a real object in the perception—that we know it as it is, or not at all—that we thus know an external object—that this external object must exist apart from perception, and that it then only differs from itself in the perception as *O minus C* differs from *O plus C*.

Having now stated, as far as we are acquainted with them, the general conditions of cognitive acts, and also a special

\* This is the declaration of consciousness. If you ask whether this deliverance is trustworthy, then you raise the further question is consciousness veracious. *Is* consciousness veracious, for every argument which we have advanced is worthless, except the integrity of consciousness is unassailable? We cannot avoid concluding, but this is not the place for stating our reasons, that consciousness *must* be pronounced thoroughly trustworthy, when the conditions of veracity are strictly fulfilled. But it is only when these are *most rigidly* complied with, that we can insist upon the thorough integrity of our intellectual nature. The replies which every tyro or loose thinker draws out from his consciousness, cannot, of course, be deemed infallible. Those replies only which are in strict accordance with the laws of consciousness as a truth organ can be pronounced beyond the reach of question.

condition of perception, the next step is to examine that faculty in detail. But here two courses present themselves; the one is to analyze perception according to the several classes of objects of which it takes note; the other according to the several varieties of its *forms*. Now the same form is common to more than one kind of perception, and consequently does not exhibit certain varieties of that faculty. If we would ascertain, therefore, what these are, we must analyze perception in relation to its objects. This then will be our endeavour in the next section. After that is done we shall have to examine it again relative to its *forms* in conjunction with conception, which faculty, unlike perception, has all *its* varieties exhibited by its forms alone. The same is true of reason.

(To be continued.)

*The Causes of Mental Disease, by DR. E. JARVIS, Massachusetts.*

The valuable report on the history and condition of the McLean Asylum for the Insane for the year 1858, derives a peculiar importance from the few pages which the Superintendent devotes to the causes of insanity, so far as they were developed and affected by the peculiar circumstances of the year, and were connected with the recent financial crisis and the religious excitements of that period. Dr. Tyler discourses wisely upon these matters, and gives admonitions which, were they heeded, would save many from mental disturbance and more from mental death.

To all things created and grown there are fixed laws and conditions of being and action. To every living organism, whether animal or vegetable, as equally to dead machinery and structures, there is assigned a definite purpose or function, which it is appointed to fulfil or discharge. If it be properly constructed, its parts or elements suitably arranged and harmonized, and all endowed with their due strength, each performs its own work, or bears its own burden. But neither their structure, nor their organization, nor their strength, will permit them to be applied to any other purpose, or to perform any other work, or to bear any other or greater burden, than those which are appointed for them,

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