

use institutional opportunities and claims making to influence it in the same way that political entrepreneurs work with other identities? If Muslim identity carries such weight in the authors' explanation of migrant mobilization in Western Europe, what does this imply about the role of Christian identity, whether in its secular or nonsecular form? Is religious identity a cultural superstructure limiting the extent to which the opportunity structures in a liberal democracy can alter behavior and shape immigrant integration patterns?

Evidence provided in Chapter 4 suggests that practical accommodations and corrective courses of action undertaken by the host state and society can even alter identity based on religious underpinnings, albeit over generations rather than months or years after policies are in place. The book points out that some of these host societies overcame their discriminatory biases toward their Jewish minorities after persecuting them for centuries. The fact that the UK has laws to prosecute people for blasphemy against Christianity but do not extend these laws to Islam (p. 157 and n. 8 in chap. 4) suggests some of the more civic territorially oriented and multiculturally tolerant liberal democracies have yet to dismantle discriminatory religious institutions. However, the critical case for hypotheses concerning the resilience and stability of religious identities in the liberal democracies of Western Europe might be France: Why in a state fitting the authors' universalist conception of citizenship do "mosques, minarets, and public calls to prayer readily become a public controversy and a French-style clash of cultures" (p. 156), but churches, steeples, and church bells do not?

The abovementioned issue notwithstanding, this book would add great value to graduate courses in comparative politics, political theory, and research methods. The authors engage major theoretical contributions on multiculturalism, social movements, immigrant politics, extremist politics, and immigration policy. They also explain links among theory, research design, data collection, and analysis clearly and effectively, and this will serve teachers well in helping students conceptualize original research. Using political claims analysis, the authors bridge the political-opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and framing strands of social movement theory and apply the derivative hypotheses effectively.

Opportunity models of collective action as conceived by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Douglas McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, Hanspeter Kriesi et al., and others have focused on institutions, structures, and processes *given* a well-formulated set of goals and grievances, but they have not explained how groups adopt particular political claims over others. The framing approach to social movements (by William Gamson, David Snow et al., David Snow and Robert Benford, for example) emphasized the constructed nature of collective identities and the significance of discursive strategies, but they did not systematically evaluate

why various discursive strategies succeed or fail. Ruud Koopmans et al. bridge these two strands of social movement theory by integrating discursive variables into a political opportunity model; they specify discursive and institutional variables by focusing on citizenship, national identity, and migrants in five Western European countries; they have systematically collected claims-making data and institutional information across time, and they use this information to test their hypotheses. In doing so, the authors not only advance our understanding of the emergence and success of social movements, but also provide a welcome example of how social scientists can design effective empirical analysis.

Dictating Development: How Europe Shaped the Global Periphery. By Jonathan Kriekhaus. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006. 244p. \$27.96.
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— David Howard Davis, *University of Toledo*

The purpose of this book is lofty: to understand the causes of economic development of the entire world. To be more specific, the study examines 91 countries outside Europe shaped by the colonial experience of the past 500 years. Kriekhaus looks at political science theories of ideology, bureaucracy, class, and education, as well as at economic theories of property rights and central policies. One of his first conclusions is that the settler counties of North America, the Cone of South America, and Australasia are far wealthier than the others. He goes on to examine the varying effects of different colonial powers, such as Portugal, Spain, France, or Britain, and whether the end of colonialism came in the nineteenth century or more recently.

Kriekhaus next analyzes data on the 91 countries using regression, finding in his optimal model for 1960 that income, health, education, property rights, and climate explain 65% of the variance (p. 67). In a disappointment for political scientists, he finds government policy less important. The author continues to examine the effects of colonialism, which contrary to much of the literature, are not strong. He describes the defensive modernization by Japan and, to a lesser extent, Thailand during the nineteenth century. Japan went on to colonize Korea and Taiwan.

The second half of the book has case studies of Mozambique, South Korea, and Brazil. He blames the failure of Mozambique on the Portuguese for exploiting agriculture, ignoring education, and blocking native leaders. War with South Africa was a further blow. The Korean chapter is remarkable in that Kriekhaus believes Japanese colonialism strengthened the government, fostered education, improved health, trained bureaucrats, encouraged native businesses, and constructed railways, hydroelectric dams, and industry. This contrasts with the conventional analysis that blasts the Japanese as ruthless exploiters. Brazil,

where Portuguese colonialism ended in 1822, did well economically until the 1980s, when barriers to international trade, combined with excessive borrowing led to hyperinflation and currency collapse.

In his grand analysis, Krieckhaus reaches several conclusions. He notes that the primary advice given to developing nations today is to liberalize their markets. They are urged to adopt free trade, privatize, deregulate, and reduce governmental spending. This is labeled the *Washington Consensus*. To the contrary, the author finds that these policies have no clear effect on growth. One conclusion he does reach is that countries can make policy mistakes, such as the Mozambican overvaluation of the exchange rate during the 1970s. He goes on to observe that many so-called mistakes are really the result of outside factors such as the oil crises or extremely high international interest rates. The worst outside factor is war. Overall, developing countries have less control over their fates than is commonly assumed. The industrial world could help in several ways. The first would be more foreign aid, and the second would be to reduce tariffs, especially against farm products.

Krieckhaus has several good insights about the effect of war as a statistical variable. Standard data sets often lack information. For example, the Penn World Tables omit Vietnam during the period of the war there. No one knows the figures for economic growth, life expectancy, primary school enrollment, and so forth. Common sense says that all these were harmed, but by how much? The lack of data means these negative factors are ignored. Iraq is another country missing information. Its war with Iran from 1980 to 1988, its unsuccessful invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War, and its invasion by the United States in 2003 all harmed the economy. But again, by how much?

Dictating Development has many good features. To paraphrase Lord Kelvin, unless you can measure something and express it in numbers, your knowledge is meager. Krieckhaus has certainly measured and expressed economic development in numbers. It is grand theory that can both inform and be debated by others willing to do similar statistical analysis. The author has agreed to make his data set available to other scholars for replication and testing. However, another researcher might use different starting dates or different factors and come up with different results.

The three case studies are a second good feature. Each ties the grand statistics of 91 countries to a single country. The cases consider elements such as government capacity, health, education, savings, and so forth in parallel. Unfortunately, modern publishing costs seem to dictate that scholarly books are limited to about 200 pages. This one would benefit from being twice as long with four or five more case studies. Finally, having the same author is a positive feature. Too often books of this sort are edited anthologies where the case studies by different authors do not mesh very well.

The Financing of Politics: Latin American and European Perspectives. Edited by Eduardo Posada-Carbó and Carlos Malamud. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2005. 266p. \$65.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.
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— Leslie Elliott Armijo, *Portland State University*

Edited books are never consistent across all chapters, but like this one, they can be fun. The book's organization is straightforward: a brief introduction, three increasingly specific theoretical chapters, and seven country case studies covering Latin Europe (Italy, Spain, and France), Britain, and South America (Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, and Uruguay).

The editors set out three big questions. *First*, how do political parties and candidates fund both ongoing activities and electoral campaigns? This question has multiple levels: What are the laws? Are they enforced? What are their results, in terms of both financial flows and political behaviors? The chapters on Europe principally explore the consequences of political financing patterns for government corruption, while the South American chapters map political financing in each country, either via a legislative and policy history of recent financing reforms, as in the selections on Chile (by Manuel Antonio Garretón) and Colombia (Fernando Cepeda Ulloa), or by illuminating critical twists in the money trail, as in the chapters on Venezuela (Diego Bautista Urbaneja) and Uruguay (Angel Eduardo Alvarez).

We have here tidbits for the connoisseur of political trivia, such as the claim by Justin Fisher that about 80% of spending by the British Conservative and Labour Parties is "routine" and in the nature of ongoing fixed costs not directly related to a general election, a funding pattern that creates a cash-flow problem, since voluntary donations reach their peak in the run-up to an election (pp. 116–17). There is also ample material for those in search of researchable theoretical hypotheses. For example, the discussions of Italy, by Véronique Pujas and Martin Rhodes, and Colombia, by Ulloa, suggest that cross-party power-sharing arrangements, once they become routinized, tend to institutionalize clientelism, graft, and kickbacks within the state. Those currently proposing power-sharing solutions to postconflict or highly polarized states may wish to note this plausible long-term consequence.

Second, what do private political contributors expect in return? Political contributors may simply support substantive policy positions, legitimately giving money to the candidate best embodying their preferences. Laurence Whitehead, erudite as always, observes that moral outrage at the existence of seepage between the formally impermeable spheres of money and politics would be naive. Of course, the wealthy invest in political access. We can acknowledge this reality, while nonetheless pursuing the promise of political equity implicit within