

genuine concern over development and supported the US initiative from the start. Nevertheless, in 1943 the Chinese minister of economy stated, 'neither plan gives sufficient consideration to the development of industrially weak nations' (quoted on p. 192).

Helleiner's revisionist approach constitutes a substantial contribution to the study of the foundations of the postwar economic order. 'Forgotten Foundations' seeks to demonstrate Latin America's agency in the design of the Bretton Woods system. However, Latin America hardly speaks for itself in the book. We look at the region mainly through US eyes. The research does not include Latin American Archives (except one in Brazil). The absence of Latin American primary sources is particularly felt in the chapters on the US missions to Cuba and Paraguay. The same applies to the lack of secondary sources produced by Latin American scholars (some of them available in English). Primary and secondary sources from Latin America could have provided much-needed information on US-Latin American relations at the time and could have contributed to reconstruct more fully the history of the events from the perspective of all protagonists.

To conclude, 'Forgotten Foundations' is, no doubt, an innovative and provocative book that those interested in the origins of the current global order should read. Like Helleiner's previous works, it would surely serve as an essential point of reference for any further discussion on this crucial issue.

*The Hebrew University of Jerusalem*

CLAUDIA KEDAR

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Christopher Darnton, *Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), pp. ix + 285, £29.00, pb.

This is an audacious book. Christopher Darnton seeks to understand the conditions under which state rivalries end given the existence of a common foe. The author explores long-term national rivalries in Cold War Latin America, focusing on how Communist threats, particularly through domestic subversion, induced *rapprochement* between states, such as between Argentina and Brazil (early 1980s), Argentina and Chile (mid-1980s), and Honduras and Nicaragua (early 1960s). After exploring why several International Relations theories fail to account for such developments, Darnton argues that 'parochial interests', coming from the military and foreign staffs, in their struggle for fiscal resources, prestige, and power within the state apparatus, had been the greatest stumbling blocks for the achievement of successful *rapprochements* in Latin America, disrupting presidential attempts to overcome rivalries. The author points out two conditions as sufficient (but not necessary) to subjugate 'vested interests' of the state bureaucracy: the existence of a common foe, allowing domestic agencies to take on new 'missions'; and a context of severe economic constraint, whose consequences (budget cuts) pressure agencies to substitute new for old 'missions' for the sake of keeping their relatively privileged positions within the state. Darnton also extends his argument to account for the maintenance of contemporary rivalries between Islamic countries (Algeria and Morocco), suggesting lessons to policy-makers engaged in coordinating multinational alliances against global *jihadism*.

Despite interesting and thoughtful insights on Latin American history, Darnton's book presents limitations, some of which, I fear, seriously compromise its findings. To

begin with, the author treats all rivalries and *rapprochements* as if they were the same, making encompassing (but problematic) generalisations. For example, the long-lasting geopolitical dispute between Argentina and Brazil, which had crucial impacts on South American development, is treated at the same level as those between medium and small Latin American countries, such as between Peru and Ecuador, or Honduras and Nicaragua. *Mutatis mutandis*, this is similar to comparing the causes of the First World War with, say, the roots of the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia. Even though the phenomena are presented under the same label ('rivalry' and 'war', respectively), their scope, actors and consequences are so different that, in fact, they constitute separate issues. This is not to argue that historical comparisons should be avoided, following Michael Oakeshott's *dictum* that 'when comparison begins, as a method of generalisation, history ends', but they ought to be undertaken with caution.

Second, although Darnton acknowledges that his model is not the only one capable of accounting for *rapprochements*, all cases analysed (nine in total) are explained solely by his theory, giving the impression he has jumped too swiftly to his conclusions. It is true Darnton has presented reasons for why realist, constructivist, and liberal approaches do not sufficiently account for rivalry maintenance or termination for each case, but he does that in a rather mechanical and superficial way. At no time does he consider the possibility of complex interaction effects among different variables and hypotheses, to say nothing of potential indeterminacy. On the other hand, when discussing evidence supportive of 'parochial interests', Darnton frequently makes inferences that go beyond his sources. In the supposed attempt by Presidents Jânio Quadros and Arturo Frondizi to overcome rivalry between Argentina and Brazil in the early 1960s, he quotes Brazilian cables from Buenos Aires showing how Frondizi's political power was constrained by the military, mainly due to the president's stand on Cuba (pp. 78–80). However, the words of the Brazilian Ambassador do not seem to allow the conclusion that the Argentine military was constraining Frondizi due to 'parochial interests'. On the contrary, the cables suggest that the main reason was actually ideological issues, largely the strong anti-Communist bias of Argentina's Armed Forces. Another example refers to the presupposition that national leaders genuinely wanted *rapprochement*, being blocked by 'vested interests'. Even if it were plausible to assume that 'leaders might focus on national problems while agencies focus on parochial interest' (p. 34), this should have been grounded empirically, which was frequently not the case (see, for instance, pages 53, 62, and 68).

Indeed, the book's main limitation seems to be empirical. Darnton has done a tremendous job in collecting primary and secondary sources about different national rivalries. But the bold scope of the study, from Cold War Latin America to contemporary Islamic conflicts, prevented the author from pursuing comprehensive field work. This becomes clear if one analyses the core of the book, the understanding of Argentina-Brazil's rivalry and *rapprochement* through four presidential summits (1946, 1961, 1972, and 1980). Darnton employs mainly Brazilian diplomatic sources to look into the 1946 and 1961 meetings (as Argentine documents are too thin), and Argentine official sources to analyse the 1972 and 1980 presidential talks (as Brazilian papers are still classified). Although it is important to look at the two sides of the story to make claims, this is not an impediment *per se* if several conditions are met, particularly if one cross-references different sources to smooth the tendency of diplomatic accounts for partiality. This is why many specialists in Latin American history employ third-country official sources, mainly US documents, to get a

broader picture. In fact, Darnton does the same, but he consulted only those US sources published by the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series, which is insufficient, as FRUS represent a minority of US documents available. Similarly, the author supports several claims grounded solely on policy-makers' memoirs (see, for instance, the figure on 'Chilean subversive threat' based on Augusto Pinochet's accounts, p. 157). Given that autobiographies and memoirs tend to be highly selective and partial in the presentation of facts, they should never be used in isolation to support claims.

To sum up, Darnton's audacity in trying to deal with many different and complex cases of state rivalry and *rapprochement* in Cold War Latin America constitutes the book's source of both strength and weakness. His book does provide interesting insights, but they should be taken more carefully than Darnton suggests.

*Institute of International Relations*  
*University of São Paulo*

FELIPE PEREIRA LOUREIRO

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Steve Ellner (ed.), *Latin America's Radical Left: Challenges and Complexities of Political Power in the Twenty-First Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), pp. xiv + 291, £18.95, pb.

The chapters of *Latin America's Radical Left* celebrate the governments led by Presidents Rafael Correa of Ecuador (2007–present), Evo Morales of Bolivia (2005–present) and begun by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (1998–present). These governments, Ellner and his collaborators suggest, deepen democracy as they pursue, to cite Orlando Núñez (a Nicaraguan Marxist), 'a "post-neoliberal or post-capitalist struggle" against women's inequality and patriarchy, racial and ethnic discrimination, and the degradation of the environment (p. 29).' The most important strength of these chapters is that they help identify the central characteristics of radical left regimes. Yet, this celebration of radical left governments should have been accompanied by answering questions about why citizens have voted for these regimes, about whether these governments can use the commodities boom to promote development, and about the political status of one-party systems.

Key chapters analyse issues of concern to political activists of the Latin American left. Steve Ellner contributes an introduction that rejects Jorge Castañeda's ('Latin America's Left Turn', *Foreign Affairs*, 85: 3 (May/June 2006), pp. 28–43) distinction between the responsible left of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay and the populist left of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Like most of his fellow authors, he decries this dichotomy for being simplistic. Supporters, critics, or (mere) analysts of these regimes can profitably read Ellner's introduction, along with the chapters by Roger Burbach, Diana Raby and George Ciccariello-Maher because they pinpoint the radical left's distinguishing traits. Two of these strike me as central. First, unlike Cuba in 1959 or Nicaragua in 1979, insurgent parties of the left won control of the state through the ballot box. Furthermore, unlike Allende's electoral coalition in Chile in 1970, radical left parties won undeniable mandates for change; in most cases, they have attracted the support of more than half of all voters in presidential and legislative elections.

Second, these authors also emphasise the strategic implications of the absence of a single revolutionary actor behind these movements; radical left regimes do not