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Lessons in International Communication: Carr, Angell and Lippmann on human nature, public opinion and leadership

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Abstract. The sub-field of International Communication within International Relations is insufficiently cognisant of the social foundations of communication. Through a selective interpretation of three prominent interwar thinkers' works, it will be argued that International Communication is a largely social, even ideological, field. The advantage of reading interwar international theory lies in their eclectic appreciation of the power of public opinion and leadership without undue fixation with realist and idealist labels. By reading Edward Carr, Norman Angell and Walter Lippmann, one can tease out the following three themes for organising the study of International Communication: human nature assumptions; opinion as power; and leadership in foreign policy in terms of public education.

While the last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a renewal of interest in the impact of electronic media on International Relations (IR), the sub-field of International Communication has yet to extend its potential. 'Hate radio' certainly contributed to genocides in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Satellite television, subsumed under the label 'the CNN effect', was hotly debated as a technological generator of the political will behind humanitarian intervention across borders. The emergence of non-state actor activism on the international stage has also amplified interest in their means of power projection. The iterated choruses of anti-capitalist protests at intergovernmental summits of the WTO, IMF, World Bank and the Group of Eight suggest that movements of conscience are enhanced through Internet-based mobilisation and the constitution of alternative sites of expertise. The ongoing War on Terror, stemming from the episode of the 11 September 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington DC, has set in motion a struggle for the hearts and minds of 'the Arab Street' via Al Jazeera television, CNN, the Internet, videotaped statements, video camera and mobile phone images. In response,

* I wish to acknowledge the valuable comments provided by the three anonymous reviewers of this article. Incidentally, my interest in Carr and Angell had been stimulated by Peter Wilson and Erica Benner years ago at the LSE postgraduate seminars on 'Concepts and Methods in IR'. Lippmann's contributions were subsequently discovered in the course of my inquiry into soft power in foreign policy: *Foreign Policy in Global Information Space: Actualizing Soft Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Generous funding for research into this article had been provided by a grant from the National University of Singapore during 2004–5 (R-108-000-017-112). Additionally, Elaine Tan, Jet Teong and Chuin Song have been invaluable research assistants during the course of the writing of this piece.

Ronald Deibert has argued that IR ought to consider decentred political narratives.[1] Piers Robinson argues that 'the CNN effect' ought to be demystified towards a more cautious policy-media interaction framework.[2] Others address the impact of the electronically mediated climate of transparency on the conventional boundaries of IR. The latter avenues collectively suggest implications for speeding up world politics, information battlespace dominance and the two-way flows of social capital intertwining domestic and international politics.[3] While these amount to important interim attempts to feel the 'elephant' of a distinct sub-field of International Communication, they are also alienated from the social foundations of IR as a whole.

The latter can be remedied if one revisits the contemporary foundations of IR as a formal discipline taught and researched in universities and institutes. Brian Schmidt has already shown that the scholarly roots of IR predate the investiture of the pioneering Chair of International Politics at the University College of Wales in Aberystwyth in 1919.[4] Nonetheless, one must not neglect the co-location of the contemporary origins of communications within IR. As Martin Wight has noted, the identity of a cognate body of inquiry into 'the international' began with philosophy, ethics and the powers of the state. The lineage of thought extended as far back as the medieval era.[5] Yet the formalisation of IR only occurred after the shock of the world's first industrialised war in 1914–18 involving direct psychological and military attacks on the belligerents' hitherto secure home fronts.

In the run-up to the conflagration of 1914, the implications of mass society, exploitative capitalism, industrialised technology and interdependence had not been sufficiently developed in the public mind. As Norman Angell and Edward Carr have warned, exclusive and romantic nineteenth century nationalisms could not be morally and logically aligned with liberal democracy under the new conditions of the early twentieth century. Collectivised and manipulated by unreflective elites, nations of men were governed by states heading for collisions with one another in the name of survival and prosperity.

Technological progress amplified this disjuncture during and after the First World War without enlightened guidance towards understanding interdependence. Guglielmo Marconi had demonstrated radio as an instrument of long-distance broadcast by 1901. By 1914, it had found entertainment, propaganda and espionage utilities, reaching its zenith of political manipulation in the hands of fascist leaders in Germany, Italy and Japan in the interwar period. The USSR too could not have consolidated 'socialism in one country' without the aid of radio and film. The British Empire was itself a veritable demonstration of how a hub-and-spoke arrangement of telegraphic junctions enabled superior military communications against its rivals. The industrialisation of newspaper production furthermore created possibilities for

[1] Ronald Deibert, *Parchment, Printing and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), ch. 8.

[2] Piers Robinson, *The CNN Effect: the Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention* (London: Routledge, 2002).

[3] See Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord (eds.), *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency* (New York: Macmillan, 2000) and Robert Latham (ed.), *Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship between Information Technology and Security* (New York: The New Press, 2003).

[4] Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998).

[5] Martin Wight, 'Why is there no International Theory?', in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 17–34.

the excitation of 'war fever' among working classes and elites alike. Concomitantly, cinema and mass printing of books extended the boundaries of 'imagined community' beyond political geography. On the eve of World War II, television was already undergoing trials in Britain and Germany, and a glimpse of the future was being offered by the invention of computing and cryptographic machines.

The medium of technology could not have been neutral in relation to the augmentation, or distortion, of the power and ethics of the state. Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Mill could not have fully appreciated technology as the author of new forms of mass power. Neither could the pre-theorists of Political Science of the likes of Charles Beard, James Bryce, Elihu Root and Robert Lansing.[6] This article makes the case that the interwar thinkers can be read as significant contributors to the field of International Communication by arguing that communications between nation-states are a largely social issue. These thinkers possess the advantages of appreciating the sociological context of technology-facilitated mass politics while enjoying the benefit of borrowing wisdom from classical political thinkers. International Communication emerges as a hybrid study of the 'political technology' of mass opinion across national borders. Since one can only do so much within the confines of an article, I propose to interpret the works of Edward Hallett Carr, Norman Angell and Walter Lippmann. Although a comparison of the three authors is not a primary focus, the secondary comparative treatment of the ideas attributed to the three would be inevitable as it is in the manner of pioneering research.

The selection of these writers is justified on three grounds. Firstly, among interwar theorists, they are most extensively preoccupied with the 'power' of public opinion as a force in international politics. The historical context inevitably influenced them. The Peace of Versailles in 1919 represented the uneasy culmination of the clash of politicised public passions over the preceding five years of conflict. Mass armies and mass slaughter on the western front became amplified into populist diplomacy at the negotiating table. Allied presidents, prime ministers and their associates were intent upon playing up to opinion at home as a lever for negotiating a punitive peace against the German and Austro-Hungarian aggressors. Even Woodrow Wilson had been compelled to accommodate his 'Fourteen Points' to his European allies. Larry Adams, a notable Lippmann biographer, observed that the effects of World War I were sobering for Liberal intellectuals and other progressive thinkers: 'war portended the flight of reason from social affairs'.[7] For Norman Angell, his was a lifelong crusade to convince humanity of the futility of war. For him the starting block was the conversion of minds away from economic and militaristic nationalism. His mission of publicity began around 1903 with the publication of *Patriotism under Three Flags*, followed by *Europe's Optical Illusion* in 1909.[8] It reached a zenith with multiple reprints of his next highly publicised work, *The Great Illusion*, on the eve of World War I, and throughout the interwar years.[9] Edward Carr was likewise politicised both by the same war and his stint with the British Foreign Office during the marathon negotiations at Versailles and diplomatic appointments thereafter. His appointment as the Wilson Chair of International Politics at the University of Wales

[6] Schmidt, *Discourse of Anarchy*, ch. 3.
[7] Larry L. Adams, *Walter Lippmann* (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1977), p. 95.
[8] Norman Angell, *Europe's Optical Illusion* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 1909).
[9] J. D. B. Miller, *Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind* (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 4–11.

at Aberystwyth opened avenues for him to address papers and books at policymakers on correcting errors, as he saw it, of foreign policy.[10]

Secondly, Carr, Angell and Lippmann represent a sample of the variety in interwar International Relations writing, broadly capturing the controversial realist versus idealist debate. In conventional understanding, Carr and Lippmann square up in one corner defending realism, while Angell occupies the corner of idealism. However as Peter Wilson has noted, the insufficiency of scholarship on what exactly defines interwar idealism 'has contributed to the tendency to equate interwar idealism with a range of not necessarily compatible things: espousal of world government; pacifism; assertion of the need for an international police force; belief in progress and the efficacy of the ''world court of public opinion''; commitment to the League of Nations and collective security; appeasement; disarmament . . . and confidence in the pacific propensities of growing interdependence.'[11] Lucian Ashworth has even observed that up till the late 1930s, both realism and idealism were 'hurled as very anti-intellectual insults'.[12]

Carr has been criticised for associating everything he opposed in interwar diplomacy under the negative label of 'utopianism'. Yet in some other parts of his corpus of writings, he adduces statements of moral unease at articulating a defence of realism.[13] Reflecting in 1980, two years before his death, Carr revealed that his ideological outlook had been animated by a quest for the application of liberalism in both domestic and international affairs. The lessons of 1914–18 for the western world ought to have been those of 'the wickedness and futility of war.'[14] With his Foreign Office delegation marginalised by the horse trading conducted at Versailles among the Allied Powers, Carr was 'outraged by French intransigence and by our unfairness to the Germans, whom we cheated over the ''Fourteen Points'' and subjected to every petty humiliation.'[15] His liberal principles led him to approve of Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 as 'a rectification of an old injustice' even though he subsequently recanted his acceptance of Hitler after the annexation of Austria in 1938.[16] Ashamed of the 'harsh ''realism'' of *The 20 Years Crisis*', Carr sought refuge 'in utopian visions of a new world after the war; after all, it was on the basis of such visions that a lot of real constructive work was done.'[17] Thereafter, Carr's subsequent ruminations on the post-1945 international order took on a liberal internationalist turn. If Carr represented the contingent nature of interwar realism, Angell's own thoughts in *Peace with the Dictators?* on the eve of World War II, sought to accommodate power realities through a scheme of reliable collective security:

[10] Charles Jones, *E. H. Carr and International Relations: a Duty to Lie* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 22–30.
[11] Peter Wilson, 'Introduction: The Twenty Years' Crisis and the Category of ''Idealism'' in International Relations', in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 8.
[12] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Where are the Idealists in Interwar International Relations?', *Review of International Studies*, 32 (2006), p. 294.
[13] Peter Wilson, 'Radicalism for a Conservative Purpose: The Peculiar Realism of E. H. Carr', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30 (2001), pp. 123–36; Jones, *E. H. Carr and International Relations*, pp. 144–63.
[14] E. H. Carr, 'An Autobiography', in Michael Cox (ed.), *E. H. Carr: a Critical Appraisal*, with foreword by John Carr (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p. xv.
[15] Ibid., p. xvi.
[16] Ibid., p. xix.
[17] Ibid.

> The obstacles must be overcome and those nations which value freedom must combine, make of their potential power a single unit, a unification arising from the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. But that unification of power must not be for the purpose of maintaining a situation which crystallises inequality of right; it must offer to those against whom it arms the same rights of independence, freedom, peace, economic opportunity, which it is formed to defend.[18]

Similarly, Lippmann's realism tended to exhibit features akin to a square peg unable to fit a round hole. Lippmann had openly evolved from being an early twentieth century Progressive intellectual to one respecting the obstinate realities of power possession. For instance, in a series of candid interviews in 1960–61, Lippmann criticised the American Cold War effort as one that ought to have supported political neutrality in the Third World over a policy of installing bases and advisors. Military stability merely needed to be sustained on the grand strategic level of nuclear and conventional arms balancing. Interventions on the peripheries of the central balance were redundant so long as Soviet forces were not directly engaged.[19] Yet in the interwar years, Lippmann had argued that the US, like every nation-state with explicit national interests, ought to expand its military presence commensurately with its worldwide interests. Under the shadow of the German threat against the highways of the Atlantic world, the British and American fleets should act naturally in concert to thwart Germany. Upon wider reflection, one can reasonably argue that the permanent core of *Lippmannist* thought lay in the provision of justifiable reasons for communitarian survival. In his survey of Lippmann's international thought, Anwar Hussain Syed has in fact supplied an apt characterisation of 'contingent realism' that resonates equally with the chameleon political thought of Carr and Angell:

> . . . in Lippmann's theory of the balance of power one must concede that there may be at least a modicum of reason in the position of the adversary. One's own side does not necessarily have a monopoly of truth and justice.[20]

This is a sufficiently sound basis for inquiring into international communication through interwar debates.

Thirdly, this article intends to build on a relatively underexploited research agenda.[21] According to media theorist Hamid Mowlana,[22] an International Communication agenda comprises four dimensions. In the first, there is the

[18] Norman Angell, *Peace with the Dictators? A Symposium and Some Conclusions* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938), p. 327.

[19] Interviews between Lippmann and Howard K. Smith, 11 August 1960 and 15 June 1961 in *Conversations with Walter Lippmann*, transcribed with the cooperation of the Columbia Broadcasting System, with introduction by Edward Weeks (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 1–70.

[20] *Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 344.

[21] For a sample, see George Gerbner and Marsha Siefert (eds.), *World Communications: A Handbook* (New York: Longman, 1984); Hamid Mowlana, *Global Communication in Transition: The End of Diversity?* (California: Sage Publications, 1996), pp. x–xiv; Stephen D. McDowell, 'Theory and Research in International Communication: A Historical and Institutional Account', in William B. Gudykunst and Bella Mody (eds.), *Handbook of International and Intercultural Communication*, 2nd edn. (California: Sage, 2002), pp. 295–308; Thomas L. Jacobson, and Won Yong Jang, 'Media, War, Peace and Global Civil Society', in William B. Gudykunst and Bella Mody (eds.), *Handbook of International and Intercultural Communication*, 2nd edn. (California: Sage, 2002), pp. 343–58; Thomas L. McPhail, *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

[22] Hamid Mowlana, *Global Information and World Communication: New Frontiers in International Relations*, 2nd edn. (California: Sage, 1997), pp. 6–7.

'idealistic-humanistic approach' that comprehends international communication as 'a means of bringing nations and peoples together and as a power to assist international organizations in the exercise of their services to the world community'.[23] This opens up the prospects of reading international communication as a policy-relevant field. The second dimension perceives international communication as the study of the efficacy of propaganda, ideology, advertising and most recently, 'image-making as international public relations'. This again claims policy relevance on the basis of producing prescriptions for manipulating audiences for foreign policy agendas. The recent manifestation of this is in the form of the earlier-mentioned scholarship focusing upon the CNN effect. The third dimension locates international communication as the study of the international political economy of news flows, information technology transfer and implementation, as well as the communications dimension of that much-debated process, modernisation. The fourth dimension, which overlaps with the third, is to view 'information as political power' of constructing communities, controlling popular discourses, mindsets and agenda-setting means. Clearly, Carr, Angell and Lippmann are not easily pigeonholed under any of the four conceptions of the field of International Communication. However, as this article will attempt to show, they contribute a basis for treating international communication seriously as a social and ideological subject. In keeping with the first, second and fourth dimensions of Mowlana's schema, the following readings will illuminate a holistic normative role of communication in either the pacification, or antagonistic exacerbation, of tensions between modern nation-states.

Drawing upon these justifications for the joint and comparative study of these three thinkers, one can tease out the following three themes for organising the rest of this article: human nature assumptions; opinion as power; and leadership as public education. These will become more apparent once the analysis gets underway. These themes would collectively posit that International Communication is best studied from the angle of holistic politics – it has a pre-theory of human behaviour, comprehension of the problem of power over minds, and broad strategic prescriptions of wielding leadership as the agency for public education in thinking intelligently about politics.

Human nature assumptions

Carr's assumptions of human nature are closely associated with his understanding of politics as a coordination of morality and power. To him 'the *homo politicus* who pursues nothing but power is as unreal a myth as the *homo economicus* who pursues nothing but gain.'[24] Men after all naturally desire to exist in groups and hence all social science attempts to study man as an isolated subject are bound to be 'purely theoretical'. In Carr's bifurcated view, man's existence within a group can manifest either egoistically or reciprocally in positive community. Egoism would imply 'assert[ing] himself at the expense of others'. At all other times he is willing to subordinate himself to a common good and 'enter into reciprocal relations of goodwill and friendship' with others. Carr noted that membership of a social group

[23] Mowlana, *Global Information and World Communication*, p. 6.
[24] Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939/1995), p. 92.

could be voluntary, or in its modern context of the state, it could be coerced participation. From these observations, Carr derives his ambivalent realism. On one hand, it would be erroneous to presuppose that man could be completely altruistic in politics. On the other hand, a belief that man was immutably 'self-seeking' would also be 'just as wide off the mark.'[25] Hence

> . . . the attempt to keep God and Caesar in watertight compartments runs too much athwart the deep-seated desire of the human mind to reduce its view of the world to some kind of moral order. We are not in the long run satisfied to believe that what is politically good is morally bad; and since we can neither moralize power nor expel power from politics, we are faced with a dilemma which cannot be completely resolved. The planes of utopia and of reality never coincide. The ideal cannot be institutionalized, nor the institution idealized.[26]

It is thus difficult for democracy in the liberal sense to gain compatibility with the restlessness of human nature. Since the mid-1800s, the growth of economic power induced its holders to actively intervene as actors within the arena of political decision-making. Furthermore, 'mass' democracy through the enfranchisement of salaried but propertyless workers consolidated for the latter a stake in the survival of the capitalist state. Exercising democratic rights required a reinterpretation of democracy in economic terms of equality and liberty.[27] Carr believed that the Weberian and international legal state is a 'necessary fiction'[28] enabling compromise between the democracy of wealth-owners and the have-nots. Likewise, foreign policy must pay heed to 'the art of persuasion' pioneered by the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages to propound normative principles for social conduct.

Norman Angell derives his account of human nature psychologically and accepts the existence of an internally conflicting duality in the human condition. His problematic of peace and war centres upon 'what one school of psychologists have termed ''the masculine protest'', the instinct or desire for power, for being in a position to impose our will upon the other party in any operation that we may have to undertake together. Never do we exchange the position of master for that of partner so long as we feel that we can maintain the mastership and achieve what we want by it.'[29] In decision-making behaviour, the preference for mastership is evident but the motivations are less clear. 'If we are masters we do not have to discuss, persuade, debate, adjust, restrain impatience, as we do when we are merely equal partners; we have only to command', Angell deduced.[30] Mankind is then not predisposed to the mental activity of thinking, which is harder to perform, as opposed to 'the masculine protest'. Through socialisation in schools and other mass institutions the individual has learnt to restrain the impulse towards domination within one's local community:

> [b]ut as a nation we permit ourselves lusts and orgies we should never dream of as individuals. The brag which every nationalist indulges about his country – its might, its glory, its wealth, power, virtue beyond all others, its right to be 'above all others', to display an egoism that becomes 'sacred'; to assert its claims 'right or wrong' – all this savagery and

[25] Ibid., p. 92.
[26] Ibid., pp. 94–5.
[27] Carr, *The Conditions of Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 14–28.
[28] Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 137.
[29] Norman Angell, *The Unseen Assassins* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1932/1935), p. 175.
[30] Ibid., p. 176.

immoralism expressed in the attitude of an individual would banish him from decent society. Expressed on behalf of a national herd it is merely patriotism.[31]

The rush to arms in both World Wars is diagnosed as the inadequacy of discussion of self-evident knowledge applied in appreciation of interdependence and superior morality. Human beings need not subscribe to 'the great illusion' of war for national gain for a consciously self-preserving humanity does not will its own deprivation. The common man can access general truths in the manner of his studied preference for sanitary hygiene.[32] Public discussion would allow all ideological causes to air their positions. In such a democracy, 'on balance, the advantage is on the side of toleration'.[33] Angell was nostalgic for the possibilities of overcoming colossal hatreds in the manner of the European achievement of religious toleration through the treaties of Augsburg, Westphalia and so forth.[34] Quoting Voltaire and Mill approvingly, he regarded the foolish and unreasonable natures of men as something rectifiable by making him listen to the 'impudence' of the critic and developing thought in response.[35] Human nature grows wisdom as a result.

Lippmann, like Angell, draws upon the pre-existing work of psychologists to assign a partially given human nature to man the social animal. From psychology, man is shown to possess passions for acquisition, hate, violence, love and spirituality. These are varied capacities for both good and bad, and hence it is difficult to predict the behaviour of an individual and singular 'self'. In actuality, many selves operate on the basis of having 'a common stem and common qualities, but the branches and the twigs have many forms.'[36] Which self or character operates 'varies in some degree through the sheer influence of time and accumulating memory, since he is not an automaton. His character varies, not only in time, but according to circumstance.'[37] There is no doubt that men know and pursue their interests all the time but it should be deducible that '[t]he craving and the action are both learned, and in another generation might be learned differently.'[38] In this sense, human nature, understood as the flourishing of circumstantially vented passions, can be constructively channelled. The test of rightfully-ordered politics should lie firstly in whether or not they are against human nature; and secondly

> [i]nstead of tabooing our impulses, we must redirect them. Instead of trying to crush badness we must turn the power behind it to good account. The assumption is that every lust is capable of some civilized expression.
>
> We say, in effect, that evil is a way by which desire expresses itself . . . To us they are the energies of the soul, neither good nor bad in themselves. Like dynamite, they are capable of all sorts of uses, and it is the business of civilization, through the family and the school, religion, art, science, and all institutions, to transmute these energies into fine values. Behind evil there is power, and it is folly, – wasting and disappointing folly, – to ignore this power because it has found an evil issue.[39]

[31] Ibid., p. 177.
[32] *The Great Illusion 1933* (London: William Heinemann, 1934), p. 14.
[33] Angell, 'Freedom of Discussion in War Time', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 78 (1918), p. 195.
[34] Angell, *Europe's Optical Illusion*, pp. 121–6.
[35] Angell, *Why Freedom Matters* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1940), pp. 72–3.
[36] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1922/1960), p. 172.
[37] Ibid., p. 172.
[38] Ibid., p. 189.
[39] Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Politics* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press and Ambassador Books, Canada, 1914/1962), pp. 42–3.

Lippmann fervently believed that humankind could find positive moral outlets in politics for good ends. This was compatible with his adherence to the Progressive Liberalism of early twentieth century America. If boys' gangs are a social menace constituting a problem for policing, it is wiser to transform their energies into the Boy Scouts, and 'a really constructive reform [would be] given the world.'[40] He argued from personal observation that dissent within democratic contestation should be 'domesticated' and guided purposefully for greater inclusiveness between propertied groups and salaried workers.[41] Likewise, national feelings do not possess inherently belligerent attributes inhibiting peaceful coexistence. The challenge posed by modernisation to mankind is to figure out the normative structures of the world that are socialising him:

> Modern man is not yet settled in his world. It is strange to him, terrifying, alluring, and incomprehensibly big. The evidence is everywhere: the amusements of the big city; the jokes that pass for jokes; the blare that stands for beauty; . . . the feeble and apologetic pulpits, the cruel standards of success . . . We are blown hither and thither like litter before the wind. Our days are lumps of undigested experience.[42]

Two distinct themes emerge from the preceding extracts of interwar writing. Pure human nature of the egoistic and domineering forms is a given. But these base characteristics can be improved through human existence in group contexts. This is where the second theme of human nature within the modernising patterns of nationalism and interdependence registers itself. Lippmann's words depict a modernising world that is complex, manufactured and insufficiently understood by base human nature. This is where Carr's pessimism about reconciling utopia and reality in the affairs of men finds similarity. Angell likewise argued that war need not be a natural condition of human nature. The impulse of human nature can be checked by open deliberations of contradictory viewpoints in an era of interdependence. Ultimately, all three argue that self-centred human nature can be rectified as a fundamental step towards world peace. Trying to pitch a realist against an idealist is beside the point. Taken together, all three theorists argue that without comprehending the social ideational bases of human enmity, war and peace in IR cannot be tackled via opinion manipulation.

Opinion as power

When it came to transforming vision into policy, Carr, Angell and Lippmann were no strangers to propaganda. Propaganda here refers to that whole range of means by which a political cause is reinforced and the number of its adherents increased through conversion. Lippmann's immersion in journalism has been well documented and his tracts on public opinion were intended to improve opinion in the service of democracy. Jonathan Haslam has written of Carr as an accomplished propagandist for himself once he was freed of diplomatic duties in 1936.[43] BBC broadcasts,

[40] Ibid., p. 43.
[41] Heinz Eulau, 'Man against Himself: Walter Lippmann's Years of Doubt', *American Quarterly*, 4 (1952), pp. 293–4.
[42] Reproduced from Lippmann's column in the *New Republic*, in Eulau, 'Man against Himself', p. 300.
[43] Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr 1892–1982* (London: Verso, 1999), pp. 58–64.

editorial columns, memorandums and books followed. Angell earned his position in IR by arguing against the train of militarism in the early twentieth century. Following publicity and acclaim for *The Great Illusion*, a number of Angellist peace societies sprung up in Britain, Germany and elsewhere in the Western world. His admirers subsequently mounted a campaign to have him awarded the Nobel Peace prize. Angell's lecture tours in Britain, the US and Germany added to his stature. Furthermore, his strategic reiteration of the theme of 'illusion' had enlarged his reputation as a prophet disabusing errant peoples of their sinful ways. For all three thinkers, power concerning opinion could be depicted in two facets: strategy and content.

Carr's most elaborate discourse on propaganda began by posing a historical lesson on strategy: if the Sultan of Egypt and Emperor of Rome drove their harmless subjects against their innate inclinations, in the manner befitting 'brute beasts', then their armies and militias must have been led 'like men by their opinions'.[44] The power over opinion is all the more salient with the advent of mass politics in the context of industrialised, populous nation-states with 'conscript citizen arm[ies]'. Democracies needed to operate on the basis of heeding public opinion while 'totalitarian states set a standard and enforce conformity to it'.[45] However, in reality neither type of ideological state are poles apart since public opinion generates the need for it to be directed or moulded. Furthermore, the importance of power over opinion must be explained hand in glove with the conditions of industrial civilisation. Capitalism, involving the bulk of the population in specialised labour within extended assembly lines, created the parallel logic of communicating to the population and pandering to its stereotypical tastes. Reinforcing this was the need for every nation-state to subject its young people *en masse* to 'universal popular education' in order to staff the production lines as well as deliver affluent consumers for the very markets the factories supply to. The advertising industry is thus part and parcel of the development of the radio, film and the popular press whether they are for serious information or pure entertainment. Carr foresaw the end of 'the old liberal conception' of spontaneous formation of public opinion.

Unsurprisingly, the modern development of propaganda, frequently associated with its widespread use in World War I, was a natural instrument for any nation-state wishing to pursue its national interests at home and abroad. Carr singled out Soviet Russia in particular for introducing propaganda as a systematic instrument of international relations since communism proclaimed itself as a gospel of universal truth. Furthermore, this was supplemented by the reputed strength of the Red Army. In his discussion of whether there might exist a distinction between national and international propaganda, Carr was ambivalent, suggesting that the distinction was made illusory as early as the French Revolution of 1789, or during the nineteenth-century British campaign to encourage the practice of free trade. Carr noted that in all these cases propaganda enjoyed the prospect of success because there was a national power, whether it was Russia, France or Britain, which put the weight of national prestige and other resources behind it.[46] Conversely, the League of Nations displayed a chequered performance in arresting international tensions because it

[44] Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 120.
[45] Ibid., p. 121.
[46] Ibid., pp. 125–6.

lacked the consistent backing of the Great Powers of the day. In reflection, Carr concluded that '[i]nternational propaganda for Fascism was an instrument of the national policy of certain states, and grew with the growth of the military and economic power of those states'[47] – with clear reference to Germany, Italy and Japan. While this may always be held out as examples of the far-reaching potential of conquering minds overseas, 'the most expert advertiser could not sell a face cream made of vitriol.'[48] In an age of competitive propaganda, there will exist 'this danger that ''truth will out'' ' as German soldiers in the trenches of World War I discovered.

This last comment was totally consistent with the revisionist interpretation of Carr as a 'peculiar realist'[49] acutely conscious of the limitations of pure power politics even as he was advocating it aloud in the course of analysing international problems. Credibility is also critical ballast for propaganda. In concluding his discourse on the power over opinion, he opined:

> The fact that national propaganda everywhere so eagerly cloaks itself in ideologies of a professedly international character proves the existence of an international stock of common ideas, however limited and however weakly held, to which appeal can be made. . . . This stock of common ideas is what we mean by international morality.[50]

Carr was obsessed with conveying the strategic possibilities of propaganda. He was reluctant to allow his readers to get ahead of reality by debating international morality in itself. In a lecture on 'Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace' in 1936, he warned that intellectual leadership of public opinion belonged 'to the world of prophecy, not to the world of politics.'[51] Yet, by the time World War II ended, Carr was attempting geopolitical prediction, as we shall see in the next section.

By contrast, Angell was more consistently concerned with the use of propaganda as a tool for enlightening minds against the penchant for nationalism and military solutions to international tensions. Unlike Carr, Angell fuses strategy and content in treating propaganda, political decisions and human nature within 'the Public Mind, the collective decisions of democracy.'[52] War and peace between nation-states hinge upon how the constituents of democratic politics – the John Smiths on the street – wish to engage questions of foreign affairs in an intelligent manner. Yet observation suggests that these are matters for 'a ''spare-time'' attention. The immense majority of voters are obliged to give most of their attention and energy to the not very easy job of earning a living.'[53] John Smith is rarely trained to think politically or philosophically. His is the training of a trade, or a profession. Therefore public policy and international affairs 'must be made for the most part on the basis of headlines in the newspapers, gulped hurriedly with the morning coffee, or of casual talk in the train . . .'[54] This quality of opinion is far from the manifestation of public opinion as the 'voice of God'. Anticipating triumphalism from sceptics of democracy, Angell argues that dictatorship is no better as a model of circumventing the 'voice of the

[47] Ibid., p. 127.
[48] Ibid., p. 129.
[49] Wilson, 'The Peculiar Realism of E. H. Carr', see n.13. Carr himself admitted to this ambivalence in his posthumously published reflection 'An Autobiography', in Michael Cox (ed.), *E. H. Carr: a Critical Appraisal* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. xviii-xix.
[50] Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 130.
[51] Carr, 'Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace', *International Affairs*, 15 (1936), p. 854.
[52] Angell, *The Public Mind. Its Disorders: Its Exploitation* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1927), p. 171.
[53] Ibid., p. 6.
[54] Ibid., p. 6.

people'. Ironically, dictators rely on the consolidation of the support of powerful sections of the public to keep the rest in check. Instead of dismissing public opinion as irretrievably nefarious or superficial, Angell sets out four points for treating the public mind:

1. That the 'natural' tendencies of popular judgment are extremely unreliable and faulty;
2. That there is, however, in the long run, no alternative to popular judgment as the basis of government;
3. That we can, by the right social disciplines and educational processes – things which are not 'natural' at all, but highly artificial – correct and guide the natural tendencies, but only
4. If we recognise clearly the necessity of so doing.[55]

To educate John Smith about politics and foreign affairs indeed acknowledges the permanent tension between the inevitability of the 'voice of the people' and its tendency towards caprice and ignorance. Borrowing heavily from John Stuart Mill and Voltaire, Angell believed that man should be made to realise that his natural tendency towards folly was best corrected by reason cultivated through 'the discipline of hearing contrary opinion'. Conversely, the trial of reason revolves around 'the right of the heretic to state his heresy, the obligation of the orthodox to listen to the heretic'.[56] Furthermore, Mill's exhortation to the greatness of mental exertion was quoted verbatim: 'Never, when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings.'[57]

John Smith could not be expected to rival the portfolios of scientists and professors but he should be socialised in the qualities of judging social and political conduct: speculation; argument via 'logic' and 'method'; and 'other-mindedness'.[58] For their part, the experts ought to diminish technical jargon in discourses of knowledge. 'Philosophy ought to be a thing of the market-place to guide the lives of all of us'[59] and the ordinary citizen should cultivate the bases of scrutinising the reports of 'experts' from the vantage point of knowing his normative goals. The public could therefore be safeguarded against the propaganda of 'bad' causes and whipped into war lust in the pattern of World War I. Deliberated truth is the best propaganda. In a significantly Kantian moment, Angell related the tragic story of a certain Father Cassidy, clergyman of Polksville, USA, who refused on grounds of universalistic conscience to participate in an orgy of symbolic anti-German fervour at the height of the war. Put on trial by the Polksville Patriotic League, Father Cassidy became a vehicle for relating another story of injustice that mirrored his circumstances. A hapless civilian was lynched in his own town by all of his fellow townsfolk on the mere suspicion of being culturally associated in the public mind with German atrocities in Belgian villages which included gross violations of young women. Father Cassidy revealed that this act of vengeful death by torture had been perpetrated by

[55] Ibid., p. 172.
[56] Angell, *Why Freedom Matters*, p. 72.
[57] Mill quoted in Angell, *The Public Mind*, p. 162.
[58] Ibid., p. 204.
[59] Ibid., p. 205.

Americans in heartland USA rather than on the frontlines in Europe! Furthermore, his fellow Americans could be accused on the same standard of 'burning Negroes for supposed rape' and 'flogging of clergymen for supposed pacifism'. Father Cassidy concluded his defence by asking his jury to ponder the difference between vengeance and justice. Father Cassidy was spared a lynching on the strength of his defence, but a fellow clergyman reported his inadequate patriotism immediately to higher authorities. This ultimately resulted in a prison term of ten years.[60] Nevertheless, Angell insisted that truth-telling would be ideal propaganda for international peace if the public mind(s) were prepared sufficiently, for

> if each side told the whole truth, instead of a part of it, these atrocities would help us towards an understanding of this complex nature of ours. But we never do tell the whole truth. Always in war-time [and other international tensions] each side leaves out two things essential to the truth: the good done by the enemy and the evil done by ourselves.[61]

Lippmann, on his part, equally appreciated the importance of public opinion within the context of the possibilities of directing human agency within the context of mass society precipitated by modern communications. In an early application of constructivism, he declared that what is termed 'public affairs' is a social conception of the behaviour of other human beings in relation to each particular individual in terms of the latter's subjective perception of that relationship's impact, causality and so on. Hence

> [t]he pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship, are their public opinions. Those pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters.[62]

The space for symbolic realignments within the three vertices of this triangular definition of public opinion offers rich possibilities for manipulation through dependence upon experts, or from the perspective of individual autonomy and its freedom of expression. Lippmann sees the interference of experts arising in the form of

> artificial censorships, the limitations of social contact, the comparatively meagre time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs, the distortion arising because events have to be compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small vocabulary express a complicated world, and finally a fear of facing those facts which would seem to threaten the established routine of men's lives.[63]

In the present time, media theorists would attribute all these distortions under the label of 'framing' message origins, transmissions and receptions. Due to this assumption, Lippmann's perspectives never completely trusted the orthodoxy of democratic theory, believing instead that in all manner of politics, successful attainment of goals could never be achieved without the assistance of experts. Yet, as the intellectual trajectory of various aspects of his writings showed, he was consistently ambivalent about the sincerity of leadership provided by public opinion. Early on, he rubbished the steering role of public opinion in *The Phantom Public*

[60] Ibid., pp. 112–23.
[61] Ibid., p. 109.
[62] Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, p. 29.
[63] Ibid., p. 30.

(1925),[64] and in his most specific study of the mechanics of public opinion formation published in 1922, he disdained the intellectual impatience of the American public in colourful language:

> Most of the frictions between two states involve a series of obscure and long-winded contentions, occasionally on the frontier, but far more often in regions about which school geographies have supplied no precise ideas. In Czechoslovakia America is regarded as the Liberator; in American newspaper paragraphs and musical comedy, in American conversation by and large, it has never been finally settled whether the country we liberated is Czechoslovakia or Jugoslovakia [sic!].
>
> In foreign affairs the incidence of policy is for a very long time confined to an unseen environment. *Nothing that happens out there is felt to be wholly real*. And so, because in the ante-bellum period, nobody has to fight and nobody has to pay, governments go along according to their lights without much reference to their people.[65]

Yet this was the same Lippmann who commented during World War II that the true test of an acceptable foreign policy would be that of popular approval, because the public cannot be cajoled or admonished into spilling blood and treasure for compelling foreign policy ends.[66] By 1944, when pondering *US War Aims* for a new world order, he lamented that with immense foreign responsibilities thrust upon the nascent superpower, America's leaders and teachers remained products of nineteenth century 'isolationism and laissez-faire individualism'. These pre-existing elites had 'exempted men from public thought and public effort'.[67] The geopolitical challenges of waging war, and the postwar economic reconstruction that would follow, demanded the skill and self-confidence of a great power. By the time Lippmann published his second most elaborate statement on democratic theory in 1955,[68] he had qualified his scathing commentary on the ignorance of public opinion during the interwar years and World War II:

> When the world wars came, the people of the liberal democracies could not be aroused to the exertions and the sacrifices of the struggle until they had been frightened by the opening disasters, had been incited to passionate hatred, and had become intoxicated with unlimited hope. . . . As a result of this impassioned nonsense public opinion became so envenomed that the people would not countenance a workable peace; they were against any public man who showed 'any tenderness for the Hun' . . .[69]

One is tempted to charge Lippmann with inconsistency of thought. But the possibility also exists of ameliorating Lippmann's inconsistency by placing him in the context of an intellectual grappling with the transition to a more democratic foreign policymaking climate between 1914 and 1945. Two unprecedented 'total wars' had occurred within an era of integrated capitalism and technological warfare of mass destructive capabilities. Populations behind the frontlines had been either victimised by bombing, or mobilised to deliver long range destructive power. Lippmann was writing about trends as rapidly as he was learning from them.[70] In 1944, he could

[64] *The Phantom Public* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925).
[65] Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, p. 241. Italics mine.
[66] Syed, *Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics*, p. 47.
[67] Walter Lippmann, *U.S. War Aims* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1944), p. 127.
[68] Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown in association with the Atlantic Monthly Press, 1955) was actually conceived in 1938 and might have been published earlier had war not broken out in 1939. See Adams, *Walter Lippmann*, p. 152.
[69] Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, p. 21.
[70] Adams, *Walter Lippmann*, ch. 2.

foresee the triumph of the Western liberal democracies against their fascist foes, with the exception of the former's erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. He interpreted the Soviet Union's political ideology and system through American lenses, and in particular, through his more nuanced endearment to public opinion and transparency in foreign policy decision-making. He concluded that neither genuine consultation nor peaceful relations with Moscow could be possible 'if all the governments which wield force are not publicly accountable to their peoples and to the opinions of the world. The world order cannot be half democratic and half totalitarian.'[71] Conversely, in the post-1945 new world order, should the Western liberal democracies decide to use their ideals collectively as standard setters in an embryonic world society, it would create a positive demonstration effect upon Soviet observance of human rights and democratic freedoms, since Moscow's adherence to its own constitution would be held to account by opinions abroad. This was Lippmann's tentative understanding of American soft power. Ultimately, for Lippmann, the road towards a communicational approach to forming a pacific world society lies in raising the awareness indices of national public opinions gradually towards communion with ever-widening circles of community. International society can only be built upon common principles accessible to human beings who accept that they 'are mere mortals with limited power and little universal wisdom'. As a goal of international communication:

> We shall collaborate best with other nations if we start with the homely fact that their families and their homes, their villages and lands, their countries and their own ways, their altars, their flags, and their hearths – not charters, covenants, blueprints and generalities – are what men live for and will, if it is necessary, die for.[72]

Opinion as international power has been assigned significant weight in international cause-and-effect by the interwar theorists. In their separate ways, they were each concerned with the popular reactions to the prospect of war. Carr chose to steer clear of dealing with the content of normative propaganda. His discourse focused on the strategy of propaganda as a logical extension of mass society and factors pertaining to wars between large industrialised populations. If necessary, propaganda could substitute itself for gospel truth and universal morality. Angell fused strategy and content of propaganda. For him, the normative goal of world peace conditioned the strategy of achieving it – essentially the humanistic devices of democratic argument, educating the public mind for discernment; and truth-telling. Righteous propaganda should lead human mentalities towards appreciating otherness. Lippmann too appreciated the possibilities of conditioning public opinion for pacific international ends. But he was ambivalent towards leadership by public opinion. Like Carr, Lippmann was more concerned with reading the temper of public opinion as it pertained to national strategy. Only in his later writings did Lippmann take a more cosmopolitan turn. Clearly among the three, Angell offers the most thorough social analysis of propaganda while Carr and Lippmann focussed on strategy over content.

[71] Lippmann, *U.S. War Aims*, p. 91.
[72] Ibid., pp. 112–13.

Leadership as public education

Implicit in their treatment of human nature and public opinion thus far is a common desire among the three thinkers for leadership to ameliorate excesses in communication. In a series of lectures on the idea of history that was published as a book under the provocative title *What is History?* in 1961, Carr sustained a theme which he had continually raised in the interwar years – namely that

> [h]istory begins when men begin to think of the passage of time in terms not of natural processes – the cycle of the seasons, the human life-span – but of a series of specific events in which men are consciously involved and which they can consciously influence. . . . History is the long struggle of man, by the exercise of his reason, to understand his environment and to act upon it.[73]

This formulation clearly echoed his narrative of events between 1934 and 1939 in which the pace of the gathering political storm in Europe was largely dictated by Hitler's manoeuvrings.[74] His definition of leadership privileged human agency and articulated implicit faith in constructing structure and agency. In this way, Carr predates the IR debates on constructivism sparked off by Nicholas Onuf and Alexander Wendt since the late 1980s.

Throughout his pronouncements on public opinion in the *Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr has always reminded his audience that the equipment of the political leader necessarily includes the 'arts of persuasion'. By locating his understanding of public opinion within the context of mass politics within twentieth century industrialised states, it is no surprise that the masses can neither lead nor follow as a corporate unity, unless leaders, constituting an elite, script propaganda for followership. This is as relevant for foreign policy leadership at home, as well as abroad. In the interests of constructing a positive new world order following the lessons of 1914–1939, Carr warned:

> . . . a new international order and a new international harmony can be built up only on the basis of an ascendancy which is generally accepted as tolerant and unoppressive or, at any rate, as preferable to any practicable alternative. To create these conditions is the moral task of the ascendant Power or Powers. . . . *Belief in the desirability of seeking the consent of the governed by methods other than those of coercion* has in fact played a larger part in the British and American than in the German or Japanese administration of subject territories.[75]

This moral task, embedded in the leadership for a benign new world order, ought to be implemented through the recognition that international authority had to substitute the 'service state' for the 'night-watchman state'. The *Carrean* service state was exemplified by the signatories of both the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter who had pledged themselves to secure the world against the recurrence of aggression from the Axis Powers as well as to foster stable conditions for 'prosper thy neighbour' foreign policies. His rendering of the night-watchman state as a vehicle beckoning further improvement stands as a fanciful extrapolation of Lockean liberalism. But it was Marxist-influenced social amelioration that he was after. To Carr, the night-watchman state was an invention of the bourgeois nationalists who

[73] Carr, *What is History?* (London: Macmillan 1961/1986), p. 129.
[74] Carr, *International Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan, 1959). First published in 1937 under the title *International Relations since the Peace Treaties*.
[75] Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 217. Italics mine.

desired protection for their private property. In this sense, bourgeois political rights gave them a literal 'stake in the country' whereas 'the worker had, in this sense, no fatherland.'[76] In discussing the prospects of internationalism, the Carr of 1945 placed socio-political inclusion on the agenda. He warned that the concentration of all authority in 'a single central organ means an intolerable and unmitigated totalitarianism: local loyalties, as well as loyalties to institutions, professions and groups must find their place in any healthy society.'[77] Likewise, stable international community should reconcile recognition of diverse authorities, loyalties and interests while addressing the problem of power through a system of 'pooled security' guaranteed by 'standing international forces made up of different national units.' He envisaged the relegation of the role of collective defence by like-minded states to a common body, and an upgrading of priorities that 'seek by active policies to improve the conditions of life of ordinary men and women in all countries.'[78] By 1945, power appeared inadequate to win a durable peace. It had to be cloaked with a social agency manifested as an international authority dedicated to the improvement of living standards everywhere. To avoid a repeat of fascist war, Carr advocated a leadership that could 'command the assent and loyalty' of the world's peoples.[79] One might suspect Carr the peculiar realist for having plagiarised David Mitrany's functionalist argument of the early 1940s. But he has dismissed functionalism for misrepresenting the persistence of power and nationalism.[80] Instead, he approved of Progressive Liberal historian Carl Becker's more limited suggestion of an evolutionary internationalism that induced limited interstate cooperation while not offending 'the pride of sovereignty'. In Becker's view, national power can only be curbed when it is 'imperceptibly abated'.[81]

Angell's ideas on leadership and public education are proximate to Carr's in terms of their belief in the potentials of human agency for a pacific purpose. He differs only in terms of his faith in the triumph of international peace through the embrace of moral reasoning by the public, as opposed to elite monopolies of knowledge. The earlier sections of this article have already noted that the face of the public – a.k.a. 'John Smith' – has been blocked from perceiving the rational path to international comity through the built-in biases of elite-organised socialisation. Angell therefore assigned 'the learned folk' their share of the burdens of leadership for peace, especially since it is they, the politicians, poets, professors, journalists and historians, who had in the first place inculcated the public mind with patriotism, nationalism and imperialism as well as other unquestioned obligations to the state.[82] The labour of learned folk must apply

> at the right place and the learning directed to the right ends. It is certain that the mere accumulation of 'knowledge' in the sense of learning facts, is no more wisdom than a train-load of bricks is a habitable house; and that merely to go on cluttering the ground with bricks if one has no notion of how to build the house, or whether even one wants a house, is not the way to secure shelter for mankind.[83]

[76] Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945), p. 10.
[77] Ibid., p. 49.
[78] Ibid., p. 61.
[79] Ibid., pp. 61–2.
[80] Ibid., pp. 50–1.
[81] Becker's, *How New will the Better World Be?* (1944) quoted in Carr, *Nationalism and After*, p. 50.
[82] Angell, *The Unseen Assassins*, p. 186.
[83] Ibid., pp. 67–8.

If elites should apply their energies to developing considered schemes for cosmopolitanism, newspaper owners and journalists would do well to shun demagogy in the channels of communication. One deadly capitalist evil allied to demagogy is the pressure for profits. Angell warned media professionals against falling prey to the Gresham Law of sensationalist reporting and the substitution of rationality with excitable passion.[84] For Angell, journalism 'must become a profession demanding a certain minimum of intellectual equipment'. He quotes Walter Lippmann approvingly on the meaning of media leadership:

> Just because news is complex and slippery, good reporting required the exercise of the highest of the scientific virtues. They are the habits of ascribing no more credibility to a statement than it warrants, a nice sense of the probabilities, and a keen understanding of the quantitative importance of particular facts.[85]

To encourage public opinion to articulate pacifist foreign policies, Angell further suggests re-engineering the syllabi of schools:

> Go to the histories, the text-books, in current use in the schools of Europe and America; note the attitude towards nationalism and patriotism. Is this necessary warning as to the dangerous ways in which patriotism may develop stressed? The exactly contrary thing is done. One of the features which gives to nationalism its danger is precisely the feature which is hidden; the quality most dangerous is developed. That quality is its one-sidedness, its astigmatism; the fact that it refuses to recognise in others the rights that it claims for itself; refuses to regard those others as on the same plane as itself.[86]

Leadership is thoroughly democratised. It is both lateral and vertical in the sense of perceiving rationally the dynamics that produce collisions and collaborations between societies. Learned folk and the masses need to co-construct their mutual division of 'knowledge labour' for discerning the moral good. Hence all 'doctrines, theories, parties are means' to the presumed end of politics – welfare. One can find such an end regardless of the location of one's nation-state in time and space, and this can be a basis for cooperative endeavour across borders.

Lippmann in turn stands in between, being a contrast against Angell's faith in leadership through public opinion, and shading into Carr's propensity for adopting a form of enlightened realism towards communication designs for stabilising international politics. Lippmann's position takes off directly from his conceptions of the vagaries of public opinion. With Machiavellian echoes, he wrote in 1955 that 'in ordinary circumstances, voters cannot be expected to transcend their particular, localized and self-regarding opinions. As well expect men labouring in the valley to see the land as from a mountain-top.'[87] As noted previously, Lippmann's contempt for the masses was in the main intellectual and ambivalent, viewed from the cockpit of political leadership. The public used to have a 'public philosophy' dating back to the Greco-Roman tradition, one based on a natural collective sense of moral right and its rationality. But modernity and the decentred embrace of liberalism had spoiled the popular conception of the public philosophy, making good government impossible. Taking the freedom of speech for instance, Lippmann believed Western civilisation owed it to the Greeks to state its practice in the context of starting a

[84] Angell, *Why Freedom Matters*, pp. 113–15.
[85] Lippmann in the *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1919, in Angell, *Why Freedom Matters*, p. 133.
[86] Angell, *The Unseen Assassins*, pp. 115–16.
[87] Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, p. 41.

dialectic equipped with the ability to raise difficult questions on both sides of an issue with an ultimate objective of arriving at a truth. 'That, and not the subjective pleasure of utterance, is why freedom is a necessity in the good society', wrote Lippmann.[88] The twentieth century assertion of public freedom of expression is often conceived of in adversarial terms with no end in mind for sincere gains in knowledge. 'The right of self-expression is, as such, a private amenity rather than a public necessity.'[89] This erosion of the public philosophy through the change in people's attitudes, is accelerated by the framing power of modern mass media; '[f]or the audience, tuning on and tuning off here and there, cannot be counted upon to hear, even in summary form, the essential evidence and the main arguments on all the significant sides of a question.'[90] Technology creates choice for unready minds and shortens attention spans.

In contrast, Lippmann depicts the world of international relations as one of recurring as well as unexpected crises demanding, if sound decisions are to be made, firm commitments based on a comprehensive consideration of the national interest. Instead the vanity and tendentiousness of the mass public have manifested decisions in the interwar years which were 'too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too intransigent'.[91] The Peace of Versailles in 1919 was rendered harsh by the domineering passions of public opinion forcing the hands of their presidents and prime ministers. The road towards Britain's embattled circumstances in 1940, and America's disaster at Pearl Harbor the year after, vindicated in Lippmann's mind the costs of allowing the public any leeway in steering international affairs. Living through these tumultuous times, Lippmann was unsurprisingly driven to view the traditional democratic process, already debased through erosion of the public philosophy, as a luxury 'for tranquillity and harmony'. In the face of foreign danger, 'it is usually necessary to secure unity and flexibility without real consent'. The foreign policy leader ought to employ symbols of closure as his banner:

> It immobilizes personality, yet at the same time it enormously sharpens the intention of the group and welds that group, as nothing else in a crisis can weld it, to purposeful action. It renders the mass mobile though it immobilizes personality. The symbol is the instrument by which in the short run the mass escapes from its own inertia, the inertia of indecision, or the inertia of headlong movement, and is rendered capable of being led along the zigzag of a complex situation.[92]

Upon this trace of a suggestion that Lippmann possessed an elitist streak in his defence of democracy, this section's discussions may be summarised. All three authors have tried to grapple with the difficulty of treating public opinion as a corporate whole ready to be serious in thinking through foreign policy challenges. Carr and Lippmann both saw the need for the mass to be led, even against their momentary and unruly passions, in their best interests in rearmament or in avoiding a severely punitive peace. Carr held that leadership ought to exert a moral force of attraction at home and abroad, while Lippmann was vaguer and prescribed a more doctrinaire effort at educating the masses into corporate responsibility for their

[88] Ibid., p. 125.
[89] Ibid., p. 126.
[90] Ibid., pp. 128–9.
[91] Ibid., p. 20.
[92] Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, pp. 238–9.

national interest. If disciplining the masses was Lippmann's elitist vision of leadership for making foreign policy, Angell was almost overboard in favour of the democratisation of wisdom in correcting the propagandistic obfuscation of the realities of good policy by knowledge-protective elites. For Angell, leadership for international peace could be manifested through the voice of reason which could be heard following the winnowing process of debate. Perhaps, Angell's thinking strikes a convenient poise for juxtaposing the indices of leadership in factoring the public into the driving seat of a democratised international arena.

Conclusion: The social origins of International Communication

International Communication should undoubtedly be regarded as a social process. It is social in the sense that it is primarily *for* and *about* peaceful coexistence. Between the three thinkers treated here, human nature's contradictory predilections for acquisitiveness, selfishness and yearnings for harmonious coexistence form the bases for communicating ideas across borders. Angell appears the most interventionist in correcting human folly. Carr and Lippmann treat human nature's foibles as givens for policymaking. Improvement in the existence of man can be had only through perfecting the leadership of public opinion. Angell is obviously more idealistic in elaborating a vision of democratised public opinion, emancipated for rigorous political debate through education.

International communication is social in a second sense of grappling with the conditions of modernisation. I hesitate in labelling twentieth century communication 'modernity' for it remains a contested process that simultaneously exhibits premodern features – read 'conservative attitudes' – and postmodern fragmentation of narratives. The treatment of human nature by Carr, Angell and Lippmann has acknowledged the persistence of atomistic human nature despite the modernising state of interdependence. It has been noted that Angell has been a key proponent of modern functionalist integration and a propagandist for a worldly cosmopolitan peace.[93] In being ahead of his time in moulding the public mind for the 'modern international', he is in retrospect more prescient than either Carr or Lippmann in comprehending that power cannot be exercised without moderation when all nations need to trade and invest finances in each other's economies. Carr suffered his 'vices of integrity' in repeatedly attempting to interpret the looming strategic horizons and then having to modify later in the wake of events that did not fit his earlier prognoses. Lippmann had also foreseen how mass populations, intoxicated with nationalistic zeal, would find themselves trapped by their limited comprehension of modernisation. Nonetheless, he too was narrowly anchored to normative visions of an American Republic with a lively democratic agora; one preferably identified with holding the torch of Western civilisation – 'the New World a place where the ancient faith can flourish anew.'[94]

Some writers have labelled this treatment of modernisation a project of 'cultural internationalism', or more grandiosely, 'creating international studies' through

[93] Cornelia Navari, 'The Great Illusion Revisited: the International Theory of Norman Angell', *Review of International Studies*, 15 (1989), pp. 341–58.
[94] Lippmann, *U.S. War Aims*, p. 131.

Liberal IR, hinting at normative intellectual imperialism.[95] Indeed, these philosophical themes should be engaged by scholars professing to be doing International Communication. It is fundamentally about scrutinising the social hunger for a construction of a good international order in the minds of national publics as a first step towards particular modernity. It hints of further need for research into embryonic, co-constitutive links between agency and structure in communication orders.[96] In my treatment, technology *per se* has unsurprisingly been relegated to the background since human wills to communicate exist *a priori*. International Communication studies ought to begin by comprehending the wielding of what I label 'political technology' over opinion. Debating the efficacious *and* the desirable manipulation of opinion is intrinsic to modernisation because it concerns the change of pace and scale of life that mass social and industrial processes bring. Nevertheless, technology in International Communication is worthy of further investigation. The space constraints of this piece do not permit discourse on how these thinkers' contemporaries have treated technology. Names that come to mind include Leonard Woolf and Alfred Zimmern since they have concerned themselves with a transactional approach to world government. In closing, Zimmern's pithy reflection upon the relationship between science and politics should serve as a healthy provocation for further inquiry: 'In the abdication of Mind, Matter cannot take command'.[97] Likewise, when inquiring further into the CNN and other techno-driven effects, it helps to first interpret the public mind at both the source and destination of the information flow.

[95] For a selection, see Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Lucian Ashworth, *Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1999); Jeanne Morefield, *Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

[96] My conclusion is sympathetic to the views expressed in some recent critiques of the CNN effect: Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37 (2000), pp. 131–43; Eytan Gilboa, 'The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations', *Political Communication*, 22 (2005), pp. 27–44.

[97] Zimmern, *Learning and Leadership: A Study of the Needs and Possibilities of International Intellectual Cooperation* (London: Oxford University Press and Humphrey Milford, 1928), p. 80.