CRITICAL NOTICE

SHOULD CITIZENS OF A WELFARE STATE BE TRANSFORMED INTO "QUEENS"?

Motivation, agency, and public policy: of knights and knaves, pawns and queens, by Julian Le Grand, Oxford University Press, 2003, 230 pages.

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1.

Julian Le Grand offers an account of public policy that arranges views along two axes: a motivational axis, along which individuals can be knights or knaves, and an agency axis, along which they can be pawns or queens. Knaves are concerned to further their self-interest, understood broadly in terms of whatever people may care about. Following Hume, Le Grand calls such characters "knaves," but this has no automatic connotations with illegal activities. Knights, on the other hand, are motivated to help others for no private reward, even to the detriment of their interests. Pawns, like the pieces on the chess board, are passive victims of circumstances, unable to make responsible choices. Queens do make such choices: they are empowered agents responsible for their fates.

Taken literally, these characterizations are a caricature, but they are useful to sketch political standpoints. For instance, social democrats take individuals to be largely products of circumstances and thus treat them as pawns *qua* targets of policy. At the same time, they have an optimistic view of human nature, thinking of those empowered to execute policy as knights. So they design policy in such a way that service recipients are left with rather limited choices, whereas providers (doctors, teachers, etc.) are taken to want the best for their clients. Neo-liberals take a pessimistic

view of human nature, treating policy makers and providers as knaves. At the same time they believe targets of policy should be transformed into queens. Since Le Grand introduces the two distinctions independently, other combinations are possible, as well as more or less strong views on the extent to which individuals are to be transformed into pawns or queens and to be considered knaves or knights. Hobbes, for instance, can be read as taking individuals to be knaves and as arguing that in virtue of being knaves, they would found a state in which all are left to be pawns – except for one all-powerful queen, known as the Leviathan.

So: should policy makers regard public servants as knights or knaves, and should they aim to transform recipients into pawns or queens? These are the two main questions Le Grand sets out to answer. In Part I, he argues on empirical grounds that individuals are moved by a mixture of knightly and knavish motivations, and that therefore policies should be "robust" in speaking to both knights and knaves. The success of a policy, that is, should not depend on whether those it affects or those who execute it are knights or knaves. In Part II, he argues on normative grounds that policies should be adopted that transform individuals into queens. His arguments for that claim form the philosophical core of his book. In Part III, then, he applies the responses to his two questions to a range of policy questions: he explores what his views entail for the organization of (universal state-funded) health care and the organization of the educational sector; he argues in support of a "demogrant" (a grant to young people for investment purposes), and proposes that a matching system of "partnership savings" should replace mandatory retirement schemes; and finally he writes in support of hypothecating ("earmarking") taxes for specific purposes, rather than raising taxes for purposes to be determined by the state independently of the tax.

Le Grand's main advice for policy makers is that measures should be taken to transform service users into queens. (Le Grand was appointed Tony Blair's health advisor in May 2004, which put him in a position to act on this advice himself.) While I will argue in due course that his arguments for this recommendation are unsatisfactory in a way that is troublesome for various bits of the book, Le Grand is right that academics often make grand claims about politics without transforming them into policy, and he must be congratulated on his effort to proceed differently. The book is highly readable and offers a wealth of thought-provoking claims and insights; studying Le Grand's ideas will be rewarding for anybody interested in public policy in a manner that takes seriously the intellectual foundations of policy advice, and this will be true even for non-British readers although most of Le Grand's discussion focuses on questions that have shaped the agenda of British domestic politics over the last 25 years. Le Grand has rendered us a great service by contributing so much to this urgently needed form of policy discourse. Still, Le Grand

leaves unexplored the philosophical underpinnings of arguments that require such underpinnings, and once we do explore them, we encounter some difficulties in completing the arguments Le Grand needs to support his views. More specifically, the challenge will be for him to say more about theories that underwrite *both* the view that individuals should be citizens of a welfare state *and* the view that they should be transformed into queens in their capacity as service users. I will argue that there is some tension between these two views, and that the fact that he leaves this tension unaddressed haunts some of his discussions.

2.

But first of all, let me dwell some more on the terminology that figures in the title of this book. Again, Le Grand is aware that his distinctions are rough, that individuals can be both knights and knaves to some extent or in some of their actions, as well as both pawns and queens with regard to different parts of their lives. Note three more points on this terminology. First, the broad notion of self-interest that is needed to make the conception of knaves interesting in the first place raises the question of whether there can be non-selfish motivation and hence a distinction between knaves and knights at all. Those who care about others find benefiting them to be in their interest, but they no more act against their own self-interest than villains who do not. But we need not worry about this issue: all that matters for Le Grand is that individuals' actions can be more or less focused on themselves, and that much is clear enough.

Second, one can ask whether individuals simply happen to be knights or knaves (or maybe both to some extent), and queens or pawns (or maybe both in some parts of their lives), or whether, instead, policy itself has an impact on these matters. Obviously, different views on the political spectrum can take different stances on these questions. As I will shortly explain in more detail, Le Grand thinks the knave–knight distinction is to some extent endogenous to policy: policy design can influence whether knavish or knightly motivations carry the day. As far as the pawn–queen distinction is concerned, Le Grand argues that policy should be designed so as to transform individuals into queens. That is, he does not take it for granted that this is what individuals are, but argues on normative grounds that it should be a goal of politics to make them into queens.

Third, note that knights come in two sorts: act-relevant and act-irrelevant knights. Act-irrelevant knights want good states of affairs to obtain. They may want that nobody in their town is hungry. Being knights, they are willing to support that goal, but if somebody beats them to it, they feel no need to do anything themselves. Act-relevant knights need to do good themselves: they derive benefits from behaving in a knightly fashion. If most knights are of the act-irrelevant sort, we will observe that private

donations to charity decrease as welfare programs improve. Such knights, after all, only need to know that the problems are solved while gaining no particular benefit from having done it themselves. Yet if most knights are of the act-relevant sort, we will not observe such behavior: such knights still feel the need to do good deeds. According to Le Grand, empirical studies support the view that knightly behavior exists, especially among public servants (though it interacts in complex ways with knavish behavior); but also that such studies suggest that much knightly behavior is act-relevant. In fact, Le Grand thinks most people are act-relevant knights. Nevertheless, the presence of knaves makes it unwise to rely on such behavior for policy design.

3.

The background to Le Gand's discussion is that in the 1980s/90s governments such as the British (his main subject), while retaining control of finance, stopped providing a range of welfare services. Provision became competitive, with independent providers competing in markets or quasi-markets. There is a *quasi-market*, say, in the educational sector if the state finances schools and education, but provides vouchers for students or parents to give to schools of their choice. In quasi-markets the state finances the services, and often the competitors for service are publicly owned or non-profit organizations. Before Margaret Thatcher became prime minister in 1979, providers were assumed to be knights while recipients were assumed to be pawns. After Thatcher, providers were assumed to be knaves and recipients were supposed to be transformed into queens; services (e.g., education, health care) were reorganized accordingly. But quasi-markets were the most Thatcher could do: privatization was politically undoable in Britain. Blair's Labour government, in power since 1997, has kept most of the changes – changes reflected also in the policies adopted by other countries over the last two decades in response to fiscal crises and disenchantment with large bureaucracies.

Le Grand offers a wealth of empirical material on motivation and on how different views on agency work out when built into policies. For instance, many economists and policy makers assume that behavior is exogenous: individuals display knightly or knavish behavior to this extent or that, and policy must respond to it. As opposed to that, and as I already mentioned above, Le Grand argues that behavior is endogenous: the extent to which individuals act knightly or knavishly is influenced by policies. He claims that

> [i]n cases of knightly activity that involve large sacrifices, people do value some form of payment both as a form of recognition and as partial compensation for the costs involved. However, that payment should not be so great as to compensate fully for the sacrifice, for if it did there would

be no satisfaction from making the sacrifice in the first place. In fact, if people were paid an amount that fully compensated them – or more than fully compensated them – the effect might be perverse, reducing rather the increasing the supply of the activity concerned.

People are not attracted to making deals by receiving compensation for sacrifices: they like to feel public-spirited, and take that sentiment to be a large part of their reward. Modest payments for activities (where previously there were none) may leave the supply constant or increase it. As payments increase, the supply may drop, because now the sacrifice is viewed as a commodity that neither comes with a feeling of public-spiritedness nor is worth it for the payment offered. As payments increase further, the supply gradually increases again because the activities now come to be seen as commodities demanded at a good price, no longer as sacrifices for recognition or for the sake of feeling public-spirited. No matter what delivery model is used (command and control, quasi-markets, etc.), it influences how individuals behave.

4.

Let me now begin the critical part of my discussion. I will raise some problems that focus on Chapters 5 and 6 of Le Grand's book, those chapters that argue that individuals should be transformed into queens. Le Grand distinguishes three approaches to the question of whether users should be transformed into pawns or queens: the liberal approach, the welfarist approach, and the communitarian approach. Liberals answer that individuals should be turned into pawns or queens depending on which more increases their liberty; welfarists think the answer turns on which best increases individual well-being, and communitarians make it turn on which stance has a better impact on society. Liberals find little in support of transforming individuals into pawns, says Le Grand; at most they may be willing to transform individuals into pawns in some parts of their lives for the sake of overall greater empowerment. For welfarists there is a presumption for empowering individuals. Following John Stuart Mill's discussion in *On Liberty*, Le Grand submits that individuals are the best judges of their own welfare. Still, there are exceptions: individuals may decide to defer to experts; have insufficient information; or display "individual failure" (they may be incompetent to complete mental tasks, display weakness of will, be too emotional, or lack experience). Communitarians hold welfarist views for or against empowering individuals, but at stake is communal, not individual welfare. Yet Le Grand thinks no welfarist reason against empowering individuals, seen at the communal level, speaks against transforming individuals as queens.

After discussing these views, Le Grand concludes that "it does seem as though there is a convincing case for the user to have a measure of power, possibly considerable, over public service provision" (81). He acknowledges restrictions on this argument, to "avoid the overuse or over-provision of the service concerned, or the uses of the service in such a way that damages either the user himself or herself or the wider society" (84). He does, however, assume a very strong presumption for transforming users into queens. Again, the essential recommendation of his book is for policy makers to act on this advice. Still (and this is my main point), his case for transforming users into queens is much weaker than Le Grand asserts, and I will argue this now by going through his three argumentative strategies for supporting the claim that they should be so transformed. Consider first the liberal view. Note that Le Grand leaves unquestioned basic constraints on the British context. Universal health care or the responsibility of the state to provide for education is not questioned: the welfare state is assumed. Distinguish now libertarians and liberal egalitarians. Libertarians, such as Robert Nozick, support a minimal (decidedly non-welfare) state; liberal egalitarians, such as John Rawls, support a state that suitably combines equality and liberty and thus register strong affinities with the welfare state, or at any rate with a state that includes strongly redistributive measures.[1]

Le Grand's argument does not speak to libertarians; rejecting the welfare state, they part from him long before he calls on them to cheer for transforming service users into queens. Nor does his argument entice liberal egalitarians. While they find a welfare state plausible (or at any rate a state that shares strongly redistributive policies with a welfare state), they do so because they value equality, which in turn they do (if they are

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[1] A referee expressed skepticism about my claim that the Rawlsian view shows affinities with the welfare state, since both in the 1999 2nd edition of the *Theory of justice* (Harvard University Press), and in his 2001 *Justice as fairness: a restatement* (edited by Erin Kelly, Harvard University Press) Rawls seems to reject the welfare state. Indeed, in section 41 of the *Restatement* Rawls does reject welfare-state capitalism, and does so in favor of a property-owning democracy or a liberal socialism. For both it is true that they "set up a constitutional framework for democratic politics, guarantee the basic liberties with the fair value of the political liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and regulate economic and social inequalities by a principle of mutuality, if not by the difference principle" (138). However, both in the *Restatement* and in the preface to the 1999 edition of *Theory* Rawls rejects a welfare state only in the sense of rejecting a state that is merely concerned with making sure that individuals do not fall below a basic income level while ignoring further-reaching distributional issues. Rawls, that is, rejects the welfare state because it does not go far enough by way of controlling inequalities. There is in particular no sense in which Rawls rejects the welfare state because he wants individuals to be Le Grandian queens. At any rate, all that matters to my discussion is that a liberal-egalitarian view of the Rawlsian sort favors strongly redistributive measures.

of the Rawlsian kind) because they believe coercive institutions must be justifiable to everybody, an endeavor that can succeed only if society is a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens. Liberal egalitarians support redistribution required for universal health care and state-funded education. They think of individual fates as tied together, and of benefits of social cooperation as to be shared out among participants. Crucially, they therefore take individuals (and argue that those would want to be seen) as pawns in some aspects; individuals are not empowered to opt out of the redistributive system, and hence the extent to which they are to be transformed into queens must be limited. Individuals are indeed to be empowered, but only within the confines of a redistributive system from which to withdraw is not at their discretion. Rawls himself is explicit that his view of justice

> includes what we may call a *social division of responsibility*: society, the citizens as a collective body, accepts the responsibility for maintaining the equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and for providing a fair share of the other primary goods for everyone within this framework, while citizens (as individuals) and associations accept the responsibility for revising and adjusting their ends and aspirations in view of the all-purpose means they can expect, given their present and foreseeable situation.[2]

Despite the Rawlsian jargon in this passage, the connection to Le Grand should be clear: as much as they (being liberals) champion responsible agency, liberal egalitarians take individuals as pawns in some ways and as queens in others; in fact, it is *so that all can be queens to some extent that all must be pawns to some extent too*. To push this point a bit more, in a way that is not meant to be unfair to Le Grand but to highlight what is at issue here: to suggest that liberal egalitarians, in virtue of their basic political stances, must be committed to the desire to transform service users into queens is a bit like suggesting that Rawls in particular would have to be committed to solving all distributional problems within society by appeal to the difference principle only because socio-economic inequalities that remain after the principle of liberty and the principle of fair equality of opportunity have been implemented are to be governed by the difference principle.

So liberal egalitarians would not automatically endorse Le Grand's anti-pawn stance and thus not without qualification endorse his goal of transforming individuals into queens. Therefore Le Grand's "liberals" can be neither Nozickian libertarians nor Rawlsian liberal egalitarians. Note that nothing in this argument turns on tying anything to Nozick or Rawls.

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[2] This quote is from Rawls, "Social unity and primary goods," reprinted in Samuel Freeman (ed.), *Collected papers*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 371.

The central issue is whether we take liberals to endorse views that support the kind of redistributive measure needed for a welfare state. If so, they will not support Le Grand's strong stance in favor of transforming service users into queens. If not, Le Grand's argument entirely ignores them. For neither libertarians nor liberal egalitarians is it a matter of their political identity to want to have service users transformed into queens.

<div align="center">5.</div>

The crucial point is that questions about user empowerment arise at a conceptually rather late stage of reflecting about how a state should be organized, a stage at which views about scope and limits of state responsibility must already be in place. Le Grand, however, gives such views no consideration. Therefore, too much political philosophy is ignored for him to be in a position to deliver satisfactory arguments in support of his views. Since liberal egalitarians (like all those endorsing a welfare state, or at any rate strongly redistributive systems) must regard individuals as pawns in some aspects, they share no presumption to regard individuals *qua* service users as queens. Liberal egalitarians would agree that, since individuals are pawns for the sake of funding welfare services, the design, say, of health care institutions must be *justifiable* to all. Such justifiability entails that resources should be used efficiently (being everybody's resources); that users be treated respectfully and their views consulted in a manner that is not merely superficial (users both fund and are affected by services). Yet to the question of whether users should actually be transformed into queens liberal egalitarians would take a pragmatic, or at any rate context-dependent attitude: if, for instance, regarding users as queens means that health care resources are used most efficiently, that stance will be more easily justifiable than considering them pawns. I suppose Le Grand would in fact want to argue that such efficiency speaks in favor of transforming users into queens: but if so, then what really drives his argument in support of such a transformation is *efficiency*, not the independent plausibility of the aim to make users queens. By the same token, if it is more efficient to administer such services by transforming individuals *qua service users* into pawns, liberal egalitarians should have no qualms endorsing that view (within the constraints mentioned above).

Next I discuss Le Grand's welfarist and communitarian approach. The welfarist approach should strike Le Grand as unattractive *per se*. Again, he accepts that a welfare state exists. Therefore, services must be administered in a manner justifiable to all. Recall that the welfarist strategy inquires about what is best for each individual. Yet given that Le Grand already assumes a shared commitment to a welfare state, he must think of individuals as co-financers of the welfare state. Therefore it is not open to him any longer to argue for the claim that service users

should be transformed into queens simply by asking how each individual should want public resources to be applied to herself – that is, without any consideration for others, as if she were alone, rather than in the presence of others who are co-financers of the welfare state. Instead, he would have to ask how each individual should want such resources to be applied *given* that she is only one among many such co-financers a good number of whom will have similar medical needs. To put the point differently: the welfarist strategy focuses on one individual at a time, and asks how this person would want public funds to be applied to her situation. Whatever the upshot of this person-by-person question is, it is the answer to the wrong question. The right question is: how should *jointly* provided resources be distributed among people with certain medical needs, *given* that others will have similar needs? Yet the welfarist strategy does not speak to *that* question at all, and thus cannot justify Le Grand's claim that users should be transformed into queens. Crucially, even if it is best for *any given* person if *she* were transformed into a queen *qua* service user, that does not mean it would be best for *everybody* if policies were adopted with the goal of transforming *everybody* into queens. Perhaps, of course, transforming individuals into queens leads to the most efficient distribution of resources. Yet such a result, again, would show that individuals should be treated as queens because that makes for the most efficient distribution of resources; but it would not show that individuals should be treated as queens because there is a justificatory strategy (the welfarist one) rendering it compelling or plausible to treat individuals as queens *independently* of efficiency considerations.

As far as the communitarian approach is concerned, consider first that Le Grand assumes that the "impact on the wider society" (74) must be assessed along welfarist (utilitarian) lines. It makes a philosopher's heart bleed that a thinker at the intersection of academia and policy is unaware that the last 30 years of philosophical reflection on politics have done much to explore non-welfarist approaches to assessing this impact (an effort to which British philosophers have contributed considerably). But setting this aside, Le Grand's reasoning itself is also problematic. He argues that, even if we consider the impact of, say, health care decisions on society as a whole along utilitarian lines, it is unclear that doctors are better positioned to pass verdicts than patients:

> In health care, the doctor has to have knowledge of thousands of potential ailments, whereas the patient has to know only about those potentially or actually affecting himself or herself. Medical handbooks can aid self-diagnosis; and, once their illness is diagnosed, especially in these days of the Internet, patients can – and indeed often do – "train" themselves in their own disease. Similarly with respect to teaching: teachers have to be able to assess the educational requirements of thousands of pupils, whereas parents have

only to do so for their own offspring, about whom they have considerable knowledge. (79)

This is unsatisfactory. Sometimes a patient may know a condition better than a doctor. But such reasoning fails more often than it succeeds. Diagnoses often require machinery and more expertise than found on the Internet. This applies even more to treatment than to diagnosis. Moreover, when it comes to resource distribution, each patient has an interest in her health and is thus a poor judge of how to distribute resources also needed by others. The reason why patients should be consulted about distributive questions, and why decisions must be justifiable to them, is also the reason why they should not actually *make* such decisions.

What Le Grand's reasoning supports is the need for designing resource distribution mechanisms that speak to both knaves and knights among providers, a conclusion he reaches earlier in his book; but it does not show that users should be queens – not if the existence of a welfare state is assumed, which again presupposes that individuals are to some extent pawns to each of whom, in turn, use of jointly contributed resources must be justifiable. Similar points apply to the other arguments in Le Grand's discussion of the communitarian approach: in each case he seeks to show that, even as far as general welfare is concerned, affected individuals are better judges of decisions for their cases than the professionals. Each time this remains implausible as long as there are strategies speaking both to knaves and knights among providers so that their better judgment is not undermined by knavish motivations. Le Grand's plea for such strategies makes it hard for him to support the communitarian approach to the queen/pawn issue. Expertise, after all, is worth a lot once providers' knavish motivations are neutralized.

6.

The upshot is that Le Grand's case for treating users as queens is weaker than he thinks. He does qualify the argument, acknowledging limits to the extent users should be queens. But he also takes his arguments to deliver a presumption in favor of his view. Yet his case is a lot weaker than even that. The welfarist and communitarian approaches fail completely, and the liberal approach, while not speaking against regarding users as queens, certainly delivers no strong presumption in favor of doing so. By way of concluding, let me explore implications of this result for other parts of the book. But before doing so, I would like to draw attention to one other way of putting the point that my distinction between the libertarian and the liberal-egalitarian stance on Le Grand's reasoning was meant to make, this time cast in terms of differences in the political cultures in the United States and Western European countries. The political culture in the United States is much more shaped by libertarian intuitions than by liberal-egalitarian

sentiments, and vice versa for Western Europe. A reader thinking from an American point of view about what political positions most urgently require justification (because of their degree of deviation from what is considered a default in society) will find it peculiar that Le Grand pushes so strongly for transforming users into queens and *still* seems to see no reason to question the welfare state as such. As opposed to that, a reader thinking about politics from a Western European standpoint (including a British one) will find it peculiar that Le Grand takes the welfare state and its redistributive system for granted and *still* so strongly champions the view that service users should be transformed into queens. It is hard to have it both ways.

On to the conclusion, then. Following the chapter discussing the three strategies in support of the claim that users be transformed into queens, Chapter 6 asks: If there is a presumption in favor of taking individuals as queens, why can the state force individuals to save for old age or to buy long-term care insurance? Le Grand's answer draws on Derek Parfit's stance on personal identity. In a nutshell, the connection between younger individuals and their older selves is so tenuous that it is rational for the former to disregard the needs of their future selves. This justifies state interference on behalf of future selves. But there are three difficulties with the solution and this way of asking the question in the first place.

First, given that we grant for the moment that the question arises in the manner in which Le Grand asks it, his answer is unsatisfactory. Consider the following dilemma. Either it is rational for younger selves to disregard their future selves, or it is not. If it is, then it is hard to see why the state should have any concern for older selves. For the only plausible reason why the state would worry about them in ways in which it does not about people living elsewhere or *their* future selves is that there is a strong connection between those future selves and somebody presently living in the state (their younger selves being the only plausible candidates). Yet by assumption, that connection is so weak as to not prompt such concern. So in this case, no argument in support of forcing people to save for old age is forthcoming. If, on the other hand, it is not rational for individuals to neglect their future selves, then those who think individuals should be transformed into queens should find it implausible that the state would interfere on behalf of future selves. For such interference would mean to force individuals who are supposed to be transformed into queens to save for old age although those queens themselves have rational grounds for doing so (in virtue of having no rational grounds to neglect their future selves). Exerting such force then would be entirely unnecessary paternalism. Thus any laws to such an effect would have to strike those as absurd who, like Le Grand, support the view that individuals should be transformed into queens. So once again, no argument in favor of forcing individuals to save for old age is forthcoming.

Second, the problem is ill-posed given that Le Grand assumes at this stage of his argument that users should be transformed into queens. If we must ask why the state can intervene to benefit the queens themselves, we must also ask why those queens can in turn be forced to support the welfare state at all. Once we do so, as I argue above, Le Grand's reasoning on behalf of his thesis unravels. Third, neither this question about justifiability of forcing individuals to save for old age nor these problems would arise if Le Grand had not overstated his case on behalf of treating users as queens. Since no view supporting the welfare state endorses this stance at the strength at which Le Grand defends it, there is not as much of a problem about forcing individuals to save for old age as he thinks there is. For instance, on the liberal-egalitarian view, again, individuals must be taken to be pawns to some extent anyway so that all can be queens to some extent as well. Mandatory retirement savings are not terribly problematic on such an account. So the discussion of Chapter 6 is an artifact of Le Grand's overstatement of his case: the problem it raises would not really arise without this overstatement.

Let us consider, finally, implications of my argument for Le Grand's policy recommendations. The two case studies most explicitly present throughout the book are health care and education. But in both cases in Le Grand's proposals (to a large extent implemented in Britain) the thrust of the argument is efficiency; the question is in each case how to optimize delivery of a service. Le Grand's terminology plays a role only because it helps pinpoint non-optimal delivery: the argument itself can be stated without reference to knights, knaves, queens, or pawns. This is unsurprising, given what I have argued before. For liberal egalitarians, in particular, the philosophically interesting battles are won once it is established that the state has a duty to finance equal and universal basic education in the first place. Within limits, how to organize it is plausibly left to efficiency considerations. That is, the political identity of liberal egalitarians is at stake at the conceptually earlier stage of arguing about the provision of funding for universal basic education, not at the later stage of organizing the service delivery.

The goal of transforming users into queens really comes into its own in Le Grand's three remaining proposals: to give demogrants to young adults (an amount of money to invest); to replace mandatory retirement schemes with a matching system of partnership savings; and to hypothecate ("earmark") taxes for certain purposes. I think demogrants are a fine idea, but I am not attracted to them because they transform individuals into queens. However, in societies in which life chances are increasingly shaped by inheritance this is arguably a good redistributive measure, where such redistribution is appropriate because benefits of social cooperation exist only because most individuals do indeed cooperate. I have no view on hypothecation and partnership savings: but it should come as no surprise

now that I do not find myself persuaded of them only because they help transform users into queens, which is what Le Grand considers their greatest virtue. Again, anybody who thinks a welfare state is justified (as I do) should feel less attracted to transforming users into queens than Le Grand does. Theories requiring everybody to be pawns in some aspects cannot also push for service users to be regarded as queens as much as he does.