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## Racism Revisited: Sources, Relevance, and Aporias of a Modern Concept

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WHY DO WE CALL CERTAIN ATTITUDES, BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE, RACIST? WHY DO WE LIST CERTAIN DISCOURSES—ADMITTEDLY A

very wide range of discourses, which single out, stigmatize, threaten, or discriminate against various human and social groups—as racist? Why do we consider that practices, both spontaneous and institutional, unofficial and officially organized, that in the past and present have resulted in lasting forms of oppression, persistent hostilities and misunderstanding, and sometimes tragic violence in all sorts of societies are racist? To my surprise, this basic and preliminary question is seldom addressed in the huge scholarly and popular literature concerning racism—the old and new forms of racism, the modernity or antiquity of racism, the quantitative and qualitative variations of racism, and so on. Or, better said, the question is addressed only partially and indirectly: the category itself is taken for granted, all the more because the study of racism has become an essential sociological and political object, and what are mainly discussed are different definitions and theories and the conditions of their application. It seems that the very fact that there exists (and has long existed) something called *racism*, which includes a variety of manifestations, is subject to transformations, and does not purely and simply coincide with violence, not even violence based on collective hatred, need not be questioned. But isn't it necessary to discuss the reasons that we consider this fact obvious?

One of the reasons for worrying about this is the fact that in contemporary societies, with the partial exception of the United States, racism as attitude, discourse, and practice is banned. The consequences of the ban in private and public life differ in different countries (including European countries) and can give rise to contradictory positions (concerning such issues as whether it is possible to argue in an electoral campaign that all immigrants, or non-European immigrants, or blacks, or Arabs, or Muslims, or Jews are too numerous, or that they cannot adapt to the dominant cultural patterns and social rules, or that their culture is inferior in this or that respect,

etc.). That racism is banned imposes a specific and binding framework on discussions concerning the origins, nature, and consequences of racism; it also makes it impossible to decide that the meaning of the term *racism* is a pure matter of convention and that you can choose freely to include any attitude, discourse, and practice within the range of racism or not.

We must worry about this issue, however formal it may appear, also because we are subjected to contradictory judgments concerning the status of racism in contemporary societies. For some analysts and commentators, racism is a declining phenomenon, which belongs to the past—or would belong to the past if it were not artificially preserved by wrong political strategies (such as reverse discrimination, also euphemistically called affirmative action). Such analysts and commentators are to be found not only among conservatives or neoconservatives, such as Dinesh D'Souza, who published a best-selling book in the United States in 1995 that endorses the concept of race or racial difference while asserting that modern societies are on their way to overcoming racial prejudice and discrimination. They are also socialist thinkers who suggest that class differences, and perhaps age or gender differences and inequalities, have largely replaced race and racism as determining factors of social conflict. These thinkers advocate a republican universalism that fears that the defense of segregated and oppressed groups imposes a particularistic identity on them. They may also advocate a postcolonial and postmodern form of cultural politics, where the reference to race is transformed into a nonexclusive, critical, or subversive form of diasporic identity, which challenges the Eurocentric tradition of community (I am particularly thinking of Paul Gilroy's recent book with the eloquent title *Against Race*). So a broad spectrum of discourses for various reasons suggest that the issue of racism has become obsolete. But an equally broad and insistent array of discourses suggest just the op-

posite: not only that racism is more alive and harmful than ever (we might say provocatively that it has a bright future, not only an impressive past) but also that in a sense we might be entering an era in which racism will dominate societies, from east to west and from north to south, because of certain effects of globalization or because of the weakening of certain political forces that have restrained racism.

Some analysts (perhaps many of us) insist that the contemporary developments in racism involve profound changes in its targets, justifications, and objectives, albeit maintaining the symbolic and social exclusion of the other. It is along these lines that such themes as cultural racism, differential racism, and, underscoring the paradoxical metamorphosis involved here, a racism without races have been introduced and discussed and that such authors as Pierre-André Taguieff have warned against the counterproductive effects of an antiracist policy that would foster new forms of nonbiological and nonhierarchical racism (*Face*). But since ethnic and religious conflicts in the north and south have again generated exterminist practices (as in the former Yugoslavia and East Africa) and have produced and projected all over the world representations of conspiracy and of essentially incompatible civilizations (e.g., the Israeli-Arab antagonism), it is increasingly argued that racism is an eternal or invariable phenomenon, which will return in the same forms and the same places, resisting the progress of societies or signaling their persistent archaic constitution.

So I would suggest that we have reached a point of extreme tension, perhaps extreme confusion, in the use of the category of racism. This confusion is anything but theoretical. Racism is primarily a political matter, a polemical as much as a theoretical concept, so the practical consequences are immediate. I recall one of them. In 2001 an international conference took place in Durban, South Africa—a place that symbolized the necessity

and possibility of fighting against the worst forms of racist discrimination inherited from the colonial past—under the joint auspices of UNESCO and the Commission for Human Rights of the United Nations and with the participation of governmental and nongovernmental delegations (see the official volume, *United to Combat Racism*). The conference was supposed to give a new impulse to the collective struggle against racial prejudices and discriminations, a struggle that forms the core of the global politics of human rights. But this conference split and in fact collapsed, with disastrous consequences, over several burning issues. One of them was the alleged equivalences between Zionism and racism on one hand and between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism on the other. Another issue was the possibility of responding to the lasting cultural and economic damages of European colonialism, particularly in Africa, on the model of the damages of genocide, including the necessity of redress and compensation.<sup>1</sup> In my opinion this is not only a political episode like so many taking place every day. It signals the urgent necessity to question afresh what exactly we call racism, why we do so, and what kind of political and intellectual tradition we are continuing by using this terminology.

I sketch here an institutional and intellectual history of the category of racism by examining four steps: (1) racism's invention and association with a reform of the category of the human, which proclaims the equal dignity of human beings and the indivisibility of the human species; (2) the epistemological consequences of this proclamation in the form of a new foundation of anthropology; (3) the resistances to this new paradigm (at least some of them) associated with other ways of theorizing racism; (4) the growing internal tensions of the anthropological paradigm, leading to its final decomposition, whose product is the notion of differential racism. As a provisional conclusion, I indicate the possibility of recasting the critique of racism in terms, not of the

indivisibility of the species, but of the forms and consequences of internal exclusion.

To begin, we must indicate the circumstances in which the word *racism* was coined and spread. For want of more complete information, I limit myself to sources in English and French. Most historical outlines (e.g., Miles) focus on the derivation of *racism* from *race* (a term with an obscure etymology—a point I put aside, although it can play a role in contemporary discussions on biological and nonbiological racisms) and give a first set of systematic uses in the 1930s, mainly by German (or German Jewish) authors writing in English. Sometimes intermediary or parallel derivations are mentioned, such as *racialism*. In his 1928 *Race and Civilization*, Friedrich Hertz used *race hatred* but not *racism*. Magnus Hirschfeld coined the term *racism* and associated it with xenophobia in his book *Racism*, first written in German in 1933–34 and then translated into English in 1938. This use is late, clearly associated with the Nazi doctrine of race (*Rassenlehre*) and its institutional use in hereditary categorizations and persecutions. Some authors (e.g., Delacampagne) feel it necessary to indicate that the phenomenon existed long before the word emerged. This is the kind of seemingly obvious remark that I want to suspend, by adopting a nominalist attitude.

According to the same narrative, there next emerged a debate—particularly among biologists, such as Julian Huxley—about whether racist doctrines of the Nazi type derived from a wrong use of the scientific category of race or from a mythical construction of a pseudobiological notion (a superstition) that had no empirical content but transposed cultural and linguistic differences (Aryans vs. Semites). The debate was then extended into ethnology and anthropology, against the background of European colonial expansion and its project of civilizing barbarians. Typical of this extension and of lasting influence is a 1942 essay by Ruth Benedict, *Race and Rac-*

*ism*. From there it is only one step to the official scientific critique of racism as contained in the 1950 and 1951 UNESCO declarations on the meaning and use of the notion of race, which became a guideline for subsequent pedagogical and political applications (Miles sees in these applications a constant tendency toward inflation). Taguieff's more detailed philological inquiry adds a significant twist to this presentation (*Force*). The term *racisme* was already used in French at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century in a positive sense, particularly in nationalist circles. Nationalists presented themselves as *racistes*, inasmuch as they insisted on the superiority of the French race over its enemies and interior aliens, who threatened it with degeneracy. This self-referential and positive use was dropped in the 1930s, when the Nazi use led to opposing the supposedly typically Germanic *racisme* or *racialisme* to the supposedly more political French or Latin *nationalisme*. From Taguieff's point of view, this reversal is important because it illustrates the intrinsic ambivalence of the notion, its vacillation from self-referential to extrinsic use, and its tendency to reproduce the logic of stigmatization, which is described as its typical feature—that is, some peoples, nations, or individuals would be described as intrinsically racist or more racist-leaning than others.

I believe that all these uses belong to a preparatory phase or prehistory of the category. The decisive fact is the constitution of racism as a universal myth or prejudice that has affected human history in different forms and that should be eliminated through a politics of humanity (*politique des droits de l'homme*) involving a scientific refutation of the pseudoscientific category of racial difference (hence inequality), a pedagogical effort enlisting schools and scholars from all parts of the world, and a concerted action of all democratic states against racial prejudice and discrimination. This is the result of the UNESCO declarations, drawn up by a group

of renowned scholars (mainly biologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists) summoned by UNESCO at the request of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The declarations in turn led to the publication in 1956 of a series of scientific brochures (by Juan Comas, Kenneth Little, Harry Shapiro, Michel Leiris, Claude Lévi-Strauss, L. C. Dunn, Otto Klineberg, et al.), later collected into a book, *Le racisme devant la science* (1960). This publication is a crucial break, the opening of a new paradigm, which has several remarkable properties.<sup>2</sup>

It is an event in the field of power-knowledge, to put it in Foucauldian terms. To be sure, such institutions as the United Nations and above all UNESCO enjoy a complex and ambiguous historical status. Although deriving from a delegation of power by nation-states, their authority is not exactly political, but neither is it purely scientific. The authority is borrowed from the disciplinary power of the sciences (biology, sociology, anthropology, etc.), but at the same time the sciences are urgently asked to transform their mythical prerequisites and reform their biased orientations in order to play an active role in the development of a politics of humanity. So there is a circle by which power and knowledge reinforce each other, and we may say that the uses of the category of racism were never and probably never will be independent of its political implementation.

But this event, the institutional invention of racism as a comprehensive category, is also directly connected to a historical juncture. Taking place soon after the end of World War II and during the emergence of colonial liberation and of civil rights movements in segregated societies such as the United States of America, this invention of racism combines three backgrounds, which from this moment become the three typical (and specific) forms of racism and illustrate its political consequences. (One should not forget that the UNESCO meeting was held following the

recognition by the United Nations in 1948 of the new crime of genocide). These forms are anti-Semitism, whose extreme but also typical institutional realization is German Nazism; colonial racism, which divides humankind into allegedly superior and inferior or civilized and barbaric races; and, not to be identified with colonial racism, color prejudice, which implies social segregation or apartheid in postcolonial societies where equal rights are denied to the descendants of former slaves. This combination—which suggests significant analogies, social and intellectual, and raises the crucial issue of the intrinsic relation between inequality and extreme violence in the form of forced labor and extermination—also marks a choice, a certain perception and selection of collective experiences. That this perception and selection are anything but exterior to the constitution of the category of racism leads us to a third aspect.

The unity of these different forms is supposed to derive from the fact that a single pseudotheory or myth—namely, the biology of human races (a belief in the struggle for existence as motor of evolution, the hereditary character of cultural dispositions and intellectual capacities, and the necessity of eugenics to preserve superior populations from degeneracy)—has been applied to the triple effect of (1) asserting the inequality of the various races that inhabit the earth, in particular the supremacy of the white over the colored and especially over the Negro race, (2) warning against the alleged biological perils of hybridization, and (3) imagining the permanent rivalry of Aryans and Semites for the domination of the world. But the critique of this pseudotheory or myth could not be asserted without the recognition of a philosophical principle that we may call the humanist foundation of universalism: the principle of the indivisible unity of the human species. Or, perhaps better, in negative terms (which allow us to raise this idea to the level of an absolute principle, analogous to the categori-

cal imperative), it is the statement that the division of the human species into essentially different subgroups, by heredity or culture or both, is impossible and therefore also unacceptable. This assertion is not as simple as we might imagine. It runs counter to established beliefs that seemed almost indiscernible from the category of civilization, and it involves a delicate—perhaps impossible—equilibrium between the denial of diversity in the human species and the interpretation of diversity in essentialist and hierarchical terms. It would be, in a sense, an infinite task of the sciences, from biology to cultural anthropology, to demonstrate the possibility of this equilibrium and give it a precise content.

Finally, it is important to note that the formulation of this political-philosophical-scientific paradigm was from the beginning affected by a latent conflict that led to permanent shifts and reformulations, masked under the appearance of scientific updating and developments of the paradigm. This conflict was illustrated by the amazing fact that UNESCO had to issue not one but two declarations on race and racism, the second after the first was challenged by some scientific authorities (notably the British Royal Academy) on the double ground that it went too far in denying the existence of biological determinants in the hereditary transmission of somatic and perhaps also mental characteristics of individuals and that without scientific foundation it reversed the sociobiological principle of the struggle for existence, positing the primacy of solidarity over competition in the human species. This initial split can be seen as the model of continuous tension and reformulation that even today make the critique of racism a work in progress. It establishes the permanent confrontation between individualistic and communitarian forms of universalism, a confrontation that lies at the heart of antiracist educational and legal policies.

It may seem that I have dwelled too long on this institutional history, but the back-

ground is necessary, because it is the only way to make sense of these three theoretical elements: epistemological consequences in the organization of modern knowledge, reasons for the resistances to the humanist paradigm that dominates the discussion about racism, and modalities of the progressive transformation of the paradigm, which resulted in a new representation of racism, one without races, a cultural-differential racism.

The epistemological consequences are striking, and that they have continuously affected the contemporary organization of disciplines testifies to the fact that racism, now interpreted philosophically as the ideological or mythical projection of natural differences in humankind, at the expense of humankind's essential indivisibility, is not an empirical field for the application of anthropological theories but belongs to the core of anthropology's constitutive assumptions. I would present it as a Copernican revolution (or reversal) in the history of anthropology or a reversal from an objectivist to a subjectivist standpoint with respect to the concept of race. Or, to put it in less abstract terms, anthropology has moved from the investigation of races or racial diversity and inequality and their cultural consequences toward the investigation of racism or the belief in the diversity and inequality of races. It now studies the tendential projection of a racial grid onto human history, the reduction of human diversity to the fixed and imaginary pattern of permanent racial differences, which are supposed to be both originary and hereditary.

This momentous change involves basic shifts in the methodology of anthropology, though the shifts are not univocal. It undermines the primacy of biological determinism, especially the Darwinian or pseudo-Darwinian form of evolutionary determinism, but it does not suppress the possibility of referring to biological preconditions for the representation of races, especially when that representation is associated with cognitive and emotional

psychological research programs. And the change does not impose that the roots of racial prejudice be looked for in socioeconomic structures—such as the stratified, more or less functional division of labor in capitalist societies, in the Marxist guise—or in symbolic and imaginary systems of representations, the tradition of cultural studies (which, not by chance, emerged in close relation with the interpretation of racism or representation of otherness in postcolonial societies).<sup>3</sup>

I go as far as asserting that this change is foundational in the history of the anthropological discipline, because—without giving a premature and simplistic answer—I want to raise the embarrassing question (embarrassing at least for me) of whether an element of continuity underlies this reversal (which does not deny, of course, that the practical consequences are opposed). Abstractly speaking, we could say that anthropology is always a program of self-cognition or self-recognition by humankind, an identification of the humanity of the human. It is a project of answering questions of identity and relations in the human (historical, geographic, cultural) world: who we are and where we are with respect to one another. An answer was tentatively provided by a theory of races and racial psychology in a period that, roughly speaking, ranges from the eighteenth to the middle of the twentieth century, in a world dominated by Eurocentric representations of history. The answer brutally shifted to a theory of racism after World War II, although culturalist tendencies challenging the primacy of race probably anticipated that change. The shift amounted to explaining that humankind is not a racially diverse species but a species capable of racism, perhaps inevitably pushed into the construction of racist (and more generally xenophobic, heterophobic) attitudes, either by some sort of transcendental illusion or as a consequence of their historical development in communities, separated cultures, and societies caught in objective relations of domination.

In both cases, science is supposed to provide the final answer. I am saying this not to dismiss scientific knowledge but to suggest that the epistemological critique involved in the disqualification of the racial theories might need to be extended to their successors, the theories of historical racism. Above all, I want to raise the issue of the practical functions of this other anthropological doublet (again in Foucauldian terms), which concerns not the individual subject but the human species or genre (*Gattungswesen*), relying on a moral-philosophical principle of the unity of humankind and assigning to anthropological disciplines the task of explaining the emergence and resistance of racial prejudices and racist subjects.

Clearly, these functions are ambiguous (but I am not sure that we can ever escape the ambiguity). On one hand, according to the initial program of international institutions, they are inscribed in the project of progressively suppressing racism through scientific critique, pedagogy, and legal measures, which could be considered a program of human self-improvement, in the tradition of the Enlightenment. On the other hand, in the framework of what, following David Theo Goldberg, I would call racial states, they are inscribed in an institutional program of managing race relations or, rather, racist conflicts and representations.<sup>4</sup> All contemporary states are racial states in this sense—they harbor inequalities and conflicts that are legitimized in terms of race differences or some practical equivalent—but they are also legally and politically committed to establishing equality, at least at the formal and juridical level, and therefore to combating racism or banning it from the public sphere and the political community. This commitment has undeniable practical consequences, if only the development of a complex jurisprudence concerned with racial discrimination and racism, which might well form the institutional counterpart of the epistemological revolution that I have been describing.

It is equally important to associate exceptions and resistances with the identification of this epistemological revolution, which made the study of racism the core of the anthropological discipline and decided that racism, its causes, its history, its variety and transformations deserved an anthropological explanation in terms of universal social and symbolic structures. These exceptions and resistances are in fact as old as the anthropological model; they challenge its dominance—and also, implicitly, its institutional legitimacy, the one granted by international bodies in the fields of culture and politics (we might even say in the philosophical field, since UNESCO is a philosophical institution par excellence). Therefore, they can be viewed either as introducing alternative models for the understanding of racist attitudes and representations or, more radically, as questioning the very relevance of racism as a universal category.

Since I have argued that the anthropological paradigm is intrinsically associated, from the beginning, with a humanist imperative, which commands the representation of politics as a *politique des droits de l'homme* 'a politics of humanity,' we might ask whether resistances to the anthropological paradigm (or implicit critiques of its validity) automatically represent an antihumanist standpoint in philosophy. It is not as simple as that, but I would suggest that they are bound to question the formulation or consistency of humanist principles in philosophy and politics, perhaps to push those principles to the limit, where they appear not as unquestionable, self-evident truths but as problematic postulates. I am especially interested in the resistances or alternative propositions that were formulated in the same period in which the UNESCO paradigm was forged—that is, immediately after World War II—and I can think of several very different examples.

Robert Antelme (author of *L'espèce humaine*, written in 1947) and Primo Levi (author of *Se questo è un' uomo*) tried to find a

literary expression of the experience of concentration camps and the system behind them, a system whose inhumanity exceeds causal explanation. Such authors refer to racism (Levi) or do not (Antelme), but in any case they focus on a problem that is not a hierarchical division of the human species but the paradoxical possibility of denying human beings the quality of being human, expelling them from the human condition not only discursively but practically. The authors invoke the limit experience of the destruction of the human bond to assert the indivisibility of the human species in a problematic, perhaps desperate, manner. Or to suggest where opposition to the anthropological paradigm could lie. One must start from such limit experiences to give meaning to the exterminist potentialities of any racist culture or structure. But the anthropological paradigm always tries to do the reverse (probably in vain): to explain the development of racist cultures or structures in order to approach the causes and describe the conditions of exterminist transgressions of the human imperative.

Another example is Frantz Fanon, particularly in his first essay, *Black Skin, White Masks* (published in French in 1952, when the author, a writer and doctor from Martinique, became chief of the psychiatric hospital of Blida in colonized Algeria before he joined the Algerian liberation struggle, for which he would write his more famous *The Wretched of the Earth*). In many respects Fanon's work, which combines psychosociological analysis with poetic evocations and outcries of revolt, can be considered a reversal of the reversal I described—the shift from the point of view of race to that of racism. It does not reestablish an objective definition of race, however, but it does present us with an early example of the performative use of race and the names of race (such as *Negro* and *nigger*) against racism, in order to challenge explanations of racism from the point of view of the dominant culture and bring in the voices of the oppressed as well.

Fanon does insist (against euphemistic views of democratic societies after the victory over Nazism, societies that were more colonial than ever) that racism is a social structure, that individuals are racist because their societies are, being based on absolute distinctions between masters and slaves. But he is particularly intent on describing from the inside the ambivalence of the psychological effects of structural racism, which he calls alienation (both of the colonized and the colonizer) and which is centered on the nearly psychotically perverse sexual relations and fantasies lying at the heart of mutual representations of dominating and dominated individuals and inhabiting their fetishized identification with color.

Finally, I would point to Hannah Arendt's *Origins of Totalitarianism*, published in 1951. Her book can be viewed as an illustration of the position of political philosophy (or political theory) with regard to anthropology, in two ways: (1) it provides us with a singular history connecting anti-Semitism and, independently, colonialism and imperialism with the genealogy of the racial state as a state of exception; (2) it reverses the traditional relation between human rights and political rights (the rights of man and the rights of the citizen). What I call Arendt's theorem leads to her insistence on the situation of stateless people, who lose their human rights, practically their human condition, when they are deprived of their legal status as national citizens. Hence, she puts the right to have rights at the core of her conception of the polity. Racism (and above all its exterminist forms) becomes in this way an institutional phenomenon that affects the construction of political communities (which is not the same as the construction of societies, although it undoubtedly has a social basis and social consequences).

Particularly important in these resistances to the anthropological paradigm (note that resistances are not pure and simple suppressions), however diverse they are (which also means that they cannot be considered



elements of another, equally consistent paradigm), is that they directly or indirectly raise not the issue of the species or humankind as a genre but the issue of the community: its reality but also, in some sense, its impossibility (as an absolute, all-encompassing whole), which becomes apparent in limit situations or in its destruction. To introduce the humanist point of view of the indivisibility of the species still does not amount to reflecting on the conditions under which something like a human or universal community can exist. Or, better said, humanism reflects on these conditions only from an ideal (transcendental) point of view, from which the common element of human beings is their origin and destination but not actual social and political structures. Such a common element or an element of ideal community must be imagined as a moral goal underlying the construction of particular communities that remain closed and in some sense exclusive. This necessity is linked to the fact that the universal principles involved in the official definition of *racism* were proclaimed in the name of specific political institutions: nation-states trying to subject their mutual relations to international law. But it is precisely this pattern of associating an ideal human community deprived of institutional force with empirical-historical communities like nations—where political representation is supposed to stand above anthropological differences or divisions (be they subjective, imaginary, or ideological)—that becomes irrelevant in states of exception and in the alienating forms of subject formation that are displayed in colonial states and exterminist policies.

I want to conclude by raising questions that call for further discussion and research. It is difficult in a limited paper to describe comprehensively the transformations of the anthropological paradigm that resulted from the internal tensions of the definition of racism when it was confronted with profoundly new situations. Nevertheless, we must wonder

if now, half a century after racism was defined through a certain combination of power and knowledge, the category has begun to decompose. My suggestion, which remains a hypothesis to be examined in detail, is that the following two epistemological phenomena can be correlated:

(1) The evolution of the understanding of racism in the anthropological paradigm has tended to the construction and perhaps hegemony of a concept of cultural racism or differential racism.<sup>5</sup> In a sense, this concept is the fulfilment of the paradigm—that is, a shift from the point of view of nature to the point of view of history and collective representations. But it also makes it problematic to limit the use of the category of racism for describing and explaining phenomena of discrimination and their violent outcomes—particularly with regard to the amazing correspondence, almost interchangeability, of racism and sexism.

(2) The addition of new cases of racism to the trinity on which the initial definition relied, combined with the increasing association of the question of institutional discrimination with the instability of political communities (especially nations) in the postcolonial and postnational era, has caused the philosophical criterion of the natural division of the human species to be replaced by another criterion in the definition of racist structures, discourses, and practices—one in which the reference to race seems superfluous. This is the criterion of internal exclusion, where two contradictory notions appear inseparable, joined in a paradoxical unity. A continuation of this historical and epistemological inquiry should focus now on this point.<sup>6</sup>

## NOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented on 5 Nov. 2003 at the international conference *Rasismen I Europa: Kontinuität och förändring*, held in Stockholm.

1. Another conflict, as one participant in the Stockholm conference rightly reminded me, was over whether to include caste and other minority discriminations in Third World countries (e.g., India) among racist discriminations.

2. The statements and commentaries on their content and interpretation appear in *Race Concept, Four Statements*, and *Racisme* (later editions of *Racisme* have partially different content).

3. Cultural studies, from this point of view, derive mainly from the work of Stuart Hall.

4. In Goldberg's terminology, it is important not to confuse *racist states* and *racial states*, even if sometimes the latter are products of transformations of the former (e.g., through decolonization or the abolition of segregationist-apartheid regimes). In racist states, racial definitions, hierarchies, and discriminations (and even the elimination of certain races) are institutionalized; they are part of the constitution. In racial states, race relations are considered a political, social, and cultural problem that should be administered or (more or less progressively) suppressed through legislations, policies, and common decisions.

5. I developed this idea in my portions of Balibar and Wallerstein and in "Retour."

6. There are interesting considerations on this point in Hund. See also Balibar, "Difference."

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